会计寻租的动因及治理对策

会计寻租是经济发展到一定阶段的产物,只要市场经济和政府管制存在,会计寻租就不可避免。会计寻租会导致财务信息失真,造成社会资源浪费,扭曲资源优化配置,严重破坏市场的正常运行环境,阻碍了我国社会经济的健康发展。本文立足于会计寻租的概念和特征,重点分析了会计寻租的动因,并提出了应对会计寻租的治理对策。     

上市公司会计寻租动因分析

"寻租是运用稀缺资源去追求人为地创造财富转移的费用",会计作为一种工具通过资本市场对资源配置的作用,使得会计寻租具有了经济后果。由于会计管制的存在、会计领域产权不清晰、会计信息不对称以及上市公司在我国经济生活中的特殊地位和作用,导致了上市公司会通过会计寻租来达到其自身利益目的不良行为。根据组织行为学和经济学的相关理论对上市公司会计寻租的动因进行分析,不仅能在深层次了解会计寻租产生的根源,而是对治理和消除寻租行为具有一定的理论和现实意义。     

浅析会计寻租

会计寻租是一种负和博弈,其本质是利用会计信息来取得非公平的财富转移和资源的不平等配置。通过探究会计寻租含义、会计寻租行为和会计寻租的预防措施等,优化会计行为,提高会计信息质量,促进资本市场的健康发展,为我国的经济建设服务。     

利益相关者在会计准则制定中的寻租表现

会计准则具有经济后果,会计准则的制定是利益相关者集团之间利益冲突与协调的结果,在我国,会计制度的"双轨制"是利益相关者的利益冲突重新协调与折衷的结果,会计寻租起到了推动作用理论意义,本文系统地指出了上市公司在会计准则制定过程中会计寻租行为的具体表现形式。最后,根据会计寻租的"双刃性"的特征指出必须对会计寻租行为进行适度遏制。     

会计寻租浅析

本文首先回顾了会计寻租的文献,对会计寻租的定义、原因、层次进行了简介,结合我国实际具体分析了我国会计寻租的特点及问题,给出了相应的对策和建议。     

论全球统一会计标准的构建与实现

经济全球化程度的日益提高是构建全球统一会计标准的客观背景和推动力.从协调到趋同再到统一是会计准则制定的范式转换过程,文化冲突、政治寻租、经济后果是阻挠全球统一会计标准全面实施的因素,有效会计系统构建需要积累充分的能量.全球统一会计标准的最终实施是一个长期渐进的过程.     

基于寻租理论的会计信息失真分析研究

随着我国经济的快速发展,在市场经济体制和政府的管制作用下,会计寻租成为逻辑必然。而会计寻租致使会计信息失真,耗费了社会经济资源,阻碍我国国民经济的发展,会计信息失真的危害已引起政府和社会各界的高度重视,国家已制定和正在制定一系列法规和制度,采取一系列措施予以防治,社会各界也纷纷献计献策。本文从寻租理论的角度分析会计信息失真的危害及原因,并就如何改善当前状况提出治理对策。     

会计寻租问题应对策略初探

完善会计准则的制定机制是控制我国会计寻租的一个有效途径,我国现在对会计准则的寻租还表现在针对会计准则的具体规定进行寻租,而不是在准则制定过程中寻租,这就要求我国必须增加会计准则制定过程中的透明度和群众参与度.针对我国会计寻租应采取适度控制的策略,公开准则制定程序,加强监督监察机制,健全激励约束措施,加强职业道德建设,提高利益相关人意识形态.     

企业会计寻租的危害、成因及对策研究

我国对会计寻租的研究起步较晚,近几年多是将研究重心放在寻租的原因上,会计寻租导致会计信息失真,造成社会资源浪费,降低会计监管效率。从会计制度和经济体制、利益驱动和会计信息不对称造成了会计寻租。相关建议:完善会计制度和经济体制;会计信息透明化。     

浅谈财务舞弊寻租

我国上市公司会计信息寻租最显著的特点是具有人为性,而由于现行会计准则具有较大的选择空间,这大大降低了上市公司操纵会计信息的寻租成本。会计信息寻租包含了会计变更寻租、财务舞弊寻租和审计意见寻租三个内容,本文主要研究财务舞弊寻租的内容。     

政府补贴与股价崩盘风险

本文以中国A股市场2007－2014年上市公司的数据为样本,基于企业寻租理论,实证检验了政府补贴对股价崩盘风险的影响,旨在为财政政策经济后果的研究提供新的经验证据。研究发现,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间呈显著正相关关系;在制度环境水平较低的地区,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;在产业政策支持的行业,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;进一步分析表明,企业寻租是两者正向关系的主要原因。本文的研究结果表明,管理层可以借助政府补贴粉饰公司业绩和隐藏公司负面消息。     

借鉴寻租理论加强国防人力资源管理

寻租作为一种非生产性活动产生于"经济人"的趋利避害行为,如果在军队中存在寻租行为,其结果会导致军事人力资源"生产"效率和配置效率的损失,损害军队战斗力的提高和优化。治理寻租行为必须引入竞争机制,实现军事人力资源的必要流动,建立事前监督和事后惩罚机制,加大寻租成本,弱化军人的寻租动机,消除诱发寻租的存在机率。     

The Regulation of Pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands: In the Public or Private Interest?

The regulation of pharmacists in Belgium and the Netherlands is analysed in order to test the rent-seeking hypothesis put forward in the private interest literature. Both the self-regulation issued by the professional bodies and public regulations are examined. It appears that many regulations in both countries either restrict the entry into the profession or restrict competition within the profession. A qualitative comparative analysis of these regulations in both countries is presented as well as some empirical findings. The economic analysis and the empirical data seem to give some support to the rent-seeking hypothesis.     

政府会计改革与国家治理研究综述

实现国家治理现代化,政府组织科学的管理机制和程序设计不可或缺,其中最为关键是如何实现政府财政与预算最优管理。合理推动会计改革对改进政府财政与预算管理尤为重要,高效的政府会计治理机制能有效预防和抑制政府官员的权力寻租,由此降低社会交易成本,促成公共资源科学配置,因此,政府会计制度可成为推动国家治理现代化的机制和程序之一。科学变革政府会计对提升政府组织管理能力,开拓国家治理新路径,夯实国家善治之基础均有促进作用。     

Future rent-seeking and current public savings

The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits. This is because myopic politicians face political risk and prefer to extract political rents as early as possible. In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic political economy model. We show that this conventional wisdom relies on economic volatility being low relative to political uncertainty. If economic volatility is high relative to political uncertainty, then a rent-seeking government actually over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government. This result emerges because of the option value of rent-seeking: a rent-seeking government over-values future funds because of the possibility of using them for future rents instead of cutting taxes in the event of a future boom (when marginal utility of private consumption is low). This over-saving bias is temporary since, in the long run, the rent-seeking government over-borrows relative to the benevolent government as it eventually squanders the funds it has accumulated. We find that both the under-saving and over-saving bias of the government can be solved by a rule of capping deficits.     

Future rent-seeking and current public savings

The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits. This is because myopic politicians face political risk and prefer to extract political rents as early as possible. In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic political economy model. We show that this conventional wisdom relies on economic volatility being low relative to political uncertainty. If economic volatility is high relative to political uncertainty, then a rent-seeking government actually over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government. This result emerges because of the option value of rent-seeking: a rent-seeking government over-values future funds because of the possibility of using them for future rents instead of cutting taxes in the event of a future boom (when marginal utility of private consumption is low). This over-saving bias is temporary since, in the long run, the rent-seeking government over-borrows relative to the benevolent government as it eventually squanders the funds it has accumulated. We find that both the under-saving and over-saving bias of the government can be solved by a rule of capping deficits.     

塔洛克寻租理论对我国房地产业资源优化配置的启示

根据塔洛克对寻租活动社会成本的分析,寻租活动的发生是通过政府的政治行程进行的,它影响社会经济运行的交易成本。在我国,利益集团的寻租活动对房地产行业资源配置产生的负面效应是:寻租活动增加政府的廉政成本,误导社会的资源流向。要使我国的房地产行业资源得到一个较为合理有效的配置,政府应改革土地使用权出让制度;完善政府的信息披露制度;实行激励机制与制约机制相结合的制度。同时,政府要明确自身的权利、权力和责任,贯彻好国家的各项经济政策,提高行政效率;社会各方面也要对其进行监督,使政府自律与他律相结合。     

Productive and harmful entrepreneurship in a knowledge economy

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with productive entrepreneurial activities and rent-seeking. Our purpose is to link contributions to the entrepreneurial and the endogenous growth literature. We deal with complementarity between productive entrepreneurship and harmful rent-seeking activities leading to potentially multiple equilibra in the economy. The degree of rent-seeking is endogenous in our model and is influenced by the economy’s legal and institutional framework as well as capital market imperfections. Policy which establishes the legal environment and financial institutions dealing with capital market imperfections together decides which of the potentially multiple equilibria is chosen by the economy. This institutional choice implies the solution to a trade-off between high economic growth on the one and a high level of productivity on the other hand.     

论会计职业道德

我们正在进行社会主义市场经济建设和改革开发,随着全球经济一体化进程的加快,真实、准确的会计信息对我们进行方针、政策的制定和经济运行情况分析至关重要.而真实、准确的会计信息是由会计人员提供的,任何保证我们获取的会计信息不失真,对会计人员加强职业道德建设显得尤为重要.