Innovation and Income Inequality in the USA: Ceremonial versus Institutional Changes

Abstract

This article investigates the distributive effects of technological progress in the United States during the last four decades. The result of our econometric analysis reveals that the shift in R&D investment from the public to the private sector was associated with an increase in income share of the richer classes at the expense of the poorer income classes. Taking an institutionalist perspective, these findings can be explained by ceremonial encapsulation of innovation by corporate capital that slows the pace of social progress. In this context, diffusion of innovation may be treated as a progressive institutional change.     

The Image of Australia. Perceptions of the Australian Economy from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century

Recent institutionalist and post-Keynesian work on business cycles continues with the traditional institutionalist supposition that financial bubbles drive cycles; however there has been a growing sense in the literature that household consumption, not business investment, has become the key variable. This paper will show how this is a change from historical institutional theory and it will then discuss how this change pushes income distribution toward a more central role in explaining current cycle dynamics. Specifically, this paper argues that much of the economic growth over the last two decades can be attributed to the top two quintiles borrowing more and the current slow growth can be attributed to high quintile households increasing their consumption while middle income households are continuing to deleverage.     

The Role of Nonattenuated Rights in Positive Economics: A Critical Appraisal

This article assesses the institutionalist elements of Friedrich Hayek's neoliberal political economy by presenting his views on the entangled relations between the state and markets in capitalism. Through the analysis of Hayek's work, the article contributes to further consolidating the view that neoliberalism is an ideological project of institutional transformation which, despite some enduring myths, has an irreplaceable role for a state with many important functions in a more limited democracy. Markets, for their part, are politically contested social constructions that depend on previous non-market institutions for their existence and legitimation. This paper argues that Hayek's work corroborates this institutionalist claim.     

Social Constructs and their Usefulness in Original Institutionalist Research: Quality Matters

Some institutionalist researchers are reluctant to use quantitative methods, possibly limiting the extent and influence of institutional research. Social indicators may provide useful inputs into institutionalist analyses, but caution is warranted. This article discusses the importance of exploring a social indicator’s quality before adopting it as a research input.     

Core Concepts of Institutionalist Public Finance: Problem Solving,Institutional Analysis,Strategic Choice,and Stakeholder Engagement

Citizens and policymakers in many nations are becoming increasingly concerned about large budget deficits and mounting long-term fiscal policy challenges. At the same time, slow economic growth in the United States and Europe is causing some people to demand more government spending (and lower taxes) and others to question the efficacy of fiscal policy. Against that backdrop, institutional economists are exhibiting renewed interest in the field of public finance. This article responds by outlining four core concepts of institutionalist public finance: problem solving, institutional analysis, strategic choice, and stakeholder engagement. What distinguishes the perspective of institutionalism from that of neoclassical economics, today’s dominant economic paradigm, is described in the course of the discussion. The core concepts of institutionalist public finance offer a coherent approach to the study of fiscal policy questions. Those concepts were first fashioned decades ago, but remain relevant: institutionalism continues to provide a solid basis for constructive analyses of fiscal challenges.     

CHANGES IN WATER ALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE

Existing institutions allocating water in California reflect prior appropriation water rights established when water was abundant. These allocation rules queue users and do not encourage water conservation. Increased water scarcity and growing valuation of water's environmental benefits are inducing a transition to water allocation mechanisms that increase water efficiency in agriculture. Transferable rights systems will lead to market-like water allocation, induce farmers to adopt water conservation technology, and may not face strong objection from senior water rights holders. One must weigh the efficiency gains associated with transition from water rights to water markets against the transaction costs associated with installing facilities that enable water exchange and trading .
Transition to water markets may preserve the agricultural sector's well-being while allowing the transfer of some water outside of agriculture—in particular, for environmental benefit. The cost of policies proposed to reduce agricultural water supply while encouraging water trading are inversely related to the extent of trading allowed. The more farmers trade water, the less costly reducing water supply is to agriculture. Policies reducing water supply to Central Valley Project contractors and allowing trading only among these contractors are much more expensive than are policies encouraging trading among all agricultural water users in California .     

The impact of unemployment on inequality and poverty in OECD countries

The purpose of this research is to examine the contribution of unemployment to income inequality and poverty in various OECD countries. These relationships have been explored using Luxembourg Income Study micro-data. Considerable differences across OECD countries are revealed through the use of within-household unemployment distributions. These differences help to explain most of the observed divergences in the relationship between unemployment and income distribution, in conjunction with the heterogeneous influence of social benefits on the economic position of the unemployed in these countries. A sub-group decomposition analysis corroborates the limited effect of unemployment on income distribution in most of the considered countries. However, it seems clear that the unemployed are among those with the highest risk of experiencing poverty.
JEL classification: D31, I32, J31.     

Economic Theory as a Guideline for Government Intervention and Control: Comment

This paper provides an institutionalist analysis of the impasse over labor issues that has stalled much needed reform of U.S. immigration policy. While it is unlikely that institutional economics can dislodge a century of conventional wisdom regarding the impact of immigrants on the labor market, a more modest goal is to refute the mainstream economic assertion that what the United States needs to do is to reduce the supply of immigrants, a conclusion that fuels the disgraceful "war on immigrants" that has long plagued reasonable debate over immigration policy.     

Cross‐country evidence on the determinants of inclusive growth episodes

Widening income disparities and slow productivity growth in most advanced and several emerging‐market economies have rekindled interest in the empirical analysis of the determinants of inclusive growth, defined in this paper as episodes of increases in GDP per capita without a concomitant deterioration in the distribution of household disposable income. The empirical analysis is based on a chronology of inclusive growth episodes between 1980 and 2013 for a sample of 78 countries. Logit and multinomial probit estimations show that human capital accumulation, the redistributive potential of tax‐benefit systems, increases in multifactor productivity and labor force participation, as well as trade openness and a range of institutional factors, including political system durability and electoral regimes, are important determinants of the probability of occurrence of inclusive growth. This empirical evidence contributes to the policy debate about how countries can deal with efficiency–equity tradeoffs.     

Contemporary Economic thought. The Contribution of Neo-Institutional Economics

This article examines the historical developments of the institutionalist theory of the business enterprise since the early 1900s in order to demonstrate its distinctive characteristics that are often overlooked or belittled by some institutional-evolutionary economists and most mainstream economists. I argue that the institutionalist theory is an evolving and emergent theory, which bears a reciprocal, evolutionary, and cumulative relationship between the business enterprise and society. The institutionalist theory is, therefore, suitable for the understanding of the real-world business enterprise as it can be modified and refined along with the evolution of capitalism. The article begins with a discussion of the present state of the institutionalist theory. The following section is devoted to the major contributions to the institutionalist theory situated in the evolution of U.S. capitalism. The penultimate section provides a critical discussion of new institutional and evolutionary approaches to the firm. The article concludes with a brief discussion as to what should be done for the further development of the institutionalist theory of the business enterprise.     

The Complementary Relationship Between Institutional and Complexity Economics: The Example of Deep Mechanismic Explanations

Analyzing economic systems from an evolutionary-institutional or a complexity perspective are two complementary approaches to economic inquiry. I discuss three arguments in favor of this hypothesis: (i) eminent institutional economists have examined the economy as what today could be considered a complex system; (ii) complexity economists lack meta-theoretical foundations which could be provided by institutionalist theory; and (iii) institutional economists could benefit from using methods of complexity economics. In this context, I argue that scholars considering the economy to be complex should seek to explain it by discovering social mechanisms instead of focusing on prediction. In order to distinguish between alternative explanations, scholars should refer to the deepness of an explanation, rather than to Occam’s razor.     

Regional Income Inequality in the United States: 1969–2017

Abstract:

This article contains an analysis of the nation’s 100 lowest and 100 highest per capita income counties in the United States from 1969 to 2017. The low-income counties are very different from the high-income counties. Compared to the high-income counties, the low-income counties are generally small, mainly rural, and geographically concentrated. The people of the low-income counties are also more likely to be from minority groups than the people of either the nation or the high-income counties. Despite major institutional and technological change, both groups of counties exhibit considerable stability over the last half century. A reasonable assertion from the analysis is that the nature of regional income inequality is not likely to change substantially over the next half-century.     

J.M. Clark and Institutional Economics: Remarks on the Receipt of the Veblen-Commons Award

This paper outlines the contributions of J.M. Clark to institutional economics. Clark is sometimes seen as standing between institutional and neoclassical economics, but I argue that this view is not accurate. Clark was intimately involved in the definition, promotion, and defense of institutional economics in sessions of the American Economic Association and in a variety of other forums. No other member of the institutionalist group was as much involved in the professional discussion of institutional economics as J.M. Clark. In addition, Clark made a number of key contributions to institutionalist theory in the areas of psychology and economics, the costs of decision-making, overhead costs and business-pricing behavior, the accelerator mechanism and business cycles, workable and effective competition and competition policy, and social control. These contributions, together with the graduate students he trained at the University of Chicago and Columbia University, serve to place him in the center of the institutionalist movement and not on its periphery.     

Investigating the determinants of domestic bonds: the role of socio-economic and institutional factors

This article investigates the determinants of the size of domestic bond market using economic, social and institutional factors. We expand the body of existing literature by suggesting that economic and social environment as well as institutional settings vary between developed and emerging economies. The article uses recent data from a wide range of countries, incorporates a variety of macroeconomic variables, social indicators and institutional factors to reassess the determinant of domestic bond markets. Robustness of the empirical analysis is established through both two-stage least squares and generalized method of movements techniques. The results of this article show that the size of the economy, breadth and depth of the banking system, the monetary policy stance, the degree of openness, the level of corruption, the degree of civil liberty and status of market access to investors, all play a crucial role in the determination of the size of the domestic bond market. We also find differences across developed and emerging market samples. The results are robust to different specifications and the corresponding estimation techniques.     

Men of Steel Meet the Market: Interpreting Firm Behavior in Russia’s Metallurgy Industry

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty (2014) explains growing income inequality via the difference between the rate of return on capital and the growth rate of the economy: the “r > g” inequality. Even if it is true that r > g leads to increasing inequality, nearly every school of economic thought predicts that r will fall as the economy grows. Thus, for Capital (2014) to be a comprehensive theory of inequality, a more adequate theory of r is required. I term this the “Piketty Problem.” I offer a solution to this problem from an institutionalist perspective.     

政府制度供给与乡村合作运动——基于20世纪前半期中国乡村社会经济史视阈分析

20世纪前半期,为挽救行将崩溃的农村经济,国民政府推行了以乡村合作运动为中心的"供给主导型"制度变迁,促使了合作社大量快速设立。但是合作社发展受到了来自于财政金融体制的制约,根源在于政府有效制度供给能力不足及制度建设协调性缺失。实际上,同时作用于乡村的各种制度共同组成了社会的"制度系统"(如与合作社相关的行政、财政金融、土地等制度),制度间耦合关系决定了任何一项制度都必须与其他制度相结合才能发挥作用。此外,制度供给还要与政府的"社会动员"相结合,以形成政府力量与乡村民众之间的"共振"。否则,社会经济变迁极有可能会陷入"头重脚轻"的困境。     

Entrepreneurship and institutional change

Entrepreneurs do more than just buy low and sell high; they sometimes also change our institutions, including our categories of thought. New institutional economics has been examining incentives that drive individuals to bring about market-supporting institutional arrangements. There is, however, an aspect of entrepreneurship conducive to institutional changes that has been neglected by contemporary institutionalist theories and that remains underdeveloped in entrepreneurship research. When and how does entrepreneurship bring about institutional change? I suggest that entrepreneurs are agents of institutional change when cultural categorization is ambiguous with regard to the proper and permissible applications of novel artifacts. Motherhood, for example, used to be a simple category, but surrogacy changed that radically. Examining newspaper evidence, social surveys, statutory law, and judicial cases, I show how entrepreneurs, by provoking a change in interpretation and judgment, challenged the existing institutional legal ordering of procreation turning a technically feasible method of surrogacy into current practice.     

Water markets design and evidence from experimental economics

Market mechanisms are gaining increasing acceptance all over the world as a way of making more efficient use of scarce water resources. Designing regulatory frameworks that ensure both inter- and intra-temporal efficient allocations is a daunting task, especially if supply is stochastic and there is ample storage capacity. In addition to defining tradable rights, specific provisions must regulate the use of reservoirs. Commonly, water statutes include provisions that establish asymmetries regarding the allocation of water, and market restrictions that ban water trading across different users. In this article, we use data collected in a laboratory to test two specific market regulations included in the 1999 Water reform in Spain. First, junior right holders are not allowed to buy water from senior users. Second, the law does not explicitly define water rights over units left in reservoirs for the following season. Results suggest that trading restrictions among water right holders lead to welfare losses for senior users. It is shown that removing this restriction would increase senior right holders’ benefits, without reducing those of junior users. Results show that defining water rights over saved units across periods would increase the average stock levels of reservoirs, and reduce market price instability. The lessons learned from the Spanish experience are applicable to settings characterized by unstable natural water supply and the availability of large storage facilities.      

To Trust or to Control: Informal Value Transfer Systems and Computational Analysis in Institutional Economics

This article illustrates the usefulness of computational methods for the investigation of institutions. As an example, we use a computational agent-based model to study the role of general trust and social control in informal value transfer systems (IVTS). We find that the terms of interaction between general trust and social control have an impact on how IVTS work, become stable, and prove highly effective. The case shows how computational models may help (i) to operationalize institutional theory and to clarify the functioning of institutions; (ii) to test the logical consistency of alternative hypotheses about institutions; and (iii) to relate institutionalist theory with other paradigms and to practice an interested pluralism.