Strategic Bankruptcies and Price Reactions to Bankruptcy Filings

This study investigates whether the stock market differentiates between firms that file bankruptcy petitions for strategic reasons and firms that file bankruptcy petitions for financial reasons. We perform both univariate and regression tests on a sample of 245 firms that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions between 1981 and 1996. After controlling for bankruptcy outcome, probability of bankruptcy, firm financial condition, and firm size, we find that, in the period around bankruptcy filing, firms that file bankruptcy petitions for financial reasons have significantly larger stock price declines than firms that file bankruptcy petitions for strategic reasons.     

Public Predisclosure Information, Firm Size, Analyst Following, and Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements

Abstract:   This study examines the effects of public predisclosure information on market reactions to earnings announcements. We develop an empirical measure of public predisclosure information impounded in price prior to earnings announcements by cumulating abnormal returns on public news release dates during the quarter. Consistent with prior literature, we document a negative association between this measure and market reactions to subsequent earnings announcements. Moreover, we find that after controlling for this measure, firm size and analyst following are significantly positively associated with market reactions to earnings announcements. Contrary to prior empirical evidence, our results suggest that, after controlling for actual predisclosure information impounded in price, market reactions to earnings announcements are greater in magnitude for larger, more widely-followed firms than for smaller, less widely-followed firms.     

Information Content and Timing of Earnings Announcements

Abstract:   The China Securities Regulatory Commission requires all listed firms to make earnings announcements by the end of April each year. This requirement creates a unique opportunity for us to evaluate the timing of earnings announcements in a four‐month cluster. Firms, which are willing to make early announcements, tend to surprise the market, as indicated by the higher volume and price reactions. Later announcements are more predictable, as indicated by the lower volume and price reactions. These results indicate that an information asymmetry exists between early and late earnings announcements in Mainland China.     

Emerging from Bankruptcy with When‐Issued Trading

We examine the set of firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy and traded on a when‐issued basis before their official return to the regular way in NASDAQ, Amex, or NYSE. We find that this when‐issued market is liquid and price efficient. The when‐issued closing price is a good indicator of the first closing price in the regular way market. Emerging firms that have when‐issued trading experience lower regular way volatility and smaller relative spreads than those without when‐issued trading. Our probit regressions show that firm size is an important determinant of the adoption of when‐issued trading.     

Bankruptcy probability changes and the differential informativeness of bond upgrades and downgrades

Prior studies have found that stock returns around announcements of bond upgrades are insignificant, but that stock prices respond negatively to announcements of bond downgrades. This asymmetric stock market reaction suggests either that bond downgrades are timelier than upgrades, or that voluntary disclosures by managers preempt upgrades but not downgrades. This study investigates these conjectures by examining changes in firms’ probabilities of bankruptcy (assessed using bankruptcy prediction models) and voluntary disclosure activity around rating change announcements. The results indicate that the assessed probability of bankruptcy decreases before bond upgrades, but not after. By contrast, the assessed probability of bankruptcy increases both before and after bond downgrades. We also find that controlling for potential wealth-transfer related rating actions, which can impact stock returns differently, does not alter our results. Tests of press releases and earnings forecasts issued by firms suggest that the differential informativeness of upgrades and downgrades is not caused by differences in pre-rating change voluntary disclosures by upgraded and downgraded firms. The results support the hypothesis that downgrades are timelier than upgrades.     

Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk?

Several studies suggest that a firm distress risk factor could be behind the size and the book-to-market effects. A natural proxy for firm distress is bankruptcy risk. If bankruptcy risk is systematic, one would expect a positive association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent realized returns. However, results demonstrate that bankruptcy risk is not rewarded by higher returns. Thus, a distress factor is unlikely to account for the size and book-to-market effects. Surprisingly, firms with high bankruptcy risk earn lower than average returns since 1980. A risk-based explanation cannot fully explain the anomalous evidence.     

Shareholder Wealth Responses to Bankruptcy Filing Announcements under the Chandler and Reform Acts

This paper examines shareholder wealth responses to bankruptcy filing announcements between 1974 and 1989 to draw inferences about the impact of the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The authors find that post-Reform Act announcements are associated with more negative pre-filing and announcement period returns to shareholders. Unlike prior research, this study finds that large firms and NYSE-listed firms experience more negative returns. It also finds that the market can discriminate between firms that are ultimately worthless and those that may retain some value for shareholders.     

Does the Medium Matter? The Relations among Bankruptcy Petition Filings,Broadtape Disclosure,and the Timing of Price Reactions

Drawing on a comprehensive sample of 330 bankruptcy petition filings from 1980 to 1993, we find that most of the market reaction does not occur on the bankruptcy petition filing date when the information becomes publicly available. Rather, most of the reaction occurs when news of the bankruptcy filing is more widely disseminated via the Broadtape. This "Broadtape announcement effect" persists after controlling for firm size, exchange listing, and predisclosure information. These are primarily timing differences since abnormal returns cumulated over an 11-day window centered on the filing date do not differ significantly across Broadtape disclosure date classifications.     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in the United States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision. We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter 7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganization under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is that a financially distressed firm chooses its action in order to minimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- and under-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates a workout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter 11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i) in default, total firm value and equity value increase upon the announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcement of Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt are more likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firms that renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firms entering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industries than for firms in growth industries.     

Can Language Predict Bankruptcy? The Explanatory Power of Tone in 10‐K Filings

We examine whether the language used in 10‐K filings reflects a firm's risk of bankruptcy. Our sample contains 424 bankrupt U.S. companies in the period 1994–2015 and we use propensity score matching to find healthy matches. Based on a logit model of failing and vital firms, our findings indicate that firms at risk of bankruptcy use significantly more negative words in their 10‐K filings than comparable vital companies. This relationship holds up until three years prior to the actual bankruptcy filing. With our investigation, we confirm the results from previous accounting and finance research. 10‐K filings contain valuable information beyond the reported financials. Additionally, we show that 10‐Ks filed in the year of a firm's collapse contain an increased number of litigious words relative to healthy businesses. This indicates that the management of failing firms is already dealing with legal issues when reporting financials prior to bankruptcy. Our results suggest that analysts ought to include the presentation of financials in their assessment of bankruptcy risk as it contains explanatory and predictive power beyond the financial ratios.     

The Bankruptcy Decision and Debt Contract Renegotiations

We consider the bankruptcy law and workout practices in theUnited States and model bankruptcy as a strategic decision.We analyze a firm's choice between liquidation under Chapter7, renegotiation of the debt contract in a workout, and reorganizationunder Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Our premise is thata financially distressed firm chooses its action in order tominimize the loss in value caused by the well-known over- andunder-investment problems. We show that the firm initiates aworkout when it faces under-investment, and commences Chapter11 when it faces over-investment. Some of the results are: (i)in default, total firm value and equity value increase uponthe announcement of a workout and decrease upon the announcementof Chapter 11; (ii) firms with shorter maturity of debt aremore likely to reorganize in a workout; (iii) among the firmsthat renegotiate their debt contract, the proportion of firmsentering Chapter 11 is higher for firms in mature industriesthan for firms in growth industries.     

The Interaction of Solvency with Liquidity and its Association with Bankruptcy Emergence

Prior research has shown that accounting information available prior to a bankruptcy is associated with the likelihood of bankruptcy. We show that additionally, the accounting information available prior to bankruptcy is associated with whether or not a firm will emerge from bankruptcy. We predict that firms that exhibit low solvency risk and high liquidity risk are most likely to emerge from bankruptcy. Firms that exhibit high solvency risk and high liquidity risk are predicted to be least likely to emerge from bankruptcy. Cross–sectionally, our results support these predictions, but our findings differ across large and small firms.     

Bankruptcy spillover effects on strategic alliance partners

This paper examines whether a party to a strategic alliance or joint venture suffers from spillover effects when the other partner files for bankruptcy. We find that the non-bankrupt strategic alliance partners, on average, experience a negative stock price reaction around their partner firm's bankruptcy filing announcement. This negative effect is strongest for longer partnerships and those with higher returns at the announcement of the initial alliance formation. Furthermore, horizontal alliance firms in declining industries have lower returns, indicating that industry conditions can exacerbate expected problems for the non-bankrupt firm. Non-bankrupt partners also experience drops in profit margins and investment levels in the subsequent two years with the worst performance concentrated among the longer-term agreements. There is very little impact on the returns or performance for joint venture partners, which suggests that these agreements are more insulating for the partner firm.     

Bankruptcy Litigation and Relationship Banking

This paper analyzes how bankruptcy litigation affects the value of relationship banking. In our model, bankruptcy courts may make type 1 errors, i.e., they may declare that an insolvent firm is solvent; and they may make type 2 errors, i.e., they may declare that a solvent firm is insolvent. Our model provides four results. First, the cost of bank debt decreases when the probability that bankruptcy courts make type 2 errors increases. Second, the value of relationship banking increases when the probability that bankruptcy courts make type 1 errors increases. Third, the cost of credit intermediation decreases when the probability that bankruptcy courts make type 2 errors increases. Fourth, the diversification mechanism does not fully solve the delegated monitoring problem.     

The Information Content of Dividend Surprises: Evidence from Germany

This paper reconsiders the issue of share price reactions to dividend announcements. We use the difference between the actual dividend and the analyst consensus forecast as obtained from I/B/E/S as a proxy for the surprise in the dividend announcement. Using data from Germany, we find significant share price reactions after dividend announcements. We use panel methods to analyze the determinants of the share price reactions and find evidence in favour of the cash flow signaling hypothesis and dividend clientele effects. We further find that the price reaction to dividend surprises is related to the ownership structure of the firm. The results do not support the free cash flow hypothesis. An additional result of our analysis is that dividend changes are not an appropriate measure to capture the information content of dividend announcements.     

Inter-firm linkages and the wealth effects of financial distress along the supply chain

Extant research examines the extent to which bankruptcy has intra-industry valuation consequences. This study broadens the investigation by examining the wealth effects of distress and bankruptcy filing for suppliers and customers of filing firms. On average, important wealth effects occur prior to and at bankruptcy filings and extend beyond industry competitors along the supply chain. Specifically, distress related to bankruptcy filings is associated with negative and significant stock price effects for suppliers. Supplier wealth effects are more negative when intra-industry contagion is more severe. We also investigate the importance of industry structure, specialized product nature, and leverage on supply chain effects.     

The response of competitors to announcements of bankruptcy: An empirical examination of contagion and competitive effects

We find, like [Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., 1992. Contagion and competitive intra-industry effects of bankruptcy announcements: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1), 45–60], that large firm bankruptcies generate a dominant contagion effect. A value-weighted portfolio of competitors' stocks experiences a significant loss of 0.56% in the three days centered around the Chapter 11 announcement. This represents an average loss of $3.32 for all the competitors combined for every dollar lost by the bankrupt firm. In addition, we find that small firm bankruptcies also generate a dominant contagion effect among smaller sized competitors; an equally-weighted portfolio of all competitors has a significant 0.12% drop. In a new approach to separate the contagion and competitive effects, we compare the stock price reactions of competitors who themselves subsequently file for bankruptcy in the next three years (candidates for contagion effect) with those who do not do so (candidates for competitive effect). As expected, candidates for contagion effect experience a significant, negative three-day stock price reaction of −4.68%. However, contrary to expectations, candidates for competitive effect also have a significant, negative return (−0.49%), suggesting that the competitive effect is weak at best since it is dominated by the contagion effect even in this sample. Other procedures to identify candidates for competitive effect generally yield similar findings. Finally, we analyze competitors' stock price reactions based on selected characteristics (e.g., industry concentration, and leverage), with similar results as before. One explanation for the failure to detect a competitive effect is that the impact may already have been incorporated in stock prices prior to the filing for Chapter 11. Consistent with this explanation, we find significant positive stock price reactions by competitor stocks for the hundred days prior to the bankruptcy announcement.     

Bankruptcy risk,costs and corporate diversification

This paper studies the impact of diversification on firms that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Prior research suggests that diversification affects both the probability and costs of distress. Treating bankruptcy as a special case of distress, we find that diversification reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy and liquidation in Chapter 11, which is consistent with the coinsurance hypothesis. However, we observe higher bankruptcy costs as measured by time spent in Chapter 11 and inefficient segment investment for diversified firms. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that diversification provides benefits to managers in terms of job security rather than to firms. Our findings may help firms to make diversification decisions and creditors determine lending policies toward different forms of organizations.     

Factors associated with price reactions and analysts’ forecast revisions around SEC filings

We investigate the extent to which rapid accessibility of financial reports filed electronically through the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR system has affected the ability of investors and security analysts to use accounting data in pricing decisions and forecasting. Consistent with prior research, we find evidence confirming that stock price reactions to SEC filings are significant in the EDGAR period but not the pre-EDGAR period. We also find significant revisions in analysts’ one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts around SEC filings dates in both the pre-EDGAR and EDGAR periods. The price and forecast revision evidence indicates that financial analysts have used SEC filings all along. However, it is the advent of EDGAR that has allowed individual investors to also use 10-K and 10-Q filings. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that in the EDGAR period, trading volume around the preceding earnings announcements may influence individual investors to react to SEC filings. In contrast, variables such as the earnings surprise and the level of total accruals attract the attention of financial analysts. Interestingly, analysts appear to have been less likely in the pre-EDGAR period to bear the cost of searching out each SEC filing to identify those with large total accruals, which are known only after examining the SEC filing itself.     

Earnings Management in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

We study the impact of earnings management prior to bankruptcy filing on the passage of firms through Chapter 11. Using data on public US firms, we construct three measures of earnings management: a real activities manipulation measure (abnormal operating cash flows) and two accounting manipulation measures (discretionary accruals and abnormal working capital accruals). We find that, controlling for the impact of factors known to influence earnings management and firm survival in bankruptcy, earnings management prior to bankruptcy significantly reduces the likelihood of Chapter 11 plan confirmation and emergence from Chapter 11. The results are driven primarily by extreme values of earnings management, characterized by one or two standard deviations above or below the mean. The findings are consistent with creditors reacting positively to unduly conservative earnings reports and negatively to overly optimistic earnings reports. We also find that the presence of a Big 4 auditor is associated with a higher incidence of confirmation and switching to a Big 4 auditor before filing increases the incidence of emergence.