Convergence,divergence, or multiple steady states? New evidence on the institutional development within the European Union

Convergence in institutions and in per capita income across the European Union (EU) Member States are key goals of the European integrations process. Especially in the course of the various EU enlargement waves starting in 2004, it was intensively discussed whether institutional and structural homogeneity are necessary preconditions for real convergence and the smooth functioning of the EU or whether a (further) catching up in the institutional and economic development will endogenously occur after the EU accession. Our paper is dedicated to the analysis of these institutional dynamics within the EU. In particular, we analyze the formation of institutional convergence clusters using Phillips and Sul's (2007, 2009) log t-test over the period 2002 to 2018. Our results indicate the existence of multiple institutional clubs with various countries being stuck in a poor institutional trap. Moreover, we find that institutional convergence clubs are formed mainly on the basis of geographic region; in particular, we identify a northwest-southeast divide. When analyzing per capita income clubs, a rather similar picture emerges, suggesting that the underlying institutional clusters might drive the formation of income clubs. We also study the factors that determine institutional club membership by using an ordered probit model. Most importantly, we find that the initial levels of human capital and institutional quality are decisive for determining whether a country is on a high or low institutional growth path.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Development outcomes,resource abundance,and the transmission through inequality

The paper studies the effect of resource abundance on human development in light of two complementary hypotheses: (i) resource abundance increases the inequality of income distribution within a country and (ii) higher income inequality reduces human development. The estimation of a system of equations provides support to both hypotheses. In addition, results suggest that resource abundance might also affect human development by reducing the quality of institutions. However, while statistically significant, this effect is quantitatively small. Finally, there is evidence of a strong, negative direct effect of resource abundance on human development after controlling for inequality, institutional quality, and the level of per-capita income.     

Rent-seeking bureaucracies, inequality, and growth

This paper develops a Schumpeterian growth model in which institutional quality matters for inequality and growth. In particular, asymmetric information between political authorities and rent-seeking bureaucratic agencies diverts resources from innovative activities – crucial for development to take off in middle and low income countries – and unnecessarily exacerbates income inequality. The theoretical predictions not only match empirical facts on inequality, institutional quality and growth well documented in the literature, but are easily assessed in two groups of Latin American and African countries, as shown in the final calibration analysis.     

Only income diverges: A neoclassical anomaly

The neoclassical growth model (NGM) is only consistent with the absolute divergence in output levels we observe if some determinants of steady state income are also diverging. In this paper we show that accumulation rates of physical and human capital are actually significantly converging, as are openness to trade and several variables measuring institutional quality. Output divergence in the face of input, policy and institutional convergence is a deep anomaly for the NGM.     

The double trap: Institutions and economic development

The empirical growth literature has established that institutional quality is a deep determinant of economic growth. We examine whether institutional quality in low income countries converges to the level witnessed in high income countries, or whether they are trapped in convergence clubs that stagnate or even deteriorate over time. Using the log-t-test suggested by Phillips and Sul (2007), we find evidence of multiple equilibria in institutional quality, with several countries stuck in poor quality institutions traps. We further find that per capita incomes of some of the developing countries are also stuck in low-level traps. Finally, using bivariate probit estimations, we establish that poor institutional traps are major determinants of low income traps. These results indicate that these countries are caught in a double trap where their incomes are stuck in low-level traps from which it is difficult to escape, because the institutions that enable growth are also stuck in low-quality traps.     

Determinants of institutional quality: an empirical exploration

ABSTRACT

Recent literature has underlined the role that institutions play in the process of development, making it essential to understand why differences exist in the quality of institutions across countries. The goal of this study is to investigate the determinants of institutional quality. Our results confirm that institutional quality is conditioned by variables that can be modulated by public policy, such as income per capita, international openness, education, taxation, and patterns of income (re)distribution. Our conclusions differ from the pessimistic outlooks of works highlighting deterministic factors, such as colonial or geographical factors, as determinants of institutional quality.     

Income Shocks,Inequality, and Democracy*

In this paper, motivated by contradictory evidence on the effect of income on democracy, we investigate the hypothesis that it is income shocks – major income fluctuations relative to the trend – rather than marginal year‐on‐year variation in income levels that lead to non‐trivial changes in the quality of political institutions. Empirical results provide support for this hypothesis, and show how income inequality plays a crucial role in the effects of economic shocks on democracy. In particular, negative income shocks reveal a positive effect on democracy in countries with high inequality, and vice versa.     

Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality

This paper explores the links between political rules and institutional quality. The paper concentrates on two political measures: the presence of checks and balances in the political system and an index of political particularism that measures the incentives for politicians to build personal support bases. The paper finds a positive correlation between checks and balances and institutional quality. It also finds that intermediate levels of particularism are associated with higher institutional quality.     

Income distribution and economic development: Insights from machine learning

We draw upon recent advances that combine causal inferences with machine learning, to show that poverty is the key income distribution measure that matters for development outcomes. In a predictive framework, we first show that LASSO chooses only the headcount measure of poverty from 37 income distribution measures in predicting schooling, institutional quality, and per capita income. Next, causal inferences with post‐LASSO models indicate that poverty matters more strongly for development outcomes than does the Gini coefficient. Finally, instrumental variable estimates in conjunction with post‐LASSO models show that compared to Gini, poverty is more strongly causally associated with schooling and per capita income, but not institutional quality. Our results question the literature's overwhelming focus on the Gini coefficient. At the least, our results imply that the causal link from inequality (as measured by Gini) to development outcomes is tenuous.     

Quality of institutions and productivity of State-Invested Enterprises: International evidence from major telecom companies

The quality of institutions is at the core of the differences in the growth of income and productivity of nations. A growing body of evidence shows how this is also true at the firm level. After taking stock of earlier theoretical and empirical literature on the efficiency of state-owned versus private enterprises, while we consider ownership as the core internal governance mechanism of firms, we add quality of government as a determinant of the external institutional environment. To disentangle the effect of internal and external institutions on firms' productivity, we use different sets of ownership and institutional environment indicators.After having identified the top 350 private, state-invested (i.e. partially state-owned) and state-owned enterprises in the telecommunications industry in EU28 and in more than 60 other countries between 2007 and 2015, we empirically investigate models of firms' productivity augmented with ownership and quality of government. Our findings suggest that, after controlling for the regulatory and competitive conditions at the country level, on average, public ownership has a negative impact on firm-level TFP. This effect is however mitigated by high external institutional quality and even reversed in some countries with a particularly favourable institutional environment.     

Factors of production,productivity, institutions,and development: Evidence from Brazil

The economic growth and development literature emphasizes that investment in technology and physical and human capital is essential for achieving higher levels of development. Political and economic institutions are also relevant in this process. With a sample of 5,503 Brazilian municipalities, this study carries out a development accounting exercise and measures the effects of institutional quality on per capita gross domestic product (GDP), physical capital intensity, human capital stock, and productivity. The empirical results indicate that institutional quality affects GDP per capita mainly through human capital accumulation and total factor productivity.     

Education, corruption, and the distribution of income

We examine how the interaction between education and corruption affects institutional reform and economic development. While corruption reduces average income and education, education increases not only output and hence potential corruption rents, but also produces more informed electorates that better monitor government actions. We find that economies with intermediate levels of education remain in a poverty trap since the level of skills creates sufficient corruption rents but not enough monitoring. Economies with low or high levels of education can escape the poverty trap, and inequality plays a key role in determining whether this occurs through a change in institutions or an expansion of education.     

Inequality and informality

This paper presents theory and evidence on the determinants of the size of the informal sector. We propose a simple theoretical model in which it is positively related to income inequality, more so under weak institutions, and is negatively related to the economy's wealth. These predictions are then empirically validated using different proxies of the size of the informal sector, income inequality, and institutional quality. The results are shown to be robust with respect to a variety of econometric specifications. We also find that government interventions through regulations lose much of its robustness in the presence of the above factors.     

Financial integration, capital mobility, and income convergence

Recent studies have found that capital moves 'uphill' from poor to rich countries, and brings little or no growth dividend when it does flow into poor economies. We show that Europe does not conform to this paradigm. In the European experience of financial integration, capital has flown from rich to poor countries, and such inflows have been associated with significant acceleration of income convergence. Analysing broader samples of countries, we find that 'downhill' capital flows tend to be observed above certain thresholds in institutional quality and financial integration. But Europe remains different even when allowing for such threshold effects, and its experience is similar to that of interstate flows within the United States. Our findings are consistent with the notion that financial diversification reduces countries' incentives to save in order to self-insure against specific shocks.
— Abdul Abiad, Daniel Leigh and Ashoka Mody     

SOCIAL COHESION, INSTITUTIONS, AND GROWTH

We present evidence that measures of "social cohesion," such as income inequality and ethnic fractionalization, endogenously determine institutional quality, which in turn causally determines growth.     

Price competition, quality and income disparities

A market is considered, the demand side of which consists of a large number of consumers with identical tastes but different income levels, and the supply side, of two firms selling at no cost products which are relatively close substitutes for each other. Consumers are assumed to make indivisible and mutually exclusive purchases. A full characterization of the demand structure and the non cooperative market solution is given, and the dependence of the latter on income distribution and quality parameters is analyzed.     

Economic performance,government size,and institutional quality

This paper studies the empirical link between government size, institutions and economic activity using a panel of 140 countries over 40 years. Our results, robust under different econometric techniques, show mostly a negative effect of government size on output, while institutional quality has generally a positive impact. Moreover, the detrimental effect of government size on economic activity is stronger the lower institutional quality, and the positive effect of institutional quality on output increases with smaller government sizes.     

The Geographical Dimension of the Development Effects of Natural Resources

We study the contribution of natural resource intensity to long-term development along different dimensions: per-capita income, institutional quality, and education. We allow natural resources to affect these dimensions differently in different regions of the world. The evidence suggests that natural resources are generally a positive driver of development, but in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) their contribution is almost negligible, if not even negative. We explain these cross-regional differences with the fact that in SSA more than anywhere else large resource endowments are combined with a particularly bad disease environment. Some historical evidence and formal econometric results support this hypothesis.     

二元结构、经济转轨与城乡收入差距分化

文章认为,城乡收入差距内生于"经济人"追求自身效用最大化的过程当中,直接套用库兹涅茨-威廉姆森假说对我国的城乡收入差距可能并不一定具有太大的解释力,而将我国的城乡二元结构和经济转轨这一双重制度变迁背景引入城乡差距模型中才能清楚地解释中国的城乡差距。研究发现,人口自由流动条件下,随着经济的发展,城乡收入差距会逐步缩小;人口不自由流动条件下,城乡差距会发生多层分化,但即使如此,中国的城乡差距仍不太符合所谓的库兹涅茨-威廉姆森假说。