LOOKING AT THE “POPULATION PROBLEM” THROUGH THE PRISM OF HETEROGENEITY: WELFARE AND POLICY ANALYSES*

Upon introducing heterogeneity and dynamics into a model of the demand for children, a problem of optimal population is defined and analyzed. It is shown that from the perspective of social welfare, better‐educated individuals produce too few children while less‐educated individuals produce too many children and all individuals invest too little in the education of their children. The impact of several policy tools geared at addressing the “population problem” is investigated, in particular how child allowances and other tax‐subsidy policies can be harnessed to enhance welfare, and how and why early childhood education programs can mitigate the “population problem.”     

Deprivation and the Dimensionality of Welfare: A Variable‐Selection Cluster‐Analysis Approach

We approach the problems of measuring the dimensionality of welfare and that of identifying the multidimensionally poor, by first finding the poor using the original space of attributes, and then reducing the welfare space. The starting point is the notion that the “poor” constitutes a group of individuals that are essentially different from the “non‐poor” in a truly multidimensional framework. Once this group has been identified through a clustering procedure, we propose reducing the dimension of the original welfare space using recent blinding methods for variable selection. We implement our approach to the case of Latin America based on the Gallup World Poll, which contains ample information on many dimensions of welfare.     

Integer programming on domains containing inseparable ordered pairs

Using the integer programming approach introduced by Sethuraman et al. (2003), we extend the analysis of the preference domains containing an inseparable ordered pair, initiated by Kalai and Ritz (1978). We show that these domains admit not only Arrovian social welfare functions “without ties,” but also Arrovian social welfare functions “with ties,” since they satisfy the strictly decomposability condition introduced by Busetto et al. (2015). Moreover, we go further in the comparison between Kalai and Ritz (1978)’s inseparability and Arrow (1963)’s single-peak restrictions, showing that the former condition is more “respectable,” in the sense of Muller and Satterthwaite (1985).     

Simple Reputation Systems*

We develop a model of simple “reputation systems” that monitor and publish information about the behavior of sellers in a search market with asymmetric information. The reputations created influence the equilibrium search patterns of buyers and thus provide for market‐based “punishment” of bad behavior. We show that a reputation system that rewards honesty can enhance welfare by allowing good sellers to truthfully signal their type. However, the same system can be prone to strategic manipulation by sellers who always have low‐quality products. In that case, we show that an alternative system which assigns reputations based on product quality rather than honesty can be superior.     

Completing Incomplete Revealed Preference Under Limited Attention

This paper discusses how to improve the identification of the preference of a decision‐maker (DM) with limited attention proposed by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012). in “Revealed Attention”. Their identification method relies on choice reversals so the obtained revealed preference is often incomplete. We propose three approaches to address this problem. The first one is accommodating a model‐free approach, which respects the DM's choice in making a welfare analysis, as long as it does not contradict the revealed preference of Masatlioglu et al. The second approach incorporates the DM's exogenously obtained attention/inattention information into the model of Masatlioglu et al. The third approach is to take framings that influence the DM's attention into effect for the identification.     

VAPORWARE*

It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability, especially in the computer industry. In this article, a firm makes pre‐announcements on its product, which are “cheap talk.” We develop a reputation model of “vaporware” where the product pre‐announcement can partially convey information about the product's quality. We discuss its implications for social welfare.     

STATUS QUO IN THE WELFARE ANALYSIS OF TAX REFORMS

The welfare analysis of tax reforms most often consists of comparing the post‐reform distribution of individual welfare with the pre‐reform distribution or possibly that obtained from another reform as if they were completely independent. Such an “anonymous” approach does not take into account “changes” in individual situations, generally the main source of contention in any tax reform debate. This paper proposes a welfare criterion that allows comparison of reforms while taking into account individual status quo—i.e. pre‐reform—situations. This is done by extending standard utilitarian social welfare criteria to the case where individual utilities depend on initial income and income change.     

Quality,quantity and duration of lives

The evaluation of development processes and of public policies often involves comparisons of social states that differ in income distributions, population sizes and life longevity. This may require social evaluation principles to be sensitive to the quality, the quantity and the duration of lives. This paper: 1) reviews some of the normative issues at stake, 2) proposes and discusses some specific methods to address them in a generalized utilitarian framework and 3) briefly illustrates the application of some of these methods to the global distribution of incomes, population sizes and longevity over the last century. Depending on the approach taken, it is found inter alia that global social welfare in 2010 can be deemed to be between 1.8 and 407 times that of 1910, the role given to the quantity of lives being particularly important in that assessment.     

TWO OR THREE PROBLEMS CONCERNING SOCIAL STABILITY AND OUR MEASURES OF WELFARE: WHAT CAN ECONOMISTS LEARN FROM OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES?*

This paper takes up several problems that are related to psychology, political science and ethics—disciplines that we regard as neighbours on the boundaries of economics. I pay particular attention to such topics as mass psychology and social stability, democracy and economic performance and the notions of wellbeing and happiness. After laying out some of the history of academic discourse on these problems and notions, I reconsider the nature of discrepancy between microlevel motivations and macrolevel phenomena, trade‐offs between equality and liberty and the problem of measurement of social welfare and “happiness” from the perspective of “dissociation of intention and consequence”.     

α‐SERIAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROVISION OF AN EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOOD

We present a new class of “α‐serial mechanisms” for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non‐consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy‐freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the “maximal efficiency loss” and “maximal manipulation” of α‐serial mechanisms and point out a trade‐off between these two properties.     

Inflation,a disease of society

This paper focuses on financing the welfare state expenditures in the UK. It offers a comprehensive analysis of social expenditures and taxes paid by the working population families, and an estimation of the net benefits received by them. While the subsequent analysis of the welfare state and its development primarily concentrates on the British experience, it has a broader application to other OECD countries. The UK as the most egalitarian “liberal market economy,” offers an interesting case for the study of the interaction between the welfare state expansion and economic growth. In terms of her capitalist economic structure, (interaction between market and economy) she is relatively closer to the USA and other Angelo-Saxon (liberal market) economies. In terms of her level of social expenditures, she is much closer to the European “social market economies” than the USA and other more egalitarian “liberal market economies.”     

The Repugnant Conclusion and Utilitarianism under Domain Restrictions

The paper investigates the problem of the repugnant conclusion in variable‐population social choice. A choice rule exhibits the repugnant conclusion if, given any alternative in which all individuals enjoy a high quality of life, there is always a better alternative (according to the choice rule) in which the population is larger and each individual has a life which is barely worth living. While it is well‐known that classical utilitarianism (CU) exhibits the repugnant conclusion on an unrestricted domain, the paper shows that critical‐level utilitarianism (CLU) also exhibits the repugnant conclusion on an unrestricted domain when repugnance is defined in terms of the critical level. In contrast, both CU and CLU are shown to avoid the repugnant conclusion on a restricted domain defined by bounded resources, the law of conservation of matter, concavity and monotonicity of preferences, positive subsistence consumption, and positive “neutral consumption.” In light of the universality of these restrictions, one may conclude that the problem of the repugnant conclusion may not be as great as previously thought.     

To disclose or not? An analysis of software user behavior

We address the ongoing debates over disclosing information about software vulnerabilities through an open public forum. A game-theoretic approach is used to show that full public disclosure can be an equilibrium strategy in a game played by rational loss-minimizing agents. We provide conditions under which full disclosure of vulnerabilities improves social welfare and analyze the effect of vendor and product characteristics, as well as the composition of the pool of software users on the decisions to disclose. We also provide conditions under which user threats to vendors to disclose after a grace period or users’ ability to develop fixes themselves further improve welfare. The likelihood that user-developed fixes improve welfare increases with user familiarity with the details of software, providing an argument for “open source” software.     

Give and Take Between Households and the State: Development and Application of A Benefaction–Contribution Ratio

This study defines a “Benefaction–Contribution Ratio” (BCR), describing the extent to which households are net beneficiaries of or contributors to the economy in relation to income and consumption. Such issues are central to assessment and targeting of policies such as social welfare and taxation. We apply the ratio to 21,144 South African households. South Africa employs various taxation‐funded social grants and subsidized services. A central question is how such transfers affect real household income and consumption. We find that the constitution of social transfers as a function of tax adjusted earned income significantly augments household buying power. Furthermore, we hypothesize and find a negative curvilinear shape which has implications for design of taxation and welfare. This constitution and distribution of this ratio may be useful for international benchmarking and household planning, and as an economic predictor of outcomes such as job seeking, entrepreneurial behavior, family planning, migration, and tax evasion.     

SOCIALLY IMPROVING TAX REFORMS*

This article proposes graphical methods to determine whether commodity tax changes are “socially improving,” in the sense of improving social welfare or decreasing poverty for large classes of social welfare and poverty indices. It also shows how estimators of critical poverty lines and economic efficiency ratios can be used to characterize socially improving tax reforms. The methodology is illustrated using Mexican data.     

Household inequality, social welfare, and trade

Working with Sen social welfare functions (meaning explicit separability between mean income and income dispersion), we develop a generalized dual approach to tracking household inequality aspects of social welfare in general equilibrium. We highlight how household equity can be examined analytically alongside production efficiency in duality-based models, using our dual framework to explore potential trade-offs between efficiency and equity effects of trade policy. Our results complement the set of standard inequality results in trade theory focused on functional rather than household inequality. We also find that the relative distributional impact of tariffs on welfare is conditional on the initial level of inequality.     

On the voluntary provision of “weakest‐link” public goods: The case of private information

We characterize equilibria in a private‐provision public‐good game where individuals are allowed arbitrary contribution levels and the level of the public good equals the least contribution made by an individual. Equilibrium comparative statics are derived for the interim Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. First, improvements in the cost distribution of even only one player benefit all. Second, even with such “weakest‐link” public goods, for which greater similarity of preferences would seem to facilitate coordination, decreased heterogeneity can actually decrease payoffs. Indeed, increasing the riskiness of cost distributions has an ambiguous effect on welfare. Two mechanisms are provided for improving equilibrium payoffs: Technology transfer and cheap‐talk communication. While substantial welfare gains are possible, examples show that (a) technology transfer may be futile if a “regularity” condition is not satisfied and (b) cheap talk may be useless if the language for communication is not sufficiently rich.     

Toward a “constitution” for behavioral policy-making

Behavioral policy interventions aimed at redirecting individuals’ behavior toward optimal choices are characterized by an important issue which is often overlooked: the lack of an instrument to define what “optimal” means. If agents are subject to behavioral biases leading them to make “wrong” choices, the policy-maker can no longer rely on the revealed preferences approach (e.g., what people choose is what people prefer) for defining a welfare criterion. In this article, we reiterate the argument put forward by some scholars that choosing a suitable welfare criterion once the link between observed choices and individuals’ preferences is broken becomes a problematic task. We review the state of the art in the literature and the possible approaches proposed to overcome the problem, concluding that a solution has not yet been reached. Moreover, we argue that the lack of an established welfare criterion characterizing behavioral policy-making could pave the way to government wanting to restrict individual freedom. In the absence of any legislative constraint for the executive, stating that what individuals choose is not what they prefer in principle justifies any freedom-reducing government intervention, since choices can be arbitrarily labeled “sub-optimal” or “welfare-reducing.” To avoid this risk without turning down the potential of behavioral policy-making, we propose that an independent committee establishes ex ante procedural rules and domains where behavioral policy-making can be implemented. The article suggests some possible examples of normative provisions characterizing this constitution-type document, such as the selective identification of the only sectors where behavioral policies could be effectively applied, the periodic evaluation of policy effects, and the use of sunset clauses.     

A Class of Social Welfare Functions That Depend on Mean Income and Income Polarization

A well‐established strategy for evaluating alternative income distributions is based on the use of an abbreviated social welfare function that depends only on mean income and an inequality index. In keeping with this literature, we study the existence of social welfare functions that can be written as a trade‐off between efficiency and income polarization. This paper proposes a class of social welfare functions consistent with the Esteban and Ray, and Duclos, Esteban and Ray income polarization indices. For this result, we expand the domain for personal preferences to incorporate not only own income but also the well‐being of others. In addition, we link our proposal to the literature on relative satisfaction. The approach is illustrated by an empirical application using the CPS database for the United States in the period 1991–2010.     

中国城市可持续发展态势分类评价

当前，中国城镇化正高速推进，城市已成为推动可持续发展的关键领域。以城市三支柱协调发展为理论基础，分别采用城市5年人口年均动态增长率、空气PM2.5浓度年达标水平、5年地区GDP年均动态增长率3项指标，作为城市社会进步、环境保护、经济增长3大维度表征，构建“8类4级”城市分类评价方案，其中4级是指城市发展呈现强、中、弱、欠可持续发展的不同特征。对中国2013年所有数据可得的地级及以上城市开展实证研究，获取基于发展态势的城市分类结果。结果显示，90%以上城市处于弱可持续发展态势，环境污染是中国城市发展面临的关键性难题。我国东北地区城市人口流失和财富增长后劲不足，可持续发展挑战巨大。