Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

A Proposed Methodological Synthesis of Post-Keynesian and Institutional Economics

Post-Keynesian and institutionalist writers have commented on the theoretical and conceptual commonalities between the two schools. Some have suggested a theoretical synthesis based on these commonalities. In spite of these theoretical and conceptual commonalities each tradition has developed significantly different methods of analysis. Instead of theoretical or conceptual synthesis we seek here to present a methodological synthesis.

Institutionalist methods have yielded "plausible" explanations, but these have been too "vague and suggestive" to be consistently used for economic policy. Post-Keynesian methods have policy necessary "rigor," but the similarity to neoclassical methods has exposed post-Keynesian theories to unwarranted synthesis with incompatible traditions.

This essay presents a synthesis of post-Keynesian and institutionalist methodology, one of "plausible rigor," combining elements of "institutional dynamics" with a heuristic framework based on John Dewey's "instrumental logic," and proposes that the resulting approach overcomes weaknesses in the methods of analysis of both schools.     

Institutional Economics as Theory of Policy Change: Impact of Past Policy Failures on Present Policy

Social scientists have developed several theories for understanding or evaluating policy change over time. Since all costs or benefits are not internalized owing to positive transaction costs, policymaking is always implemented under cost underestimation conditions and, therefore, is imperfect. I call this trait policy failure in this article. Furthermore, I show that a new framework combining the social costs approach and the legal/economic approach in institutional economics is suitable and can be applied to evaluating how past policy failures affect present policy, providing as an example the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan.     

"三农"问题的制度经济学分析

从制度经济学的角度来看,制度歧视、扭曲、农村组织缺位及制度变迁的滞后、非均衡是导致"三农"问题的直接原因,而诺斯的"国家理论"则揭示了"三农"问题的更深层原因。     

Modeling System Complexity in the Context of Geopolitics Related to Climate Change

Due mainly to the evolution of science and technology, ontic systems have continuously become more complex. Thus, original institutional economics has adopted and advanced the concepts of complex systems. This article further develops complexity concepts and relates them to problems of climate change. Systems complexity is combined with concepts from geopolitics in order to introduce geopolitical analysis about boundaries/borders into complex systems. The addition of geopolitical ideas allows for systems to focus on a designated social and ecological context that fits the problem of interest. The social and ecological components of open geopolitical systems lead to processes that are dynamic and complex. Thus, complex-systems modeling needs the assistance of geopolitical concepts and geopolitical models need to be embedded in complex systems. Each section of the article clarifies its meaning with examples of climate change concerns.     

利益集团与制度变迁的“陷阱”——兼论转型的合法性危机

文章主要讨论制度变迁过程中那些无效率的制度均衡是如何形成的.在时利益集团经济行为进行分析的基础上,主要考察了Dayis和North理论意义上的第一和第二行动集团在制度变迁中的作用.研究表明,由于利益集团自身利益与社会利益之间存在着冲突,因此即使是启动和推进制度变迁过程的第一和第二行动集团,也有可能妨碍制度变迁迭至最优点,使其掉入"陷阱"之中.     

Institutional Approaches to Economic Development: The Current Status of the Debate

The recent publication of "Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History" (Chang 2011a) has stimulated a thought-provoking debate, and has brought forth a wide-ranging demonstration of the theoretical arsenal of the new institutional economics. The debate proves that, as of yet, no satisfactory theory of institutions has been articulated, nor is there an agreement on the relationship between institutional change and the politics of development. It also demonstrates the presence of two distinct lines of research: ideological and political, both of which rely on different theoretical legacies, and embody distinct economic worldviews. This scenario allows a summary of the argument in the most recent literature to be made on the relationship between institutions and development, as well as to relate the debate to the concept of development as a process of expansion of capacities.     

Financial Liberalization as a Process of Flawed Institutional Change

I argue that the financial liberalization of the last decades, which resulted in a worldwide crisis, relied on an institutional change that ill-shaped actors’ behavior so as to let them enter into unsustainable speculative activities at the expense of macro-stability. To support such an assertion, I draw upon a specific Veblen-Minsky approach to a credit-money economy and its endogenous fragilities. I also maintain that, when financial markets are liberalized and private-interestsrelated self-regulation replaces public macro-prudential supervision, the financial system undergoes institutional deadlock and the ensuing confusion is transformed into a market gridlock. Markets then become unable to recover without public rescue operations of banks. The subsequent negative economic and social consequences are beyond the limits of any acceptable liberal ideology and scientific understanding. Therefore, systemic stability calls for a tighter macro-regulatory framework to remove the domination of speculative finance over economic decisions and activities.     

Contracting Boundaries as Institutional Infrastructure: Efficacy, Adaptation, and Obsolescence: Commentary on La Croix and Ghiselin's Comments

The New Institutional Economics (NIE) emphasizes that different governance structures generate a rich variety of observed institutional arrangements. In Yarbrough & Yarbrough (1999), we extended this reasoning to argue that different governance structures also carry implications for the sets of acceptable contracting partners or ‘insiders’. Here we discuss various contracting groups as institutional infrastructures and evaluate their efficiency, ability to adapt, and longevity or possible obsolescence in the face of changes in the nature of transactions or of the transactional environment. The fact that, despite their many shortcomings, private institutional infrastructures continue to be built, to adapt, and to function, even in modern societies with well-developed state-based legal systems, provides a measure of the centrality and complexity of the task of assuring contractual integrity. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

我国民间金融发展的制度变迁与制度安排

民间金融的发展对我国渐进式改革提供了重要的金融资源支持.在分析我国既有的金融体制变迁的基础上,民间金融的发展是内生于民营经济的诱致性制度变迁.     

制度变迁与经济增长质量:理论分析与计量检验

本文提出有效的制度变迁是经济增长质量变化的重要原因这一假说,论述了制度变迁对经济增长质量的作用机理,并依据1992-2007年数据检验了二者长期因果关系。结论是制度变迁是中国经济增长质量的长期格兰杰原因。中国经济增长质量总体呈上升趋势,但与经济增长速度并不同步。提高经济增长质量需要从制度方面加以型塑,逐步实现经济增长与质量提高进行同步。     

制度绩效递减规律与我国21世纪初新一轮体制创新研究

21世纪初我国有必要也有可能再次进入“快速增长”时期。如何才能确保我国21世纪初的快速增长,本认为关键在于体制创新。为此,本以制度绩效生命周期与递减规律与理论基础,说明要确保我国经济快速增长则必须进行新一轮体制创新,并在概括20世纪末我国体制创新的特征基础上,提出了21世纪初我国体制创新的原则和相应的有关措施。     

经济国有化与行政垄断制度的发展——基于制度变迁理论的经济史研究

文章在新制度经济学的理论框架下,对新中国的经济国有化和行政垄断制度的发展历程进行了经验研究。研究结果表明,行政垄断与国有经济存在很强的共生关系。当今中国的行政垄断是以法律法规形式存在的社会正式规则,它与国有经济、市场经济长期稳定共存,是转轨时期中国经济制度的一大特色。     

转型期农业基础建设制度变迁的考察——“徐闻实践”的实证研究

在系统考察广东省徐闻县农业基础建设制度变迁的实践基础上,文章揭示了其制度变迁的逻辑核心在于追逐灌溉之利,其内在动力在于农民自发逐利、社区精英协同与地方政府助民成利三股力量的契合;进而,文章指出农民经济自由权利和生产赢利空间的扩大是农业基础建设长效机制形成的根本,有助于形成稳定收益预期的制度安排,将激励农民对农业基础设施建设投资的积极性和利用效率,而乡村集体行动制度供给力量则决定着制度变迁的时滞和经济效率。这也正是徐闻实践蕴涵的独特理论价值和现实借鉴意义。     

产权管制放松与制度绩效变迁——来自广东经济非均衡转轨的证据

过去大量的研究强调政策、区域、禀赋等对广东经济转轨绩效的影响,论文从产权管制放松的角度出发,构建了一个简单的博弈论模型,旨在分析广东政府放松对资源配置权利的管制对经济转轨产生的制度效应。研究发现,广东各级地方政府放松对资源配置权利的管制,大幅节约了租金耗散,并衍生出更多给予经济个体发挥比较优势的获利空间,扩展了市场范围,从而促进了地区经济均衡转轨。论文对于理解广东经济转轨问题提供了一个新的视角和框架,它尤其有助于揭示产权管制放松与经济绩效变迁二者之间的内在机理和制度逻辑。     

交易费用和制度变迁的分析与启示

交易费用与制度变迁都涉及到经济生活中的具体操作方面,比如资源优化配置和效率问题。中国在深化改革的过程中,不仅必须考虑到资源优化配置、改革成本和经济运行效率,而且更应以此作为检验改革成效的标尺。这些又与特定的制度安排有着内在联系,因此,只有认真研究交易费用和制度变迁的相关问题,才能保证中国改革的进一步深化。     

两种制度经济学范式中的意识形态理论:分歧与根源

作为制度经济学的两种范式,新制度经济学和马克思经济学的意识形态理论在意识形态的本质和功能、意识形态的根源与变迁、意识形态与制度变迁的关系等方面存在着明显的分歧.整体来看,马克思的分析框架迄今仍是最有说服力的.这些分歧的根源是方法论:新制度经济学的方法论是制度个体主义和建构理性主义,马克思的制度经济学的方法论是制度整体主义与制度个体主义的统一、演进理性主义与建构理性主义的统一.     

经济转型中的制度移植与非正式制度约束

经济转型的实践表明,制度移植很大程度上取代了制度设计.而制度移植成功的关键在于制度创新,将移植来的正式制度形式与本土的非正式制度相融合.如果在经济转型过程中只关注目标制度的形式,而不关心其内涵,必然会与本土的非正式制度形成冲突,导致移植失灵,陷入制度陷阱.文章的主要观点通过对中国和俄罗斯制度创新模式的实证分析得到支撑.     

价值现象学视野中的新制度经济学

新制度经济学突破了新古典经济学的范式,引入了交易费用分析范式。运用价值现象学的方法可以对新制度经济学的理论基础进行分析,新制度经济学由于忽视交易费用赖以存在的条件,所以在研究过程中经常会颠倒事物之间的因果关系,这与新制度经济学的社会心理基础有关。怨恨构造了现代社会的精神气质,新制度经济学与这种精神气质是一致的。新制度经济学对制度起源及变迁的关注都与怨恨所造成的价值假象密切相关。     

The End of Transition: An Institutional Interpretation of Energy Sector Reform in Eastern Europe and the CIS

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the growing institutional divergence of systemic transformation in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Based upon the institutional theory of economic and legal systemic change, we empirically analyse reforms in a sector where the transformation process proved to be particularly tough: the energy sector. We test to what extent reforms reflect the ideal types seen in Western contexts (e.g. Anglo-Saxon and French), and to what extent new models have emerged. By generalising the results from the energy sector, one key finding emerges: starting from similar reform projects, transition in Eastern Europe has led to fundamentally different outcomes, of which we identify three ideal types: i) the reforming Central/Eastern European market economy; ii) the post-Soviet mixed economy; and iii) the Caspian state economy.