Wages and International Tax Competition

We introduce wage bargaining and private information into a model of profit shifting and tax competition between a large and a small country. Shifting profits to the small country not only reduces a firm's tax bill but also creates private information on profitability, altering the wage bargaining in favor of the firm. This additional shifting incentive makes the tax base of the large country more elastic and leads to higher outflows, lower wages, higher firm profits and lower equilibrium tax rates. Tax rates are no longer the only determinant of the direction and extent of profit shifting.     

国际税收竞争是21世纪对政府的制约

资本流动 近几十年来，世界各国的经济变得越来越紧密、越来越一体化了。跨国投资方面的高速增长已经成为了这种一体化的一个重要方面。在过去好几十年里，很多国家曾经构建壁垒以阻碍国际投资，但是今天，大多数国r家已经认识到，国际投资意味着新的就业机会的产生、新工厂的建立以及领先技术的掌握。因此，各国政府已经卸掉了以前戴在国际投资流动脚上的镣铐。     

国际税收竞争条件下我国涉外税制改革研究

本文分析我国涉外税制存在的问题,提出在国际税收竞争环境下,我国涉外税制的改革着力点。     

Capital Tax Competition and Cooperation with Endogenous Capital Formation

Incorporating consumption–savings choices under a general concave utility function and hence an endogenous capital supply into a model of capital tax competition, we re‐investigate Nash equilibrium and compare it with the optimum under cooperative tax policy. In contrast to the case of fixed capital supply, it is shown that if savings sufficiently increase with the interest rate, a Nash equilibrium may be more efficient than a cooperative tax policy. Therefore, the distortionary effects of capital supply are important to issues of tax policy coordination.     

分税制、地区竞争与地方政府债务扩张

近年来,中国地方政府债务持续扩张引起政府、社会和学界的高度关注.通过构建一个包含地区增长目标、分税制和地方政府博弈的动态随机一般均衡模型,从税制视角对地方债扩张这一现象加以解释.研究表明,在地方政府追求经济增长的背景下,当前的税收制度扩大了地方政府发生短视或者经济出现不利冲击时政府债务扩张的程度.渠道分析发现,地方政府发生短视时,顺周期的增值税放松了地方财政约束并降低了地方政府债务扩张程度,转移支付降低了地方借贷成本并提高了债务扩张程度;负向生产率冲击发生时,顺周期的税收收入加剧了财政压力并放大了地方政府债务的扩张.此外,地区竞争放大了税制产生作用的强度.由此,可以通过增加财产税等直接税的比重、规范转移支付的获取和促进地区协作等方式限制地方政府债务扩张.     

经济全球化下的国际税收竞争与税收优惠

本文从经济全球化入手,论述了经济全球化、税收国际化、国际税收竞争与税收优惠的关系,主张纵向研究国际税收竞争,从国民经济发展的全局出发审视利用税收优惠手段参与国际税收竞争的利与弊.     

税收竞争的效率与规范

政府收入最大化不符合效率的要求。西方经济理论中一个基本的观点是,在市场作为资源基础性配置手段的条件下,政府的职能是弥补市场的失灵和不足,满足社会公共需要,如抑制垄断、解决信息不对称、提供公共产品、消除坏的外部效应等。政府要履行以上职能,必然需要一定的财力支,一定条件下政府的职能一定,那么中央政府聚集的收入也就应该有一个客观的界限,并非是越大越好。中央政府的收入最大化要求,如果与经济发展水平相适应,与增长的公共需求相匹配,也无可厚非。     

分税与税率:从政府到企业

分税体现着政府间财政关系,税率体现着政府与市场的关系,通过对分税与税率关系的研究,可以观察政府间财政关系对政府与市场关系的影响。研究认为,中国政府间实行税收弹性分成、企业面临着差异化税率是两个重要典型事实;理论分析发现,地方政府偏好、税收分成比例分别影响着企业实际税率;实证分析发现,市县级政府面临的企业所得税和增值税分成比例上升,导致企业逃税减少和实际税率上升。上述结论从分税的角度揭示了政府与市场的关系如何受财政体制影响的独特机制,解释了中国企业面临的差异化税率的来源,为下一步财税体制改革提供了参考。     

从竞争到合作：走进战略联盟

20世纪90年代,美国DEC公司总裁简·霍普兰德(J.Hopland )和管理学家罗杰(R.Nigel)提出了“战略联盟”的概念,即由两个或两个以上对等经营实力的企业(或特定事业和职能部门),为了达到共同拥有市场,共同使用资源等战略目标,通过各种协议、契约而结成优势相长、风险共担、要素水平式双向或多向流动的松散型网络组织。战略联盟多为长期联合与合作,是自发的、非强制的,联盟各方仍旧保持着原有企业管理的独立性和完整自主的经营权。1997年,普瑞斯(Kenneth     

International Competition for Multinational Investment

We examine the economic justification for providing investment subsidies to foreign-owned multinationals. These provide employment opportunities and generate demand for domestic intermediate inputs, produced by domestic workers with increasing returns to scale. Offering subsidies to multinationals may be in the national interest if the investment raises the net value of domestic production. When agglomerative forces are sufficiently strong, a subsidy that attracts the first foreign firm may induce several to enter, establishing a thriving modern sector. With a limited number of foreign enterprises, countries may compete to attract investment. This subsidy competition transfers much of the rents to the multinationals.
JEL classification: F 12; F 23     

Revenue Sharing Rules for International Telephony

The method for settling telecommunications payments between operators in different countries is the reciprocal accounting rate system. This is a discriminatory system, because different operators pay different prices to access the same national network and these price differences are not related to different costs of providing the service.Reforms of the accounting rate system are currently under discussion in international organizations. In this paper we study the effects of the existing regime and of the main alternative proposal, the international traffic terminating fee, on the retail price of international telephone calls.Our main result is that the current regime of reciprocal accounting rates may determine lower prices than the proposed alternative system.     

The BRICs and International Tax Governance: The Case of Automatic Exchange of Information

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the BRICs’ involvement in the adoption of Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) by the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a major breakthrough in the global fight against tax evasion. Our main questions concern the BRICs’ willingness to accept AEoI, and their agreement to the Western-dominated OECD as its institutional forum. First, we examine the domestic drivers for BRICs’ participation, as their statist model of capitalism reveals strong disincentives to join this regime and the fact that the budgetary consequences of the global financial crisis were less severe than in Western states. We argue that their agreement on AEoI results more from their persistent balance-of-payments vulnerability to illicit capital than from fiscal weakness, while also discussing the possibilities for mock compliance. Second, we review the role of the non-reciprocal US foreign account tax compliance act (FATCA) in shaping the BRICs’ preference for a multilateral AEoI-regime centred around the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS). Last, we show that the BRICs’ acceptance of the OECD resulted from pragmatic interests and receiving ownership over the process, together with the absence of coercive mechanisms within the CRS-regime that could fundamentally undermine their sovereignty in this domain.     

The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions

This paper shows how a popular system of federal revenue equalization grants can limit tax competition among subnational governments, correct fiscal externalities, and increase government spending. Remarkably, an equalization grant can implement efficient policy choices by regional governments, even in the presence of differences in regional tax capacity, tastes for public spending, and population. If aggregate tax bases are elastic, however, equalization leads to excessive taxation. Efficiency can be achieved by a modified formula that equalizes a fraction of local revenue deficiencies equal to the fraction of taxes that are shifted backward to factor suppliers.     

Economic Competition and Evolution: Are There Lessons from Ecology?

After generally discussing models in ecology and economics that combine competition, optimization, and evolution, this article concentrates on models of intraspecific competition. It demonstrates the importance of diversity/inequalities within populations of species and other environments for the sustainability of their populations, given the occurrence of environmental change. This is demonstrated both for scramble (open-access) and contest competition. Implications are drawn for human populations and industrial organization. The possibility is raised that within-industry competition may not always exist between firms in all stages of the development of a new industry. Policy implications are considered. For example, it is argued that policies designed to encourage intense business competition and maximum economic efficiency have the drawback of eventually making industries highly vulnerable to exogenous economic changes. (JEL L100 , J100 , Q150 )     

入世后我国区域参与国际产业分工合作初探

通过对国际产业分工合作在我国变化趋势的预测,探讨我国区域经济参与国际产业分工合作的途径及支柱产业纳入国际产业分工合作体系的思路;同时,从WTO规则及我国入世法律文件框定的视角审视区域产业发展的制度环境,并提出改进意见。     

Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations

This paper analyzes a simple model of taxation in a federal system within which policymakers are revenue–maximizing Leviathans and fiscal externalities arise not only horizontally, across the "states," but also vertically between levels of government. Such an economy is characterized by excessively high taxation in the noncooperative equilibrium. Intensifying horizontal competition, by increasing the number of states, unambiguously increases revenues (contrary to the Leviathan wisdom) but nevertheless enhances consumer welfare (consistent with the Leviathan wisdom). Revenue sharing arrangements between policymakers are shown to be—contrary to the Leviathan wisdom—Pareto improving.     

Conflict,Cooperation and Competition in Anarchy

Caplan and Stringham (2002) attempt to rebut the paradox of cooperation (Cowen and Sutter 1999) as it applies to libertarian anarchy. The paradox in the context of anarchy implies that if private defense agencies can cooperate to avoid conflict they can also collude to reestablish coercion. Caplan and Stringham argue that arbitration is self-enforcing while collusion requires solution of a prisoners dilemma. We agree that collusion requires more cooperative efficacy than arbitration, but maintain that arbitration requires considerably more organization than a simple coordination game. If a network of protection agencies can organize sufficiently to arbitrate disputes, they can also create a barrier to entry by refusing to arbitrate with entrants.     

监管竞争和监管合作:争论及启示

在学术界,关于监管竞争和监管合作的讨论早已有之,在一些联邦制的国家,很早就有学者讨论联邦体制下州与州之间的监管竞争问题。近年来,随着世界经济全球化进程的不断推进和跨国交易壁垒的减少,对这一问题的讨论上升到了国家层次,在国际上又引起了众多学者的关注,形成了一场影响甚广的辩论。