Privatization,political risk and stock market development in emerging economies

This paper investigates whether privatization in emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through the resolution of political risk. We argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty over political commitment to a market-oriented policy as well as to regulatory and private property rights. We present evidence suggesting that progress in privatization is indeed correlated with improvements in perceived political risk. Our analysis further shows that changes in political risk in general tend to have a strong effect on local stock market development and excess returns in emerging economies. We conclude that the resolution of political risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the rapid growth of stock markets in emerging economies.     

China׳s secondary privatization: Perspectives from the Split-Share Structure Reform

The Split-Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), opening up the gate to China?s secondary privatization. The expectation of privatization quickly boosted SOE output, profits, and employment, but did not change their operating efficiency and corporate governance. The improvements to SOE performance are positively correlated to government agents’ privatization-led incentive of increasing state-owned share value. In terms of privatization methodology, the reform adopted a market mechanism that played an effective information discovery role in aligning the interests of the government and public investors.     

Post-totalitarian transition: risk and opportunity

The risk of the post-totalitarian transition is identified as the populistic syndrome: in a short-term perspective the totalitarian psychology, though usually disguised, still prevails. The opportunity lies in a longer-term privatization process, which is an economic and—perhaps even more important—a social task, namely through combining educational programmes with the participation of the workforce. This argument is developed in essay scenario form.     

Controlling shareholder,expropriations and firm's leverage decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable share reform

This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for tunneling rather than investing in positive NPV projects. We also find that excess leverage in firms with excess control rights decreases and the market reaction to announcements of related party transactions are more positive after NTS reform. This confirms that tunneling by the controlling shareholders actually reduced. We argue that in emerging markets where legal protection for creditors and shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders borrow excess debt to tunnel through inter-corporate loans and related party transactions. Furthermore the privatization of these economies can reduce the controlling shareholders' tunneling activities and associated excess leverage which destroys firm value.     

Automating german equity trading: Bid-ask spreads on competing systems

As a result of automating trading in the most active German stocks, data on bid-ask spreads on three competing system—IBIS, MATIS, and SEAQ International—have become available. The intraday pattern of spreads suggests a mid-session effect and a home-market effect. Contrary to what one might expect, the spreads for identical stocks differ substantially from system to system. Paradoxically, the system with the lowest spreads, MATIS, did not attract most of the volume. Actually, its market share declined. In an attempt to explain the MATIS paradox we hypothesize that bid-ask spreads compensate the market maker for a bundle of several transaction services of which providing immediacy is merely one. This complicates both national and international spread comparisons and has implications for the decomposition of observed bid-ask spreads.     

Privatization as an agency problem: Auctions versus private negotiations

This paper investigates the design of privatization mechanisms in emerging market economies characterized by political constraints that limit the set of viable privatization options. Our objective is to explain the striking diversity of mechanisms observed in practice and the frequent use of an apparently sub-optimal privatization mechanism: private negotiations.     

A re-examination of China’s share issue privatization

Previous studies show that in contrast to evidence that share issue privatization (SIP) in most other countries have improved firm profitability, China’s SIP of the 1990s had no such effect. We argue that the main reason for the failure of China’s SIP is likely to have been the weak institutional environment in place at that time. We examine China’s SIP in a more recent period in which the institutional environment was greatly improved. Using a matching sample method, we find that SIP firms continued to experience negative post-SIP profitability changes in our sample period. However, their performance decline was significantly less than that of their matched non-SIP SOEs. We also find that the introduction of the independent director rule helped to improve firm performance. Our results reconcile the findings of the SIP effect in China with international evidence and illustrate the importance of a developed capital market to ensuring the success of privatization schemes.     

The dynamics of privatization, the legal environment and stock market development

In this paper, we examine under which conditions privatization is an effective means to develop local stock markets for a panel of 61 countries over the last twenty four years. By addressing the endogeneity between privatization and stock market development, we show for the 1980-98 period that the initial legal environment is a significant contemporary determinant of stock market development, while privatization is not. When we examine the dynamics of privatization in interaction with the legal environment, we find that privatization has a two-year-lagged effect on stock market development in emerging markets, and a one-year-lagged effect in developed countries. Results for the 1999-2003 period seem to be largely affected by the global crash that followed the Asian crisis.     

Re-engineering the teaching of bond liabilities

Re-engineering, popular in today's business world, emphasizes work simplification — analyzing tasks to identify and drive out unnecessary procedures — so as to accomplish the end result in less time. It is appropriate to apply re-engineering to accounting education, especially to topics that require considerable classroom time to cover and present unnecessary difficulty for the student to understand. Considerations of premium, discount and their amortization complicate the teaching of bond liabilities. Yet these concepts are totally unnecessary — they are artificial constructs of the accountant, not real events. By re-engineering the approach to teaching bond liabilities, we can eliminate these complications and simplify the task for both professor and student. Using an approach built around the amount borrowed, market interest rate, and repayment pattern, together with a one-size-fits-all amortization schedule, enables the topic of bond liabilities to be taught effectively, in less time and with fewer pages of text material than currently employed.     

Competition and Efficiency after Privatization: The Role of the NAO

One of the arguments for privatization is to promote market competition in order to facilitate efficiency gains. This review of NAO privatization reports shows that the promotion of competition is rarely stated as an objective of a privatization and, where it is, it can lead to difficulties in drawing objective audit conclusions. The work of the regulators is of considerable importance after privatization; and a more recent role for the NAO is that of responsibility for the financial audit and value-for-money studies of these regulators. These NAO studies provide new opportunities to review the effectiveness of the regulators and to promote accountability in competition policy after privatization.     

Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation

Many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial-market turmoil. We develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation. In the model, asset issuers can shop for ratings—observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable—before auctioning their assets. When assets are simple, agencies’ ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low. When assets are sufficiently complex, ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges. Thus, an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings, despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset's true quality. Increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem. Switching to an investor-initiated ratings system alleviates the bias, but could collapse the market for information.     

Privatization and stock market liquidity

This paper shows that share issue privatization (SIP) is a major source of domestic stock market liquidity in 19 developed economies. Particularly, privatization IPOs have a negative effect on the price impact – measured by the ratio of the absolute return on the market index to turnover. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for other observable and unobservable factors, having also considered the endogenous nature of the decision to privatize.     

The People's Republic of China: Rapid growth and the risk of economic instability

Conclusion At the People's Congress this March, the Chinese leadership restated its commitment to continue with, and accelerate the economic reform programme. Several important steps along the road to reform have already been taken. At the same time, a number of domestic and foreign-trade developments call for important decisions to be made: China will only escape from the cycle of inflationary expansion and subsequent contraction of economic activity if the taxation system and enterprise management and administration — including a clear definition of ownership and managerial rights — are restructured. Only when public revenue is at a high and constant level and an effective capital market is in operation will the state be in a position to realise its ambitious investment programme without recourse to central-bank borrowing and thus without continually creating an inflationary potential. The support of a broad majority of the population, who are increasingly keen to participate in determining the course of economic policy, will also be required if the reforms are to succeed.     

The property rights game: Discovering the meaning of private property

In this paper we discuss the results of an educational game we have developed. This game deals with the acquisition, use, and transfer of private property rights in land and shows participants the importance of property rights in market economies. While our findings are not scientific, they do show that production in a society with solely communal property collapses while production in a society with private property flourishes. We hope that these results encourage others to use this exercise as an educational experience for students.     

Privatization and Fiscal Deficits in European Emerging Markets

Privatization and fiscal deficits have been linked theoretically as emerging market countries completed transitions from command to market-based economies. This study examines the joint relationships among relative fiscal deficits, privatization, and exogenous factors for twenty-five Central and Eastern European emerging market countries. Pooled regression models suggest that increased privatization does not reduce fiscal deficits, but fiscal deficits increase as privatization increases over time. These effects are dependent upon the set of countries considered and the privatization measure employed. There is limited support for the hypothesis that privatization is increased when fiscal deficits decline for the nine early privatizers.     

从制度经济学角度分析土地流转

我国农村土地制度具有三个特点:等级性、社区封闭性和政府控制。与产权残缺相比,土地的保障功能更可能是减少供给从而阻碍土地流转的主要原因。土地承包权只有成为物权,才能表现为一种具有交换价值的独立资产。赋予农户以处分权的意义也在于使承包者能够将承包权当作独立的交换价值进行流转。只有存在完整意义上的承包经营权,才谈得上形成土地使用权流转的市场机制。     

民营化、融资约束与企业创新——来自中国工业企业的证据

本文研究国有企业民营化对企业创新的影响及其影响机制。利用中国工业企业数据库,以民营化企业为实验组、以国有企业为对照组进行双重差分检验,结果发现,国有企业民营化显著抑制了企业创新,而融资约束是抑制民营化企业创新的重要因素。进一步检验发现,融资约束对民营化企业创新的抑制作用主要存在于金融发展水平较低的地区,而在金融发展水平较高的地区,这种抑制作用并不明显。本文的研究结果从融资约束的角度拓展了民营化影响企业创新的相关研究,且从民营化的角度为金融市场如何影响企业创新提供了新的视角。此外,本文有助于澄清有关民营化的争议,为进一步深化混合所有制改革、加强金融对民营企业的支持以促进民营企业的创新和发展提供理论依据和政策参考。     

The Information Environment of China's A and B Shares: Can We Make Sense of the Numbers?

In 1990, three stock exchanges were opened in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing. Partial privatization of China's enterprises began with offering two types of shares: A shares are sold only domestically to locals and are denominated in local currency; B shares are denominated in dollars and are sold only to foreign investors. All listed firms offer A shares, but to qualify for offering B shares, the firm must prepare financial statements in accordance with International Accounting Standards and also meet other requirements. Firms issuing A shares only adopt domestic accounting regulations.As a way of generating capital funds, market segmentation has been a success. Both types of shares, however, have two different information environments. The environment of A shares appears to be dominated by local regulations and customs at the time of offering or trading. The information environment of A shares appears to be relatively unstructured and is affected by informal communication between various groups. Other than the roles played by state officials and appointed managers, external monitoring of A shares appears to be limited. Independence and social acceptance of auditing appear to be making slow progress, especially when the majority of domestic CPA firms are government owned. In contrast, the information environment for the B shares is more structured because (1) financial reporting adheres to International Accounting Standards, (2) financial statements are audited by CPA firms with international practice; and (3) foreign investors — mainly large financial institutions — also act as external monitors.We elaborate on the differences between these two information environments and suggest that accounting earnings and A share prices are not correlated, but earnings and share prices are correlated for B shares. In an event-study approach, we find results inconsistent with both hypotheses — for 1994 and 1995 we find that earnings and unexpected returns are correlated for A shares but not for B shares. The high price volatility, the significant and continuing dominance of government officials, and the thinness of trade in B shares are offered as possible explanation for these results.     

Railroad Development and Land Value

Land owners in the rural Midwest experienced significant capital gains during the late 1840s and early 1850s. A primary catalyst of increasing land values was the construction of new railroads. Land in close proximity to new railroads became more valuable because of decreased transportation costs. We use a straightforward model of land price determination to estimate the impact on land values of distance from the railroad. The estimates allow us to infer a lower bound for capital gains attributable to the construction of railroads in Knox County, Illinois, during the 1850s. Knox County landowners reaped capital gains of more than $270,000—9% of the value of land.     

地权稳定与农业生产

本文以《农村土地承包法》在省一级层面的实施作为政策冲击,研究稳定的农村土地承包经营权对农业生产效率等的影响及其作用机制。主要研究结论如下:第一,稳定的农地承包经营权能够增强经营主体对未来的确定性预期,保障各方市场主体的合法权益,活跃土地流转并有效提升农业生产效率;第二,《农村土地承包法》的实施促进了农户转出而非转入土地,农业生产效率提升主要源自稳定产权的直接激励效应以及由此带来的资源配置效率改进,稳定的农地产权能够促进土地有效流转,优化农户农业生产与劳动配置决策;第三,地权稳定性改革有效缓解了因人口流出与区位劣势造成的农业生产效率损失,显著提高了农户的务工收入以及整体收入水平。本文研究结论表明,合理的制度设计能够提升农业生产效率,提高农村土地和劳动力资源的配置效率。清晰的产权设计、合理的预期管理是实现市场化资源配置的必要条件。