“Business and Government” Then and Now

Socio-environmental conflicts are widespread, and global economic growth will likely increase them in the coming decades. While political ecology, the analysis of common pool resources, and ecological economics, among others, have provided praiseworthy insights into such conflicts, institutional approaches to these phenomena are still scarce. Classical institutional economics has occasionally been put to work on environmental issues, but proposed frameworks remain relatively underdeveloped. We wish to contribute to institutional research on environmental issues by building upon Bruno Théret’s interpretation of John R. Commons’s transactional model and applying the framework to a case of socio-environmental conflicts. First, we briefly sketch the landscape of institutional contributions (especially those that follow the classical institutionalist tradition) to the analysis of environmental issues. We explain why Commons has largely been ignored on these issues. Then, we analyze some of the key concepts of Commonsian economics that are of particular interest to our theoretical elaboration. Following this, we depict Commons’s transactional scheme and propose an application to a case of socioenvironmental mining conflict in Peru. Our framework could complement existing ones and shed light on the institutional dynamics of natural-resource management through conflict.     

Solving the U.S. Trade Deficit and Competitiveness Problem

We compare the analytical approach of John R. Common and Ronald H. Coase to institutional analysis and social provisioning. In particular, we examine their similarities in (i) the definition and role of institutions in the economy, (ii) the allocative (social provisioning) role of institutions in the economy, and (iii) the inescapable and unchanging role of institutions in shaping the social provisioning process. We contend that Commons and Coase had more in common than did Coase and many of his followers in the “new institutional economics.” In particular, the two had strong similarities in both (a) their insights into the nature of institutions in the legal-economic nexus that is the foundation of the economy and (b) their methods for conducting economics research. Because this role of institutional evolution is, as Warren Samuels noted, an inescapable and unchanging part of an economy’s social provisioning process, it will remain an integral part of any such work in the future, regardless of the “school of analysis” or methodological approach.     

Theoretical Issues of Gender in the Transition from Socialist Regimes

Institutional economics is often presented by its critics as a tradition in political economy purporting a mechanistic, robot-like, view of the human agent. In this paper this portrayal of institutional economics is rejected and choice is reclaimed for institutionalism. In fact, institutional economics is not committed to an understanding of behavior as mere stimulus-response. Notwithstanding the fact that institutionalism places great emphasis on habit in human conduct, this does not mean that it excludes autonomy, volition or rationality.

The paper addresses the notion of habit within the pragmatist-institutionalist tradition with the aim of clarifying this concept, disentangling it from current misconceptions. With the intention of contributing to the development of a theory of choice in institutionalism, it then deals with deliberation and choice in the pragmatist literature, namely in John Dewey's Human Action and Conduct. Finally, the implications of deliberation thus conceived, namely in respect to collective action and institutional change, are highlighted.     

New institutional economics: what does it have to offer?

This article discusses the empirical relevance of what is considered two prinicipal contributions to the new institutional economics–the contributions of A. Schotter and O. Williamson – and draw three general conclusions. First, it is argued, on the basis of a comparison of the above mentioned two contributions to new institutional economics, their empirical relevance cannot be discussed in general but must be based on separate analyses of the two contributions and will depend on the institutions which are analysed. Secondly, that it is especially within analyses of consequence and design of institutions that the Williamson-approach to new institutional economics presently has something to offer while there seems to be rather limited possibilities for application of the approach of Schotter. Thirdly, that in their future development, the two contributions can probably both mutually benefit each other and benefit from an integration of elements from other institutional theories.     

Rethinking John R. Commons’s Theory of Collective Action: The Viewpoint of Regulation and Convention

This article examines the theoretical connection between John R. Commons, régulation theory, and convention theory. In institutional economics (Commons 1934), by applying the idea of “multiple causation,” Commons approached macro-dynamics based on the expansion of some key concepts and studies on income distribution and demand growth. It is a prototype of the growth analysis based on the cumulative causation model, with the various forms of coordination later formulated by régulation theory. The two-layered coordination in convention theory attempted to explicitly explain the individuals’ reflexive capacities to change preference endogenously and to evaluate collective and social value, which were implicitly assumed in Commons’s term “intellect.”     

J.M. Clark and Institutional Economics: Remarks on the Receipt of the Veblen-Commons Award

This paper outlines the contributions of J.M. Clark to institutional economics. Clark is sometimes seen as standing between institutional and neoclassical economics, but I argue that this view is not accurate. Clark was intimately involved in the definition, promotion, and defense of institutional economics in sessions of the American Economic Association and in a variety of other forums. No other member of the institutionalist group was as much involved in the professional discussion of institutional economics as J.M. Clark. In addition, Clark made a number of key contributions to institutionalist theory in the areas of psychology and economics, the costs of decision-making, overhead costs and business-pricing behavior, the accelerator mechanism and business cycles, workable and effective competition and competition policy, and social control. These contributions, together with the graduate students he trained at the University of Chicago and Columbia University, serve to place him in the center of the institutionalist movement and not on its periphery.     

International Monetary Reform: A Review Article

Original institutional economics (OIE) has three significant, but apparently contradictory, definitions of institution(s) stemming from Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and J. Fagg Foster. In this first installment of a two-part paper I address this apparent contradiction by developing an "irenic reconciliation" of these definitions using a methodological approach I call "critical institutionalism"— a synthesis of the OIE in the tradition of the Veblen, Commons, and Foster, the pragmatism theory of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, the critical realist methodology of Margaret Archer, and the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar. In so doing, I provide an alternative discussion to that of some current institutionalists who propose to replace the existing OIE definitions of institution(s) with "consensual definitions" developed in the discourse with non-OIE traditions. I propose that there is still considerable analytical value in the OIE definitions, and that replacing them with non-OIE-originating concepts would unnecessarily carry OIE away from its methodological and philosophical roots. In the second installment of this paper (yet to be published), I proceed to demonstrate the analytical value these "reconciled" definitions have for the OIE project.     

Sen and Commons on Markets and Freedom

Amartya Sen's enlarged conception of freedom has augmented the scope of economic analysis but it also has had the surprising effect of being more supportive of the free market than conventional welfare economics. It is argued here that a comparison of Sen's position with that of the American institutionalist, J R Commons, highlights some problems with Sen's approach and points to possible ways in which they might be addressed.     

Comparing alleged incommensurables: Institutional and Austrian economics as rivals and possible complements? ∗

The purpose of this article is to explore the changing relationship between Austrian and Institutional economics and the common ground that they appear increasingly to share. It is maintained that both parties have something to learn from each other - there are gains to be made from intellectual trade and inter-research tradition discourse. Neither Austrian economics nor institutional economics presently provides a sufficiently robust or sophisticated approach to individual and group problem-solving activity within institutional-knowledge constraints and historical time dynamics, yet they are both beginning to seriously grapple with such issues. The gulf between the Austrian and Institutional research traditions is narrowing given that there is some convergence toward a middle ground where it is recognized that individuals do not exist in a vacuum and that institutions both constrain and enable purposeful behaviour. Through increased interaction Austrians may learn to take ‘institutional’ frameworks even more seriously whilst Institutionalists may learn to be even more earnest in their treatment of ‘individual’ action within a historical time continuum.     

Race,competition, and institutional change in J.R. Commons

This article examines the contribution of J.R. Commons to race relations, competition, and institutional change. One result of our study is that, in his analysis of institutional dynamics in the United States, Commons’ rejection of laissez-faire is derived from a racist analytical framework: the “superior races” should be protected from the “inferior races”. Another result is that Commons adopts a neo-Lamarckian framework which takes education as the basis for the assimilation of “inferior races”. This article then shows that policies often defended as progressives, as education policies, may be derived from racist foundations. The final remarks single out the ambiguous connection between race and culture revealed by Commons’ approach.     

The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister,Volume One,Minister of Housing 1964–66

While John R. Commons often referred to third sector organizations, such as associations, cooperatives, and trade unions, it is unclear how these organizations can be fitted into his transactional typology. This paper clarifies this problem by identifying two dimensions of bargaining, managerial, and rationing transactions: 1) the extent of legal equality of transactional participants, and 2) the extent of commonness of these participants' transactional interests. These dimensions enable defining the identity of the third sector in terms of a distinct variety of rationing transactions combining legal equality of transactional participants with significant commonness of their interests. The paper further explores several implications of this argument for new institutional economics, concerning the citizenship aspect of markets and hierarchies and the possibility of viewing third sector organizations as hybrids between markets and hierarchies. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for further research.     

马克思企业理论和新制度经济学企业理论的比较

本文从企业的产生、企业的边界、企业的内部控制,以及分配三个方面对马克思主义经济学和新制度经济学的企业理论进行比较。马克思主义经济学用历史唯物主义方法将企业看作资本主义经济运行过程中的一个环节,揭示了企业产生和发展的原因,并精辟地分析了隐藏在物的背后的两大阶级之间的矛盾对立关系;新制度经济学采用逻辑实证的方法对企业进行分析,认为交易费用是决定企业产生及规模变化的重要因素,企业内部的控制和分配关系是由效率来决定的——这种将所有生产要素都看作是客观资源的分析方法,掩盖了利益分配的实质,从而忽视了人的主体性因素。     

新制度经济学的边界——三种代表性观点及其比较

在新制度经济学的边界问题上,新制度经济学家(威廉姆森和芮切特)、旧制度经济学家(霍奇森)以及经济思想史家(卢瑟福)不仅边界刻画依据不完全相同,而且他们对新制度经济学智力成果的描述也存在着很大的差异。新制度经济学家认为,某种制度分析是否属于新制度经济学关键是看该理论是否假定环境存在着不确定性、人是否具有有限理性,是否明确地或隐含地以交易费用为正为前提。而新制度经济学的边界在旧制度经济学家和经济思想史家那里被进一步放宽。他们深入到本体论层面,认为某种制度分析只要坚持方法论个人主义,那么它就属于新制度经济学的内容。而新制度经济学家的边界刻画更能准确、客观地反映新制度经济学的智力成果。     

Eighteenth-Century Evolutionary Thought and its Relevance in the Age of Legislation

This essay revisits the evolutionist writingsof the eighteenth century to clarify their key ideas concerninglegal and social evolution and to assess their relevance in thepresent era of pervasive legislation. The discovery of the principleof the accumulation of design is traced to these writings andthe continuity of twentieth century spontaneous-order theoryand new institutional economics with this tradition is noted.While highlighting the contributions of other institutional theoriststo the elucidation of the role of purposive action in legal evolution,the author argues that input designing does not alter the fundamentalnature of legal emergence as postulated by the eighteenth centuryscholars. The essay supports the ideal of legal generality, freespeech, property and contractual freedom as normative implicationsof the evolutionary viewpoint.     

Revolution,Reform, and Social Justice

The literature on mainstream economics usually takes the United States as the main geographical reference. However, the various criteria that define mainstream economics can be applied outside the United States. The ideas that have prestige and influence in a given country’s academia may not be the same ideas that constitute American mainstream economics. Brazil has been an example of pluralism. An institutional perspective helps explain why several people in Brazil conform with institutional rules of thought and of behavior that differ from those of the American mainstream, including the norm of pluralism, and how these rules influence many people.     

Institutionalism and the State: Founding Views Reexamined

Economists in the institutional tradition have spent a great deal of time dealing with the notions of governance and the state. Yet that school of thought has yet to develop a complete unified theory of either governance or the state. In the work Commons and Veblen we see very different levels of analysis and commentary on these issues. Both authors are recognized as founding thinkers in the Institutional school yet they differ on how they use their methods and they have differing ideas about the usefulness of the state. Still, considered together they present a fairly complete and useable set of ideas about how governance and the state work. This essay summarizes, clarifies, and somewhat expands on the views held by Commons and Veblen with the view of moving towards a clear and concise institutional theory of the state.

The Institutional Theory of Radhamakal Mukerjee: Lessons for Modern Nonprofit Economics

This paper examines the way the institutional economics of Radhamakal Mukerjee can inform modern nonprofit economics. A brief survey of Mukerjee's work highlights several elements of his theory that yield useful implications understanding the nonprofit sector. First, Mukerjee's theory implies that this sector's role is in helping the economies to better accommodate broader societal values, rather than in addressing market failure. Second, his theory suggests that the nonprofit sector provides an institutional framework for the pursuit of common interests that are not reducible to individual utility maximization. Finally, as he considered the state to be inherently coercive, he believed the nonprofit sector to be the only meaningful outlet for citizenship behavior, thus advancing an original theory of complementary state-nonprofit relationship. The paper concludes with calling for more institutionalist research on the economics of the nonprofit sector.     

Global Production Networks and the Private Organization of World Trade

As John R. Commons understood, the role of the firm in providing employment and income distribution is a form of public power (Munkirs and Knoedler 1987). This public power of firms is supported by the laws of the state, which protect private property and enforce market transactions. The Global Production Network (GPN) is a new form of the firm, influenced by information technology to lower “transaction costs” (Coase 1937), as well as international trade regimes, such as the Washington Consensus to improve the ease of world trade and investment. The GPN is globe-scanning, yet private and able to shape the economies and policies of countries. Under the banner of branded products, the lead firm in a supply chain exercises considerable power over subsidiaries, contractors, workers, communities, and countries. By influencing trade relations, GPNs also influence international finance, foreign currency reserves and exchange rates, as well as trade deficits and “race to the bottom” of taxes and environmental protection. Drawing on interdisciplinary research, this topic benefits from an alliance of sociology, business, history, law, and international as well as institutional economics in the AFEE tradition. I draw on the work of leading scholars in the field (Antras 2016; Baldwin 2016; Gereffi 2013; Milberg and Winkler 2013) and analyze the implications for the world trade system, as well as the ongoing political resistance to globalization. These GPNs are no longer “of” their country of origin (Tyson vs. Reich).