规制、腐败与规制改革

文章对政府规制与腐败的因果关系进行了深入的分析,指出规制具有限制市场竞争的特点,而市场竞争被抑制的领域必然会产生经济租,经济租诱发寻租活动,对规制权力监管的缺陷导致腐败行为的发生。在此基础上,文章提出了有效减少腐败的规制改革方案。     

Debt Stabilizing Fiscal Rules

Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be stabilized around a certain target level of debt by adjustments in various fiscal instruments, like government spending, transfers, or taxes. This paper investigates properties of debt stabilizing rules which link the needed budgetary adjustments to the state of the economy. The paper establishes that the magnitude of the target level of long‐run debt is a key determinant of whether it is possible to find a rule of this type that can be implemented under all available fiscal instruments. Specifically, considering linear feedback rules, the paper demonstrates that there may well exist a critical target level of debt beyond which this is no longer possible. From an applied perspective, this finding is of particular relevance in the context of a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policies. Depending on the target level of debt, there might be a conflict between a common fiscal framework that tracks deficit developments as a function of the state of the economy and the unrestricted choice of fiscal policy instruments at the national level.     

Sharing Rules in Teams

We examine the problem of output sharing in a moral hazard in team situation. Although we do not consider any particular procedure, we assume that the team uses some procedure to decide a sharing rule before actual production takes place (for example, this may be a bargaining process or a team welfare maximization problem). This must take into account that the team will play a noncooperative game in the production process conditional on the chosen sharing rule. We show that the procedure for deciding the sharing rule does not have to look for anything more complicated than simple linear sharing rules. We also show that, when there is limited liability, the procedure needs to consider only the slightly more complicated piecewise linear rules. As a consequence of the linear sharing rule result, we are also able to provide a characterization of implementable outcomes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, D2, C72, J54.     

反倾销规则的悖论

WTO现行的反倾销规则基本是在1947年确定的GATT第六条的基础上,经1994年乌拉圭回合修订而来的.从其理论、行为、本质与事实上都有不尽合理的地方,其规则本身也漏洞百出.因此,WTO必须顺应时代发展的需要,加大改革的步伐,增加国际监管的力度.中国有责任敦促WTO尽快改革现有反倾销规则中不合理的部分,从根本上解决与各国之间的贸易摩擦,全面改善国际贸易环境.     

Voting on Majority Rules

We analyse an overlapping generations model of voting on "reform projects". These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later payoff. Since the time during which old people get the benefit is shorter, or because older people are more wealthy and hence pay more taxes, they are more conservative (against reforms) than young people.
We show that if people vote on which majority should be required in future elections for a bill to become a law, the winning proposal specifies a supermajority. This result is very robust even if age related conflict is only one determinant among others for voting behaviour in the society.     

Fundraising and Optimal Policy Rules

This paper develops a simple spatial model of fundraising, in which charities select a target population to solicit donations. First, we show that in a competitive charity market without any intervention, the number of charities in the market and/or the overall net funds raised by charities may be suboptimal. Next, we analyze whether a social planner can prevent such shortcomings and show that a regulatory mechanism can be designed to achieve socially desirable outcomes. In contrast to the previous literature, our model does not necessarily produce monopoly as the optimal market structure. We show that if fixed costs associated with establishing charities are sufficiently low, then the optimal market structure is not a monopoly. Given the importance of the trade‐off between the volume and variety of charitable services, we argue that this result may be of particular interest to policy makers.     

Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules

We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single-peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and "solidarity" (population-monotonicity or replacement-domination) must equal a so-called target rule.     

Monetary Rules and Deficit Shocks

Modern theory on interest rate rules is based on the representative agent framework with infinite-horizon consumers, thereby ignoring redistributions of the fiscal burden across generations due to deficit shocks. We show how the ‘Taylor principle’ relies on this restrictive assumption. In a dynamic New Keynesian general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, the existence of a unique stable rational expectations equilibrium may also occur under a passive monetary policy. However, active monetary policy is still required to stabilize the economy in response to fiscal shocks. Thanks are due to an anonymous referee, Andrea Costa, Jordi Galí and Giancarlo Marini for very useful comments and discussions. Financial support from CNR and the FIRB project is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

反倾销规则的悖论

WTO现行的反倾销规则基本是在1947年确定的GATT第六条的基础上，经1994年乌拉圭回合修订而来的。从其理论、行为、本质与事实上都有不尽合理的地方，其规则本身也漏洞百出。因此，WTO必须顺应时代发展的需要，加大改革的步伐，增加国际监管的力度。中国有责任敦促WTO尽快改革现有反倾销规则中不合理的部分，从根本上解决与各国之间的贸易摩擦，全面改善国际贸易环境。     

The Perils of Taylor Rules

Since John Taylor's (1993, Carnegie–Rochester Conf. Ser. Publ Policy39, 195–214), seminal paper, a large literature has argued that active interest rate feedback rules, that is, rules that respond to increases in inflation with a more than one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate, are stabilizing. In this paper, we argue that once the zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account, active interest rate feedback rules can easily lead to unexpected consequences. Specifically, we show that even if the steady state at which monetary policy is active is locally the unique equilibrium, typically there exist an infinite number of equilibrium trajectories originating arbitrarily close to that steady state that converge to a liquidity trap, that is, a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is near zero and inflation is possibly negative. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E52, E31, E63.     

On Sustainable Pay-as-You-Go Contribution Rules

An unfunded social security system faces the major risk, sometimes referred to as "political risk," that future generations do not agree to contribute as much as expected. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each new born generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macroeconomic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors—intragenerational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt—on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed.     

Policy Rules and Monetarist Arithmetic

This note demonstrates the existence of an important equilibrium path overlooked in the literature on monetarist arithmetic. Pleasant monetarist arithmetic is possible when the interest‐elasticity of money demand exceeds unity. In this case, tight money may lead to a transitory increase in seigniorage, the retirement of government debt, and lower inflation in both the short run and the long run. The set of equilibrium paths is sensitive, however, to the form of the policy rule. Pleasant monetarist arithmetic is not an equilibrium if the policy rule fixes the share of the fiscal deficit financed by seigniorage. Both pleasant monetarist arithmetic and the tight‐money paradox are equilibrium paths when the government's commitment to low money growth is conditional on inflation remaining below its previous level.     

Western Rules for Eastern Banking

The article outlines the most significant changes in the banking sector and traces its possible future path in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the context of competing banking models. The main conclusion is that despite the transition the orientation of the banking sector will be towards the government sector (including the central bank). The new network of financial interrelations that emerged during transition is characterised by the banking sector's significant net defensive position and creditor passivity. Although CEE countries are developing their financial systems in line with a universal banking model the aggregate balance sheets of their banking sectors reveal a structure that is more in line with other proposed models. Financial relations between households, the corporate sector and the state sector intermediated by the banking sector reveal a severe retreat of banks from the corporate sector in favour of maintenance of government and central bank operations.     

Bertrand Games and Sharing Rules

We consider asymmetric Bertrand games with arbitrary payoffs at ties or sharing rules, and identify sufficient conditions for the zero-profit outcome and the existence of Nash equilibria. Subject to some technical conditions on non-tied payoffs the following hold. If the sharing rule is strictly tie-decreasing all players but one receive zero equilibrium payoffs, while everybody does so if non-tied payoffs are symmetric. Mixed (pure) strategy Nash equilibria exist if the sharing rule is (norm) tie-decreasing and coalition-monotone. I would like to thank Fernando Branco, the audience at Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), ISEG (Lisbon), University of Mannheim, ESEM 2003 (Venice), EARIE 2005 (Porto), two anonymous referees, and the editor Dan Kovenock for very useful comments. This research received financial support under project POCTI/ECO/37925/2001 of FCT and FEDER.     

不规则赤字的管理规则

文章引入不规则财政收支因素,将结构性赤字分解为不规则赤字和相机抉择赤字。在分析中国的不规则赤字的特殊成因之后,论文指出对不同因素引起的不规则赤字,需要采取不同的方法加以控制。我国当前不规则赤字的重点管理措施包括改变政府的赤字支出结构,调整财政政策、产业政策、分配政策,推进财政投资体制、社会保障制度等制度改革。