“诺思第二悖论”及其新破解

在新制度经济学家看来,制度的一个重要作用是降低作为经济运行的"摩擦力"的交易费用。理论上,交易费用会随着一国制度的进步和完善而降低。但是,据瓦利斯和诺思测算,美国自1 870年到1 970年的1 00年间总量交易费用占GNP的比例不仅没有降低,反而越来越高了。这种理论(随着制度的进步交易费用应该越来越低)与实际(测量到总量交易费用越来越高)的矛盾被称之为"诺思第二悖论"。瓦利斯和诺思测量到的总量交易费用并非交易费用的全部,表面上测量到的总量交易费用上升了,但"理论上"的总量交易费用是下降的,即是说,随着制度的进步,不仅每笔交易的交易费用下降了,理论上的总量交易费用也是下降的,所谓"诺思第二悖论"是不存在的。     

The deep historical roots of modern culture: A comparative perspective

This paper presents evidence showing that there have been since antiquity two opposed types of institutional systems: one resembling central planning and present in ancient China, ancient Egypt, the Inca Empire and other territorial states, and another one with strong market institutions, protection of property rights present mostly in city-states, not just in the Mediterranean but throughout the world. Evidence is presented that these institutional differences dating back to the antiquity are shaped by special geographical conditions. These institutional differences can be seen to be at the root of the two cultural systems in today's world: individualism and collectivism. These cultural differences have effects on economic performance and institutions in today's world.     

Do island states have better institutions?

Since the end of World War II, the number of countries in the world has increased dramatically. Many of these newly independent countries are small both in terms of population and geography, and several are islands. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of island status and country size on institutional quality, and to determine if these institutional effects can explain the relatively strong economic performance of islands and small countries. I distinguish between political institutions (Democracy) and economic institutions (Rule of Law). One of the main findings of this paper is that the relationship between island status and institutional quality is significantly positive, and that these results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables. Further, I find that country size is negatively related to institutional quality, which is in keeping with previous results. These results provide further support for the hypothesis that institutions account for these countries’ relatively better economic performance.     

The Austrian Theory of Institutions Applied to Science-Industry Relationships: The Relevance of Innovative Institutions

This contribution aims at using an Austrian approach of institutions to discuss specific institutional arrangements in the current working of science-industry relationships. By combining distinctive characteristics between Menger's and Hayek's research programs, we establish a typology of institutions that goes beyond the usual way to approach business institutions and allows us to identify transitory types of institutional arrangements called innovative institutions. We apply that Austrian approach of institutions and address its relevance to highlight some puzzling issues derived from empirical evidence. Then, innovative institutions reveal particularly suited to understand how public and private research work together in science-industry relationships.     

Decentralization,social capital,and regional growth: The case of the Italian North-South divide

This paper aims to show how a region's constant level of social capital may have a very different impact on its economic growth depending on whether the central or the local level of government is responsible for regional policy.Our case study is the economic performance of Northern and Southern Italy in the post-World War II period, when a long phase of regional convergence came to a sudden halt in the early 1970s. We focus on the economic effects of the 1970s institutional reforms on government decentralization and wage bargaining. Our main hypothesis is that decentralization allocates the provision of public capital to institutions, the local ones, more exposed to a territory's social capital. Since social capital is lower in the Southern regions, decentralization made their developmental policies less effective from 1970 onwards, and regional inequality increased.We build an endogenous growth model augmented to include the interaction between social capital and public investment as well as the reform of the Italian labour market. We calibrate our model using data of the Italian regions for 1951–71. Our quantitative results indicate that decentralization triggered the influence of local social capital on growth and played a central role in halting the convergence path of the low-social-capital regions.     

Decentralization and regional government size in Spain

The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of fiscal decentralization on the size of regional governments in Spain, by controlling for economies of scale, interregional heterogeneity and institutional framework. We study it over 1985 to 2004 using a panel dataset of seventeen spanish regions. The results can be easily summarized. Firstly, it supports the classic public goods theory of a trade-off-between the economic benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity. Secondly, it doesn??t reject the ??Leviathan?? hypothesis and neither does the ??common pool?? hypothesis. Thirdly, by contrast, the paper partly rejects the ??Wallis???? hypothesis. It argues that government size is mediated by financial resources obtained through intergovernmental grants, consistent with welfare economics and positive economic policies. We conclude that later advances in the decentralisation process must be compatible with the goal of reducing fiscal imbalances that emanate from the vertical structure of fiscal power.     

Political Economy of Systemic and Micro-Corruption Throughout the World

The purpose of this paper is to apply some of the core general principles of heterodox political economy — especially with an institutional and evolutionary emphasis — to the topic of corruption as a global, regional, and national phenomenon. I start with the principle of historical specificity, where the known history of corruption processes and concepts are examined. I follow the evolution of the corruption discourse, starting with the classical scholars of ancient Greece and numerous others, who had a systemic view of the matter. I proceed through the micro-views of Roman law, to Adam Smith and others who took an individualist view of corruption, and onto the reemergence of the corruption discourse in the period between the 1970s and the 2010s. In the process, I investigate the micro-perspective, but increasingly center on the "modern classical works" on systemic corruption. Then, I present the basics of a modern institutional and evolutionary perspective on corruption through the principle of contradiction, which defines corruption as the promotion of vested interests against the common good in the form of bribery, fraud, embezzlement, state capture, nepotism, extortion, and others. Social dominance theory is applied to corruption vis-à-vis dominant and subordinate groups, and the styles of corruption activated by elites are surveyed as they gain resources, favors, and economic surplus against the interests of "common people." Finally, I scrutinize the principle of uneven development, paying special attention to four main stylized facts about corruption throughout the world in relation to (i) development patterns, (ii) corporate corruption, (iii) key sectors/nations, and (iv) inequality. Throughout the paper, I outline ways to reduce corruption and modify the structure of power to benefit the common good, socioeconomic performance, and the functioning of institutions.     

Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

Institutional quality and public spending in Europe: A quantile regression approach

We appraise the effects of institutional quality on public spending for a set of 27 European countries and 18 Euro-area economies over the 1996–2017 period. While institutions play a weak role in affecting spending once the fixed-effects model is employed, the application of the quantile regression indicates that improved institutional quality mitigates public spending, although the effects crucially depend on the distribution of public expenditure and the sample examined. For both the Euro-area sample and the full sample, we show that better quality of institutions reduces public spending, although the effects become less significant the higher the levels of public spending. Further, for the Euro-area sample, institutions appear to have a stronger role in mitigating public spending. Several robustness tests confirm our findings.     

Competition and diversification in public and private higher education

The development of mass higher education and growing competition between higher education institutions has given increasing visibility to the issue of diversification. This article analyses the issue of programme diversification, using a panel of 181 Portuguese higher education institutions over the period 1995 to 2007, by comparing the behaviour of public and private institutions. The results show that the legal status of institutions is the major determinant of programme diversification, as private institutions are far more specialized than their public counterparts. The study also evaluates the role of other institutional variables, such as the institution’s size, age, location, institutional mission and research intensity, to explain differences in the diversification behaviour of higher education institutions. The results provide important insights, as competition has been thought to improve the performance of higher education institutions.     

The impact of sub‐national institutions

This paper assesses the effect of sub‐national institutions on the economic performance of Russia's regions (oblasts, republics, krais and okrugs) from 2001 to 2008, a period of rapid economic advancement and recentralization. Approximating sub‐national institutions with the RA Expert index of investment risk, we find that a reduction in investment risk by one standard deviation increases output by 1.4 percent in the short run and 11.9 percent in the long run, suggesting a substantial regional performance gap in government practices, despite intensive political recentralization. Assuming that the main components of effective governance are running satisfactory public health programmes aimed at decreasing overall mortality among the working‐age population, creating fair labour market conditions and improving the regional institutional climate to encourage investment in fixed assets, we argue that sub‐national institutions remain important for growth in post‐Soviet Russia after 2000. This paper contributes to the literature on institutional persistence.     

AGGREGATE HEALTH EXPENDITURES, NATIONAL INCOME, AND INSTITUTIONS FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY

Being careful about the potential for endogeneity bias, I find robust evidence that "institutions for private property" share a more fundamental relationship with health expenditures than does national income. This research should interest a wide audience. First, health scholars may be interested in its relatively careful estimate of income's relationship to health spending. Second, institutions and commitment scholars should be interested in its evidence of institutions' primacy in a heretofore overlooked, but theoretically and substantively attractive, application. Finally, policy entrepreneurs may find important the implication that reforming governance structures can be more productive than is directly funding health services.

A useful model of the macroaspect or even microaspects of an economy must build the institutional constraints into the model.

(North, 1990, p. 112)     

Social Control of Corporate Power: Comment

Economic activity takes place within an institutional framework. The economy, like society, represents a complex of institutions, ranging from the smallest, such as the family, to the largest and most comprehensive, the state (Chavance 2009). Institutional economics offers a broad perspective that brings forward the concept of gender, since gender is a fundamental organizing principle of institutions (Jacobsen 2003). A focus on social provisioning, typical for both feminist as well as institutional economists, leads to a broader understanding of economic activity. This broader approach includes activities like caring and care labor that cannot be entirely understood in terms of individual choices. In this paper, I explore the relationships between care and the economy from the perspective of neoclassical, institutional, and feminist economic theory. Economic theories are a basis for public policies that have a major impact on people’s lives. I argue that changing the dominating economic perspective into feminist-institutional one would improve the situation of care providers, who would, in turn, contribute to the development of society and the economy.     

Imagination and society. The affective side of institutions

Since the contributions by D. North [(1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: CUP] and his Nobel Prize lecture [(1994). Economic performance through time, Nobel Prize Lecture. The American Economic Review, 84(3), 359–368], the relationship between mind and institutions has been increasingly investigated by economists. Mantzavinos, North, and Shariq [(2004). Learning, institutions, and economic performance. Perspectives on Politics, 2(1), 75–84] introduced the expression cognitive institutionalism in order to define this stream of research. In the first part of the paper we discuss some recent findings of the cognitive approach to institutions and its roots in the history of economic ideas. We also claim that in such an approach, no place has yet been found for a crucial faculty of the human mind, imagination. We then explore the concept of radical imaginary developed by Cornelius Castoriadis in his book The Imaginary Institution of Society (1975; 1987). From the perspective of cognitive economics, and on the grounds of Castoriadis’ legacy, we aim at highlighting some basic mechanisms of interaction between imagination, affectivity and institutions.

Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability*

Whether natural resources are good or bad for a country's development are shown to depend on the interaction between institutional setting and, crucially, the types of resources possessed by the country. Some natural resources are, for economical and technical reasons, more likely to cause problems such as rent‐seeking and conflicts than others. This potential problem can, however, be countered by good institutional quality. In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis, we show the impact of natural resources on economic growth to be non‐monotonic in institutional quality, and increasingly so for certain types of resources. In particular, countries rich in minerals are cursed only if they have low‐quality institutions, while the curse is reversed if institutions are sufficiently good. Furthermore, if countries are rich in diamonds and precious metals, these effects—both positive and negative—are larger.     

基于诺思制度变迁框架的中国近代企业史研究——以荣家企业制度变迁为例

从20世纪90年代起,中国经济史学研究引入了新制度经济学理论,这是传统经济史学研究方法上的突破。但这些研究大多集中于正式制度对近代企业的影响和运用交易成本或产权理论分析近代企业制度变迁。文章在诺思产权—国家—意识形态的制度变迁理论框架的基础上,以企业代替国家为制度变迁的主体,重点从意识形态视角进行研究,并通过对荣家企业的案例分析,为近代企业史研究提供了一个内在逻辑一致的理论框架。     

Visibility,Institutional Preferences and Agency Considerations

We show that market frictions and agency considerations are important concerns when institutional investors make portfolio allocation decisions. For a sample of widely followed firms, institutional holdings increase with increases in visibility as measured by the number of analysts following the firm. We also report a significant seasonal pattern in institutional holdings consistent with the gamesmanship hypothesis, which asserts that institutions rebalance their portfolios in response to agency considerations. Finally, we find that excess returns are highly seasonal with performance, deteriorating when the following by financial analysts increases. "Followed" firms actually exhibit inferior market performance over the 1981-1996 sample period.     

制度转型、经济增长和交易费用——来自中国各省市的经验分析

交易费用的测量是新制度经济学里面最核心的问题。中国的制度转型及其经济增长为检验新制度经济学的核心理论提供了很好的样本。本文力争在国内外文献的基础上做出如下贡献。第一,我们采用沃利斯和诺思（Wallis,North,1986）的基本思路,首次对中国各省的交易费用进行了测算。第二,我们对制度转型、经济增长和中国的交易费用的关系进行了实证分析,发现制度转型降低了中国的交易费用,证实了好的制度就是节约交易费用;但是经济增长却没有显著地促进交易费用的增加,这与正统的新制度经济理论预期不符;第三,我们证实了交易也存在一定的规模效应,当市场上的交易费用达到一定的程度时,由于规模效应可能会节省每笔交易的交易费用,从而导致每笔交易的交易费用减少。     

The self-organisation of strategic alliances

This paper is based upon an analysis of various experiences of electronic commerce. It analyzes the role of private institutions in the organization of systems of transactions. Private institutions take place between public institutions (that are insufficiently specialized) and inter-individual governance structures (that do not benefit from scale and cognitive economies). These private institutions are very diverse and the paper points out the various types of services provided by diverse institutions depending on their constitutional mode.

While various possible institutional frameworks have very different features in terms of coordination, there is no most efficient institutional environment. Moreover, the emergence process of these institutional framework strongly influences their ability to survive. Very different institutional frameworks can therefore organize electronic trade quite differently in the various industries     

The weight of the median voter ageing on public debt

This paper studies the relationship between an ageing society and voter preference for financing public expenditures with debt versus income taxation. We focus on advanced economies and OECD members where ageing is relatively severe, the political process is more democratic, and economic institutions are subject to electorate scrutiny. Since there are no international data sources available for the median voter age, one of the contributions of this paper is the construction of a median voter series for the countries included in the study. The sample period covers 30 years, from 1980 to 2010. The panel estimates confirm the Brennan hypothesis (Const Polit Econ 23(3):182–198, 2012). A 1-year ageing of the median voter increases the public debt to GDP ratio by on the order of 4.5 percentage points.