差别化存款保险费率与银行风险承担——基于我国农村银行的经验证据

本文拓展了Freixas and Rochet(2008)的理论模型,证明存款保险差别化费率机制对银行风险承担具有抑制作用,在此基础上选取我国农村银行为研究对象,运用2015—2019年某省119家法人投保机构进行实证检验。研究发现:引入差别化费率设计显著降低了农村银行的风险承担;这一作用存在异质性,对于自身风险承担水平较低、资产规模较大的农村银行来说,抑制作用更为明显。进一步研究发现,差别化费率机制在一定程度上缓和了农信社改制短期内对农商行风险可能造成的不利影响。本文结论对加强存款保险制度的早期纠正功能、防范化解金融风险以及深化农村金融机构改革具有一定的理论意义和参考价值。     

Bank risk,competition and bank connectedness with firms: A literature review

The outbreak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and of the European sovereign debt crisis again raised questions about the vulnerability and the behaviour of banking institutions. The unconventional monetary policies that followed have flattened the yield curve and created a low interest rates environment. This can give rise to risk-taking behaviour from banks and can therefore undermine the stability of the banking system with negative impact of the credit supply, corporate investment and real economy. This article proposes a literature review on the main determinants of bank lending and risk-taking decisions, going through the competition in the banking market, the bank connectedness with firms and the role of monetary and banking authorities. The systemic risk concept is also discussed as well as its drivers and potential measures that should be monitored by prudential authorities in order to preserve financial stability.     

Using an Alternative Estimation Method to Perform Comprehensive Empirical Tests: An Application to Interest Rate Risk-Management

Using a sample of 241 U.S. bank holding companies, we test all relevant rationales for corporate risk-management activities related to interest rate risk. Three main results emerge: (1) measurement error and the possibility of multiple influences on the model's proxy variables indicate that the confirmatory factor analysis method can provide a more accurate and comprehensive test of interest rate risk-management rationales than conventional estimation techniques, (2) the corporate risk-management theories most consistently supported are those related to financial distress costs and firm size, and (3) an exogenous factor related to interest rate volatility negatively influences a firm's interest rate risk exposure.     

货币政策和银行风险承担：一种非线性关系

宽松的货币政策会通过估值、收入和现金流机制,追逐收益机制以及中央银行沟通和反应机制等渠道增加银行风险承担,通过风险转移机制降低银行风险承担,从而导致货币政策与银行风险承担之间可能存在复杂的非线性关系。本文使用面板阈值模型,基于我国银行业数据研究了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,发现我国货币政策对银行风险承担的影响存在门限效应,即货币政策对银行风险承担的影响取决于货币政策基准利率偏离泰勒规则利率的程度。当这种偏离小于门限值时,宽松货币政策会增加银行风险承担;当这种偏离大于门限值时,宽松货币政策会降低银行风险承担。本文研究对更好地理解我国货币政策对银行风险承担及金融稳定的影响有一定参考意义。     

金融开放与银行风险承担的异质性研究——基于98个国家的实证分析

金融开放是加剧银行业风险还是分散风险,是颇具争议的研究课题。本文借助Gygli et al.(2018)的金融开放指标,应用1999-2016年98个国家的跨国数据,检验了金融开放和银行风险承担的长期均衡和短期关系。从长期均衡关系来看,金融开放显著地提高了银行抵御风险能力,具有长期"促进效应";从短期关系来看,金融开放则存在一定"风险效应"①。进一步研究发现,短期"风险效应"与外资银行资产占比不存在关联,而与市场制度环境显著相关,即完善的制度环境有助于弱化"风险效应"。结合中国实际情况,文章支持"以开放促改革"的观点,强调完善市场制度环境的重要性,为政策制定者提供实证依据。     

环境灾害冲击对银行违约率的影响效应研究:理论与实证分析

本文通过模型模拟和基于中国数据的实证检验,分析了环境灾害损失冲击对于银行违约率的影响。本文模型模拟的结果显示,环境灾害冲击会显著提升银行体系的违约率水平,同时伴随着企业融资溢价水平的提升以及整个经济活动的萎缩;实证研究发现:环境灾害损失冲击会导致银行违约率水平显著提升。且与理论分析一致,本文实证发现宏观经济不确定性水平、企业的资本折损以及全要素生产率的下降在环境灾害影响银行违约率的过程中发挥了显著的传导作用。进一步研究发现,环境灾害冲击及其导致的银行违约率上升还会降低银行的风险偏好水平,降低放贷规模和主动风险承担,并反作用于实体企业,提升企业的融资约束和成本。本文的研究结论丰富了基于中国视角的环境物理风险研究,刻画了环境灾害损失对于银行风险的影响及其后续效应,为政策部门防范气候环境风险提供了借鉴。     

Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.     

Financial statement comparability and bank risk-taking

This study examines the relationship between financial statement comparability and bank risk-taking. Our analysis of a sample of publicly listed U.S. banks over the 1994–2019 period shows that banks with more comparable financial statements are related to significantly less risk-taking. We also find that the negative relationship between comparability and risk-taking is more pronounced for firms with more severe moral hazard and agency problems. Our documented findings are robust across alternative measures of comparability and risk-taking and considering change analysis, after controlling for strength of corporate governance and using propensity score matching and two-stage least squares estimation to address endogeneity concerns. Our analysis also shows that the relationship between financial statement comparability and bank risk-taking is stronger for smaller banks than for larger banks. Overall, this study provides unique insights into the role of financial statement comparability in curbing risk-taking in the banking sector.     

互联网金融、存款竞争与银行风险承担

本文通过构建纳入互联网金融的银行环形城市模型,推演了“互联网金融→存款结构/付息成本→银行风险承担”的传导机制。在此基础上,以2003-2016年我国83家商业银行为样本,建立多重中介效应模型进行实证检验。研究结果表明:(1)互联网金融发展经由恶化存款结构和抬高付息成本两种渠道显著加重了银行风险承担水平,其中,恶化存款结构效应的相对贡献为50%左右,抬高付息成本效应的相对贡献为35%左右;(2)相较于互联网渠道构筑业态,互联网支付结算、互联网资源配置和互联网财富管理业态对银行存款结构和付息成本的不利影响更为强烈;(3)相对于国有、大规模、低流动性和低资本充足率商业银行,面对互联网金融的冲击,非国有、小规模、高流动性和高资本充足率商业银行的客户存款流失更快,平均付息成本上涨更多。     

第三方合作存款与商业银行风险承担

近年来与第三方互联网平台合作推出存款产品一度成为部分中小银行吸收存款的重要手段,监管部门对此高度关注并出台监管措施,但相关的学术研究较为匮乏。本文基于国内上市银行2012—2020年的面板数据,实证分析开展第三方合作存款业务对银行风险承担的影响并考察内在机理。研究发现,开展该业务显著提高了银行风险承担水平,表现为加权风险资产的扩张及高风险行业信贷资产配置的提升。机制研究表明,合作银行的储蓄存款规模显著扩张,流动性资金的过快增长刺激银行信贷向高利率贷款、高风险行业倾斜。本文研究对完善互联网存款监管,防控商业银行风险具有一定的启示意义。     

公司治理、资本监管与银行风险承担

选取2007-2017年中国25家上市银行数据,采用面板回归模型对公司治理与资本监管对银行风险承担的影响进行实证分析。研究表明：股权集中度与银行风险承担之间呈正U型关系,较低的股权集中度会降低银行风险资产配置权重,股权集中度的提升会加大银行风险承担。董事会规模会促进银行风险承担,董事会规模过大将平滑单个董事表决权,导致董事会控制效率下降而引发银行经营决策频繁变动,由此加大银行风险承担。资本监管会抑制银行风险承担,资本监管的趋严促使银行减持风险资产进行资本补充;资本监管对股份制银行、国有大型银行与城农商银行风险承担的影响力度依次递减。货币供给增速的放缓将降低银行存款吸收能力,由此加大银行流动性风险,货币供给对银行信贷存在制约效应;经济增速的下调将降低企业盈利能力,由此加大银行风险承担,银行存在顺周期放贷倾向。     

The Association Between Market and Exchange Rate Risks and Accounting Variables: A GARCH Model of the Japanese Banking Institutions

This study has two purposes. First, it estimates the market, interest rate, and exchange rate sensitivities (betas) of the Japanese banking institutions. Second, it investigates the relationship between the market-based measures of risk and accounting-based financial ratios. We extend the literature in three important ways. First, we employ a multi-factor GARCH model to estimate the betas. This framework incorporates non-linearities in the bank stock return modeling and allows for time-varying risk premia. Second, we investigate the determinants of market and exchange rate risk in terms of bank financial ratios. To this end, we regress the beta measures derived from the GARCH model against the corporate decision variables to determine the direction and the magnitude of the impact of the latter on the market and exchange rate risk exposures. Third, by using data on the Japanese banking institutions, we provide a comparison of the bank interest rate and exchange rate sensitivities and the strength of the links between the risk measure and the corporate decision variables between the U.S. and the Japanese banking institutions. This comparison sheds light on the robustness of the results concerning interest rate and exchange rate risk, and their determinants, across the two countries. Several interesting results are obtained. First, empirical results indicate that interest rate is only occasionally significant while market and exchange rate variables are significant for all the banks in the sample. Second, market and exchange rate risk measures do impound information in the financial ratios with the explanatory power of the market beta model being higher than that of the exchange rate beta model. Third, the association of the market-based risk measures and the financial ratios is weaker for the Japanese banks than those found for their U.S. counterparts in the existing literature.JEL Classification: G21, F37     

极端气候对商业银行风险承担的影响——来自中国地方性商业银行的经验证据

深化对气候相关金融风险的认识,对于促进绿色低碳发展,防范系统性金融风险具有重要意义。本文以2004—2018年期间281家中国地方性商业银行为样本,实证检验了极端气候对银行风险承担的影响及其机制。研究发现,极端强降水气候显著提升了银行风险承担,极端高温和极端低温气候对银行风险承担不存在明显影响。极端强降水主要通过给银行信贷主体带来经济损失,影响违约概率和银行信贷资产质量,进而影响银行风险承担水平;提高灾前的保险保障水平、强化碳减排机制以及确保银行资本的充足性均有利于弱化极端气候对银行风险承担的影响;相较于以地级和省会城市工商业和居民为主要服务对象的地方性商业银行,极端强降水对以“三农”为主要服务对象的县域地方性商业银行风险承担的影响更大。因此,提升商业银行应对极端气候风险意识,提高气候灾害保险保障水平,强化碳减排机制和银行资本充足管理,均有利于降低极端气候对银行风险的影响。     

对外开放是否导致银行业的风险上升？——基于外资持股比例与海外资产占比的实证检验

对外开放是否导致商业银行的风险上升,以往学者的研究结论并不统一。本文基于中国392家商业银行的微观数据,检验了“引进来”(用外资持股比例作为替代指标)与“走出去”(用海外资产占比作为替代指标)对商业银行风险承担行为的影响。结果显示,对外开放与商业银行的风险之间呈现非线性曲线特征并存在临界点;对中小型商业银行而言,过高的外资持股比例与过低的境外投资规模会带来风险;对大型商业银行而言,境外投资规模存在一个阈值区间,在阈值区间内,可能导致银行风险上升。政策建议是:外资参股中小型商业银行的比例可能不宜过高,鼓励中小型商业银行加大境外投资力度,大型商业银行可以根据特定时期的目标来调整对外开放策略,同时应强化风险预警与防范手段,在坚持与扩大银行业对外开放的背景下,实施宏观审慎原则,维护我国金融体系的整体稳定。     

Political institutions and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines the impact of political institutions on bank risk-taking behavior. Using an international sample of banks from 98 countries over the period 1998–2007, I document that sound political institutions stimulate higher bank risk-taking. This is consistent with the hypotheses that better political institutions increase banks’ risk by boosting the credit market competition from alternative sources of finance and generating the moral hazard problems due to the expectation of government bailouts in worst economic conditions. While it is contrary to the hypotheses that better political institutions decrease banks’ risk by lowering the government expropriation risk and the information asymmetries between banks and borrowers. The results are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including alternative proxies of bank risk-taking and political institutions, cross-sectional bank- and country-level regressions, endogeneity concerns of political institutions, country income levels, explicit deposit insurance schemes and sample extension from 1998 to 2014. I also examine the interdependence between political and legal institutions and find that political and legal institutions complement each other to influence bank risk-taking behavior.     

货币供应量、利率与银行系统性金融风险——基于CoVaR方法的实证研究

在常态化疫情防控的背景下,商业银行系统性金融风险有上升迹象,这对央行实施货币政策工具和力度的把握提出了更高要求。本文利用条件在险值模型检验了我国货币供应量、利率与银行系统性金融风险的关系。研究结果表明,货币供应量和利率与银行系统性风险之间的关系不是线性的,而是U型的,即存在最优的货币供应量和利率能够使商业银行的系统性金融风险最低。当货币供应量和利率小于这个最优组合时,增加货币供应量和提高利率能够有效降低商业银行的系统性金融风险;而当货币供应量和利率大于这个最优组合时,增加货币供应量和提高利率反而会增加银行系统性金融风险,进而降低商业银行的金融稳定性。     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Internet finance development and banking market discipline: Evidence from China

Depositor discipline is the only viable and universal source of banking market discipline in China. This paper investigates whether the depositor discipline of banking works in the context of an emerging economy under financial repression and implicit government guarantee, such as the Chinese economy; how banking market discipline is affected by Internet finance development; and whether the impact of Internet finance development on market discipline changes across heterogeneous banks. The results suggest that, in general, measures of bank risk are negatively associated with the growth of deposit volumes. Internet finance development alters the sensitivity of deposit growth ratios to some bank risk measures. For non-state-owned banks, fewer measures of bank risk are significantly negatively associated with the growth of deposit volumes, and the attenuation impact of Internet finance development on market discipline for bank capitalization instead relatively increases. For large banks, market discipline works significantly, except in the case of the bank capitalization variable; moreover, these significant market disciplines are strengthened with the development of Internet finance.     

US government TARP bailout and bank lottery behavior

Considerable debate surrounds how the US government's TARP bailout intervention has affected the risk-taking and moral hazard behavior of U.S. banks around the global financial crisis. We examine this issue with a focus on lottery behavior introducing MAX/MIN as a new measure of lotteryness in banking to capture the loss protection from bank bailout guarantees. We find that the TARP bailout increased the likelihood of bank lotteryness and risk shifting. Lottery-like bank equities are riskier after TARP and exhibit fatter right to left tails. A consistent pattern of risk taking and lottery behavior extends both before and after the 2008–2009 crisis, engulfing the largest systemic banks (SIFIs). While confirming that lottery-like bank equities have lower short-term return, we find they exhibit better cumulative long-term return performance. Our findings have important policy implications regarding government intervention in banking crises.     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动?本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用"中介效应"因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。