Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.     

Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem

We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62, D82.     

Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem

We examine a setting in which property rights are initially ambiguously defined. Whether the parties go to court to remove the ambiguity or bargain and settle before or after trial, they incur enforcement costs. When the parties bargain, a version of the Coase theorem holds. However, despite the additional costs of going to court, other ex-post inefficiencies, and the absence of incomplete information, going to court may ex-ante Pareto dominate settling out of court. This is especially true in dynamic settings, where obtaining a court decision today saves on future enforcement costs. When the parties do not negotiate and go to court, a simple rule for the initial ambiguous assignment of property rights maximizes net surplus. A paper circulated under the same title and dated 6 March 2000 contained the basic structure examined in this paper, but did not develop many of the results reported here. For comments, we would like to thank participants at the WZB-CEPR contests conference and seminar audiences at the University of Southern California, the University of British Columbia, UC Davis, and UC Riverside.     

Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis

Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation – mandatory disclosure of information. While information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior – often resulting in lower levels of pollution – little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome a lack of information on the part of the public. We characterize the conditions under which information disclosure will lead to a reduction in emissions, and ultimately, the conditions under which it will enhance social welfare. Several extensions of the model are briefly explored, including the effect of two sources of pollution – only one of which is subject to information disclosure. This paper was prepared while V. Santhakumar was a Visiting Scholar at the Vanderbilt Center for Environmental Management Studies, Vanderbilt University.     

科斯产权理论的适用范围与土地产权理论的发展

科斯提出,只要财产权是明确的,并且交易成本为零或者很小,那么,无论在开始时将财产权赋予谁,市场均衡的最终结果都是有效率的。科斯的产权理论对于优化资源配置、完善产权制度具有重要意义,但其对于土地这一不一定具有可替代性的资产,并不完全适用。通过实例定性分析科斯产权理论的局限性和适用范围,阐述土地产权位移理论提出的背景,为土地产权理论的进一步发展提供可借鉴的参考。     

科斯三定理的新表述与新证明

科斯第二定理指出,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,产权的不同界定会对资源配置效率产生影响。政府(或法院)的基本原则应该是把权利界定给能以较低交易费用解决外部性问题的一方。科斯第三定理的准确含义是,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,制度安排的生产本身是有成本的,净收益最大的制度安排就是最佳的选择。科斯第二、三定理为市场经济中普遍存在的外部性问题提供了新的解决措施和科学的决策原则,间接意味着科斯并非政府干预的完全反对者,科斯定理也不足以成为有些学者把新制度经济学定性为新自由主义的充分理由。     

China's emerging market for property rights: Theoretical and empirical perspectives1

his paper contrasts state–directed and market–mediated reform of enterprise ownership rights in transition economies. We evaluate China's emerging market for enterprise ownership rights from the perspective of conditions underpinning the Coase Theorem: the assignment of property rights, the degree of competition, and the nature of transaction costs. China's recent experience suggests that policies designed to expand and support the scope of decentralized, market–based restructuring of ownership rights, even under conditions that deviate widely from the ideal assumptions underlying the Coase Theorem, may prove more beneficial than direct official intervention. JEL classification: G34, K11, L1 and P3.     

生态经济的产权基础:一个科斯注释

发展生态经济面临的最大困难是有关经济主体对资源的过多消耗带来压力和在消耗资源生产商品时产生的大量废弃物的排放.以工业废气排放为例,1983年工业废气排放量为63167亿标立方米,2010年比1983年增加456001亿标立方米,增长7.21倍.产权是制度安排的核心之一,生态经济的发展应以合理的产权制度为前提,只有产权给各方利益主体提供了足够的激励与约束,才能促进生态经济的持续发展.如何根据经济运行的实际情况,更好地选择和设计制度,有效调整产权制度来促使外部性内部化,使有关经济主体减少废物、废气的排放,从而使一条生态经济之路,这可能是科斯定理给我们实施可持续发展战略、走生态经济之路的最大启示.     

市场结构与市场绩效——基于我国乳业成长期的实证研究

本文选取我国乳业1998～2004年的相关数据进行回归分析,以检验我国乳业市场结构与市场绩效诸要素之间的相互影响的程度,并就市场结构对市场绩效在要素层面的相互影响的实证分析。结果表明,内部效率对产品差异和进入壁垒具有负面影响;配置效率对产品差异具有正面影响;技术进步效率对产品差异和进入壁垒具有负面影响;而规模结构效率对市场结构各个指标都没有表现出显著影响。更为重要的是,在加入国有产权结构变量后,内部效率指标与产品差异和进入壁垒之间没有表现出相关性。本研究结果将使产业组织的分析范式更加完善,并进一步对促进企业的改革和优化产业的资源配置有着重要的意义。     

International Monetary Reform: A Review Article

Original institutional economics (OIE) has three significant, but apparently contradictory, definitions of institution(s) stemming from Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and J. Fagg Foster. In this first installment of a two-part paper I address this apparent contradiction by developing an "irenic reconciliation" of these definitions using a methodological approach I call "critical institutionalism"— a synthesis of the OIE in the tradition of the Veblen, Commons, and Foster, the pragmatism theory of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, the critical realist methodology of Margaret Archer, and the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar. In so doing, I provide an alternative discussion to that of some current institutionalists who propose to replace the existing OIE definitions of institution(s) with "consensual definitions" developed in the discourse with non-OIE traditions. I propose that there is still considerable analytical value in the OIE definitions, and that replacing them with non-OIE-originating concepts would unnecessarily carry OIE away from its methodological and philosophical roots. In the second installment of this paper (yet to be published), I proceed to demonstrate the analytical value these "reconciled" definitions have for the OIE project.     

Economic Synthesis: A Review of the Work of Boris Ischboldin

Current research on efficiency wages and transaction costs utilizes models of economic behavior that require a theory of market institutions. Yet the institutional structure of market exchange appears at odds with the neoclassical theory of markets under perfect competition. Both Samuel Bowles/Herbert Gintis and David Levine recognize this as a problem for traditional economic theory. Bowles and Gintis suggest that market power is a prerequisite for the effective utilization of resources within the capitalist enterprise. Levine identifies market exchange with the need for individuals to define for themselves a distinct way of life in order to secure the recognition of others and preserve the integrity of the self. The middle ground between a theory of market power and individual personality formation lies in the inherent social relations governing market exchange. By exploring this middle ground, market exchange can be presented as a set of communicative practices through which individual needs are shaped and power is either challenged or maintained.     

A Note on Tradeable Permits

This note offers a perspective on whether tradeable permits are a passing fad or an enduring trend. It does so in noting how various types of tradeable permit systems relate to conventional environmental permits, what are the unique requirements of tradeable permit systems, and why they might be preferred to alternative instruments. A final observation concerns the analogy between tradeable permits for environmental goods and private property in land. This note first appeared in the CESifo Forum, 4: 3 (Spring 2003), a quarterly publication of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich, Germany, as an invited article. Permission to republish is gratefully acknowledged. In forming the ideas expressed here, I am indebted to many years of discussion and collaborative research with Paul Joskow, Juan-Pablo Montero, David Harrison, and Richard Schmalensee. All errors of fact and interpretation remain mine.     

The Dilemmas of Technology: A Review Article

During the 1990s, all of the European transition economies (TE) experienced a major recession and suffered from the explosion of income inequality. However, distribution of income between labor and capital differed greatly from one group of post-communist countries to another. The paper discusses and analyzes linkages between models of capitalism that emerged in former communist countries in the 1990s and the outcome of capitalist transition for labor in terms of income distribution and inequality. It is based on the estimates of the Marxian rate of exploitation and other indicators of labor income performance during the reform period.     

Theory of Public Choice: A Review Article

In this article, we analyze at a conceptual level some of the more relevant effects of the neoliberal takeover on the provision of social costs, including employment, health care, and nutrition. Adopting key perspectives of Karl Polanyi and other thinkers, we develop our examination under the seemingly perpetual conflict between markets and social reproduction. We argue that financialization has both expanded market spaces and changed relationships within those spaces. The ever-greater domination of financial markets means that employment has become increasingly more precarious in the strict spaces of the labor market. At the same time, financialization has steadily eroded the social forms that exist outside of formal markets, greatly weakening the mechanisms through which societies can both defend themselves from predatory markets and reproduce themselves with some degree of purpose and hope for the future.     

Product Market Integration and Environmental Policy Coordination in An International Duopoly

We analyse the effect of product market integration on environmental policy incentives in an international duopoly, where national policy makers act strategically. If traditional trade policy instruments are not available, environmental policies will typically be determined by the interaction of conflicting policy incentives. Contrary to popular belief, we find that international product market integration, in this particular setting, might reduce the need for transnational policy coordination, both from a purely environmental and from a social welfare perspective.     

市场交易:资源产权改革的出路

在中国,虽然通过承包制等改革手段划分了资源产权的权属,但因未明确赋予产权行使者对所承包资源实施市场交易的权利,影响了产权功能的发挥和资源的可持续开发与有效利用.本文在分析产权与市场交易关系的基础上,提出市场交易是产权的一项根本内涵,是产权的资源配置功能得以实现的重要条件,并结合牧场等资源产权改革的问题与困境,提出实现市场交易是资源产权改革的最终出路.     

Optimal Allocation of Tradable Pollution Rights and Market Structures

Tradable environmental rights are increasingly pursed as a regulatory instrument, to control for environmental quality. However, in the presence of market power, regulation through an allocation of tradable rights generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article analyzes the effect of the initial distribution of tradable rights on the firms’ strategies and performance in abatement and production, and proposes an efficient criterion for the allocation of tradable rights among firms with market power and competitive fringe firms. The suggested criterion maximizes efficiency of the market based regulation. A simple numerical example illustrates the theoretical discussion.I am very grateful to Richard J. Sexton for useful comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank Giacomo F. Bonanno, the editor, anonymous referees, and participants at the CORE workshop “Industrial Economics and the Environment” (2004) for helpful discussions and comments that improved the paper.