Taking Chances: The Effect that Growing Up on Welfare Has on the Risky Behavior of Young People*

In this paper, we analyze the effect that growing up in a family with a history of welfare receipt has on young people's engagement in a variety of social and health risks. Unique administrative data matched to survey data for 18‐year‐olds and their mothers allow us to evaluate the effect of welfare receipt over the course of a young person's childhood. Much of the apparent link between family welfare history and risk taking disappears once we control for the effects of family structure, mothers’ own risk taking, and mothers’ investments in their children. We find no evidence that growing up on welfare causes young people to engage in risky behavior.     

Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.     

Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies: Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy‐efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step‐level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff‐superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom‐up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.     

THE MORTALITY COST OF EXPENDITURES

This paper updates the mortality cost of expenditures, which has relevance to a broad range of policies, including regulations, wars, and COVID‐19 restrictions. Because changes in income lead to changes in mortality risk, health investments costing more per life saved than a threshold cost‐per‐life‐saved cutoff level are expected to increase mortality risk. This article discusses the mechanisms driving this relationship and provides recent empirical support. The 2019 cost‐per‐life‐saved cutoff level at which expenditures increase mortality risk has a lower bound of $83.1 million and an upper bound of $133.8 million, with a midpoint of $108.5 million. (JEL D61, I18, J17, K32)     

Boosting tourism's contribution to growth and development: Analysis of the evidence

The tourism sector's contribution to economic development depends upon complex and dynamic socioeconomic, environmental, and institutional factors. Policymakers require objective evidence to base decisions on which public policies or investments to pursue. In this paper we develop an economy‐wide approach to assessing public investments in tourism. The approach is powerful in that it considers all inter‐sectoral linkages that are critical for tourism‐sector analysis. This framework is linked to a microsimulation module that enables estimation of household‐level and destination‐specific impacts and the distribution of benefits. To illustrate the framework and the insights it can generate, we apply it to a public investment in Belize's Cayo District. Our findings show that the overall level of economic activity increases while an appreciation of the real regional exchange rate results in slower growth in traditional nontourism exports. Greater availability of capital and labor to meet increased demand would reduce this effect. The investment results in a reduction in the poverty headcount on the order of 0.7 percentage points, though there is a small increase in inequality that is a function of the skill requirements of the new positions created as a result of the investment.     

Half a Century of Public Software Institutions: Open Source as a Solution to Hold‐Up Problem

We argue that the intrinsic inefficiency of proprietary software has historically created a space for alternative institutions that provide software as a public good. We discuss several sources of such inefficiency, focusing on one that has not been described in the literature: the underinvestment due to fear of hold‐up. An inefficient hold‐up occurs when a user of software must make complementary investments, when the return on such investments depends on future cooperation of the software vendor, and when contracting about a future relationship with the software vendor is not feasible. We also consider how the nature of the production function of software makes software cheaper to develop when the code is open to the end users. Our framework explains why open source dominates certain sectors of the software industry (e.g., programming languages), while being almost non existent in some other sectors (e.g., computer games). We then use our discussion of efficiency to examine the history of institutions for provision of public software from the early collaborative projects of the 1950s to the modern “open source” software institutions. We look at how such institutions have created a sustainable coalition for provision of software as a public good by organizing diverse individual incentives, both altruistic and profit‐seeking, providing open source products of tremendous commercial importance, which have come to dominate certain segments of the software industry.     

Saving the public from the private? Incentives and outcomes in dual practice

We consider a monopoly physician offering free public treatment and, if allowed, a private treatment for which patients have to pay out of pocket. While patients differ in the propensity to benefit from private treatment it always yields better health outcomes than public treatment but is also more costly in terms of money and time. We study the physician's supply of private care and allocation of time costs across public and private patients and contrast these with the first‐best allocation. To increase the willingness‐to‐pay for private treatment the physician shifts time costs to public patients. While this turns out to be socially optimal, the resulting positive network effect leads to an over‐provision of private care if time costs are sufficiently high. A second‐best allocation arises when the health authority sets public reimbursement but has no control over private provision. Depending on the welfare weight the health authority attaches to physician profits, a ban of dual practice may improve on the second‐best allocation. Notably, a ban benefits not only public patients but also private patients with a moderate propensity to benefit from private care.     

The Impact of Foreign Aid Linked to Infrastructure and Pollution Abatement

This paper studies the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid taking into account environmental quality. We develop a dynamic equilibrium model in which public investments in both infrastructure and pollution abatement can be co‐financed using domestic resources and international aid. We consider untied aid, aid fully tied to either infrastructure or abatement and aid equally tied to both expenditures. We find that when the extent to which agents are affected by environmental problems is taken into account, then, regardless of the chances of substitution between factors, transfers linked to both infrastructure and pollution abatement may be the best welfare‐enhancing alternative.     

Public overspending in higher education

We study the trade-off between governmental investments in pretertiary and tertiary education from an efficiency point of view. We develop a model comprising agents with different incomes and abilities, public and private schools, and public universities that select applicants based on an admission exam. Reallocating governmental resources from tertiary to pretertiary education may positively affect aggregate production and human capital if some conditions are satisfied. For instance, in an economy with a high proportion of credit-constrained students, a reallocation of expenditure toward public schools benefits many students, compensating for the negative effect of a decrease in public university investments. We also quantitatively investigate the optimal allocation of public investment between pretertiary and tertiary education, and we find that a 10% increase in productivity of public investments in pretertiary education could increase the optimal GDP between 2.1% and 3%.     

Microfinance and child mortality

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) offer targeted opportunities for the poor to generate additional income with a range of financial services including credit, insurance, savings accounts and money transfers. Aside from reducing poverty, microfinance can potentially improve health because it is the poor who are usually more constrained from health investments due to limited budgets. Furthermore, microfinancing specifically targets women, who are more likely to spend additional income on children’s well-being. Finally, several MFIs have also begun to offer health-related services, such as health education, health-care financing, clinical care, training community health workers, health micro-insurance and linkages to public and private health providers. Using a new data set, this article conducts the first multi-country study of the effect of microfinance on child mortality, the health outcome, which is most sensitive to the effects of absolute deprivation. Our findings confirm that an increase in the proportion of MFI clients in a country is significantly associated with lower under-five and infant mortality rates. We conclude that if MFIs’ educational and health services have indeed caused improvements in health outcomes at the community level, then it may be important for governments to complement these activities with similar campaigns, particularly in remote areas where MFI penetration is low.     

HEALTH IMPROVEMENTS AND THE TRANSITION OUT OF MALTHUSIAN STAGNATION

The central component of most economic models that analyse the transition from the Malthusian regime to self-sustaining developed economies is education. Improved health is normally envisaged as simply a by-product of economic growth. Whereas growth does, indeed, tend to improve health status, the reverse is also true, namely that health improvements are a dynamic force capable of driving economic expansion. This paper underlines the importance of health improvements in escaping from Malthusian stagnation. Further, and in contrast to existing literature, which emphasizes the effects of changes in mortality rates, this paper focuses on the relationship between health status and the efficiency of human capital technology. Through this channel, health improvements stimulate investments in child quality in terms of both nourishing and schooling and drive the economy towards the Modern Growth regime.     

Why Subsidise Private Health Insurance?

What are the economic rationales for the public subsidy of private health insurance? Inducing more people to purchase private cover has the potential to create a positive fiscal externality, as it frees up the limited public beds and other public resources for people who cannot afford private health insurance. Investigating this quantitatively, based on short‐run demand estimates, we find that the subsidy cannot be justified on the basis of this externality effect alone. We estimate that the optimal subsidy is actually negative, that is, a tax on private health insurance premiums. On the other hand, the externality does finance some of the costs. We then consider a long‐run dynamic version, consistent with the government's stated rationales for the reforms. In this context, the subsidy might be justified, or at least largely offset, by the fiscal externality. We then discuss other rationales for a subsidy and implementation issues.     

Monopoly regulation when customers need to make sunk investments: evidence from the Swedish district heating sector

Regulatory agencies routinely seek to promote price stability. A rationale for this practise might be that regulators seek to protect customers’ relationship-specific sunk investments. We develop a simple model which confirms that commitments to future rigid prices may increase welfare when customers need to make such investments. We use data from the Swedish district heating sector during the 1998–2007 period to explore the impact of monopoly pricing decisions on the take-up rate of district heating.     

INEQUALITY IN MORTALITY OVER THE LIFE COURSE: WHY THINGS ARE NOT AS BAD AS YOU THINK

Recent research shows increasing inequality in mortality among middle‐aged and older adults. But this is only part of the story. Inequality in mortality among young people has fallen dramatically in the United States converging to almost Canadian rates. Increases in public health insurance for U.S. children, beginning in the late 1980s, are likely to have contributed. (JEL D63, I18, I38, J1, J3, J18)     

Monopoly pricing with negative network effects: The case of vaccines

We study the market for vaccinations considering income heterogeneity on the demand side and monopoly power on the supply side. A monopolist has an incentive to exploit the external effect of vaccinations and leave the poor susceptible in order to increase the willingness to pay the rich. Even the possibility of price discrimination does not remove this incentive. We demonstrate that the weaknesses of standard policy measures are mitigated when income heterogeneity is taken into account. This offers an efficiency based rationale for distribution oriented national or international public health interventions.     

Health Selection and the Effect of Smoking on Mortality

We show that individuals who are in poorer health, independently from smoking, are more likely to start smoking and to smoke more cigarettes than those with better non‐smoking‐related health. We present evidence of selection, relying on extensive data on morbidity and mortality. We show that health‐based selection into smoking has increased over the last 50 years with knowledge of its health effects. We show that the effect of smoking on mortality is greater for more highly educated individuals and for individuals in good non‐smoking‐related health.     

Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing

We develop a game‐theoretic model of private–public contribution to a long‐term project with sequential actions and moral hazard. A private agent is one who is in charge of both the financial contribution and the management effort, these two actions entailing private costs and uncertain ex‐post private and social benefits. A public agent is one who decides the amount of public funding to this quasi‐public good, knowing that the size and the probability of attaining a surplus ex post depend on the private agent's effort. We consider four public‐funding scenarios: benefit‐sharing versus cost‐sharing crossed with ex‐ante versus ex‐interim government intervention. We test our theoretical predictions by means of an experiment that confirms the main result of the model: Cost‐sharing public intervention is more effective than benefit‐sharing in boosting private financial contribution to the project. Furthermore, when public intervention comes after private contribution ( ex‐interim government intervention), both public‐funding scenarios have a negative impact on the private management effort. In our model, the latter result is explained by the private agent's high degree of risk aversion. These results have policy implications for strategic investments with long‐term social consequences. In deciding the optimal timing and method of the contribution, governments should also consider the indirect effects on agents’ long‐term management efforts.     

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON HEALTH IN TAIWAN AND ITS LONG‐TERM ADJUSTMENT*

This paper investigates the dynamic change of the population health status in Taiwan. Specifically, it provides insight into the empirical determinants of health production function and explores the nature of the long‐term adjustment in health performance. For these purposes, panel data are used incorporating dynamic effects as well as controls for unobservable area‐specific effect and area‐invariant time effect. The findings are consistent with the earlier research in terms of the determinants of the health production function. The result of the present paper suggests that after decades of improvement in health care, people in Taiwan have lower age‐adjusted mortality rates. Also, the decreases in mortality rates follow a rapid pace of long‐term adjustment implying that health‐care policy that focuses on the provision of medical care services substantially benefits the nation's health.     

Effect of public programs on family size,child education and health

"A bulk of public resources in developing countries is devoted to the subvention of population control and health investments. The effects of these programs have been evaluated in this study with household and community data from Bangladesh. The results suggest that subsidy on family planning and secondary school would be most effective in the achievement of harmonious goals of reducing fertility and mortality and fostering investments in child education."     

Strategies for Fiscal Reform in the Context of the EMU: the Case of Portugal

The authors use an endogenous growth dynamic general‐equilibrium model, which accommodates the institutional constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact, to study tax reform in Portugal. Simulation results suggest that tax cuts financed in a nondistortionary way increase long‐term GDP; i.e., they are efficiency improving, but do not always increase welfare. The tradeoff between efficiency and welfare is alleviated when reductions in public spending or increased public indebtedness finance the tax cuts. Since these mechanisms are not realistic under the institutional setting of the Stability and Growth Pact, tax reform in Portugal must involve trading off distortionary tax margins. In this case, the best strategy to increase both efficiency and welfare is to increase investment tax credits and finance them either through personal income taxes or through employers’ social security contributions.