Planning and Urban Growth: An Anglo-American Comparison

Understanding the complexity of institutional change is a necessary step in gaining deeper knowledge of economic performance over time, and it is one of the main challenges in the research agenda of institutionalism. Institutional change can be studied using a variety of theoretical approaches. We study some of the main approaches to institutional change in original economic institutionalism and new institutional economics. First, after comparing the approaches of Émile Durkheim and Thorstein Veblen, we focus on the contributions of the instrumental value theory and other original institutional traditions in the study of institutional change. Second, new institutional economics improved on the weak points of rational choice institutionalism regarding institutional change and incorporated the “institutions-as-rules” approach (Douglass North) and the “institutions-as-equilibria” approach (Avner Greif, Masahiko Aoki). We analyze both approaches to institutional change. Furthermore, we present an updated nonintegral overview of approaches to institutional change, show several interconnections between original and new institutionalisms, and conclude that the dialogue between the different theories of institutional change is relevant and beneficial.     

Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

Towards a History of American Institutional Economics

This paper focuses on a number of issues that have arisen in my efforts to deal with the history of American institutional economics in the interwar period. The specific issues addressed here are (1) the choice of time frame; (2) the definition of institutionalism in terms of its commonly held ideas; (3) the treatment of the network of personal contacts that make up the institutional movement; (4) the treatment of certain institutional and cross-disciplinary connections and supports; and (5) the variety of reasons lying behind the relative decline in the position of institutional economics after World War II. Each of these issues is discussed in light of historical material and examples and with a view to detailing the specific challenges and possible solutions involved.     

新制度经济学的新发展与政治学新制度主义:比较与启示

新制度经济学和政治学新制度主义在发展中都因为缺乏现实性、历史性和社会性而受到批评.面对相似的问题,经济学领域兴起了以青木和格雷夫为代表的比较制度分析,政治学领域兴起了历史制度主义和社会学制度主义.本文从制度观、制度对行为的影响、制度的变迁、过去的制度对现在制度的影响、文化观念和意识形态在制度形成和发展中的作用等方面,对比较制度分析和历史制度主义、社会学制度主义进行了比较,就未来制度研究的发展趋势提出了看法.     

John R. Commons’s Foundations for Policy Analysis

Psychological insights have been present in institutional economics since its beginning. Recently, cognitive aspects of institutional economics have been highlighted. The proposal of this paper is to offer other psychological insights related to institutional economics, which are complementary to a cognitive approach. The goal is to emphasize elements of Psychological Social Learning Theory as a possible foundation of Institutional Economics. This paper argues that people vicariously learn by the observation and interpretation of exemplary behaviors. Vicarious learning relies on the comprehension of people about who/what models are. Vicariously, people are motivated to behave as a model; when they succeed, models are reinforced. As something socially and cumulatively acceptable and/or desirable, exemplary behaviors can take place repetitively and become a habit. Institutions arise as outgrowths of those habits. In this logic, a working definition of institution is a cognitive inertia about the typifications of foreseeable regularities in behaviors of people in a society.     

Core Concepts of Institutionalist Public Finance: Problem Solving,Institutional Analysis,Strategic Choice,and Stakeholder Engagement

Citizens and policymakers in many nations are becoming increasingly concerned about large budget deficits and mounting long-term fiscal policy challenges. At the same time, slow economic growth in the United States and Europe is causing some people to demand more government spending (and lower taxes) and others to question the efficacy of fiscal policy. Against that backdrop, institutional economists are exhibiting renewed interest in the field of public finance. This article responds by outlining four core concepts of institutionalist public finance: problem solving, institutional analysis, strategic choice, and stakeholder engagement. What distinguishes the perspective of institutionalism from that of neoclassical economics, today’s dominant economic paradigm, is described in the course of the discussion. The core concepts of institutionalist public finance offer a coherent approach to the study of fiscal policy questions. Those concepts were first fashioned decades ago, but remain relevant: institutionalism continues to provide a solid basis for constructive analyses of fiscal challenges.     

Neoliberal ordnungstheorie and constitutional economics

Various new theoretical approaches, such as the economics of property rights, economic analysis of law or constitutional economics, have led to a renaissance of institutional theory. To a large extent, this renaissance emerged independently of the old institutionalism. In Germany, institutional analysis has a long and autonomous tradition, which has not been given proper international recognition. This applies especially to the neoliberal Ordnungstheorie, of which Walter Eucken is generally acknowledged to be the leading representative. This article examines the methodological and theoretical similarities and differences between Eucken's Ordnungstheorie and Buchanan's Constitutional Economics. I am indebted to Jack Wiseman for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.     

Towards Sustainability Economics: Principles and Values

Synopsis  Radical alternatives, in terms of our ideas about science in society, about economics, ideology and institutional arrangements, should be included among possibilities considered within the scope of a pluralistic philosophy. While all these aspects of our mental maps are interrelated and important, economics plays a key role in attempts to get closer to a sustainable society. Mainstream neoclassical economics is not enough. The tendency to exclusively rely on this particular theory is considered part of the problems faced. A ‘sustainability economics’ more in line with dominant ideas of democracy is proposed, emphasizing the ethical, ideological and political elements. Reference is made to institutional theory but the principles and concepts suggested are in many ways similar to other kinds of heterodox economics and developments in other social sciences. Neoclassical economics is used as a point of reference in pointing to alternative ideas about human beings, organizations, markets, decision- making, efficiency, rationality, progress in society and institutional change processes. Predilection for such an alternative conceptual framework (or for neoclassical economics) is not exclusively a scientific choice but as much a matter of political and ideological preferences. One paradigm may be dominant at a time, but because of the ideological specificity of each paradigm, competing theoretical perspectives should be accepted and even encouraged in a democratic society.      

International Monetary Reform: A Review Article

Original institutional economics (OIE) has three significant, but apparently contradictory, definitions of institution(s) stemming from Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and J. Fagg Foster. In this first installment of a two-part paper I address this apparent contradiction by developing an "irenic reconciliation" of these definitions using a methodological approach I call "critical institutionalism"— a synthesis of the OIE in the tradition of the Veblen, Commons, and Foster, the pragmatism theory of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, the critical realist methodology of Margaret Archer, and the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar. In so doing, I provide an alternative discussion to that of some current institutionalists who propose to replace the existing OIE definitions of institution(s) with "consensual definitions" developed in the discourse with non-OIE traditions. I propose that there is still considerable analytical value in the OIE definitions, and that replacing them with non-OIE-originating concepts would unnecessarily carry OIE away from its methodological and philosophical roots. In the second installment of this paper (yet to be published), I proceed to demonstrate the analytical value these "reconciled" definitions have for the OIE project.     

制度主义分析的缺陷及其超越——关于中国村民自治建设和研究的反思

自20世纪80年代中期以来推行的中国乡村民主自治政治建设基本上建基于制度主义的后设理论。它强调制度建设、行政推动和制度归因。制度主义理论家族包括两大类成员：一类是结构制度主义;另一类是理性选择制度主义。结构制度主义假设了传统一现代的二元对分,套用现代理想类型,来分析乡村发展诸问题,却难以提供制度变迁的具体的路径和方式。理性制度主义虽然指出了,作为一种公共物品的基层民主政治建设,需要通过自上而下的行政推动来克服搭便车问题,但是自身却难逃制度理性和行政代理人利益理性的悖论。实践取向的能力建设方向,建基于当地村民的地方性知识和实践智慧基础上,围绕着实践中的问题,在外部专业人员协助下,通过行动反思,来融合传统资源和现代制度,寻找乡村发展和民主自治的出路,或许这才是跳出制度主义困境的希望所在。     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.     

Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects

Institutions shape social outcomes, yet institutions themselves are products of political choices. When institutional choices are determined by the same political and social processes that they shape, institutions are endogenously selected. Here I address the question of whether this endogenous institutional selection necessarily implies endogenous institutional effects. If it does, the use of institutional parameters as independent variables explaining policy outcomes and properties of the resulting political regimes, widespread in the literature on comparative political institutions, is hard to justify. I argue, however, that strategic choice of the rules of the game implies designers' ability to obtain their preferred institutional effects only under conditions of complete information. Under incomplete information, ex-post institutional effects do not need to be endogenous, since at the time of designing the rules the designers were not in position to control the selection of these effects. The reason why the choice of the rules does not imply the choice of their effects lies in the intervening and interactive (rather than additive) role played by the environmental parameters, including players' own characteristics, that are not revealed at the time of the institutional choice. Additionally to the model which illustrates the logic of the argument and the workings of intervening structural effects, I find supporting evidence in the processes of design of election laws in post-communist Europe, where stages of design and implementation followed each other in a very quick succession yet were characterized by substantial changes in manifested institutional preferences of the key political players.     

Social Costs and the Automobile Industry: A Challenge to National Planning

Neoinstitutional thought is based on an integration of Thorstein Veblen's evolutionary theory of institutional change and John Dewey's theory of instrumental valuation. It offers a coherent methodology that guides both economic analysis and policy formation. Neoinstitutionalist methodology differs from mainstream economic methodology in its rejection of the normative-positive dualism. It denies that "objectivity" requires that science be wertfrie, arguing instead that normative propositions based on instrumental valuation are the foundation of scientific objectivity. The analytical focus of neoinstitutional economics is the process of institutional change which it treats as a change in the value structure of the institution.     

A History of the Founding and Early Years of AFEE

During the late 1950s, institutionalists started organizing themselves amid the decline of institutional economics, leading to the 1965 founding of the Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE). We analyze the history of the movement to found AFEE and its early years. We use archival evidence, much of it previously unpublished, to provide a detailed history of these early years. We also present an account of AFEE that highlights the role of different interpretations of institutional economics in building the association. In addition, we provide a brief history of the early years of the Journal of Economic Issues (JEI).     

Apology and Ambiguity: Adolf Berle on Corporate Power

A sociocognitive foundation for transformative agency requires much deeper exploration to adequately understand the causal origins of human interests, preferences, and choices as they shape both the emergence of institutions and the process of institutional change. In the collegial spirit of rapprochement, reminiscent of earlier efforts at “bridge-building,” our central contention is that the new institutional economics of “late” Douglass C. North (2005) North, Douglass C. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar] provides such a sociocognitive approach, as well as an important ontological frame for dealing with embedded agency. This agency may afford original institutional economics a complementary meta-theoretical account of how institutions are formed and changed over time.     

Comparative Institutional Advantage and the Appropriate Development Model for Sub-Saharan Africa

The theory of comparative institutional advantage posits that certain types of firms locate production facilities in a particular location and avoid other locations due to unique institutional advantages and disadvantages. In sub-Saharan Africa, neoliberal policies, weak and corrupt states, and Transnational Corporations have created a particularly destructive variant of capitalism. African capitalism generates little in the way of economic growth, rewards mainly the TNC and the African elites, and undermines Africa’s economic future via activities that are utterly extractive in nature. African capitalism is facilitated directly by the WTO, the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the World Bank, and the institutional structures of African economies. After outlining the problems with African capitalism as currently structured, the paper goes on to suggest an alternative to this model involving experimental, embedded, grass roots development efforts that build on domestic cultural institutions that would generate significantly more positive outcomes for the people of sub-Saharan Africa. By abandoning neoliberal policies, it might be possible to create a better economic model that would build on community-centered institutional strengths to benefit a greater proportion of the population.

Contributions of the Galbraith “Technostructure” to the Growing Crisis of the U.S. Economy

This paper lays the methodological foundations of an analytical framework that may help shed some new light on the issue of territorial inequalities in the digital economy. It opposes the recent tendency to build up an evolutionary economic geography as an alternative not only to the so-called "New Economic Geography" (namely "geographical mainstream economics") but also to the institutional economic geography. The paper advocates the development of an evolutionary and institutional approach in economic geography, which would be meso-focused. Finally, it presents some insights that highlight the heuristic potential of this approach in reappraising the territorial features of the digital economy.     

Institutional Economics as Theory of Policy Change: Impact of Past Policy Failures on Present Policy

Social scientists have developed several theories for understanding or evaluating policy change over time. Since all costs or benefits are not internalized owing to positive transaction costs, policymaking is always implemented under cost underestimation conditions and, therefore, is imperfect. I call this trait policy failure in this article. Furthermore, I show that a new framework combining the social costs approach and the legal/economic approach in institutional economics is suitable and can be applied to evaluating how past policy failures affect present policy, providing as an example the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan.     

Choice, habit and evolution

Several leading mainstream economists including Gary Becker have treated habit as serially correlated behaviour resulting from deliberate choices. This approach puts choice before habit but involves assumptions of extensive memory and decision-making capacity. By contrast, earlier authors such as William James, John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen saw deliberation and choice as a contingent outcome of habits, where the latter are defined in terms of acquired dispositions rather than overt behaviour. The approach of this second group is more consistent with an evolutionary perspective and the limited computational capacities of the human brain.