Planning and Urban Growth: An Anglo-American Comparison

Understanding the complexity of institutional change is a necessary step in gaining deeper knowledge of economic performance over time, and it is one of the main challenges in the research agenda of institutionalism. Institutional change can be studied using a variety of theoretical approaches. We study some of the main approaches to institutional change in original economic institutionalism and new institutional economics. First, after comparing the approaches of Émile Durkheim and Thorstein Veblen, we focus on the contributions of the instrumental value theory and other original institutional traditions in the study of institutional change. Second, new institutional economics improved on the weak points of rational choice institutionalism regarding institutional change and incorporated the “institutions-as-rules” approach (Douglass North) and the “institutions-as-equilibria” approach (Avner Greif, Masahiko Aoki). We analyze both approaches to institutional change. Furthermore, we present an updated nonintegral overview of approaches to institutional change, show several interconnections between original and new institutionalisms, and conclude that the dialogue between the different theories of institutional change is relevant and beneficial.     

The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists

There are two institutional economics approaches to law and economics. New institutional economists prescribe that arbitrators foster efficiency in setting economic disputes and original institutional economists focus on creating reasonable values – that is, balancing efficiency and justice. Disequilibrium between desired efficiency and perceived fairness triggers agency and is a source of coevolution of law and economics.     

Are We Forgetting Something? Remarks on the Connections Between Douglass North’s Contributions and Original Institutional Economics

Douglass North’s latest works have become central to the current discussion regarding the differences and similarities between new institutional economics (NIE) and original institutional economics (OIE). We seek to contribute to this debate by offering a specific analytical perspective to evaluating North’s contributions. After defining a set of philosophical and methodological principles that specifies OIE, we endeavor to verify if and how North’s work relates to these foundations. We believe that this methodological perspective brings to light a fundamental issue not stressed by earlier analyses: the profound difference between the institutionalisms regarding the role of market order as a mechanism of human sociability.     

马克思主义与制度经济学

新制度经济学是对古典制度经济学的复归,而马克思的政治经济学则是古典制度经济学的集大成者.从古典制度经济学到新制度经济学的发展,体现了经济学演进历史的内在逻辑性.但是,马克思制度经济学与新制度经济学存在着根本分歧:前者以揭示经济制度的本质为目的;后者以为市场经济运行服务为目的.这种根本分歧的存在,决定了我们不应将二者的理论基点和研究方法混为一谈.     

Institutions and Values: A Methodological Inquiry

Economics entails a study of institutions regardless of the school of thought, and it is inherently an analysis of institutional transformation with a vision toward creating positive social change through economic arrangements. However, the conceptions of institutions, identity of individuals, human nature as it pertains to economics, identification of the economic sphere, its concerns, and studying its evolution, all vary substantively across schools of thought. We examine the following issues: (i) the differences in the ontological identity of the individual between heterodox approaches, new institutional economics (NIE), and the neoclassical school; (ii) the central point of divergence between original institutional economics (OIE) and NIE, despite both schools being committed to the project of an “institutionally” centered approach to economics; and (iii) the absence of a cohesive project to explore foundational theoretical congruencies among those heterodox approaches that have a shared vision, values, and a common ontological identity of socially embedded people.     

The Onset and Persistence of Secular Stagnation in the U.S. Economy: 1910-1990

Human relations involve a balance of substitution and complementarity. In economics, substitution is stressed and complementarity ignored. An economics of substitution will lead to competitive fragmentation. An economics of complementarity supports a case for cooperation and organizational health. If complementarity outweighs substitution, what are the implications? A shift to common needs enters new realms of social design. If wellbeing is social — if our benefits are aligned — the lack of conflict invites community. Here, competitive values cause strife and harm. In this paper, I depict the culture of complementarity in economics. I offer a key to achieving community, replacing substitution with complementarity in our basic assumptions. To move beyond a myopic culture resulting from competition, we need an economics of complementarity.     

Upward and downward complementarity: the meso core of evolutionary growth theory

We propose that the concept of complementarity can take two distinct meanings in evolutionary economics: one referring to Adam Smith’s notion of increasing specialization and the division of labour, which we denote ‘downward complementarity’ (wholes into new parts); and a second type that refers to the discovery of emergent complementarity between extant or new components and products, which we call ‘upward complementarity’ (parts into new wholes). We outline this new conception and explore some of its analytic and theoretic implications.     

Atoms,Bits, and Wits: A New Economics for the Twenty-First Century—Part I

Part I: Three elementary components of economics are atoms, bits, and wits. The economics of atoms is familiar to economists, in the production of physical outputs treated as substitutes in consumption. The relation of value to scarcity with atoms is that abundance reduces the worth of material goods. The realm of bits is less understood; the issues appear in network effects, where abundance augments the worth of intangibles. The economics of networks is social: conflicts of interest (substitution) are balanced with concerts of value (complementarity) in combination. But in information networks—the realm of bits—substitution cedes to complementarity and competition defers to cooperation as efficient.     

互补性、概念格、塔尔斯基不动点定理

本文综述 1 998年以来经济学和认知科学交界处的三个基本概念 ,它们来自代数学“格论” :(1 )“概念格” ,这是代数理论在“观念拓扑”及“知识表达”方面的运用 ;(2 )“互补性” ,这是格论在不完全竞争博弈、技术扩散、网络现象、学习过程等的运用 ;(3)塔尔斯基不动点定理 ,这是在三类“不动点定理”当中应用最为广泛的一类 ,在人工智能“归纳推理”、逻辑学“谓词演算”、语义学及“知识表达”、经济学“互补 (或互替 )策略博弈”、网络理论“模型检验”、计算理论“收敛与逼进”算法等方面 ,正日渐成为基础性的定理之一。“新经济”的主要特征是 :(1 )“观念”在适当的制度安排下成为物质生产及其效率的决定因素 ;(2 )“知识”在收益递增经济活动中表现出来的强烈的互补性 ;(3)新古典经济学的以“凸性假设”为基础的分析方法 ,在收益递增经济现象面前显得格外无力。“概念格”理论 ,作为认知科学的最新成果 ,对于知识的经济学研究极端重要。本文对上述三个基本概念的讨论 ,将以知识的经济学研究为贯穿始终的视角     

Integration of and Deliveries among the World Zionist Organization,Israel, and Diaspora Countries: System Articulation with the Social Fabric Matrix

Abstract:

The religious economics (not economics of religion) concern here is the relationship between the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and Israel, which is known as a geopolitical power in its region and which is also known as an economic success story. Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi explained how the political economy of medieval Europe was influenced and guided by Christian morality. This paper extends the analysis of religious economics by using the social fabric matrix of original institutional economics to define and structure the integration of the WZO, Israel, and the Diaspora countries. This allows us to observe how to conduct such work and to learn how Israel is guided and influenced by the WZO. It also helps to explain Israel’s “risk of tearing itself apart” as noted in a recent article in the New York Times.     

Habit,Decision-Making,and Rationality: Comparing Thorstein Veblen and Early Herbert Simon

The article aims to contribute to the convergence between institutional and neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economics. It intends to help unify the behavioral foundations of these two strands of thought by returning to the original views of their main historical inspirations. It thus proposes a comparative analysis of the theory of human behavior developed by Thorstein Veblen and Herbert Simon, respectively. The article notably discusses how Simon’s early work links together the notions of habit, rationality, and the decision-making process, and explores the extent to which his views are consistent with, complementary to, or divergent from Veblen’s. The article highlights several commonalities between Simon and Veblen’s views on habits. However, Simon departs from Veblen in developing a dual model of human behavior which clearly differentiates habit-based from decision-based behaviors. The article argues that neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economists should go beyond this binary model and build on the pragmatist-Veblenian approach, in which these two dimensions are intimately entangled. This process could allow the economists in question to take advantage of the most valuable insights of institutional economics regarding the interactions between individual choices and habits and institutions.     

Revolution,Reform, and Social Justice

The literature on mainstream economics usually takes the United States as the main geographical reference. However, the various criteria that define mainstream economics can be applied outside the United States. The ideas that have prestige and influence in a given country’s academia may not be the same ideas that constitute American mainstream economics. Brazil has been an example of pluralism. An institutional perspective helps explain why several people in Brazil conform with institutional rules of thought and of behavior that differ from those of the American mainstream, including the norm of pluralism, and how these rules influence many people.     

制度转型、经济增长和交易费用——来自中国各省市的经验分析

交易费用的测量是新制度经济学里面最核心的问题。中国的制度转型及其经济增长为检验新制度经济学的核心理论提供了很好的样本。本文力争在国内外文献的基础上做出如下贡献。第一,我们采用沃利斯和诺思（Wallis,North,1986）的基本思路,首次对中国各省的交易费用进行了测算。第二,我们对制度转型、经济增长和中国的交易费用的关系进行了实证分析,发现制度转型降低了中国的交易费用,证实了好的制度就是节约交易费用;但是经济增长却没有显著地促进交易费用的增加,这与正统的新制度经济理论预期不符;第三,我们证实了交易也存在一定的规模效应,当市场上的交易费用达到一定的程度时,由于规模效应可能会节省每笔交易的交易费用,从而导致每笔交易的交易费用减少。     

新制度经济学的边界——三种代表性观点及其比较

在新制度经济学的边界问题上,新制度经济学家(威廉姆森和芮切特)、旧制度经济学家(霍奇森)以及经济思想史家(卢瑟福)不仅边界刻画依据不完全相同,而且他们对新制度经济学智力成果的描述也存在着很大的差异。新制度经济学家认为,某种制度分析是否属于新制度经济学关键是看该理论是否假定环境存在着不确定性、人是否具有有限理性,是否明确地或隐含地以交易费用为正为前提。而新制度经济学的边界在旧制度经济学家和经济思想史家那里被进一步放宽。他们深入到本体论层面,认为某种制度分析只要坚持方法论个人主义,那么它就属于新制度经济学的内容。而新制度经济学家的边界刻画更能准确、客观地反映新制度经济学的智力成果。     

Are complementary reforms a “luxury” for developing countries?

This paper investigates the impact of complementarity reforms on growth and how it depends on GDP per capita. Based on reform data for six policy areas compiled from various sources during the period 1994–2006 for over 100 countries, we compute composite indicators of reform level and complementarity. We provide qualitative justification for the existence of pair-wise complementarities among policy areas. We then use cross-section and panel data estimates to test the effect of reform level and complementarity on GDP per capita growth. We found reforms to be positively related and their dispersion (or the inverse of complementarity) negatively related to growth, controlling for initial conditions, monetary stability and other structural and institutional variables, as well as endogeneity of reform level and complementarity. We show that the effect of policy complementarity is a stronger condition for sustainable growth in developing than in advanced countries, to conclude that complementary reforms are not a ‘luxury’ for developing countries.     

The Institutional Theory of Radhamakal Mukerjee: Lessons for Modern Nonprofit Economics

This paper examines the way the institutional economics of Radhamakal Mukerjee can inform modern nonprofit economics. A brief survey of Mukerjee's work highlights several elements of his theory that yield useful implications understanding the nonprofit sector. First, Mukerjee's theory implies that this sector's role is in helping the economies to better accommodate broader societal values, rather than in addressing market failure. Second, his theory suggests that the nonprofit sector provides an institutional framework for the pursuit of common interests that are not reducible to individual utility maximization. Finally, as he considered the state to be inherently coercive, he believed the nonprofit sector to be the only meaningful outlet for citizenship behavior, thus advancing an original theory of complementary state-nonprofit relationship. The paper concludes with calling for more institutionalist research on the economics of the nonprofit sector.     

Interrogating Sickonomics,from Diagnosis to Cure: A Response to Hodgson

Hodgson's review of our books argues against us that marginalism neither adopted methodological individualism nor excluded the social from economics. Thus, he finds a partial solution to sickonomics in abandoning the term methodological individualism and using both structures and individuals as analytical starting point(s), revisiting Marshallian marginalism dressed up in socio-institutional clothing. He also denies any relationship between the current malaise in economics and the marginal revolution, as we claim, focusing exclusively on institutional developments since the Second World War. We show Hodgson is either partial or wrong on all of these counts. Firstly, his alternative to methodological individualism is untenable. Secondly, institutions, although implicitly present in Marshallian and Walrasian economics, play no substantive analytical role and as such are superfluous. Finally, although institutional factors help explain the sickness of modern economics (in addition to socioeconomic, ideological, political, and intellectual factors), the intellectual roots of this decay lie in the conceptual framework established around the marginal revolution.     

The Machine-Building Industry in Communist China

This article identifies the connections between original institutional economics and communitarian philosophy. For instance, both share the common emphasis on the cultural conditioning of human agency. Moreover, they present a common orientation to the human motives that surpass purely traditional economic considerations. We exemplify these correspondences with the similar explanations of the institutionalist Anne Mayhew and the communitarian political philosopher Michael Sandel to American farmer protests during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. We conclude by suggesting a possible common research agenda for institutionalists and communitarians regarding the moral limits of markets and civic consequences of economic arrangements.     

试论凯恩斯经济学研究方法的新取向

随着主流凯恩斯主义经济学的流行，原创性的凯恩斯经济学实际上已经“夭折”了，它的革命思想并没有得到真正的阐发与传播。从范式角度比较和分析原创性凯恩斯经济学和三个凯恩斯经济学流派之间的本质关系后发现，后凯恩斯经济学对原创性凯恩斯经济学的研究提供了重要启示；但是后凯恩斯经济学的理论局限性说明，必须探索一种新的研究方法，即一种制度的演化的经济学范式，从而推动凯恩斯经济学的进一步发展。     

Atoms,Bits, and Wits: A New Economics for the Twenty-First Century—Part II

Learning also affects the organization of economic activity as a “force locomotif” of growth. Bounded rationality opens a theory of planning horizons as an ordinal measure of wits. The realm of wits shines a novel light on the nature of interdependence, since the balance of substitution and complementarity is horizonal: longer and broader horizons shift this balance away from substitution in favor of complementarity, augmenting concerts of interest over conflicts in social relations. Atoms, bits, and wits are modeled to show why substitution only applies to short-run atoms; a case for complementarity rises from both increasing returns and bits, where wits strengthen the case for cooperation as efficient. With complementarity, competition—not collusion—stifles output. The social and institutional implications of this are addressed theoretically in this paper.