The impact of unemployment on inequality and poverty in OECD countries

The purpose of this research is to examine the contribution of unemployment to income inequality and poverty in various OECD countries. These relationships have been explored using Luxembourg Income Study micro-data. Considerable differences across OECD countries are revealed through the use of within-household unemployment distributions. These differences help to explain most of the observed divergences in the relationship between unemployment and income distribution, in conjunction with the heterogeneous influence of social benefits on the economic position of the unemployed in these countries. A sub-group decomposition analysis corroborates the limited effect of unemployment on income distribution in most of the considered countries. However, it seems clear that the unemployed are among those with the highest risk of experiencing poverty.
JEL classification: D31, I32, J31.     

Transition from unemployment benefits to social assistance in seven European OECD countries

The topic of this paper is the transition from unemployment benefit schemes to social assistance in seven European OECD countries. The unemployment benefit schemes are formally quite different in the seven countries. Most are mandatory but Denmark and Sweden have voluntary unemployment insurance and Finland has a mandatory basic scheme with a voluntary income related component on top of that. Self employed people can join the U.B. schemes in the 3 Scandinavian countries. All the U.B. schemes have working or contribution conditions to be met by the members in order to obtain eligibility for benefits. These conditions are relatively tight in the Netherlands, France and Sweden and relatively easy in Denmark and Great Britain with Germany and Finland in between (based on rules in 1994–95). Recent developments in several countries have been to tighten the access conditions to the U.B. schemes and from 1997 Denmark will be ‘on line’ with Germany. The Netherlands have tightened the access criteria very significantly in 1995. There is a considerable variation as far as the duration of the unemployment benefit period is concerned. Sweden has a benefit period in fact without effective time limitations. The Danish benefit period is also very long, 7 years now being reduced to 5 years. 5 years is also the maximum duration in the Netherlands and in France, but only after many years of work and after a relatively high age has been reached. The maximum period in Germany, 22/3 years, also requires a long work history and a relatively high age. Finland and Great Britain have uniform benefit period (just as in Denmark and Sweden), in Finland it is appr. 2 years (longer for elderly unemployed just as in Sweden and Denmark) and in Great Britain it was 1 year but from October 1996 it was reduced to 1/2 year. The differences in the duration of the benefit periods between the seven countries are very considerable. As already mentioned, there has been a tendency to reduce the benefit period in several countries. Such a change is also being considered for the ‘never ending’ benefit period in the Swedish U.B. scheme. The benefit formula is purely flat rate in Great Britain and income related in the other countries. There is a maximum benefit level in 5 of these countries, but not in Finland, where the compensation is stepwise decreasing with increasing income. In the 5 countries with income related benefits and a maximum benefit level, this maximum level is reached at a relatively low income in Denmark (2/3 APW income) and Sweden (close to APW income) and at a relatively high income in the Netherlands (appr. 1.5 APW income) and Germany (appr. 1.7 APW income) and at a very high income level in France. France is the only country among the 7, where the benefits after an initial period are being reduced regularly (every 4 months) in the benefit period down to a minimum level. Sweden and Germany have reduced the benefit levels in recent years. Denmark has the highest gross compensation percentage, 90, in relation to lost income, but it is only effective over a relatively narrow income interval, from approx. 133,000 DKK to 162,000 DKK (1996), ‘between’ the min. and max. U.B. rates. According to the 3 institutional criteria applied here, access to the schemes, duration of the benefit period and the type of benefit formula, the U.B. schemes of the seven countries studied are very different. The exit scheme from U.B is social assistance in most of the countries, but not in Germany, where it is possible to continue in a scheme with lower compensation but still income related. For Sweden it is hardly meaningful to speak of an ‘exit scheme’ when the U.B. insurance is without effective time limitations. The exit schemes in the other countries are all characterized by having flat rate benefits. All the exit schemes are means tested and this is a crucial difference to the U.B. schemes, and they are without time limitations. Means testing and no effective time limitations are usual characteristics for social assistance and social assistance like schemes. In all the countries, except in Denmark and Sweden, there is ‘topping-up’ from social assistance to a guaranteed minimum level disregarding the income sources. In the two Scandinavian countries mentioned, a ‘social event’, i.e. illness or unemployment, is required in order to be eligible for social assistance benefits. Net replacement rates are used to illustrate the levels of compensation within the U.B. and the S.A. schemes, to identify possible incentives problems, and to illustrate the economic implications of the transition from U.B. to S.A. schemes. The net replacement rates presented are calculated by using the ‘disposable income after net housing costs’ income concept. The calculations include several family types, singles and couples with and without children and for the couples with one or two incomes. A general result but with some modifications, cf. the following, could be that the U.B. based replacement rates usually are higher than the S.A. based, but that the difference is minor when the U.B. scheme is flat rate or income related with a maximum benefit level being reached at a relatively low income, for Great Britain there are in several cases no difference at all. The ‘topping-up’ has the implication that the U.B. and S.A. based replacement rates are often identical at the lower end of the income scale. The very high S.A. based replacement rates (well over 100 per cent) often seen for Denmark and Sweden at low income levels do not necessarily imply, that social assistance in those two countries is more generous than in the other countries, it is very much an effect of not having more or less automatic ‘topping-up’ to a guaranteed minimum income level when earned income is low. The single parent family type seems to have incentives problems at relatively low income levels in most of the countries, especially when receiving U.B., she may temporarily be caught in the ‘unemployment trap’. The one earner couple with children may also be exposed to the ‘unemployment trap’ but on a more permanent basis. The S.A. based replacement rates for this family type are extraordinarily high (and higher than the U.B. based) in Denmark and Sweden, where this family type, however, is very rare. For the two earner family (where one of the spouses always has earned income) the means testing of S.A. makes an impact on the S.A. based net replacement rates, they are in most cases substantially lower than the U.B. based. The results of the net replacement calculations indicate no or only minor economic implications by a transition from U.B. to S.A. in the lower end of the income scale while the effect in most cases will be more substantial in the higher end of the income scale. This is not always the case in Sweden and Denmark where S.A. for some family types are preferable to U.B. and where the difference in other cases may be so small, that it implies incentives problems for joining the voluntary U.B. scheme. The calculation of ‘long term’ (5 years) net replacement rates for families at a low income level (the point in the income distribution where only 5 per cent have lower income) and only including one earner families, reveals that either the long benefit period in the U.B. scheme (Sweden and Denmark) or ‘topping-up’ (Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain) generate ‘constant’ net replacement rates, and quite high ones, at low income levels. Only in France and to some extent in Finland will there be a decrease in net replacement rates over time. Most of the differences concerning the duration of unemployment benefit periods and to some extend the benefit formulas have no effect on the long term net replacement rates. At higher income levels the time limitations in the U.B. schemes will be visible again, except in Great Britain where the U.B. and S.A. benefits are almost identical. It is not possible to point out a ‘worst’ country with respect to ‘incentives’ problems, but the Danish, and to some degree also the Swedish, U.B. schemes with their high net replacement rates at lower income levels and long duration periods ‘stand’ out in many cases, and the S.A. schemes in those two countries may also contribute to permanent ‘unemployment traps’ as well as lack of incentives to join the voluntary insurance schemes. The two Scandinavian countries are, however, not alone with ‘incentives problems’. The section on long term net replacement rates showed that for low income levels the replacement rates were high and constant in most countries. This result is often due to ‘topping-up’ to a guaranteed minimum standard.     

Optimal welfare and in-work benefits with search unemployment and observable abilities

This paper explores the optimal interaction between the tax system and social assistance in insuring people against the risks of involuntary unemployment and low ability. To that end, we introduce search unemployment in a model of optimal non-linear income taxation. The relationship between welfare benefits and the optimal level of in-work benefits is U-shaped. This explains why in-work benefits are called for both in countries that grant low welfare benefits and countries that provide high welfare benefits. An earned-income tax credit optimally induces all agents to look for work if job search is cheap and effective, agents are not very risk averse, and the least-skilled agents are relatively productive.     

Do unemployment benefits promote or hinder job reallocation?

According to recent and largely untested theories, unemployment benefits (UBs) could improve the extent and quality of job reallocation even at the cost of increasing unemployment. In this paper, we use a new set of yearly panel data from a large number of countries to evaluate empirically the relationship between unemployment benefits and job reallocation. Unlike previous work assessing the effects of UBs on labor market stocks, we focus on flows and rely on policy “experiments,” notably the introduction from scratch of unemployment benefits in many countries. We exploit the longitudinal nature of our data to lessen the potentially important selection, endogeneity, and omitted variable problems. We find a positive, sizable, and significant effect of the introduction of UBs on job reallocation, arising mainly from the job destruction margin although this effect fades away over time. These findings appear to be robust to changes in the countries in the sample, control variables or estimation methods. We discuss to what extent our results are consistent with equilibrium matching models with or without endogenous sorting of workers into jobs providing entitlement to UBs and stochastic job matching.     

Finance and unemployment: new panel evidence

The effect of credit market imperfections on unemployment is largely investigated in the context of financial crises. This paper shifts the focus toward financial development and structure in a panel of advanced and developing countries. Some important findings emerge. Unemployment increases with financial development and concentration in banking markets but decreases with market orientation, the effect is stronger in magnitudes for young workers than female ones. More rigid market regulation increases unemployment. These findings are particularly pronounced for countries with higher income, better developed financial sectors, lower income inequality, greater trade openness, higher democracy, and common-law systems.     

Shocks and the unavoidable road to higher taxes and higher unemployment

This paper considers a matching model in which multiple steady-state unemployment rates exist if government expenditures and unemployment benefits are high enough. The focus on the extensive margin and a possible transition to a steady state with higher unemployment rates imply that the effect of tax rates can be high even when the elasticity between consumption and leisure is low. The matching friction limits transitions between steady states due to self-fulfilling expectations. After a sufficiently large increase in the unemployment rate and after a large enough increase in the tax burden caused by an exogenous increase in government spending, however, transition towards the high-unemployment steady state is unavoidable in an economy with generous unemployment benefits.     

Estimating the relationship between labour market tightness,unemployment insurance benefits and union election activity

Using detailed data from the US National Labor Relations Board, we find labour market tightness, defined as the ratio of job vacancies to the number of unemployed, has a positive relationship with the likelihood of voting in favour of union representation. Specifically, a 1 SD increase in labour market tightness increases Vote Share in favour and the likelihood of union certification by roughly 1.5% and 3%, respectively. We also find that length of unemployment insurance benefits has a positive relationship with Vote Share in favour. Taken together, these results suggest that workers are more comfortable engaging in pro-union election behaviours when exogenous conditions, like labour market tightness and unemployment insurance benefit duration, shift in a way that more favourably insulates them from unemployment and income risk.     

Unemployment Duration and Inflows onto the Disability Support Pension Program: Evidence from FaCS LDS Data

From the administrative data of the Australian Department of Family and Community Services it is found that a large proportion of Disability Support Pension (DSP) recipients transferred from unemployment benefits. Among those who transferred to DSP from unemployment benefits, a large proportion experienced multiple spells of income support receipt prior to the transition and a majority had more than a half‐year pre‐transition unemployment duration, with the average pre‐transition unemployment duration being more than one year. These findings suggest that the unemployment benefit is not simply a‘hold‐on’ benefit for those who experienced the unemployment—DSP transition. This article further examines what factors are associated with the transition. It is found that, among other things, the probability of transition to DSP from unemployment increases with duration on unemployment benefits.     

Exports, unemployment, and the welfare state

Abstract .  The paper analyzes the labour market effects of globalization when foreign market entry is costly and risky. With flexible labour markets, a fall in foreign market entry cost tends to generate more income inequality, but not necessarily so, as more firms pay foreign entry cost. By contrast, when labour markets are inflexible in the short run, globalization tends to increase unemployment. In this situation, government unemployment benefits reduce the wages that exporting firms need to pay workers as risk compensation. Thus more firms within an industry and more industries enter the foreign market, which in turn tends to increase unemployment.     

Work incentive and other effects of social assistance and unemployment benefit policy in the Czech Republic

In this paper we provide an account of most of the passive labor market policies (unemployment compensation, social assistance, state social support and the pension system) in the Czech Republic during the 1990–1996 period. The eligibility requirements and benefit levels are described in great detail. Using Labor Force Survey data, we compare the characteristics of unemployed people receiving unemployment benefits with those receiving social assistance and those not receiving any benefits and we find significant differences in their characteristics. Finally, we provide an analysis of the work disincentive effects of the unemployment and social assistance benefits by comparing these benefits to market wages and by analyzing the effect of being in the system on the duration of unemployment of two cohorts of unemployed in 1994 and 1995. We find that social assistance benefits are fairly generous for low income families with more children, individuals with these characteristics have a higher probability of receiving social assistance and they tend to stay unemployed longer than those people with relatively fewer dependants. We conclude that the social assistance scheme seems to be having some disincentive effects for at least one group in the population.     

Persistence and stochastic convergence of euro area unemployment rates*

This paper analyzes unemployment rates in the euro area (EA) countries to test for EA-related benefits and economic integration of the EA in the form of lower unemployment rates and unemployment rates convergence. We employ recently developed unit root tests with structural breaks and non-normal errors to analyze the persistence, test the stochastic convergence and locate structural break(s) in EA unemployment rates from 1995q1 to 2016q2. Our results imply a certain degree of unemployment hysteresis in the EA. Even though the results support the stochastic convergence of the majority of EA countries, we find that EA membership is not a sufficient condition for stochastic convergence. Nevertheless, EA-related breaks are followed by the periods of convergence to the EA11 average. Crisis-related breaks are followed by the periods of divergence. Although providing initial benefits, EA is not functioning as an optimal currency area.     

Episodes of unemployment reduction in rich,middle-income and transition economies

This paper studies the incidence and determinants of episodes of drastic unemployment reduction, defined as swift, substantial, and sustained declines in unemployment. We identify 43 episodes over a period of nearly 3 decades in 94 rich, middle-income and transition countries. Unemployment reductions often coincide with an acceleration of growth and an improvement in macroeconomic conditions. Episodes are much more prevalent in countries with higher levels of unemployment and, given unemployment, are more likely in countries with better regulation. An efficient legal system that enforces contracts expeditiously is particularly important for reducing unemployment. The results imply that while employment is largely related to the business cycle, better regulation reduces likelihood of high unemployment and facilitates a more rapid recovery in the event unemployment builds up.     

Technological unemployment in industrial countries

Using annual data on 21 industrial countries from the period 1985 to 2009 and a large number of controls, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of technological change on unemployment. As proxy for technological change, it uses the ratio of triadic patent families to population. According to the regression results, an increase in technological change substantially increases unemployment over 3 years. There is no long-term effect, though. The results are robust to both endogeneity and numerous variations in specifications. They support theoretical contributions according to which faster technological progress may increase unemployment, at least during a transition period.     

Does past unemployment experience explain the transition happiness gap?

The profound economic and political changes of the 1990s had detrimental social effects in many domains of life in post-socialist countries, including diminishing life expectancy and growing unhappiness. Despite economic improvements in the second decade of transition, research has documented that happiness lagged behind. We test whether past unemployment experience can explain this ”transition happiness gap in the context of Ukraine”, a country with a painful delayed transition from planned to market economy. We analyze unique longitudinal data for the period 2003–2012. Current unemployment substantially reduces subjective wellbeing, and the effect is roughly 50% larger for men than for women. The effect of past unemployment is significant, but small in magnitude compared to the effect of current unemployment. However, it does correspond to around 8% of the “transition happiness gap” found by Guriev and Melnikov (2017), suggesting that past unemployment experience can be considered as a partial explanation.     

Equilibrium unemployment, search behaviour and unemployment persistency

Unemployment persistency and high equilibrium unemployment isoften assumed to be caused by rigidities and low search efficiencyin the labour market, especially in European welfare stateswith generous income replacement schemes. These arguments aretested on data from Sweden, an old welfare state with a longperiod of full employment that has changed into a situationwith high unemployment. Data show a clear and very strong unemploymentduration dependency, but it is not possible to prove that thisis a result of low employability among the long-term unemployed.Getting a job is most of all associated with relative qualifications,recall expectations and local labour market conditions, andnot with search behaviour or high wage demands. It is arguedthat unemployment duration when unemployment is high can bestbe understood as a selection process rather than a search process,and that econometric estimations of equilibrium unemploymentare too pessimistic about the potential for an expansive economicpolicy. It is also argued that an active labour market policyis a more efficient compliment to such a policy than changesin income replacement ratios.     

Long-term unemployment, social assistance and labor market policies in Romania

Long-term unemployment in Romania has grown in both absolute and relative terms in the last few years, leading to increased expenditures, both absolutely and in relation to unemployment benefits, for the support allowance and social assistance programs and for pensions to labor force drop-outs. The paper uses a variety of data sources, including registration information, labor force surveys, and our own survey of registered unemployed (SRU) to describe these trends in the characteristics of Romanian unemployment and to examine differences across unemployment benefit (UB), short-term and long-term support allowance (SA) recipients. We employ the data to estimate the transition flow probability from the UB to the SA program; discuss the work incentives, income maintenance effects, and public costliness of the labor market and social insurance (including pension and disability) policies; and investigate the effects of the policies and of other characteristics of the unemployed and the areas where they live on the hazard for the escape rate from unemployment for UB and SA recipients separately.     

The beneficial effects of generous unemployment benefits on profits and employment

Theories of the labor market generally predict that high unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages, thus diminishing the profitability of employing labor and exacerbating unemployment. It remains to be explained why firms agree to contribute to generous schemes (replacement rates for general schemes in Europe and US are in the range 50–85%) that they are often willing to supplement (with sector- or firm-specific schemes that may involve even 100% replacement and long benefit duration). An answer can be found by including in the shirking–efficiency wage model, the hypotheses that workers are risk-averse and that those discharged for misconduct are not eligible to benefits. It is then optimal for risk-neutral firms (and for employment) to introduce an insurance scheme with full income coverage and with a duration limited only by the workers' participation constraint (there is no trade-off between level and duration of benefits). The more difficult it is to detect and fire shirkers, the higher is the rent workers enjoy above the competitive wage and the longer is the benefit duration consistent with the participation constraint. This result can be interpreted as a complementarity between the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) and the duration of benefits, which seems to conform with broad patterns observed in primary vs. secondary employment and in continental Europe vs. Anglo-Saxon countries.     

Trade in quality goods,trading regimes and unemployment in transition economies1

One of the most important consequences of the transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been the dismantling of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). It is argued in this paper that the abrupt loss of trading partners for the former CMEA countries and the Newly Independent States (NIS) are partly responsible for the ensuing contraction of output and the emergence of unemployment. A model in which trade is conducted in vertically-differentiated products is constructed with the implication that the dismantling of ‘clearing trade’arrangements among CMEA countries may make unemployment more than just a short-term phenomenon.     

A comparison of unemployment, income and mortality interaction for five European countries

The relationship between unemployment and health status is examined in a comparative study of five European countries using a time series model. "The hypothesis considered in this paper is that the secular decline in mortality rates can be attributed to the secular rise in real per capita income and that the remaining fluctuations in mortality rates can be explained by cyclical movements in income and variations in unemployment." The data concern the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and Ireland.     

Income inequality,unemployment, and poverty in Nigeria: a vector autoregressive approach

The main features of poverty are low levels of consumption and income, a fact‐of‐life in most African countries. This paper analyzes the fundamental trends of per capita income, government capital expenditure, the human development index, and the rate of unemployment in the Nigeria. A vector autoregressive model finds that: A reduced unemployment rate improves human development and consequently reduces poverty. As growth in public capital expenditure rises, unemployment falls and the human development index improves. Therefore, infrastructure‐based policies, which initially reduce unemployment, will also improve the living conditions of Nigerians in the end.