Tariff Structure,Trade Expansion,and Canadian Protectionism, 1870–1910

Canada's trade policy at the end of the 19th century is commonly viewed as protectionist and extremely costly. In this paper, we employ the Anderson‐Neary Trade Restrictiveness Index to re‐examine this view. Based on product‐level customs data, we show that Canadian trade policy between 1870 and 1910 was more restrictive than previously understood, but created smaller welfare losses than previously believed. These results are primarily driven by high tariffs on inelastic, non‐competing import goods. Although Canada's tariff structure becomes more restrictive over the period, our findings indicate it was not as protectionist or as costly as once thought.     

FDI and Outsourcing in a Service Industry: Welfare Effects of Liberalising Trade and Investment

This study examines a foreign firm's entry decision and its effects on the host country's welfare in a model with a composite good in which both commodity and service generate utility for consumers. Along with the commodity it produces, a producer can provide the service by itself or outsource the service. The result shows that the incentive for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the service sector increases under liberalising trade in the final‐good market. Moreover, there exist policy combinations of trade and investment liberalisation, whereby the domestic firms' profitability is traded off with the host country's social welfare when the foreign firm provides a service through FDI or through outsourcing, respectively. Finally, the welfare after simultaneously liberalising trade and investment is not necessarily greater than that under autarky.     

Vertical Foreign Direct Investment versus Outsourcing: A Welfare Comparison from the Perspective of a Host Country

In the offshoring literature, there is a huge disconnect between the alternative modes of organizing offshore production and their relative welfare impact on a host country. We bridge this gap by comparing the welfare of a host country from vertical foreign direct investment (VFDI) vis‐à‐vis international outsourcing. Our model finds that the ability to maximize welfare in the alternative modes of organizing offshore production is contingent on the absorptive capacity of the host country. If a host country's absorptive capacity is above a critical threshold, outsourcing is more welfare enhancing vis‐à‐vis VFDI; while even with an absorptive capacity lower than this critical threshold, outsourcing being welfare improving over VFDI cannot be ruled out.     

Competition and the location of overseas assembly

Abstract. How does international competition affect overseas outsourcing? To address this question, this paper studies production decisions in the U.S.'s overseas assembly program (OAP). In this setting, a number of regularities emerge. First, prior participation is highly correlated with current participation, which suggests that sunk costs influence outsourcing choices. Second, increases in own‐country costs and declines in competitor‐country costs reduce participation probabilities. In addition, these persistence and cost effects are much larger for outsourcing in developing countries. Finally, outsourcing responses appear to reflect differences in 'market thickness,’ as cost sensitivity generally rises with competitor presence.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY*

This paper investigates the effect of a home firm's lobbying on a strategic export policy in a third market with a differentiated duopoly. We focus on its effect on domestic welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Regardless of the mode of competition, the strategic export policy cannot improve domestic welfare in the presence of lobbying if the degree of product differentiation is high or the government is overly concerned with political contribution relative to domestic welfare. Moreover, for the same degree of product differentiation, the lobbying‐induced export policy is more likely to deteriorate domestic welfare relative to free trade under Cournot competition.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Regulation on International Transportation

Incorporating pollution emissions from international transportation into a model of strategic trade and environmental policies, we investigate the effect of trade liberalization and environmental regulation on national welfare and the environment. Our model includes imperfectly competitive markets for international transportation and final products. We find that trade liberalization may reduce each country's welfare unless some level of environmental regulation on international transportation is in place. When international trade is liberalized initially, a mutual increase in the common emission tax rates may improve each country's welfare. However, when international trade is highly protected initially, imposing an emission tax may reduce welfare.     

Outsourcing and the Heckscher–Ohlin Model

The purpose of this paper is to incorporate the currently mushrooming phenomenon of outsourcing into the standard two‐sector, two‐factor Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade. We first show how outsourcing modifies a firm's production function, and then demonstrate that outsourcing generally raises the return to capital and lowers the real wage, although the nation's GDP rises in proportion to the value‐added in the outsourcing industry. Furthermore, the output of the outsourcing sector may actually fall even though its unit cost goes down; the output of the other sector then rises. By contrast, employment in the outsourcing sector may actually rise.     

International Outsourcing and Unemployment in a Minimum‐wage Economy

To explore the impact of international outsourcing on unemployment and social welfare, the conventional trade model is extended by including both economies of scale and a minimum‐wage constraint in the unskilled‐labor market. In the paper, the scale economies are linked with the production of the most skill‐intensive good. It is shown that within such a framework, there is a trade‐off between a more socially desirable endowment allocation and a greater level of employment. Therefore, even though outsourcing could raise aggregate employment, this benefit is at the cost of further exacerbating the resource misallocation. In this way, the extensions to the traditional framework explored in the paper generate new insights as to why outsourcing may cause a net welfare loss to the home country.     

International outsourcing when labour markets are unionized

Abstract. We consider the implications of international outsourcing in a simple general equilibrium model where the wage rate is the outcome of negotiations between a firm and a trade union. The effects of potential, but non‐realized, international outsourcing, is a reduction in the wage rate and an increase in employment. Aggregate welfare increases, but the trade union becomes worse off while owners of capital become better off. Realized international outsourcing gives rise to an increase in the wage rate and a reduction in employment. Aggregate welfare decreases, but the trade union becomes better off, while owners of capital become worse off.     

Additive versus multiplicative trade costs and the gains from trade liberalizations

This paper addresses welfare effects from trade liberalization in a Melitz ( 2003 ) heterogeneous‐firms trade model including the empirically important per‐unit (i.e., additive) trade costs in addition to the conventional iceberg (i.e., multiplicative) and fixed trade costs. The novel contribution of the paper is the result that the welfare gain for a given increase in trade openness is higher for reductions in per‐unit (additive) trade costs than for reductions in iceberg (multiplicative) trade costs. The ranking derives from differences in intra‐industry reallocations and, in particular, from dissimilar impacts on the number of exporters (i.e., the extensive margin of trade).     

Who benefits from China’s coal subsidy policies? A computable partial equilibrium analysis

Using a computable partial equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and based on global coal production, trade and consumption data in 2014, this study simulates the economic and welfare impacts of China’s coal subsidies at the industry level. Simulation results show that, first, the government’s subsidies have greatly promoted China's coal output, but may aggravate the overcapacity in China’s coal industry. Second, China's coal subsidies have significant trade destruction effects and its coal imports fall by more than 20% annually. Third, if considering the environmental cost, China's coal subsidies cause not only huge net welfare loss to China, but also harm to the global environment, thus no country benefits from China's coal subsidies.     

TARIFF JUMPING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISION IN A QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED MARKET

Using a product differentiation model, this paper discusses the issue of transnational firms evading tariffs and investing directly in a host country (through foreign direct investment (FDI)). Where product quality is differentiated between foreign and host country firms and assuming a firm's quality requirement is a long‐term strategy and is not affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, we obtain the following findings. First, whether or not a host country firm produces high or low quality products, raising the quality requirement for foreign products will increase the possibility of a foreign firm choosing FDI instead of exporting a product to the host country. Second, raising the quality requirement for domestic products will lower the possibility of foreign firms choosing FDI without regard to the product's quality. Finally, given a competitor in the host country, in FDI, a foreign high‐quality product‐producing firm has an advantage over a low‐quality product‐producing firm. We also find that even when firms' quality decisions are affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, most of the above results will still hold.     

The welfare effect of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign direct investment and rules of origin

This paper investigates the welfare effect of forming a free trade agreement (FTA). To receive tariff‐free treatment, firms must comply with the rules of origin (ROO). Outside firms could undertake either market‐oriented or export‐platform foreign direct investments (FDIs). ROO have the following effects: (i) An infeasible FTA may become feasible by deterring outside firms' FDIs, (ii) an FDI of a less efficient firm could replace that of an efficient firm, or (iii) FDIs made before the FTA is concluded might be eliminated. These potential effects complicate the welfare effect of the FTA and could decrease the consumer surplus.     

Trade liberalization,forward‐looking firms,and welfare

We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion.     

On the welfare effects of trade and investment liberalization

Using a three-factor knowledge- and physical capital model of trade and multinational activity, we consider a set of policy experiments to assess the welfare effects of trade and investment liberalization in general equilibrium. Specifically, we address the question of whether and under which circumstances a single versus a combined trade/investment liberalization strategy or a unilateral versus a bilateral policy change is preferable from a single country's and the world's point of view. The focus of this paper is to look at three relevant questions. First, when is investment liberalization beneficial and when is it harmful for a single economy or the whole world? Second, is pure investment liberalization a welfare maximizing strategy? Third, when is either kind of liberalization (trade, investment, or both) welfare improving and when neither of them?     

Market entry and trade weighted import costs

Trade weighting is a common method of aggregating trade frictions. It will understate changes in these costs when there are non‐ad valorem trade costs and quality differences. Newly traded goods enter at higher trade costs than previously traded ones. Lower import costs shift trade to low‐quality goods with higher measured trade costs. These effects are quantitatively important. U.S. import costs fall more than twice as fast as trade weighted measures from 1974 to 2004 after the impact of shifting quality and newly traded goods is accounted for. Empirical estimates that use trade weighting will underestimate the welfare impact of trade costs.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

Trade‐Induced Unemployment: How Much Do We Care?

It is a common perception that a government, especially in the face of elections, is particularly sensitive to the presence of trade‐induced unemployment. In this paper, I ask: how much weight does the incumbent politician actually attach to unemployment resulting from trade? To answer, I build a model that captures government's sympathy to trade‐affected workers and allows me to decompose the channels through which trade‐induced unemployment affects the level of sectoral protection chosen by a politically‐driven incumbent official. I provide empirical evidence that the US government is very sensitive to the presence and the magnitude of trade‐induced unemployment. Specifically, I estimate the weight that the office holder attaches to the welfare of trade‐affected workers to be positive, significant, and four times larger than the weight on the welfare of those who are not affected by trade.     

Heterogeneous firms,trade liberalization and agglomeration

Abstract In this study, we develop an economic model to examine agglomeration of heterogeneous firms following trade liberalization. In a closed economy, we show that high‐productivity firms are more likely to agglomerate because they benefit more from agglomeration than their low‐productivity counterparts. However, trade liberalization, especially with a high‐productivity partner, favours partial agglomeration; that is, low‐productivity firms relocate away from the region where high‐productivity firms agglomerate. Consequently, the welfare gap between the domestic regions of an economy narrows following trade liberalization. The latter result suggests that trade liberalization promotes regional economic development.     

With whom do you trade? Defensive innovation and the skill‐bias

Abstract We examine whether increased trade with countries with ineffective protection of intellectual property has contributed to the skill‐deepening of the 1980s. We construct an index of effective protection of intellectual property at the country level, combining data on protection of patents and rule of law. Next, we construct an industry‐specific version of this index, using as weights each country's trade share in the total trade of the industry. We find a decline in this trade‐weighted index, owing to a rise in trade with countries with low effective protection of intellectual property, which explains 29% of the rise in within‐industry skill‐intensity.