Research on Corporate Governance Cost

According to the concept of corporate governance, we deduce four principles of corporate governance cost. There are （1）any cost caused by relative activities from separation between property right and management right must be reckoned in corporate governance cost; （2）cost of activities in the cross area in which governance activities or other activities cannot be distinguished should be reckoned in relative cost according with characters of the main operational activities; （3）cost caused by corporate governance activities of external ＂Stake Holder＂ also should be reckoned in corporate governance cost. After thorough analysis of the above three principles, we define corporate governance cost as the cost caused by governance activities from separation between property right and management right as well as those originated from external stakeholders. Its boundary accords with the boundary of accountant mergence report forms. We briefly offer some analysis methods of corporate governance cost and some advices of disclosure of relevant information.     

Governance as ‘Kicking Away the Ladder'

The label ‘poor governance’ throws together real evils such as corruption and rent-seeking with a new group of alleged evils which are actually good for development, including a role for the state in the economy and support for domestic capital. Successful development policies of Europe in the late nineteenth century and the Asian Tigers and Brazil in the second half of the twentieth century are now labelled as ‘poor governance.’ This is what Ha-Joon Chang described as ‘kicking away the ladder’ by which rich countries climbed to development, so that today’s poor countries cannot follow. Mozambique is cited as an example of how the good governance rhetoric has been misused to retard development and poverty reduction.     

Imperial Governance: Governing Inwards or Outwards?

This article presents an analysis of the European Union and of the integration process using the concept of empire. It also offers a critical reflexion on the use of the concept of empire to analyse contemporary polities. It argues that many scholars of politics have a biased understanding of this concept, which is ‘tailored’ to analyse only one type of empire, the colonial empire, and to disregard the existence of another type of empire. To escape this trap, the article suggests the use of two concepts, ‘inwards imperial governance’ and ‘outwards imperial governance’. These concepts make it possible to account for different types of empire in the past as well as contemporary polities. They also help shed a different light on the EU’s empirehood and its evolution over time. In its concluding remarks, the article suggests the potential usefulness of these concepts for the analysis of other contemporary cases.     

Thinking of Establishing Corporate Governance Model with Chinese Characteristics

After repeated comparison, we believe that the theory of building Chinese management system should be to stimulate innovation as a core, thus forming a complete Chinese enterprise culture, as well as business development and strategic choice as a means of enterprise organizational change management theories     

Governance and competence: how can they be combined?

Transaction cost economics faces serious problems concerningthe way it deals, or fails to deal, with bounded rationality,the efficiency of outcomes, trust, innovation, learning andthe nature of knowledge. The competence view yields an alternativeperspective on the purpose and boundaries of the firm. However,the competence view cannot ignore issues of governance and,in spite of serious criticism, transaction cost economics yieldssome useful concepts to deal with them. This paper aims to contributeto the development of theory and empirical research that connectsgovernance and competence perspectives.     

Arrangement for Capital Structure in the Framework of Corporate Governance

Using the method of principal component analysis, the paper conducts a systematic study on the issue of how corporate governance influences capital structure. The study manifests the results that the proportion of circulation shares, the ability that other big shareholders contend with the first biggest shareholder, the proportion of corporation-owned shares, and the frequency of directorate meetings all have a positive relationship with the liability level. Meanwhile, the concentration degree of owners＇ equity, the proportion of state-owned shares, the phenomenon that one person serves as both chairman of directorate and general manager, and the intensity of competition in product market are all negatively related to the level of debt. Finally, the scale of directorate, the proportion of independent directors as well as the percentage of management-owned shares have no significant relationship with the capital structure. The statistic analysis also shows that the proportion of independent directors of some Chinese listed companies does not meet the regulation of the CSRC. In addition, the paper tests the impacts of corporate operating characteristics on capital structure.     

On Efficiency of the Compulsive Institution in the Environment Governance

Limited by the condition of information, technology and natural elements, the compulsive institutions in the environment governance can not form a “hard constraint” to the individuals. Because of the individual‘s speculative behaviors, the government‘s deviation from its environmental governance, and the non-cooperative game between individuals and the legal organization, the implementation of the compulsive institutions is not as good as being expected. Through analyzing the mechanism of the compulsive institutions, this paper puts forward some suggestions to enhance the efficiency of such institutions‘ implementation.     

Are CEOs Replaced For Poor Performance? Effects of Takeovers and Governance on CEO Turnover

This article analyzes the risk of CEO turnover in US firms over the period 1993–2011. There is an increase in the CEO turnover rate and a 41% decline in median tenure. Where firm performance is poor, CEOs are increasingly replaced, either by the board or in the process of the firm being taken over. US corporate governance regulations had some success in mitigating the agency problem. In the wake of those reforms, CEO turnover outcomes are more strongly associated with firm performance. The declining CEO tenure may have structural impacts on CEO pay.     

Beyond ‘Poverty Reduction through Good Governance’: The New Political Economy of Development in Africa

The new political economy of development, characterised by the rising powers' new resource finds in many poor countries and the financial crisis, has driven development ideas and practices towards a paradigm shift, moving it beyond the post-Washington Consensus which marked the high point of development's ‘Poverty Reduction through Good Governance’ agenda. This has important implications for the extent to which developing countries remain governed by the institutional and ideological imperatives of development. Optimists suggest that this could herald a new era of sovereignty that enables African countries to take fuller control of their governance and development priorities, including a shift towards a ‘southern consensus’ around structural transformation, whilst pessimists argue that the hegemony of orthodox development ideas has only been partially reordered and that new problems of sovereignty are now emerging. Insights from Uganda suggest that both of these scenarios are currently unfolding, leaving the outcomes uncertain and much to play for. What remains of the ‘good governance’ agenda has yet to adapt itself to this new politics of development, which requires the emergence of new forms of developmental state in Africa.     

An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Board of Directors Governance and Corporate Performance of Chinese Public Companies

Board of directors is an important component part of corporate governance. As a governance mechanism, we empirically study relationship among the scale of the board of directors, the structure of the board of directors and the duality leadership structure with corporate performance in Chinese public companies. The result shows that the smaller scale of the board of the directors is, the better performance is. With the ownership structure changing better, the structure of the board of directors will change better and promote the performance. The duality leadership structure doesn＇t affect the corporate performance. The fundamental method for the governance effectiveness of the board is to set up the reasonable ownership structure and the marketing mechanism for occurrences in human .     

China’s Macroeconomic Outlook and Risk Assessment: Counterfactual Analysis,Policy Simulation,and Long-Term Governance — A Summary of Annual Report (2015–2016)

This summary report highlights the confluence of continued downward pressures and deflation scares in the face of looming uncertainty in China’s key macroeconomic landscapes. Counterfactual analyses and policy simulations are conducted, in addition to benchmark forecasts, based on IAR-CMM model and taking into account both cyclical and secular factors. Economic deceleration is projected to continue in the short to medium term, with real GDP growth declining to 6.3% (5.5% using more reliable instead of official data) in 2016 and facing a significant risk of sliding further down in 2017. Five key factors contributing to the weak outlook, additional to frictions and impediments associated with economic transition/restructuring and lackluster domestic/external demands, are identified, including: lack of new growth/ development engine, exhaustion of government-led driving force, the crowding-out of private sectors by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with excess capacity\capital overhang, nonperforming government sectors and officials, and twist or misinterpretation of the “New Normal.” A root cause of these problems, lying with sluggishness in China’s transformation into a market based economy, has to do with overpowered government but underpowered market in resource allocation and government underperformance in enforcing integrity and transparency in the marketplace and in providing public goods and services. At the nexus between inclusive growth and institutional transformation are market oriented and rule of law governed structural reforms and harmonious development. As such, fundamental institutional reforms that dialectically balance demand and supply side factors and properly weigh short run stabilization against long run development should be elevated to the top of the agenda.