World Human Development: 1870–2007

How has wellbeing evolved over time and across regions? How does the West compare to the Rest? What explains their differences? These questions are addressed using a historical index of human development. A sustained improvement in world wellbeing has taken place since 1870. The absolute gap between OECD and the Rest widened over time, but an incomplete catching up—largely explained by education—occurred between 1913 and 1970. As the health transition was achieved in the Rest, the contribution of life expectancy to human development improvement declined and the Rest fell behind in terms of longevity. Meanwhile, in the OECD, as longevity increased, healthy years expanded. A large variance in human development is noticeable in the Rest since 1970, with East Asia, Latin America, and North Africa catching up to the OECD, and Central and Eastern Europe and Sub‐Saharan Africa falling behind.     

Trade and Diversity: Is There a Case for ‘Cultural Protectionism?’

Abstract. In contrast to the predictions of standard models of international trade, globalization critics are claiming that trade destroys diversity. We demonstrate that with endogenous sunk costs, trade integration in horizontally differentiated industries can indeed lead to a fall in diversity. Consumers are faced with a tradeoff between gains in real income and a loss in diversity, so that the impact on welfare is ambiguous. However, it is possible through fiscal policies to replicate pre-trade choices and still realize gains in real income. Thus, calls for a 'cultural protectionism' are not justified.     

Trade policy and industrial development: iron and steel in a small open economy, 1870−1913

In this paper we argue that effective tariff protection associated with the 1879 National Policy and the 1887 Tupper tariffs triggered investment in new, technologically advanced blast furnaces that were capable of accommodating rapid output expansion. This conclusion is based on an appreciation of the timing of late nineteenth‐century investments in Canada and their connection to changes in government policy and other demand determinants. In our empirical investigation we use new information on westbound transatlantic freight rates, intra‐continental transport costs, and furnace‐specific micro‐data, and we acknowledge the endogenous relationships linking investment to domestic demand, labour costs, and tariffs.     

National borders matter … where one draws the lines too

Abstract The fact that crossing a political border dramatically reduces trade flows has been widely documented in the literature. The increasing number of borders has surprisingly attracted much less attention. The number of independent countries has indeed risen from 72 in 1948 to 192 today. This paper estimates the effect of political disintegration since World War II on the measured growth in world trade. We first show that trade statistics should be considered carefully when assessing globalization over time, since the definition of trade partners varies over time. We document a sizeable resulting accounting artefact, which accounts for 17% of world trade in 2007. Second, based on a structural gravity equation, we estimate that since World War II political disintegration alone has raised measured international trade flows by 7% but decreased actual trade flows (including inter‐regional trade) by 2%.     

Trade Blocs and Trade Wars during the Interwar Period

What precisely were the causes and consequences of the trade wars in the 1930s? Were there perhaps deeper forces at work in reorienting global trade prior to the outbreak of World War II? And what lessons may this particular historical episode provide for the present day? To answer these questions, we distinguish between long‐run secular trends in the period from 1920 to 1939 related to the formation of trade blocs and short‐run disruptions associated with the trade wars of the 1930s. We argue that the trade wars mainly served to intensify pre‐existing efforts toward the formation of trade blocs which dated from at least 1920. More speculatively, we argue that the trade wars of the present day may serve a similar purpose as those in the 1930s, that is, the intensification of China‐ and US‐centric trade blocs.     

The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings at the Berlin Stock Exchange, 1870–96

Abstract. In this article, we evaluate underpricing of initial public offerings at the Berlin Stock Exchange between 1870 and 1896. In contrast to modern data, first‐day returns were extraordinary low and averaged less than 5%, even during the speculative period of the early 1870s. Moreover, standard underpricing theories based on asymmetric information, signalling mechanisms or litigation risk cannot explain underpricing. In contrast to modern markets, underpricing was higher during hot issue markets. Finally, we show that cash‐flow relevant information contained in the corporate charter was readily factored in the first market price. Thus, the historical capital market differed from today's market, but seems to have been efficient.     

US–Japan Trade Frictions: The Past,the Present,and Implications for the US–China Trade War

The United States and Japan have been involved in trade frictions over a number of products including textiles, steel, automobiles, semi‐conductors, and agricultural products over the last 50 years. US–Japan trade frictions have taken basically two forms: (i) the United States attempting to restrict Japan's exports to the United States; and (ii) the United States attempting to increase its exports to Japan by “opening” the Japanese market. By putting pressure on Japan to adopt necessary measures, the United States sought to achieve two main objectives: (i) to reduce its trade deficit vis‐à‐vis Japan; and (ii) to protect and/or promote US industries. The United States failed to achieve the first objective, while some success was achieved for the second objective. The United States triggered a trade war against China with the objectives of: (i) reducing the bilateral trade deficit; and (ii) stopping unfair trade practices by Chinese firms such as violations of intellectual property rights and forced technology transfer. Based on the experiences from the US–Japan trade frictions, the United States may achieve some success for the second objective, but not for the first. The chances of achieving the second objective would increase if the United States cooperates with countries such as Japan and the European Union, which are faced with similar problems.     

Protection for maturing industries: Evidence from Canadian trade patterns and trade policy, 1870–1913

As industries mature, experience is accumulated, productivity increases, trade performance improves on domestic and international markets and learning potential dissipates. Using theory‐consistent empirical specifications, I find a strong, robust negative relationship linking tariff rates to trade performance for manufactured products that matured during the first decade after Canada prioritized protectionist policy objectives in 1879. This relationship also holds at a more aggregate industry level, where I can use other measures of maturity, control for import penetration, use historically contemporaneous trade elasticity estimates, link trade performance to trade restrictiveness and effective rates of protection and where I can instrument for import penetration and trade performance using a two‐stage IV–GMM estimation approach. The results suggest that after 1890 the Canadian government carefully cut tariffs on products produced by maturing Canadian producers and this retreat from protectionism significantly lowered the static deadweight losses resulting from Canadian trade policy during the post‐1890 period.     

Eco-labels, Trade and Protectionism

Eco-labels are suspected to serve protectionist purposes. We analyze the choice between an environmental standard and a voluntary eco-label scheme in a partial trade model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm. The environmental standard will only apply to the domestic firm, while both firms can adopt the eco-label. Pollution is production related, and domestic consumers demand products that are produced in an “environmentally friendly” way. Our results show that it may be optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco-label and get both firms to adopt the label, instead of setting an environmental standard. However, to what extent this policy serves protectionist purposes is ambiguous. In particular, if the willingness to pay for green products is sufficient to cover the pollution abatement costs of the foreign firm, foreign firm profit will increase while domestic firm profit will decrease compared to the outcome with a domestic environmental standard. On the other hand, if the willingness to pay for green products is insufficient, the foreign firm would be better off with a domestic environmental standard.     

Exchange‐Rate Risk and Japanese–Thai Industry Trade

Over the past decade, many papers have studied the effects of exchange‐rate volatility on international trade, particularly at the bilateral level for large numbers of individual industries. This is necessary because the underlying theory is ambiguous and because earlier papers failed to uncover significant results at a higher degree of aggregation. This paper examines the case of Japan and Thailand over the period from 1970 to 2010. We find that slightly more than half of 117 export industries and 54 import industries are affected by volatility in the short run. In the long run, 6 export and 2 import industries are affected positively, and 22 export and 9 import industries are affected negatively. Small Japanese export industries are more likely to be negatively affected, while imports show no differences regarding industry size. In a sectoral analysis, we find some evidence that Japanese exports of manufactures and certain machinery and transport equipment might be relatively more affected by the exchange‐rate risk. Raw material imports are least affected. These findings therefore suggest which industries might benefit most by a policy promoting a stable yen.     

The Canadian productivity stagnation, 2002–2014

Total factor productivity (TFP) growth in Canada between 2002 and 2014 has been only 0.16% per year. This figure is substantially smaller than that of the United States, or that of Canada in the past. We perform multiple counterfactual exercises to show that this small TFP growth cannot be accounted for by several compositional effects or mismeasurements of factors of production. We identify two key sectors (mostly Mining and to a lesser extent Manufacturing) that drive all of the TFP growth difference with the United States. Despite the lack of TFP growth, Canada has experienced sustained income growth due to a prolonged period of appreciation of the terms of trade (while US terms of trade have deteriorated), making real income in the two countries grow at similar rates.     

Tariff evasion and rules of origin violations under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement

Abstract Using product‐level data on trade between Canada and the U.S., this paper presents evidence of tariff evasion and violation of the rules of origin occurring under the Canada‐U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). It shows that more imports go unreported at the destination country when tariffs are higher. Consistent with the tariff evasion hypothesis, this result implies that the trade creation effect of a free trade agreement may in fact be due to less underreporting. Further, this paper shows that the larger Canadian tariff preference margin for the U.S. is associated with more goods originating in third countries being transshipped through the U.S. territory for re‐export. The preference margin is also positively correlated with the value of excess imports from the U.S., which qualify for preferential treatment. Both results suggest the presence of persistent violations of CUSFTA’s rules of origin.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

Export Market Dynamics and Plant‐Level Productivity: Impact of Tariff Reductions and Exchange‐Rate Cycles*

In this paper, we examine how changes in tariff rates and industry‐specific real exchange rates affect the entry/exit process to export markets and productivity growth. Using the experience of the Canadian manufacturing sector over three decades, we find that firms in export markets enjoy faster productivity growth than non‐participants. The size of the growth advantage depends on whether real exchange rates are increasing or decreasing. The increase in the value of the Canadian dollar during the post‐2000 period almost completely offset the productivity growth advantages enjoyed by new exporters during this period.