Financial intermediation and fragility: the role of the periphery

A peculiar feature of the present international economy is that the leading ‘hegemonic’ country, USA, has a large and mounting external deficit which it finances by issuing debt in its own currency. The US can be seen to be at the apex of a pattern of triangular payments recycling the surpluses of creditor countries to debtor countries in the periphery. The paper shows, within a stock‐flow‐consistent framework, how capital flight from debtor periphery countries, by precipitating a shift from assets denominated in domestic currency to those denominated in dollars, acts like a safety valve for the international monetary system.     

国际货币衰落的影响因素和韧性特征

国际货币也有生命周期,有其发育、壮大、衰落甚至消亡的过程.导致国际货币衰落的因素主要是,母国经济的国际地位从上升转为下降,从巨额债权国演变为巨额债务国,货币从强势转为弱势并出现兑换性和价值储藏职能的危机,以及国际货币地位的滥用.但由于浮动汇率制、金融创新、虚拟经济超越实体经济而自我发展,当代国际货币的地位具有自我修复机制,衰落中呈现出韧性,国际货币衰落是一个长期而曲折的过程.     

Currency Exposure to Downside Risk: Which Fundamentals Matter?

I study whether or not countries' macroeconomic characteristics are systematically related to their currencies' exposure to the downside market risk. I find that the currency downside risk is strongly associated with the local inflation rate, real interest rate and net foreign asset position. Currencies of countries with high inflation and real interest rates and negative net foreign asset position (debtor countries) are more exposed to the downside risk whereas currencies of countries with low inflation and real interest rates and positive net foreign asset position (creditor countries) exhibit “safe haven” properties. The local real interest rate has the highest explanatory power in accounting for the cross‐section of currency exposure to the downside risk. This suggests that the high currency exposure to the downside risk is a consequence of investments in high‐yield risky countries and flight from them in “hard times”.     

Capacity Utilization,Foreign Portfolio Investment and International Debts and Deficits

This paper develops a long-run equilibrium growth model, in the tradition of Keynes, Kalecki and Steindl, involving international capital flows between a debtor and a creditor country, and in which capacity utilization is variable. This latter assumption implies that the shares of savings by capitalists and workers will vary with capacity utilization. Profit rates will also vary with capacity utilization rates, so that the establishment of a common warranted rate of growth requires that the rates of profit in the creditor and the debtor countries must vary inversely. The long-run equilibrium shares of ownership of the two stocks of capital must therefore vary as the utilization rates vary. Taking the international interest rate as given, steady growth in each country at near full employment is shown to be accommodated, to some extent, through variations in the degree of capacity utilization. Even if income distribution remains unchanged, the variability of capacity utilization allows the existence of a range of growth rates consistent with the long-run equilibrium conditions of the model.     

“Burden sharing” in sovereign debt reduction

We examine a concerted debt reduction deal between a sovereign debtor, a private creditor, and an official creditor, who insures the deposits of the commercial bank. Our results show that a weakening of the financial position of the commercial bank reduces the contribution of the commercial bank and increases that of the official creditor, without affecting the net terms faced by the debtor. This result is robust to changes in seniority. Moreover, leaving both creditor values unchanged requires that commercial banks retire debt at “unfairly” high prices, while official creditors make a net contribution.     

Global banking,global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises

We examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries׳ risk of suffering financial turmoil. We construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks׳ balance-sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets. This allows us investigating the effect of (foreign) bank balance-sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011. Our proxies of shocks towards bank balance-sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries. Confirming these results, bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks׳ assets are hit by negative shocks, as measured by credit rating downgrades from third-party countries. Short-term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll-over and funding risks, thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders’ balance-sheets. Domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities, such as illiquid assets and a low deposit-asset ratio, are found to increase crisis contagion risk. In contrast, a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks׳ assets to debtor countries.     

The world's greatest debtor nation?

The widely repeated assertion that the United States has become “the world's greatest debtor nation” is based on reports of its “net international investment position.” This position relates not exclusively to debt but rather to the difference between net United States claims to foreign assets and net foreign claims to United States assets. Major portions are equities and direct investment, the latter valued at “book” or original cost.Estimates of the current value of direct investment, either market value on the basis of share prices or replacement cost, effect huge asymmetric adjustments. As United States direct investment abroad is generally much older, it has appreciated much more than foreign direct investment in the United States. With adjustments as well for the market value of gold and for bad debts, it is estimated that the United States net international investment position was more or less in balance at the end of 1987 and in only relatively small deficit at the end of 1988.     

IMF Conditionality as a Screening Device

A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When the country is credit constrained, an alternative screening mechanism is to undertake an IMF programme in return for debt reduction and possibly an IMF loan.     

Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence

One of the most notable international economic events since 1990 has been the enormous increase in the number of free trade agreements (FTAs). While Baier and Bergstrand were the first to show empirically the impact of a country‐pair's economic characteristics on the likelihood of the pair having an FTA, the literature has been extended to demonstrate the importance empirically of FTA “interdependence”—the effect of other FTAs on the probability of a pair having an FTA. In the context of the Baier–Bergstrand framework, this paper delves deeper into the sources of interdependence—an “own‐FTA” effect and a “cross‐FTA” effect. The authors argue that the own‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between two countries owing to either already having other FTAs) likely dwarfs the cross‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between the pair owing to other FTAs existing in the rest of the world, or ROW). Augmenting a parsimonious logit model with simple “multilateral FTA” and “ROW FTA” terms to differentiate the own and cross effects empirically, it is shown that the marginal impact on the probability of a country‐pair having an agreement of either country having one more FTA with a third country is 50 times that of one more FTA between another pair in ROW. The results suggest that “domino (own‐FTA) effects” have far exceeded “competitive liberalization (cross‐FTA) effects” in the proliferation of FTAs.     

Norman's Lament: The Greek and Euro Area Crisis in Historical Perspective

This article uses original and secondary archival sources to examine the value of the distinction between creditor and debtor states in explaining the behaviour of domestic elites in international and European macroeconomic and monetary cooperation, compared to variables like size and trade. It highlights the paradox and tension between changes in institutional forms and stronger incentives to cooperate (Montagu Norman's ‘new Europe’) and persisting patterns in strategic behaviour across space and over time. Central to this continuity is a fundamental asymmetry of power between creditor and debtor states. The imbalances that underpin creditor–debtor state relations also reveal the structural underpinnings of arguments from economic principle, ‘who argues what’ and receptiveness to economic ideas and thinkers. Not least, the case studies and arguments in the article offer fresh and different insights into British and French attitudes to European coordination.     

Net foreign assets,productivity and real exchange rates in constrained economies

Empirical evidence suggests that real exchange rates (RER) behave differently in developed and developing countries. We develop an overlapping generations two-sector exogenous growth model in which RER determination may depend on the country's capacity to borrow from international capital markets. The country faces a constraint on capital inflows. With high domestic savings, the RER only depends on the productivity spread between sectors (Balassa–Samuelson effect). If the constraint is too tight and/or domestic savings too low, the RER depends on both net foreign assets (transfer effect) and productivity. We then analyze the empirical implications of the model and find that, in accordance with the theory, the RER is mainly driven by productivity and net foreign assets in constrained countries and by productivity in unconstrained countries.     

Theorizing the Financial Statecraft of Emerging Powers

‘Financial statecraft’, or the intentional use of credit, investment and currency levers by the incumbent governments of creditor – and sometimes debtor – states for both international economic and political advantage, has a long history, ranging from money doctors to currency wars. A neorealist, zero-sum framing of international monetary relations is not inevitable, yet casts a persistent shadow especially during periods of prospective interstate power transitions when previously peripheral countries find themselves with unexpected new capabilities. This article seeks to understand and theorise the financial statecraft of emerging economies, moving beyond the traditional understanding that closely identifies the concept with financial sanctions imposed by a strong state on a weaker state. We propose that the aims of financial statecraft may be either ‘defensive' or ‘offensive’. Financial statecraft may be targeted either ‘bilaterally' or ‘systemically’. Finally such statecraft may employ instruments that are either ‘financial' or ‘monetary’. As emerging market economies have moved up in the ranks in the interstate distribution of capabilities, they have also expanded their financial statecraft strategies from narrowly defensive and bilateral to those involving offensive tactics and targeted at the global and systemic level. Historical and contemporary examples illustrate the analysis.     

Dynamic stability under a dual exchange rate regime with neutral intervention operations

This paper examines the dynamic stability under dual exchange rates with neutral intervention operations. It is shown that the relationship between the stability properties and the residents' net foreign asset position depends crucially on the impact of foreign assets on the current account, and that, regardless whether the domestic economy is in a net creditor of debtor position, it is not possible for the system to have an infinite number of stable paths.     

VOLUNTARY DEBT REDUCTION OPERATIONS: BOLIVIA, MEXICO, AND BEYOND

This paper describes the main aspects and the results of voluntary debt reduction operations that occurred recently in Bolivia and Mexico. It studies the motivations and behavior of the three main agents in such operations: debtor countries, participating creditor banks and non-participating creditor banks. The paper also discusses the main issues that debtors must address in designing future voluntary debt reduction operations.     

Grace Periods in Sovereign Debt

This paper presents a theoretical analysis of grace periods in the context of an overhang of external debt creating a tax on domestic investment. The grace period arises as a Nash equilibrium strategy of the creditor in a dynamic, noncooperative game. Its length is shown to depend on the planning horizon of the parties, the discount factor and the growth prospect of the debtor country.     

The 2018 Clarence Ayres Scholar An Institutional Riposte to the “After the Washington Consensus”

The Washington Consensus as conceived in 1989 by John Williamson, the initiator of the term, was the foundation of the mainstream perspective on international development. The Washington Consensus consisted of a set of ten policies to be imposed through conditionality by international financial institutions on distressed developing countries. The vast criticism that ensued brought a set of policies in the form of the After the Washington Consensus (hereafter the AWC) in 2003, which designated a “new” set of policy reforms and conditionalities for developing countries. The aim of this article is to contrast the two sets of controversial policies, the original Washington Consensus and AWC, to an alternative perspective of international development based on an institutionalist approach.     

Incentives to lead,follow, or compete: comparative national choices of international copyright

I study the desirability and incentives for countries to lead or follow in international copyright policy making by analyzing a lead-follow model of international copyright and comparing it with a competitive model. The analyses suggest that the lead-follow model is globally preferable except when the information products have short economic life in the leading country. In this exceptional case, the incentives of individual countries are compatible with global welfare as they also prefer the globally preferable competitive model. However, in the cases where the lead-follow model is globally preferable, individual countries do not always have the incentive to lead or follow. For example, a small country may prefer competition over leading or following, as competition may allow it to free-ride on the copyright protection provided by the larger country. This suggests that ‘extraordinary’ incentive is sometimes needed to induce individual countries to adopt the lead-follow model of international copyright when it is globally desirable.     

Effects of Unilateral Climate Policy on Terms of Trade,Capital Accumulation,and Welfare in a World Economy

We present a two-good, two-country overlapping generations model where emissions arise from production and each country has a domestic emission permit system. When one country unilaterally reduces her cap on emissions, her output available for domestic and foreign consumption diminishes more than in the other country. With unchanged consumption expenditure shares for both goods the domestic terms of trade improve, while capital stocks decline in the reducing and less strongly in the non-reducing country. Improving terms of trade in the reducing country and falling capital stocks lead in total to welfare losses in both countries. However, if the country which unilaterally reduces her emission permits is a net creditor to the world economy and the Golden Rule applies, her own welfare loss remains below that of the non-reducing country.     

THE LOOMING U.S. EXTERNAL DEBT: HOW SERIOUS IS IT?

This article examines the state of U.S. external debt accumulation, especially the rising burden of interest payments. It points out that the favorable yield differential between U.S. external assets and liabilities may be declining at the same time the United States has become the world's largest international debtor. The favorable yield differential has enabled the United States, which became a net debtor in 1987, to avoid making net interest payments on its international debt until 1994. However, servicing the increasing U.S. net international debt is likely to be a much greater burden in the future as the favorable yield gap wanes while net debt continues to grow.     

Is ‘no news’ really ‘good news’? Country visibility and FDI location choice

In choosing where to invest, firms seek out information on a set of possible locations. Information asymmetries may make country visibility particularly important in decisions to locate investment abroad. We develop a country visibility index based on international news stories in The Economist, and show that broad country visibility is at least as important in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) as other specific investment promotion activities or proxies for information frictions. Controlling for standard gravity model determinants of FDI, we find that greater visibility of developing countries, in particular lower middle- and low-income countries, increases the investment that they receive from US multinational corporations.