Tacit Collusion in Price‐Setting Duopoly Markets: Experimental Evidence with Complements and Substitutes

We study the effect of demand structure on the ability of subjects to tacitly collude on prices by considering Bertrand substitutes and Bertrand complements. We find evidence of collusion in the complements treatment, but no such evidence is found in the substitutes treatment. This finding is somewhat in contrast with a previous study that observes tacit collusion in two treatments with similar underlying demand structures but with no market framing.     

A Psychological Reexamination of the Bertrand Paradox

The Bertrand paradox describes a situation in which two competing firms reach an outcome where both price at marginal cost. In laboratory experiments, this equilibrium is not generally observed. Existing empirical works on Bertrand competition have found evidence for boundedly rational models. We find that such models are useful in organizing behavior in early stages of the game, but less so in later stages. We show that a new model, coarse grid Nash equilibrium, based on the assumption that subjects discretize the strategy space, explains the data better.     

Price competition under universal service obligations

In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service obligations are likely to alter firms' strategic behavior in such competitive markets. In the present paper, we show that, depending on the entrant's market coverage and the degree of product differentiation, the Nash equilibrium in prices involves either pure or mixed strategies. We show that the pure strategy market sharing equilibrium, as identified by Valletti, Hoernig, and Barros (2002), defines a lower bound on the level of equilibrium prices.     

Illegal Cartel Overcharges in Markets with a Legal Cartel History: Bitumen Prices in South Africa

In recent years, South African competition authorities have initiated a number of price‐fixing cases in markets where cooperation among competitors was legal and often encouraged. These markets present economists with special difficulties when estimating cartel overcharges. Conventional approaches often rely on temporal approaches, where pricing during the cartel period is compared with prices in a competitive period. In markets with a legal cartel history, a competitive price cannot be identified in the period preceding illegal collusion. Structural change also reduces data, and hence the robustness of temporal models. Spatial approaches, where prices are compared with those in other countries, offer a better alternative. The paper studies the performance of temporal and spatial approaches in estimating overcharge in the context of a bitumen price‐fixing case. The results suggest that, while the bitumen cartel may have responded to cost and demand shocks in a similar way to how players in more competitive markets respond, it was still cushioned by a large monopoly premium: the long‐run level of South African bitumen prices are higher than in comparable competitive markets. The findings have implications for the study of transition dynamics from legal to illegal cartel regimes and for the detection of cartels.     

STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTO INSURANCE MARKET: 1980-2000

The traditional structure-conduct-performance framework makes the explicit prediction that market structure determines market conduct, performance and power. The primary goal of this study is to evaluate this prediction using the South African (SA) short-term auto insurance market. The empirical evidence shows that a link between market structure and market conduct, performance and/or power is not present. "Prices" and profits are not statistically significantly related to various sellers' concentration measure and do not follow any explicit trend over time. By construction, profits are directly related to "prices" and follow a cyclical trend, as observed in other countries. A secondary goal of this paper is to compare the findings for the US auto insurance market with the empirical evidence on the SA auto insurance market. While there are few similarities, there is an underwriting cycle in the SA auto insurance market such as is observed for the US auto insurance market.     

Endogenous Price Leadership and the Strategic Acquisition of Information

We model a differentiated Bertrand duopoly in which a firm's earlier knowledge of market demand than its competitor results in endogenous price leadership with the information advantaged firm leading. In such a setting with second‐mover advantage, we then study the firms’ incentives to acquire information and analyze an information acquisition game. Both (i) neither firm acquiring information and (ii) one firm acquiring information can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium, but both firms acquiring information is never an equilibrium outcome, even if information is free. Information may have a negative value if it causes a change in the timing of price competition.     

Simulating the Effects of Railroad Mergers

The purpose of this paper is to add to the empirical literature regarding merger simulation analysis by examining the effect of railroad mergers on railroad market power. This is done by measuring railroad profits and revenue/variable cost ratios corresponding to different degrees of intrarailroad competition for movements of Kansas export wheat to Houston, Texas. Two models are developed to achieve the objectives of the study. A network model of the wheat logistics system is used to identify the least cost transportation routes from the Kansas study area to the market at Houston. A profit improvement algorithm, which identifies Nash equilibrium prices, is developed to measure the amount by which railroads can profitably raise their prices above variable cost. The results of the study have implications for U.S. railroad merger policy. The paper indicates that railroad mergers do not necessarily increase railroad market power or make railroad shippers worse off. Instead, the study demonstrates that the impact of railroad mergers on shippers and railroads depends on factors that vary geographically, such as the degree of intrarailroad and intermodal competition in the area.     

The Differential Impact of Accurate Product Cost Information in Imperfectly Competitive Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation*

Many researchers claim that costing systems that provide materially more accurate or precise cost reports have a strict value-enhancing effect on decisions (i.e., Cooper 1988, 1995; Cooper and Kaplan 1991; Christensen and Sharp 1994; Rogers. Comstock. and Pritz 1994; Swenson 1995; Gupta and King 1997). However, this study provides theoretical and empirical evidence that the value of more accurate cost information may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure, as well as the firm's product market strategy. We extend the theoretical work of Gal-Or 1986 to incorporate an endogenous imprecise cost signal in two imperfect market structures: Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with imperfectly substitutable products. In addition, we theoretically link market structure to product market strategy. To examine product market strategy, we employ a laboratory markets design that allows for strategic reaction by a rival firm in each of these markets, because the competitive position of a firm is determined by its capacity to produce at low cost, or to differentiate its product from other products (Porter 1985). Consistent with our theoretical work, we argue that firms that compete on the basis of cost leadership (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Cournot competition), benefit through increased profits from increased product cost accuracy, whereas firms that compete on the basis of product differentiation (which we demonstrate may be characterized as Benrand competition) do not benefit from such increased product cost accuracy. Our results are consistent with this contention. That is, profit is higher in the experimental cost leadership markets (operationalized as Cournot markets) when subjects know their true cost, while profit is higher in the experimental product differentiation markets (operationalized as Bertrand markets) when subjects receive uninformative cost reports and make their decisions based on expected costs. These results suggest that the value of more accurate cost reports may be dependent upon the firm's competitive market structure strategy and product market strategy.     

How Do Retailers Price Beer During Periods of Peak Demand? Evidence from Game Weeks of the German Bundesliga

This article considers retail beer pricing during game weeks of the German Bundesliga. German consumers exhibit a high degree of brand‐loyalty in their preference for regionally crafted beers, and we exploit the regional brand‐loyalty of German beer consumers to identify brand‐level demand shocks for beers preferred by the home team's fans and visiting team's fans during Bundesliga game weeks. We find retailer price adjustments at the category level mask a considerably more nuanced pricing behavior at the brand level. Retailers in regions hosting Bundesliga games significantly increase beer prices at the category level during game weeks; however, at the brand level, we find retailers selectively discount prices on the home team's sponsored beers and systematically raise prices on the visiting team's sponsored beers. Our findings are consistent with a “tourist–natives” model of retail pricing during periods of increased demand in the German beer market.     

An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization

We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms’ investment levels, relative size, and profitability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a firm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well‐known antitrust cases.     

外生单向溢出效应下纵向差异化产品Cournot和Bertrand竞争均衡的比较研究

研究价格(Bertrand)和数量(Cournot)竞争模式下,单向溢出对企业质量选择、利润的影响。以纵向差异化市场结构为例,建立了基于单向质量溢出的不对称寡头竞争模型,运用赋值计算对模型的均衡解进行了比较分析,结论是:1给定溢出因子和学习效应的合理取值范围,领先和跟随企业的质量与利润在价格竞争下都小于数量竞争;2质量间的单向溢出效应、跟随者的学习努力都会导致领先者初始质量的下降,但在价格竞争时,这种"逆向选择"效应的程度较低;3跟随者的学习激励随着溢出效应的提高而降低,并不受竞争策略变化的影响。这些发现可以解释中国轿车产业竞争模式对合资和自主创新企业关系变化的影响。     

基于高铁竞争关系下民航的策略研究

全服务航空成立子品牌低成本型航空公司成为应对高铁竞争的有效策略之一。建立全服务航空、子公司低成本航空与高铁三者之间的竞争博弈模型,并通过数值分析研究不同策略下航空公司需求及收益情况,研究结果表明:全服务航空公司成立低成本航空有利于提高航空公司收益;航空公司之间采取合谋策略优于竞争策略。最后针对我国航空运输业的发展现状为民航部门及政府部门提出不同时期的发展建议。     

Strategic corporate social responsibility of high-speed rail in China

This paper investigates the strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) of a high-speed rail (HSR) firm when competing with an airline firm in a differentiated transportation market and the interactions with government environmental policies in the context of a Cournot–Bertrand comparison. We find that a standard CSR chosen by the government is lower under Cournot than that under Bertrand when both the marginal cost of HSR and product substitutability are low enough, while a voluntary CSR chosen by the HSR operator is always higher under Cournot than that under Bertrand. We also find that the voluntary CSR could be higher or lower than the standard CSR, depending on marginal costs, product substitutability, and competition modes. We then show that when the government imposes an environmental tax together with CSR activities, both the strategic CSR and environmental tax are always lower under Cournot than those under Bertrand. Finally, we show that equilibrium traffic volumes, ticket fares, consumer welfare, and social welfare are independent of competition modes with environmental tax.     

WhatDrives China＇s House Prices： Marriage or Money？

The high and rising house prices in China are not adequately accounted for the traditional explanations emphasizing demand‐driven or cost‐push factors. Recent published studies claim that gender imbalance increases competition among men in the marriage market, which has pushed Chinese, especially parents with a son, to buy houses as a signal of relative status in the marriage market; this marriage competition then causes high demand for houses and eventually leads to rising house prices in China. Empirical results in this paper, however, provide little support for this hypothesis and we find that a rise in the sex ratios for most age cohorts accounts for very small percentage variations in house price movements in China during 1998–2009. Further investigation suggests that excess demand driven by high monetary growth was a significant cause of the rising house prices in China during 1998–2009. Therefore, the impact of gender imbalance on house prices should not be exaggerated and monetary dynamics remains an important leading indicator for house price movements in China.     

Good Girl,Bad Boy? Evidence Consistent with Collusion in Professional Tennis

We identify professional tennis matches where one player competes for extraordinarily high payoffs while their opposition does not. Players “on the bubble” of direct qualification to upcoming Grand Slam events face substantially higher stakes than opponents, which presents an opportunity for collusion. Our findings produce evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis of unethical behavior taking place on the men's tour, as bubble players are 5.1 percentage points more likely to beat better ranked opponents than in comparable nonbubble matches. However, no such evidence emerges when analyzing women's tennis. We find additional support for the hypothesis of match‐fixing activities on the men's tour from analyzing the occurrence of tie‐breaks and the fact that our results become stronger once monetary incentives were increased after the 2013 season. Finally, the betting market does not predict this phenomenon, further confirming our suspicion of irregular activities.     

Determinants of Tacit Collusion in a Cournot Duopoly Experiment

We contribute to a growing literature that examines the relationship between the nature of strategic interaction and collusive behavior. We present results from a repeated Cournot duopoly experiment with treatments in which quantity choices are either strategic complements or substitutes. The initial underlying demand function allows for direct comparison with previous work utilizing a Bertrand duopoly setting. We find some evidence of collusion in the substitutes treatment, but no collusion in the complements treatment. We study an additional substitutes treatment to control for the absolute slope of the reaction functions across treatments, where we again find evidence of collusive behavior. However, using an alternate demand function parameterization where the goods are less closely related, we find no evidence of collusive behavior in either the substitutes or the complements treatment.     

Highway to Economic Growth? Competition in Public Works Tenders in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the poorest countries in the world. The construction sector will play an essential part to bring the country on the path of economic growth, and competition within the sector is crucial to achieve this goal. In this paper, we analyse the effect of competition in public works tenders in the DRC, using a unique and newly assembled database on public works contracts. We find that the number of participating bidders significantly reduces contract prices, confirming our prior hypothesis that competitive pressure can enhance the overall performance of the sector. Further, we account for the possibility of heteregenous tender participants, finding that the competition effect can vary with the degree of bidders' heterogeneity.     

What Are SEC Football Tickets Worth? Evidence from Secondary Market Transactions

Tickets to sporting events are highly differentiated—seat location, date and time of the game, and home‐team and opponent qualities make each ticket unique. Preferences also differ nontrivially across fans, all of which make the supplier's pricing problem complex. We examine strategies employed by Southeastern Conference (SEC) universities in pricing their football tickets and evaluate their effectiveness in extracting surplus from fans. We use hedonic analysis of data collected from online secondary market transactions to construct a synthetic season ticket, which we compare to prices actually charged by university athletic departments. We also compare quality premiums charged by universities for better seats with market evaluations of those quality differences.     

Market structure and bank conduct in Lesotho

Lesotho's banking industry is highly concentrated and is perceived to be uncompetitive. However, high market concentration does not necessarily imply a lack of competition in the market. Until now, there is no evidence supporting the view that the industry is uncompetitive. Therefore, this paper uses monthly bank-level data from 2013:10 to 2019:5, and employs the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the Boone indicator to examine competition in Lesotho's banking industry. We find that the industry acts as a ‘monopoly’ or a ‘perfectly colluding oligopoly’. We, therefore, argue that policy makers should set up the long anticipated antitrust agency to oversee conduct in this industry, and all other industries to improve societal welfare.