Central Bank Credibility before and after the Crisis

A new measure of credibility is constructed as a function of the differential between observed inflation and some estimate of the inflation rate that the central bank targets. The target is assumed to be met flexibly. Credibility is calculated for a large group of both advanced and emerging countries from 1980 to 2014. Financial crises reduce central bank credibility and central banks with strong institutional feaures tend to do better when hit by a shock of the magnitude of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The VIX, adopting an inflation target and central bank transparency, are the most reliable determinants of credibility. Similarly, real economic growth has a significant influence on central bank credibility even in inflation targeting economies.     

Emerging and small open economies,unconventional monetary policy and exchange rates – a survey

At the outset of the Great Recession emerging in 2007, central banks of major-currency economies have adopted non-standard monetary policies. We examine whether and to what extent these measures pose a challenge to central banking in emerging and small open economies. In particular we assess how global liquidity spillovers caused by major central banks affect the economic dynamics of emerging and small open economies. In this respect, economies which are close to or even at the periphery of major-currency economies are particularly prone to “unbalanced” real exchange rate dynamics. In the short run, corresponding level and volatility effects in key relative prices may endanger financial stability in the recipient country. The long-term effects include a metamorphosis of the anchoring of private-sector inflation expectations into a perilous tightrope act in central banking of these economies.     

The Impact of EMU on Inflation Expectations

This paper analyses the impact of the monetary regime change from the Bundesbank to the ECB on inflation expectations. In the theoretical part, the Barro-Gordon model is used to derive the potential effect of a new central bank on inflation and inflation expectations. The econometric investigation is based on a flexible specification of expectation formation which allows both for rational and adaptive elements. The results indicate that the monetary regime change did not have a strong and lasting impact on the formation of inflation expectations and that the credibility of both central banks is not perceived to differ significantly anymore. JEL Classification Numbers: E 58, E 31     

Reactions to Shocks and Monetary Policy Regimes: Inflation Targeting Versus Flexible Currency Board in Sub‐Saharan Africa

The paper examines the monetary policy actions through which central banks in sub‐Saharan Africa have tried to eliminate the negative impacts of the shocks facing their economies. We compare two different monetary policy regimes: a currency board regime (in the CFA zone) and an inflation targeting policy regime (Ghana and South Africa) when central banks respond to demand, supply, and fiscal shocks. We extend the usual forecasting and policy analysis system models to replicate the economic features of these economies during the period 2002–12 and to evaluate the impact of several policies in response to these shocks. We find that both policies are inappropriate in helping the economies escape from the effects of negative demand shocks, both are essential when negative shocks to primary balance occur, while inflation targeting dominates the currency board regime as a strategy to cope with positive shocks to inflation.     

债务风险、量化宽松与中国通胀前景

在全球金融危机期间,美、英、日等主要发达国家的财政状况迅速恶化、公共债务急剧增加。而美联储和其他主要央行实施量化宽松的货币政策,更可能直接增加流向中国的热钱。另外还有三大因素将直接抬高中国的通胀压力:第一是粮食及大宗商品价格直线上升;第二是工资水平急剧上涨;第三是极度宽松的货币政策环境。所有这些表明通货膨胀可能是2011年中国最大的宏观经济风险,央行需要采取包括加息、升值等的全面性的货币政策紧缩来控制通胀风险。     

Inflation and economic growth: A dynamic panel threshold analysis for Asian economies

This paper investigates the existence of a threshold level for inflation and how any such level affects the growth of Asian economies. We use a dynamic panel threshold growth regression, which allows for fixed effects and endogeneity. We observe a nonlinear relationship between inflation and economic growth for 32 Asian countries over the period 1980–2009. We detect an inflation threshold of approximately 5.43%, at a 1% level of significance. We find that inflation hurts growth when it exceeds 5.43% but has no effect below this level. Different estimation methods determine that the effect of inflation on growth is robust. Our findings may be useful to central banks as a guide for inflation targeting.     

Central bank credibility and the expectations channel: evidence based on a new credibility index

This article investigates the relationship between central bank credibility and the volatility of the key monetary policy instrument. First, we propose a time-varying measure of central bank credibility based on the gap between inflation expectations and the official inflation target. While this new index addresses the main limitations of the existing indicators, it also appears particularly suited to assess the monetary experiences of a large sample of inflation-targeting emerging countries. Second, by means of EGARCH estimations, we formally prove the existence of a negative effect of credibility on the volatility of the short-term interest rate. In line with the expectations channel of monetary policy, the higher the credibility of the central bank, the lower the need to move its instruments to effectively fulfill its objective.     

Inflation Targeting in ASEAN‐10

The paper addresses the empirical question of whether economies that do not systematically target inflation (non‐inflation targeters) experience higher exchange rate volatility as compared with inflation targeters in 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) from 1990 to 2010. The paper examines the role of real exchange rate, exchange rate volatility and the reaction functions of central banks using dynamic panel estimation techniques. The results indicate that the output gap offers more useful information than the inflation gap in setting interest rates for inflation targeters, implying that the real term is more important than the nominal term. In turn, this suggests that an increase in interest rate can be wielded swiftly to reduce real gross domestic product and suppress inflation. The real exchange rate appears as a weaker determinant in setting interest rates for non‐inflation targeters. Inflation targeters experienced lower exchange rate volatility compared with non‐targeters in the ASEAN, which implies that implementation costs to their domestic economies may be marginally lower. Meanwhile, the non‐targeters follow a mixed strategy as both the inflation and real exchange rate are used as instruments to set the interest rates.     

Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: a missing link?

Granting central banks independence is widely assumed to decreaseinflation by increasing the credibility of commitments to pricestability. This paper analyzes public- and private-sector behaviorin a sample of 17 OECD countries for evidence of variationsin disinflationary credibility with monetary institutions. Thepaper does not find evidence that the costs of disinflationare lower in countries with independent central banks. It alsofinds no evidence that independence inhibits collection of seignoragerevenues or electoral manipulation of policy. These resultsraise questions about some explanations of the negative correlationbetween central bank independence and inflation.     

Estimation of historical inflation expectations

Expected inflation is a central variable in economic theory. Economic historians have estimated historical inflation expectations for a variety of purposes, including studies of the Fisher effect, the debt deflation hypothesis, central bank credibility, and expectations formation. I survey the statistical, narrative, and market-based approaches that have been used to estimate inflation expectations in historical eras, including the classical gold standard era, the hyperinflations of the 1920s, and the Great Depression, highlighting key methodological considerations and identifying areas that warrant further research. A meta-analysis of inflation expectations at the onset of the Great Depression reveals that the deflation of the early 1930s was mostly unanticipated, supporting the debt deflation hypothesis, and shows how these results are sensitive to estimation methodology.     

紧缩货币政策下商业银行缓释信贷规模压力工具研究

2011年,国家多次运用货币政策工具控制货币和信贷增长速度,实现对通货膨胀预期的管理。通过调高金融机构存款准备金率收缩银行信贷规模,商业银行在执行货币政策和谋发展上面临挑战。文章通过研究紧缩货币政策下缓释商业银行信贷规模压力的工具,达到维稳银行大客户的目的。     

DO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PROGRAMS IMPACT ON THE SACRIFICE RATIO?

From time to time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) makes resources available to member states for short‐term balance‐of‐payments support under an agreed arrangement know as a program. Most IMF programs include quantitative performance criteria for key macroeconomic variables, which borrowers must meet to obtain Fund resources. Standard open economy models predict that if policymakers are able to credibly commit to reducing inflation, rational economic agents will lower their expectations of inflation and, therefore, the trade‐off between inflation and output will fall. The present study tests whether IMF programs, by lending credibility to a country's adjustment program, influence the inflation–output trade‐off. The results from the study suggest that IMF programs do not significantly influence the inflation–output trade‐off. This finding is robust to changes in the estimation approach, the method used to obtain the output gap estimates and outliers.     

What influences aggregate inflation expectations of households in India?

We analyse the factors influencing Indian households’ inflation expectations and draw out implications for inflation targeting. The literature finds news on inflation affecting expectations. Using quarterly data from India over 2008–2019, we find: (i) in estimated epidemiological models of learning in expectation formation, the response coefficient on inflation news in the shape of central bank forecasts exceeds coefficients estimated for advanced economies, implying official views having a relatively greater weight on expectations; (ii) error variance decompositions of expectations to shocks in variables including commodity and core inflations, demand and policy variables in a series of SVARs, also show policy communications affecting expectations in the short-term. Food inflation has a significant short-run effect on expectations, but demand determined core inflation dominates over the long run; (iii) impulse responses show a rise in the policy rate raising expectations. The above results show communications as more effective than policy rates in influencing inflation expectations.     

美国持续量化宽松政策和主权债务困境

人口老龄化和债务危机,成为限制发达国家经济增长的重要因素。美国二次量化宽松政策的推出,以及后续持续量化宽松的趋势,引发全球国债竞争性发行问题。量化宽松政策之下,通货膨胀预期骤增,而发达国家的就业状况和经济增长问题并没有得到解决,实体经济的持续复苏需要虚拟经济的相对缩减和重大技术创新的涌现。在全球经济体系相对混乱之际,中国应在人民币国际化、推进区域货币金融合作与改革国际货币体系三个层面开展行动,化危机为机遇,发挥应有作用。     

ARE AFRICAN CENTRAL BANKS SUFFICIENTLY INDEPENDENT FOR MONETARY CONVERGENCE?

Central bank independence (CBI) is currently a widely debated and topical issue commanding the centre point of many economical and political debates, filling the pages of many scholarly journals. Both central bank independence and accountability are currently regarded as necessary best practices for achieving price stability. The importance of CBI rests on the premise that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, and that the cost of reducing inflation can be lowered by an independent central bank with credibility. Support for CBI also stems from the argument that the power to create money should generally be separated from the power to spend it. This is even more relevant for countries with weak political institutions. However, various studies (cited below) detected lower inflation in those countries where independence of their central banks is the strongest. Countries all over – including some on the African continent – have increased the independence of their central banks accordingly.     

Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to fine-tune the economy. A new data-set covering 132 countries, of which 86 countries had implemented such reforms, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country has been characterized by a high variability in historical inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.     

Explaining Interest Rate Spreads in Ghana*

Abstract: The question of the optimal spread between bank lending rates and rates that banks pay on deposits, which is fair to bankers, depositors and borrowers, has dogged economies for some time. In Ghana, there is widespread perception that the spread is too wide. Bankers, on the other hand justify the spread on the basis of economic variables that affect them. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying, in the case of Ghana, the short‐run response of the net interest margin of banks to changes in bank‐specific, industry‐specific and macroeconomic variables within the broad framework of Ho and Saunders (1981) . We find that increases in the following factors significantly increase net interest margin — bank market power (or concentration), bank size, staff costs, administrative costs, extent of bank risk aversion and the rate of inflation. On the other hand, increases in the following variables decrease net interest margin significantly — bank excess cash reserves, the central bank lending rate, management efficiency and the passage of time. To help reduce interest rate margins, we recommend that banks should not get too big, the central bank should consider lowering the capital adequacy ratio and banks should be required to pass on to borrowers the full extent of reductions or increases in the central bank lending rate. Continued efforts at keeping inflation at bay will also help.     

SUPPORTING AN INFLATION TARGETING POLICY WITH THE MEASUREMENT OF INFLATION CREDIBILITY

Inflation targeting anchors inflation expectations, which are not within the sphere of control of the authorities, but can only be influenced over time by consistent policy. As public distrust of inflation figures will feed through to inflation expectations, this paper highlights pilot studies measuring the credibility of inflation in terms of an inflation credibility barometer. Despite initial discouraging results, the conclusion is that knowledge and information improve the credibility of inflation, but only one inflation rate (ideally the one used for inflation targeting purposes) should be communicated. Moreover, the rate used for targeting purposes should be specified with ease of communication in mind.     

通胀预期管理下中央银行沟通的有效性研究——基于中国2003～2010年数据的实证分析

有效管理通货膨胀预期已成为中央银行货币政策调控的重要任务之一。近几年,世界上很多国家通过实施中央银行沟通引导市场预期,实现有效的货币政策调控。本文通过考察通货膨胀预期和中央银行沟通及其他经济变量之间的相关关系,分析中央银行沟通能否有效引导市场通胀预期。结果显示,由于缺乏系统性,中央银行沟通对市场预期的引导作用仍不如其他经济变量,但国内中央银行沟通对市场通胀预期的影响是显著的。其中,相对书面沟通,口头沟通对通胀预期的影响更为显著。在目前较强的通胀预期背景下,系统实施中央银行沟通将对未来通胀预期的管理起到积极作用。     

通货膨胀预期的运行特征及其对我国货币政策的启示

国内学者就我国经济转型时期通货膨胀预期的运行特征展开了初步研究。文章对这一领域的研究成果进行了理论概括,认为通胀预期主体的分层性、通胀预期基础的混沌性、通胀预期过程的持续性、通胀预期强度的波动性是我国当前通货膨胀预期的基本特征。现阶段通胀预期强化的直接原因在于过度宽松的货币政策。弱化通胀预期、缓解通胀压力的短期措施是货币政策尽快转向正常化。