The P* model and Austrian prices

In theP ^* model the price level is determined by the money stock per unit of potential out-put and the long-run equilibrium level of the velocity of money. This article applies this model to Austria. Problems in identifying permanent shocks to potential output and/or velocity lead to the rejection of such models of the price level, but their first-difference version is not so suspect. While evidence is found of a long-run relationship between Austria inflation and money growth, even the first-difference version of theP ^* model is rejected for Austria. Since Austria is a small economy, closely tied to Germany, the article also investigates whether Austrian prices are tied to a GermanP ^* measure. This hypothesis is also rejected, but there is a statistically-significant long-run relationship between Austrian and German inflation. Moreover, Austrian money growth remains significant even in this relationship.This article was written while the author was a Visiting Scholar at the Austrian National Bank. The author is indebted to Fritz Breuss, W. Jahnke, and Dieter Proske for help in obtaining the data used here, and for useful discussions about the data, relevant theoretical issues and results. The comments of the referees on an earlier version are also gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed here are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Austrian National Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.     

The Treatment of Smith's Invisible Hand

Adam Smith used the metaphor of an invisible hand to represent the instincts of human nature that direct behavior. Moderated by self-control and guided by proper institutional incentives, actions grounded in instincts can be shown to generate a beneficial social order even if not intended. Smith's concept, however, has been diluted and distorted over time through extension and misuse. Common misperceptions are that Smith unconditionally endorsed laissez-faire markets, selfish individualism, and Pareto efficiency. The author draws upon recent literature to clarify Smith's meaning and to discuss ways of improving its classroom presentation. The author argues that the invisible hand operates within a variety of institutional settings and that a number of arrangements are compatible with economic progress.     

Seniority and Incumbency in Legislatures

In this article, we elaborate on a strategic view of institutional features. Our focus is on seniority, though we note that this general approach may also be deployed to understand other aspects of institutional arrangements. We have taken the initial game‐theoretic model of seniority of McKelvey and Riezman ( 1992 ), simplified it in order to characterize its fundamental implications, generalized these results in several ways, and extended the model by deriving additional implications. The broad messages of our article, articulated by McKelvey and Riezman as well, are two. First, the endogenous choice of institutional features like seniority by self‐governing groups is strategic. While the fine‐grained ways of doing things in an institutional context surely serve internal functional objectives, these are not the only objectives. Agents making choices on how to govern themselves have private motivations – in the case of elected politicians they often revolve around re‐election. This leads to our second broad message. The institutions through which self‐governing groups conduct their business do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in a broader context. Those offering functional explanations for various institutional features overlook this. Particular institutional arrangements have effects outside the governance institution itself. These effects, in principle, could be accidental by‐products. Our strategic approach, however, argues that they may well be the primary reasons for a practice being instituted.     

The Institutional Quality Effect on Credits Provided by the Banks

Research on developing economies is deficient in analysing institutional quality dimensions that are beyond standard determinants of the provision of credits by banks. This study fills this gap by adopting a broad-based modelling approach in examining the effects of institutional quality on credit provided by banks for a large sample of developing economies. A structural model, including balanced annual panel data from the World Bank World Development Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators for the period 2004 to 2017, was estimated using panel-corrected standard errors and two-stage least squares estimation techniques. The core variables determining the credit provided by banks were controlled for in the estimation phase. The findings showed that the rule of law, regulatory quality and the strength of legal systems are significant determinants of credit provided by banks, among other factors. Investments in improving institutional quality can be beneficial for credit diffusion by the banks. This study is distinct from previous empirical studies of the developing economies as it directs attention to institutional quality measures on bank credit expansion in an inclusive modelling framework. It makes a significant positive contribution to the finance institutional nexus literature in terms of understanding the value and role that institutional quality plays in fostering bank credit provision in developing economies.

     

Trade patterns and institutional change in East Asia

We investigate how trade patterns – institutionally intensive exports (IIX) – affect institutional quality in East Asia compared to the rest of the world, and whether the effect changed due to the Asian financial crisis. To examine this, we use panel data of 117 countries for the period 1988–2007. Our fixed effect model estimation reveals that the effect of IIX on institutional quality is negative and significant for East Asia, while the effect is insignificant for the rest of the world. The negative effect in East Asia is more pronounced for the five East Asian countries that were strongly affected by the crisis – South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand – than for other East Asian countries. Furthermore, our results reveal that the negative effect for East Asia does not change significantly after the crisis, both in the short and long term, and that improvement in institutional quality after the crisis is not different from that of the rest of the world. This suggests that the crisis had no significant impact on East Asia's institutional quality or on the effects of IIX on institutional quality.     

Unionization and absenteeism

Until recently any labour economist doing empirical work on unionization was concerned almost exclusively with the effect of unionization on wages. But beginning with Freeman's 1976 analysis of the rich institutional structure of unions, economists have been considering the role of unions in, for example, increasing productivity, lowering quit rates, enhancing fringe benefits, reducing income inequality, improving working conditions, and affecting a variety of other attributes at the workplace. ^{1 1}It is not the purpose of this paper to provide an exhaustive bibliography on the ‘new view’ of unionization. Nevertheless, the interested reader may want to see Freeman (1976, 1978, 1980) and Brown and Medoff (1978). To date, however, no study has directly addressed a question that appears ripe for empirical analysis: Does unionization affect absenteeism?

This paper presents results from a study designed to answer that question. The first section presents a simple model of absenteeism. The second section discusses the five mechanisms through which unionization influences absenteeism. The third section describes the data and variable selection. Results from logit regressions are presented in the fourth section and the paper closes with a summary of the arguments and evidence.     

Measuring Bubble Expectations and Investor Confidence

This paper presents evidence on two types of investor attitudes that change in important ways through time, with important consequences for speculative markets. The paper explores changes in bubble expectations and investor confidence among institutional investors in the U.S. stock market at six-month intervals for the period 1989 to 1998 and for individual investors at the start and end of this period.

Based on the results of the questionnaires administered during the period, the author develops specific time-series indicators for each of the following: a speculative bubble (an unstable situation with expectations for a increase in the short term only), a negative speculative bubble (an unstable situation with expectations for a downturn in the short term only), and investor confidence (a feeling that nothing can go wrong).

Using the indicators, the author produces indexes indicating the average percentage of the population at a given time with bubble expectations, negative bubble expectations, and investor confidence, respectively.     

HOW TO OVERCOME SHAREHOLDER APATHY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE ROLE OF INVESTOR ASSOCIATIONS IN GERMANY

ABSTRACT: Investor apathy by private retail investors and highly diversified institutional investors is often blamed for poor managerial accountability and control of majority investors. Attempts to encourage shareholder activism tend to focus on large institutional investors and ignore retail investors. However, in Germany associations of private retail investors play an increasingly important role in organizing collective shareholder action and defining minority shareholder interests. The German example highlights a possible alternative to the US and UK model of shareholder activism, which is dominated by institutional investors.     

Induced Institutional Innovation and Transaction Costs: The Case of the Australian National Native Title Tribunal

The theory of induced innovation says that technological innovations which economize on relatively scarce inputs will be invented and adopted. Hayami and Ruttan have hypothesized that this model also holds for institutional innovations. Coase and Williamson suggest that economic organization, such as vertical integration, is the result of transaction cost minimization. Coase discusses the transaction costs of negotiation versus other alternatives for solving externality problems. This paper brings these previously unconnected threads of the literature together and incorporates transaction costs in an induced institutional innovation model.

This conceptual model is brought to bear on the issue of institutional innovations over time in relation to the National Native Title Tribunal. In addition to the reductions in transaction costs from a negotiated settlement rather than litigation, there are other advantages of negotiation. These may include improved “quality” of settlements, improved relations between the negotiating parties, and more timely resolution.     

中国城市化快速发展的机制研究

中国城市化进入快速发展阶段,经济全球化和经济转型深刻地影响到城市化机制。文章建立了不确定条件下农村剩余劳动力的城市化决策模型,解释了制度创新对城市化的作用模式。在对传统工业化与城市化之间数量关系进行计量分析的基础上,提出了城市化快速发展主要由第三产业推动的观点。并根据工业制成品的进出口差额,粗略估计了封闭条件下中国的工业产值,计算了国际贸易对城市化水平的贡献程度。研究表明,城市化快速发展更多依赖于国际贸易和制度创新。     

Inflation and growth: Explaining a negative effect

The paper presents a monetary model of endogenous growth and specifies an econometric model consistent with it. The economic model suggests a negative inflation-growth effect, and one that is stronger at lower levels of inflation. Empirical evaluation of the model is based on a large panel of OECD and APEC member countries over the years 1961–1997. The hypothesized negative inflation effect is found comprehensively for the OECD countries to be significant and, as in the theory, to increase marginally as the inflation rate falls. For APEC countries, the results from using instrumental variables also show significant evidence of a similar behavior. The nature of the inflation-growth profile and differences in this between the regions are interpreted with the credit production technology of the model in a way not possible with a standard cash-only economy. Research assistance by László Konya, Rezida Zakirova, and Anton Nakov and comments by Michal Kejak, Myles Wallace and Toni Braun are kindly acknowledged, along with comments from the 17^th European Economic Association Meetings, Venice, and the 10^th International Panel Data Conference, Berlin. We also thank the editors and referees for valuable comments, and the first author is grateful to Central European University for research funds.     

Interrelationship among institutional infrastructure,technological innovation and growth. An empirical evidence

This paper uses a multi-equation model to achieve an overall study of two key factors which explain growth, technology and institutions. The paper focuses on the process of the accumulation of these factors and the interrelationship arising among them. A theoretical model is given, together with empirical evidence for the joint impact of these factors on economic growth in a wide-ranging sample of countries between 1985 and 1997. This paper also contributes certain novel aspects in the variables employed. Thus, an indicator of human capital and an index reflecting institutional infrastructure have been used. The human capital indicator considers health, formal education, informal education and accumulated experience. It embraces a wider range of factors than the variables conventionally used in empirical studies. As to the institutional infrastructure index, it has been constructed on the basis of six institutional sub-indices, comprising voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Thus, the index constructed captures a greater wealth of the items commonly covered by the concept of institutions.     

Political entrepreneurs and electoral capital: the case of the Israeli State Economy Arrangement Law

This article looks at a specific institutional change in Israel. In 1985, Israeli politicians adopted the “State Economy Arrangement Law” (SEAL), commonly regarded as part of the budgetary legislation in Israel. This law became an alternative channel through which applicants could circumvent the necessity of applying to the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) for the implementation of certain policies. This law enabled an accelerated, flexible regulatory process that short circuited democratic discussion in the Knesset and obviated the intervention of Israeli consumer organizations. This article suggests that this institutional change should be analyzed as part of a process where institutional reality influences individual and collective beliefs, thus triggering an individual and collective learning process that eventually leads to institutional change, specific policies and outcomes in terms of economic performance. The article also claims that the SEAL legislation is an equilibrium that results from the actions of political entrepreneurs (or agents of change) who operate to maximize their own electoral capital against the backdrop of certain structural and cultural conditions, both local and international. They operate in an environment characterized by the inability of the government to function effectively (non-governability) and the development of an alternative political culture.

Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. Effectively, rules are “players” who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent. For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration.     

Lawyers and politicians: the impact of organized legal professions on institutional reforms

Organized legal professions often play a central role in successful institutional development. The paper’s model examines how legal professions affect institutional reform. Professional review of reform proposals solves a politician’s informational problem in a way that makes democracy, political stability, and professional power substitutes. The model’s applicability is examined by showing that its predictions track the fortunes of lawyers in the USSR and early transition and are consistent with events in 1688 in England and 1789 in France, indicating why these two revolutions had different consequences. The model suggests why and when civil law and common law systems differ.

Interest Rate Defenses of Currency Pegs

ABSTRACT

Reducing rigidity in labor markets is key to lowering unemployment. Theoretical models suggest that the impact of such reforms depends on the country-specific regulatory framework. We test this hypothesis by estimating the impact of changes in six categories of regulation conditional on the country-specific regulatory environment for 26 OECD countries. We overcome problems of modeling a large set of institutional interdependencies by applying a machine learning type model selection approach. We provide evidence for the existence of higher-order institutional interdependencies. We further document that especially for changes in employment protection and the unemployment benefit system the impact on unemployment is mixed across countries.     

Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. Effectively, rules are “players” who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent. For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration.     

New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

ABSTRACT

Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include deadlock in expansive multilateral fora, institutional drift as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and fragmentation as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.     

Medical Dominance and Institutional Change in the Delivery of Health Care Services

This paper puts the theory of medical dominance, as it understood as a sociological theory of historical change, into a broader theory of institutional change of the delivery of medical care. The application of medical dominance theory to three institutional contexts (Australia, USA, and Canada) is reviewed. The possibility of progressive institutional change in the delivery of medical care is addressed, as well as the type of technological innovation that might accompany such institutional change. The concept of medical dominance is useful to explain the dominant characteristics supporting the institution of medical practice. However, an explanatory theory of the evolution of health care delivery should be linked to the instrumentally warranted standards for medical care. These standards are then discussed.