Bankers' compensation and fair value accounting

This paper examines the role of certain fair value accounting (FVA) outcomes in compensation of US bank CEOs. The use of FVA in compensation invites an agency cost—the clawback problem—if cash compensation is based on unrealized profits that may reverse in the future. At the same time FVA may be a good measure of current managerial effort and so be cash compensated. We find evidence consistent with a positive link between CEO cash bonus and fair value (FV) valuation of trading assets, managed for short-term profit, as well as (amongst banks with limited trading exposure) a positive link between CEO pay and FV valuations of available for sale (AFS) assets. We find no evidence that trading income is incrementally compensation relevant, indicating that compensation committees avoided the clawback problem for unrealized trading gains. The paper also provides evidence on the link between FVA outcomes and equity-based pay.     

Does fair value accounting contribute to market price volatility? An experimental approach

This paper contributes to the debate on the impact of accounting measurement rules for financial assets. We examine the association between fair value accounting for financial assets and market price volatility for nonfinancial firms in an experimental setting. One group of participants was provided with financial statements where held‐for‐trading securities were reported at fair market value (FVA). Another group received financial statements with investments reported at historical cost (HCA). Controlling for accounting data, we find no systematic difference between FVA and HCA for three different measures of market price volatility, despite higher earnings volatility and marginally heavier trading under FVA.     

Research Note: Revisiting Fair Value Accounting––Measuring Commercial Banks' Liabilities

IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IASB, 2000), requires assets to be marked to fair value if held-for-trading, available-for-sale purposes, or if they are derivatives; held-to-maturity securities, originated loans and originated securities are measured at amortized cost, providing they are not held-for-trading. Financial liabilities are measured at amortized cost except those that are held-for-trading or derivatives. A proposed amendment would accommodate improved fair value measurement of financial instruments. Commercial banks are greatly affected by any accounting standard concerning the recognition and measurement of financial instruments, whether related to assets or liabilities. This article demonstrates that the existing and proposed standards perpetuate the mismeasurement of interest rate risk for commercial banks. Under IAS 39 banks that have a balanced position, that is, no interest rate risk, counterfactually could show large changes in income through interest rate changes. An alternative accounting treatment, full fair value reporting of financial assets and liabilities, including all loans and deposits, is offered. Presently fair value data are mandated as footnote disclosure.     

Market reactions to policy deliberations on fair value accounting and impairment rules during the financial crisis of 2008–2009

Fair value accounting (FVA) has been blamed for amplifying the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We investigate investor and creditor reactions to policymaker deliberations, recommendations and decisions about FVA and impairment rules in the banking industry. If FVA was a key contributor to the financial crisis as some industry pundits and academic research suggest, we first should observe positive stock market reactions to proposals that relax FVA rules and negative reactions when policymakers support FVA. Second, we investigate cross-sectional stock price reactions to bank-specific factors that potentially contributed to pro-cyclical contagion. Third, we examine whether banks that have fewer alternative sources of information about fair values experience relatively negative reactions to potential relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. Finally, we investigate credit market reactions to these policy deliberations, recommendations and decisions by examining changes in credit default swap spreads for a subset of banks in our sample.     

The Effect of Fair Value Adjustments on Dividend Policy Under Mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards Adoption: Australian Evidence

Using a sample of firms from the financial sector of the Australian Securities Exchange, we examine the effect of the fair value adjustments of financial instruments on firms’ dividend distributions in the context of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. We find a positive relationship between the fair value adjustments of financial instruments and firms’ dividend payouts, suggesting that the frequent use of fair value adjustments of financial instruments by financial firms following mandatory IFRS adoption has the potential to increase the proportion of transitory earnings in reported earnings and cause changes in dividend policies. Our results add to the ongoing debate on the unintended economic consequences of fair value accounting (FVA) and provide empirical support for regulators’ concerns that unrealized FVA gains from asset revaluation during booms may encourage the distribution of those unrealized gains.     

IAS 39 reclassification choice and analyst earnings forecast properties

In October 2008, the International Accounting Standards Board amended IAS 39 to allow banks to retroactively reclassify financial assets that previously were measured at fair value to amortized cost. By reclassifying financial assets, a bank can potentially avoid recognizing the unrealized fair value losses and thereby increase its income and regulatory capital during a market downturn. We examine the implications of the reclassification decision by banks for the properties of financial analyst earnings forecasts during 2008–2009, when economic conditions were highly volatile. We find that the reclassification choice during the financial crisis reduced analyst forecast accuracy and increased forecast dispersion. We also find that the observed decline in analyst forecasting ability is limited to the year of adoption when the economic environment was highly volatile.     

Fair value accounting,fragile bank balance sheets and crisis: A model

A topic of recent interest in accounting research has been the investigation of the role of fair value accounting (FVA) in the global financial crisis. This research focused on finding a link during the crisis time-period and often states that “accounting is only a messenger”. The model presented in this paper emphasises finding the link before the crisis and “accounting as money.” Use is made of an accounting model of the economy due to the inability of standard models of monetary transmission to incorporate global financial crisis characteristics such as feedback effects, systemic risk and the centrality of the financial sector in the crisis. The model shows FVA in banks to be an accelerator that amplifies the financial cycle upswing. Feedback effects noted in the model include changes in the demand for financial instruments and changes in demand in the real economy. Minsky-like, crisis is shown to be endogenous to the model, working through the fragility of balance sheets in the real sector as well as in the financial sector. Bank balance sheet fragility is caused by bad capital driving out good capital, banks reaching for yield and the inversion of the yield curve. The model shows that the practice of not meeting rising credit demand with increasing credit supply is an essential control mechanism in the financial cycle.     

管理层动机、会计政策选择与盈余管理——基于新会计准则下上市公司金融资产分类的实证研究

本文对新会计准则下上市公司金融资产的分类进行了实证研究,主要关注企业对交易性金融资产和可供出售金融资产的确认和计量。本文的实证结果发现,当上市公司持有的金融资产比例较高时,为降低公允价值变动对利润的影响程度,管理层会将较大比例的金融资产确认为可供出售金融资产;在持有期间,为了避免利润的下滑,管理层往往违背最初的持有意图,将可供出售的金融资产在短期内进行处置。本文的实证结果为研究管理层动机、会计政策选择和盈余管理之间的关系提供了新的视角。     

The Role of Fair Value Accounting in Promoting Government Accountability

A key factor to improve the financial accountability of governments is the existence of a set of generally accepted financial reporting of standards, such as IPSAS issued by the IFAC, which seek to enhance information transparency. This paper examines the capability of fair value accounting to improve, through financial transparency, government accountability, analysing the possible effect of the implementation of this measurement basis on understandability, comparability and timeliness—three qualitative characteristics linked to the relevance of financial reporting. This paper further considers whether the difficulties involved in achieving FV estimations could affect government financial accountability. The findings indicate that FVA implementation could enhance accountability by improving understandability, comparability and timeliness in governmental financial reporting, although the use of objective measures to estimate the FV of assets is fundamental. In addition, the type of assets and the existence of an active market are crucial to improving the comparability of financial statements under FVA, whereas improving timeliness could be limited by the possibility of estimating FV measures in‐house.     

What Do FAS 157 “Fair Values” Really Measure: Value Or Risk?

FAS 157, the U.S. accounting standard that prescribes how fair values of assets and liabilities are to be measured when other U.S. GAAP standards require fair valuation, stipulates that fair values be measured as the exit values of assets and liabilities—the proceeds for assets hypothetically sold on the date of the financial report, and, correspondingly, the amount required to settle liabilities on the date of the financial report. This conceptual article argues that exit values do not reflect the value of the net assets of the firm to shareholders, which is best reflected by discounted cash flows to maturity. Moreover, exit values—biasing fair values downward when markets are illiquid—have a pernicious, systemic risk effect; specifically, they give rise to write‐downs that in turn cause contagion: prices of equities and other financial instruments of peers react negatively, leading to further write‐downs by those peers. This may have aggravated the recent financial crisis. However, while exit values are not proper measures of value to shareholders, they are useful measures of downside risk when prospects turn sour for a firm. Thus, both exit values and discounted cash flows should be presented in financial statements.     

Reclassification of Financial Assets under IAS 39: Impact on European Banks' Financial Statements

In response to the financial crisis, the IASB issued on 13 October 2008 an amendment to IAS 39 which enables entities to reclassify non-derivative financial assets held for trading and financial assets available-for-sale. This paper examines the influence of this controversial amendment on the 2008 financial statements of 219 European banks which apply IFRS. I find that approximately one-third of the sample banks have taken extensive advantage of these reclassification opportunities. The mean reclassification amount is 3.9% of total assets and 131% of the book value of equity, respectively. I further document that reclassifying banks avoid substantial fair value losses, and hence, report significantly higher levels of return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), book value of equity and regulatory capital. In particular, the mean ROE switches sign from a negative ROE of ?1.4% to a positive ROE of 1.3% due to gains from reclassifications. Overall, this paper documents a substantial impact of the amendments on banks' financial statements and suggests analysing these reclassifications with particular caution.     

Information asymmetry of fair value accounting during the financial crisis

We examine whether US banks’ fair value net assets, measured according to the three-level hierarchy introduced in SFAS 157, are associated with information asymmetry during the 2008 financial crisis. Our results show that bid–ask spread, a proxy for information asymmetry, is positively associated with fair value net assets, and the degree of association is contingent upon the three-level hierarchy, with bid–ask spreads being lowest for Level 1 (the most transparent valuation inputs) and highest for Level 3 (the least observable). Also, there is some evidence that SFAS 157 led to a reduction in bid–ask spread, and we find that quarterly changes in Level 1 and Level 2 fair value net assets are significantly associated with changes in bid–ask spread in 2008 when the spread was rapidly rising, but not in 2009 when it was falling. Our findings suggest that the three-level hierarchy under SFAS 157 provides investors with useful information, and fair value is associated with uncertainty, as measured by bid–ask spread, before and during the financial crisis.     

Measuring Integrated Market and Credit Risk in Bank Portfolios: An Application to a Set of Hypothetical Banks Operating in South Africa

The banking crises of the ‘90s emphasize the need to model the connections between financial environment volatility and the potential losses faced by financial institutions resulting from correlated market and credit risks. Due to the number of variables that must be modeled and the complexity of the relationships an analytical solution is not feasible. We present here a numerical solution based on a simulation model that explicitly links changes in the relevant variables that characterize the financial environment and the distribution of possible future bank capital ratios. This forward looking quantitative risk assessment methodology allows banks and regulators to identify potential risks before they materialize and make appropriate adjustments to bank portfolio credit qualities, sector and region concentrations, and capital ratios on a bank by bank basis. It also has the potential to be extended so as to assess the risks of correlated failures among a group of financial institutions (i.e., systemic risk analyses). This model was applied by the authors to the study of the risk profile of the largest South African Banks in the context of the Financial System Stability Assessment program undertaken by the IMF in 1999. In the current study, we apply the model to various hypothetical banks operating in the South African financial environment and assess the correlated market and credit risks associated with business lending, mortgage lending, asset and liability maturity matches, foreign lending and borrowing, and direct equity, real estate, and gold investments. It is shown to produce simulated financial environments (interest rates, exchange rates, equity indices, real estate price indices, commodity prices, and economic indicators) that match closely the assumed parameters, and generate reasonable credit transition probabilities and security prices. As expected, the credit quality and diversification characteristics of the loan portfolio, asset and liability maturity mismatches, and financial environment volatility, are shown to interact to determine bank risk levels. We find that the credit quality of a bank's loan portfolio is the most important risk factor. We also show the risk reduction benefits of diversifying the loan portfolio across various sectors and regions of the economy and the importance of accounting for volatility shocks that occur periodically in emerging economies. Banks with high credit risk and concentrated portfolios are shown to have a high risk of failure during periods of financial stress. Alternatively, banks with lower credit risk and broadly diversified loan portfolios across business and mortgage lending are unlikely to fail even during very volatile periods. Asset and liability maturity mismatches generally increase bank risk levels. However, because credit losses are positively correlated with interest rate increases, banks with high credit risk may reduce overall risk levels by holding liabilities with longer maturities than their assets. Risk assessment methodologies which measure market and credit risk separately do not capture these various interactions and thus misestimate overall risk levels.     

Fair Value‐related Information in Analysts’ Decision Processes: Evidence from the Financial Crisis

We use a sample of conference calls and analyst research reports from international banks to examine how financial analysts request and communicate fair value‐related information in their valuation process. We find that analysts devote considerable attention to fair value‐related topics. Most of the conference call questions and references in research reports pertain to fair value reclassifications and fair value changes of liabilities resulting from banks’ own credit risk. The accounting impact of these one‐time effects during the financial crisis and a lack of corresponding firm disclosures help to explain the prevalence of these two topics. The content of the questions and references suggests that analysts have different motives for their interest in fair value‐related information. While some analysts adjust reported earnings for unrecognised fair value changes of reclassified assets, most of the observed analysts exclude banks’ own credit risk effects from reported earnings. Thus, the use of fair value‐related information varies substantially across analysts and across instruments.     

An accounting revolution? The financialisation of standard setting

This paper analyses the political-economic content of the recent ‘revolutionary’ shift in financial accounting rules for listed companies, specifically the rise of IFRS and fair value. It connects this shift to the socio-economic changes that are currently being discussed in the literature on financialisation, e.g. the rise of shareholder value and the proprietary view of the firm. Two ideal-typical accounting systems are constructed on the basis of normative accounting theory and extant standards – historical cost accounting (HCA) and fair value accounting (FVA). The ‘accounting revolution’ of the past 10–15 years can be understood as a qualitative shift from HCA to FVA. It is further argued that these ideal-typical systems are related to different circuits or forms of capital – productive and money capital respectively – and to the particular perspective that these afford on the, capitalist firm. Inasmuch as financialisation is related to the circuit of money capital one can make sense of the rise to prominence of FVA, which represents the dominance of a financial view of the firm in the field of financial accounting. Throughout this paper, however, the limits to financialisation are also highlighted and traced back to the ineradicable manifestation of the circuit of productive capital.     

Fair Value Accounting and the Financial Crisis: Messenger or Contributor?*

This commentary discusses how fair value accounting (FVA) affects the nature of financial reporting, especially for financial institutions that were deeply affected by the 2007‐9 financial crisis. Toward that end, I address four questions. First, I review FVA's role in financial reporting, emphasizing its development over time. While the commentary's focus is on the interface between financial instruments and FVA, its reach extends well beyond financial instruments. Thereafter, I discuss the measurement and valuation challenges that arise from the use of FVA in financial reporting. Then, I analyze the evidence, analytical and empirical, on the role that FVA may have played in the financial crisis of 2007‐9. Since, to some extent, the crisis is still unfolding, there is limited yet very insightful empirical evidence on this issue. The evidence does suggest that FVA, in combination with its use by regulators, may have severely undermined the financial condition of some institutions. The effect was amplified for institutions holding assets in markets that saw their liquidity dry up during the crisis. In other words, FVA may have amplified the crisis. Finally, I discuss some implications that we can draw from the crisis about the merits and risks underlying FVA. For instance, I conclude that, in a search for relevance, the use of FVA in financial reporting may accelerate its disconnection from a firm's business reality.     

资产负债表视角下的公允价值会计顺周期效应研究

在近几年的金融危机中,公允价值会计被指责为扩大了资产负债表的波动性,即具有顺周期效应。本文通过模拟正常的商业周期以及极端条件下的商业周期,比较了完全公允价值、混合计量属性两种计量模式对银行资产负债表波动性的不同影响。模拟的结果揭示了虽然应用公允价值会计时,资产负债表的数据存在一定的波动;但是该波动反映了经济体自身波动,波动也不一定具有顺周期性,波动的幅度受市场环境的影响。最后在此基础上得出公允价值会计并非必然导致顺周期效应的结论。     

IFRS fair value measurement and accounting policy choice in the United Kingdom and Australia

This study investigates the use of fair value measurement by 228 listed companies in the UK and Australia around the time of adoption of IFRS from 1 January 2005. We test whether within and between country comparability in policy choices (as measured by T indices) has changed in relation to (a) mandatory and (b) optional use of fair value measurement. Mandatory requirements related to financial instruments (IAS 39) and share-based payments (IFRS 2) have increased comparability, with a weaker effect for biological assets (IAS 41). In relation to the optional use of fair value, comparability increased in relation to property (IAS 16) because some companies discontinued fair value measurement. Under IAS 39, the fair value option for other financial assets and other financial liabilities decreased comparability. Options to use fair value in other areas (intangible assets, plant and equipment and investment properties) are not generally taken up, either for on-going measurement or on IFRS adoption (under the ‘deemed cost’ option). The results suggest a conservative approach and/or lack of incentives to use fair value measurement for most companies. Exceptions include some banks and insurance companies (for other financial assets and liabilities) and companies holding investment properties.     

Tainted portfolios: How impairment accounting rules restrict security sales

Contrary to claims that fair value accounting exacerbated banks’ securities sales during the recent financial crisis, we present evidence that suggests – if anything – that the current impairment accounting rules served as a deterrent to selling. Specifically, because banks must provide evidence of their ‘intent and ability’ to hold securities with unrealized losses, there are strong incentives to reduce, rather than increase, security sales when market values decline to avoid ‘tainting’ their remaining securities portfolio. Validating this concern, we find that banks incur greater other‐than‐temporary impairment (OTTI) charges when they sell more securities. We then find that banks sell fewer securities when their security portfolios have larger unrealized losses (and thus larger potential impairment charges), and these results are concentrated in banks with homogenous securities portfolios, expert auditors, more experienced managers, and greater regulatory capital slack. Overall, our results suggest that – contrary to critics’ claims – the accounting rules appear to have reduced banks’ propensity to sell their securities during the financial crisis.     

The association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary accounting choices

This study examines the association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary loan loss provisions using regulatory financial data from 2009 to 2016 for a sample of U.S. public bank holding companies. I find that banks recognizing larger proportions of fair value assets and liabilities based on level 2 and level 3 inputs are associated with lower discretionary loan loss provisions. However, there is no significant association between level 1 fair value assets and liabilities and discretionary loan loss provisions. When pre-managed earnings are lower, banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities report smaller discretionary loan loss provisions to inflate earnings. Banks reporting larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are more likely to use discretionary loan loss provisions to beat earnings benchmarks and manage tier one capital ratios. Overall, the results support the proposition that fair value assets and liabilities based on level 2 and level 3 inputs are less transparent and are subject to more discretion regarding loan loss provisions.