Long-term unemployment, social assistance and labor market policies in Romania

Long-term unemployment in Romania has grown in both absolute and relative terms in the last few years, leading to increased expenditures, both absolutely and in relation to unemployment benefits, for the support allowance and social assistance programs and for pensions to labor force drop-outs. The paper uses a variety of data sources, including registration information, labor force surveys, and our own survey of registered unemployed (SRU) to describe these trends in the characteristics of Romanian unemployment and to examine differences across unemployment benefit (UB), short-term and long-term support allowance (SA) recipients. We employ the data to estimate the transition flow probability from the UB to the SA program; discuss the work incentives, income maintenance effects, and public costliness of the labor market and social insurance (including pension and disability) policies; and investigate the effects of the policies and of other characteristics of the unemployed and the areas where they live on the hazard for the escape rate from unemployment for UB and SA recipients separately.     

Long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment benefits: The changing nature of non-employment subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe

Non-employment rates in all central and eastern European countries have increased dranatically thoroughout the transition and are currently larger than those of the lowest income OECD countries. Non-employment benefits other than unemployment benefits are providing income support to this growing number of able-bodied individuals out of work. Under the present design of unemployment benefits and social assistance, there may be serious incentive problems related to the shift from unemployment benefits to other, means-tested, non-employment benefits and this shift occurs in transition countries at rather early stages of an unemployment spell; these incentive problems are bound to become particularly acute in a less inflationary environment.     

The social costs of unemployment: accounting for unemployment duration

This article contributes to the literature on unemployment and well-being by investigating the linkage between personal life satisfaction and a macroeconomic indicator of the duration of unemployment. Using data for more than 50?000 individuals in 10 European countries, 1992–2002, we find that the social costs of unemployment, in terms of general unemployment's impact on life satisfaction, relate significantly and to a considerable extent to unemployment duration. It is thus not just the risk of becoming or staying unemployed that people worry about, but especially the prospect of staying long-term unemployed. This fear affects employed and unemployed people alike. Our findings provide a strong point for focusing labour market policies on long-term unemployment, in addition to considerations of human capital depreciation.     

Recurrent unemployment,welfare benefits and heterogeneity

The objective of this paper is to investigate the causes of the recurrences of individuals in unemployment during benefit periods. So as to attain this objective, we use administrative data from the Spanish Employment Agency to estimate a duration model with multiple spells that allows for unemployment state dependence through lagged unemployment duration in order to distinguish the heterogeneity and scarring effects. We find that an increase in the duration of previous unemployment benefit periods lengthens the expected duration of future unemployment benefit periods. True state dependence and heterogeneity, intensity of job search and local labour market conditions are among the elements that explain this unemployment state dependence.     

Jobs specialization versus unemployment: more on the productivity effect of unemployment benefits

We use the Marimon and Zilibotti (Econ J 109: 266–291, 1999) circle model and we endogenize the choice of the degree of specialization of jobs. We show that an increase in unemployment benefits not only reduces the mismatch of talents (as in Marimon and Zilibotti), but it also raises the degree of specialization of jobs. This reinforces the productivity enhancing effects of unemployment benefits.      

The beneficial effects of generous unemployment benefits on profits and employment

Theories of the labor market generally predict that high unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages, thus diminishing the profitability of employing labor and exacerbating unemployment. It remains to be explained why firms agree to contribute to generous schemes (replacement rates for general schemes in Europe and US are in the range 50–85%) that they are often willing to supplement (with sector- or firm-specific schemes that may involve even 100% replacement and long benefit duration). An answer can be found by including in the shirking–efficiency wage model, the hypotheses that workers are risk-averse and that those discharged for misconduct are not eligible to benefits. It is then optimal for risk-neutral firms (and for employment) to introduce an insurance scheme with full income coverage and with a duration limited only by the workers' participation constraint (there is no trade-off between level and duration of benefits). The more difficult it is to detect and fire shirkers, the higher is the rent workers enjoy above the competitive wage and the longer is the benefit duration consistent with the participation constraint. This result can be interpreted as a complementarity between the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) and the duration of benefits, which seems to conform with broad patterns observed in primary vs. secondary employment and in continental Europe vs. Anglo-Saxon countries.     

Running out of time: Limited unemployment benefits and reservation wages

We study unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium environment in which unemployed workers only receive benefits for a finite length of time. Although all workers have identical productivity and leisure value, the random arrival of job offers creates ex-post differences with respect to their time remaining until benefit expiration. Firms, which are also homogeneous, can exploit these differences, leading to an endogenous wage distribution.This allows us to examine the equilibrium effect of policy changes in both the size and length of UI benefits. Surprisingly, an increase in benefits can actually cause wages to fall, which is contrary to the predictions of on-the-job-search models. Moreover, we explain well-documented patterns of how the hazard rate of exiting unemployment responds to these policy changes. Our theory also explains why this hazard rate jumps at the time of benefit exhaustion.     

Long-term unemployment, the invention of 'hysteresis' and the misdiagnosis of structural unemployment in the UK

This paper investigates the empirical basis for the belief thatunemployment makes people less ‘employable’, andthat the existence of a pool of long-term unemployed peopleis therefore in itself a barrier to full employment. Drawingon data for Great Britain from the 1940s to the present day,it shows that this idea has arisen through misinterpretationsof the statistical evidence. The resulting policies, besidesdiverting resources from the demand-side programmes appropriateto the true situation of structural unemployment, appear tohave created a problem of the kind they were intended to address,by encouraging unemployed people to move onto sickness benefits.     

Enterprise restructuring and social benefits

Soviet era firms provided generous social benefits, including health and child care. Despite recent cuts, firm survey data show that benefits have remained a major component of total compensation. With benefits largely firm-specific and firms dominated by insiders, continuing attachment of workers as well as widespread informal sector participation has resulted. This has impeded restructuring, in part by generating significant set-up costs for new private firms. We simulate the effects of a cut in subsidies to benefits provision. We show that while this leads to falls in benefits and employment and an increase in wages, the outcome critically depends on the availability of alternative providers. The key to cushioning these adverse consequences is the stimulation of a market in benefits provision. Given initial conditions, rapid removal of benefits supports will require transitional income support scheme of transitional support and show that it can be financed from the savings from removal of current subsidies to benefits.     

Long-term appointment of central bankers: costs and benefits

Why do independent central bank boards have a reputation for more moderate policy than do elected governments, even if the board's members have been appointed by the current or former government? This paper gives an explanation for the case of a political world with ‘zeitgeist shocks’ on the electorate's preferences. If the median position of preferences inside the board determines the monetary policy, a trade-off concerning member term length arises: a longer term entails more moderation, while enhancing the likelihood of detachment from contact to the electorate's current preferences.     

Partial unemployment insurance benefits and the transition rate to regular work

In Finland, unemployed workers who are looking for a full-time job but take up a part-time or very short full-time job may qualify for partial unemployment benefits. In exchange for partial benefits, these applicants must continue their search of regular full-time work. This study analyzes the implications of working on partial benefits for subsequent transitions to regular employment. The timing-of-events approach is applied to distinguish between causal and selectivity effects associated with the receipt of partial benefits. The results suggest that partial unemployment associated with short full-time jobs facilitates transitions to regular employment. Also part-time working on partial benefits may help men (but not women) in finding a regular job afterwards.     

Hysteresis in the development of unemployment: the EU and US experience

We examine hysteresis in EU and US unemployment by panel unit root tests. First generation tests indicate that unemployment is stationary. Second generation tests show mixed results. Idiosyncratic components are stationary in the US. A unit root in the US common component depends on the starting point of the sample. While the common component is nonstationary over the whole period, it is mean-reverting after initial observations are dropped. Hysteresis in EU unemployment is attributed to idiosyncratic, but not to common components. The findings might reflect a different regulation of labour markets and a lower degree of migration in the EU.     

Equilibrium unemployment, search behaviour and unemployment persistency

Unemployment persistency and high equilibrium unemployment isoften assumed to be caused by rigidities and low search efficiencyin the labour market, especially in European welfare stateswith generous income replacement schemes. These arguments aretested on data from Sweden, an old welfare state with a longperiod of full employment that has changed into a situationwith high unemployment. Data show a clear and very strong unemploymentduration dependency, but it is not possible to prove that thisis a result of low employability among the long-term unemployed.Getting a job is most of all associated with relative qualifications,recall expectations and local labour market conditions, andnot with search behaviour or high wage demands. It is arguedthat unemployment duration when unemployment is high can bestbe understood as a selection process rather than a search process,and that econometric estimations of equilibrium unemploymentare too pessimistic about the potential for an expansive economicpolicy. It is also argued that an active labour market policyis a more efficient compliment to such a policy than changesin income replacement ratios.     

Technological choices and unemployment benefits in a matching model with heterogenous workers

This article aims at understanding the interactions between public policies, such as unemployment benefit systems, and firms’ technological choices. For this purpose, we use a matching model in which workers are vertically differentiated and where the nature of jobs is endogenous. We show that an improvement in unemployment benefits leads to an increase in productivity by making agents more selective and jobs more complex. However, the impact on labour market participation is negative.     

Limiting the system and reshaping lifestyles: Solving unemployment by social and technical innovations

We have become used to seeing crises in growth, unemployment, and inflation as purely economic problems that can be overcome by suitable economic and political means. One basic assumption of the following reflection however, is that the above might be only half the picture. To paraphrase a formula of Friedrich Engels, the concern is not “in the first and last instance” with questions of the “economic basis,” but with questions of the current images of human kind, social milieus and lifestyles. Solutions will thus tend to lie in social innovations and reorganization of the System insofar as they complement the new lifestyles.     

Wages fund, high wages, and social conflict in a classical model of unemployment equilibrium

The aim of the paper is to provide an explanation of involuntary unemployment in a classical (post-Ricardian) framework. The model describes a three-stage bargaining process with four agents (governments, firms, unions, workers). In the first stage, firms determine the wage offered, following a short-run version of the wages fund theory. In the second stage, unionists determine the wage demanded, which depends on workers’ tendency to conflict, while firms decide the number of employed under a “right to manage” hypothesis. In the third stage, governments tax the wages fund and pay unemployment benefits. Public intervention is subject to a trade-off between accumulation and legitimation.     

Earnings,social security legislation and retirement decisions: the Austrian experience

This paper analyses the labour supply behaviour of elderly males in Austria and asks how far it is determined by the characteristics of the Austrian Social Security System. This is of particular interest because old age insurance in Austria is dominated by the public pension plan, so that private pension plans are of minor importance. I argue that from a theoretical point of view the actuarial unfairness of the insurance plan creates a strong incentive to withdraw from the labour force at the minimum retirement age. Secondly, the rising earnings replacement ratio might be responsible for the decreasing average retirement age. These hypotheses are tested empirically. A pooled time-series cross-sections labour force participation model is estimated for single birth year cohorts of elderly males. I find strong evidence for the proposition, that the age-participation pattern might be determined by the incentives created by social security and that the decrease in labour force participation rates over time may be due to the rising earnings replacement ratio. Remaining differences in labour force participation of elderly males may be attributable to cohort population size and to a long run trend.