The Economics of Taxation in Casino Tourism with Cross‐border Market Power

This paper provides a theoretical proof that casino taxation may have great potential as a contributor to tourism efficiency under sufficient market power. We also examine empirical evidence for the economic efficiency of casino tourism in Macao even with a “high” tax owing to geographic market power. Both theory and evidence point to such power as a key factor that affects the ability of a tourism resort to pass along local taxes to gambling visitors. This ability makes all the difference between the good or bad effect of casino taxes on tourism development. The policy implication is that a gaming tax should be lowered to support casino businesses if it is inefficient, but can be raised to extract public revenues if it is efficient.     

Factor Taxation, Income Distribution and Capital Market Integration

This paper addresses the optimal mix of capital and wage taxation when policymakers maximize the political support of workers and capitalists, subject to a fixed revenue requirement. Capital market integration increases the efficiency costs of a tax on capital but simultaneously changes the political equilibrium through its effect on the distribution of factor incomes. These distributional effects are directly opposed in the capital importing and the capital exporting region. While the capital tax rate will always be lowered in the capital importing region, the tax rate in the exporting country will rise when political resistance to market-induced changes in the distribution of income is sufficiently high.     

Optimal Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists with Endogenous Market Structure

This paper examines the optimal output taxes for polluting oligopolists under endogenous market structure, in the presence of external costs that vary exogenously with aggregate output. For general functional forms, we show that (i) the equilibrium number of firms in an industry may differ from the socially optimal number of firms and (ii) the second-best optimal taxes under imperfect competition could be less than, equal to, or greater than marginal external damages depending upon the curvature of market demand.     

Taxing Market Power

We investigate the effectiveness of tax and transfer policies in correcting market distortions when the economy is imperfectly competitive. We perform this analysis in the context of an exchange model representing bilateral oligopoly situations, which constitute particular examples of Shapley–Shubik strategic market games.     

Market Power and Buffer Stocks

The first-order conditions for a monopolist inventory holder are found under more general conditions than previously. It is found that monopolist storers facing inelastic demand will carry over more stock than they would with competition unless the elasticity of demand b increasing as price decreases or is constant. The competitive stocks equilibrium is identified and found to be Pareto optimal and hence Sams' result that there will be no losers from a rent-maximizing buffer stock policy is shown to be wrong.     

Growth,Employment and Taxation with Distortions in the Goods and Labour Market

Abstract. This paper analyses taxation in the presence of distortions in goods and labour markets in an endogenous growth model. The government disposes of capital, labour and consumption taxes. It is shown that the market solution leads to suboptimally low levels of growth and employment. However, available tax instruments are sufficient to attain the first‐best growth path in this economy. The paper further explores the relative distortion of capital and labour taxes. For plausible parametrisations of the model, lowering capital taxes dominate reductions in labour taxes in welfare terms.     

Uber and the Persistence of Market Power

Entry into the taxi industry involves few risks. Entrants have lower costs than the incumbents, sunk costs are small, and modern technology makes it easy to hail a cab using the Internet. Despite large scale entry and low barriers to entry, monopoly power persists. The persistence of monopoly power illustrates that new technologies may not quickly eviscerate monopoly power.     

金融科技、市场势力与银行风险

随着商业银行布局金融科技进程的加快,银行业市场结构发生了深刻变革,并成为新旧动能转换和风控升级的节点.本文使用2008-2018年中国68家商业银行的微观数据,对银行发展金融科技、市场势力与银行风险之间的关系进行了实证研究,结果表明:(1)银行发展金融科技可以显著降低银行所承担的风险水平;(2)市场势力与银行风险之间存在U型关系,即随着银行市场势力的增强,银行风险呈现"先降后升"的态势,并且目前市场势力的提高导致银行风险降低的效应占主导作用;(3)整体而言,银行发展金融科技显著提高了银行的市场势力,导致银行风险水平下降,但是对于不同类型的银行而言,金融科技加剧了银行业的"马太效应",即大型国有银行和股份制银行的市场势力更强,其风险水平下降,而农村商业银行的市场势力减弱,其风险上升.     

On Pollution Permit Banking and Market Power

We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To smooth compliance towards a long-run emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock (i.e., bank) of permits that can be gradually consumed. We first show how the large firm can credibly manipulate the spot market in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Motivated by features observed in the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions, we then show that the introduction of stock transactions has no effects on market power, but that forward trading and incomplete observability of stock holdings do have pro-competitive effects. Both authors are also Research Associates at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.     

Monetary Policy and Market Power in Banking

Applying a spatial competition model to banking, we analyze the effects of the choice of a monetary policy rule by the central bank on banks market power as measured by the Lerner index. We show that a procyclical monetary policy may reinforce the countercyclical movement of the Lerner index. That is, this measure of competitiveness of the banking sector may vary more over the business cycle due to the monetary policy rule.JEL classification: G21, E52, L13.Acknowledgements The author thanks Hans Degryse, Hans van Ees, Marco Haan, Eko Riyanto, Bert Schoonbeek, Elmer Sterken, three anonymous referees, and participants of the EARIE 2001 conference (Dublin), the NAKE Day 2002 (Amsterdam), and a seminar at Ghent University for their constructive comments.revised version received November 11, 2003     

Renewable Energy Policy Instruments and Market Power

Markets for green certificates allow generators with market power to squeeze the margins of their competitors, as a generator that is vertically integrated into network activities might do. We analyze this issue in a stylized electricity industry in which a dominant producer of both conventional and renewable energy is facing a competitive fringe of renewable‐energy producers. We demonstrate that whether or not a dominant firm is vertically integrated into network activities, it can disadvantage the fringe producers by distorting certificates prices, thereby inducing cost inefficiency in the generation of renewable energy. We compare green certificates to a system of feed‐in tariffs, where a similar margin squeeze is not possible.     

Upstream Market Power and Wasteful Retailers*

We provide a novel explanation for the wasteful product disposal by retailers. In our model, after purchasing a quantity of a product from the manufacturer, the retailer exerts a costly effort to sell the product to the final users. The manufacturer’s production cost and the outside opportunity associated with it is private information. We show that, when the manufacturer has the upstream market power, the retailer sells all units purchased from the manufacturer. However, when the retailer has the market power, it might deliberately purchase more than it sells to the final users (thus wasting the unsold amount).     

市场过程内生的垄断:市场权势和自然垄断

作为内生的垄断现象,市场权势实际上是争胜竞争过程的结果,并非垄断的市场结构所决定。如果将竞争理解为一个动态过程,市场权势具有竞争性和暂时性。自然垄断现象也是市场过程演化过程中的自然现象,无论源于规模经济还是范围经济,都表明自然垄断具有动态效率特征。除非政府人为阻碍争胜竞争过程的展开,通常市场过程内生力量能够有效制约非政府垄断现象。     

Taxation and Tournaments

This paper analyzes the effects of progressive taxes on labor supply and income distribution in the context of the rank‐order tournament model originally developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We show conditions under which a more progressive tax schedule will cause so large general equilibrium effects that the inequality in disposable income will actually increase. We also show that a non‐zero redistributive tax is always optimal if society's welfare function displays inequality aversion; this result always holds, regardless of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects.     

Pricing Policy Under Double Market Power: Madagascar and the International Vanilla Market

This paper uses a price-leadership model of the international vanilla market to study the welfare consequences of alternative pricing policies for Madagascar, the leader, that also controls domestic production through a single-channel marketing system. Econometric estimates of the model are used for simulations of welfare and revenue changes and internal redistribution of income. Results indicate that Madagascar could have gained between 0.9% and 2.6% of GDP per year on average over the period 1981–91 by following optimal pricing policies, and that producers were overtaxed suggesting that political economy considerations played a role in the pricing decisions.     

Environmental Taxation and Induced Structural Change in an Open Economy: The Role of Market Structure

Abstract. Studies of structural change induced by environmental taxation usually proceed in a perfect-competition framework and typically find structural change to be quite moderate under realistic emission reduction scenarios. By observing that some of the industries affected are likely to operate under imperfect rather than perfect competition, additional mechanisms emerge which may amplify structural change beyond the extent identified as yet. Especially, changes in economies of scale may arise which weaken or strengthen the competitive position of industries over and above the initial cost effect. Using a computable general equilibrium model for Germany to examine the effects of a unilaterally introduced carbon tax, we find that induced structural change is more pronounced under imperfect competition than under perfect competition. At the macroeconomic level, we find that aggregate losses in economies of scale are larger than aggregate gains, implying that the total costs of environmental regulation are higher under imperfect competition than under perfect competition.     

论国际税收竞争与中国税法之完善

国际税收竞争导致全球所得税税率不断攀低,这为跨国公司国际避税创造了条件,同时减少了国家的财政收入。我国应进一步完善税法,在吸引外资和提供税收优惠、让渡税收利益中寻找平衡点,既要有利于本国经济发展,又应避免对他国税基造成不当侵害。     

Market Power and Interest Rate Spreads in the Caribbean

This paper investigates the determinants of the high bank spreads observed in the Caribbean over the financially liberalised period of the 1990s. A theoretical model is formulated and tested using panel data. Among other factors, market power is found to be one of the main influences on these large spreads. A major conclusion of the paper is that to reduce interest rate spreads, alternatives to commercial banks' loans should be encouraged, and the recent move to impose monetary regulations on non-banks be discouraged.     

市场势力、企业社会责任与绿色创新

企业绿色创新是促进高质量发展的重要支撑。随着《中华人民共和国反垄断法（2022修正）》的实施,企业市场势力对绿色创新的影响更值得学术界关注。结合组织惰性理论和合法性理论的观点,文章尝试构建一个以企业社会责任为传导路径的整合性解释框架。在文献回顾基础上,区分战略性企业社会责任和反应性企业社会责任,分别探讨二者在市场势力和绿色创新关系中的中介作用。以沪深A股上市公司为样本,通过实证研究发现,市场势力负向影响企业绿色创新,战略性企业社会责任在二者关系中存在遮掩效应,而反应性企业社会责任则发挥中介效应。本文有助于解释中国情境下不同市场势力的企业通过履行社会责任推动绿色创新的行为倾向与路径差异,从而为绿色创新的政策制定和管理实践提供理论借鉴。     

电力市场设计:理论与中国的改革

沿用最新的规制经济学和电力经济学的分析工具和分析框架 ,本文首先对电力市场设计中的核心基础理论———节点价格体系、双边契约机制和电力市场中的风险规避进行了详细的研究和分析。结果表明 ,采取节点边际价格体系以及相应的支撑体系 ,即两部清算机制和传输权市场等可以最优化短期经济调度 ,可以保证和促进行业发电、输电的长期投资 ,保证行业的持续健康发展。随后 ,在分析中国电力行业特殊的制度和经济约束条件的基础上 ,给出了中国电力市场机制改革的若干政策建议。