On the Relevance of John Rawls's Theory of Justice to Welfare Economics

Mainstream microeconomic theory makes some use of John Rawls's Theory of Justicein discussing welfare economics and social welfare functionals. While various elements of his approach are usually mentioned, his basic point is generally taken to be his difference principle (maximizing the welfare of the worst off individual) applied as a decision principle for evaluating the equity of resource allocation.

To take the difference principle as the essence of Rawls's work is an error. The present paper reviews the basic argument of the Theory of Justice

compares it with the use that economists make of it, and concludes that in a number of quite specific ways Rawls's ideas are misrepresented and misused by mainstream microeconomists.     

Rawls's influence and counter-influence on Sen: Post-welfarism and impartiality

Abstract

This article aims to clarify Sen's paradoxical relationship to Rawls's work in the face of some misconceptions. It is argued, first, that the dialogue between the authors did not start with Sen's 1980 article “Equality of What?”: Rather, this article represents the beginning of a transformation in Sen's position towards Rawls. Second, Sen's approach to justice is not a mere extension of Rawls's theory of justice as fairness: The departure relies less on a different metric of justice than on a divergent conception of impartiality, one which undermines the foundation of Rawls's theory of justice.     

Of clouds and clocks and Keynes: conceptions of reality and the growth of knowledge function of money ∗

In this paper, John Maynard Keynes' General theoryand the concept of money are given an evolutionary interpretation. This interpretation is based on Karl Popper's delightful essay ‘Of clouds and clocks: an approach to the problem of rationality and the freedom of man’. The essay presents two things: Popper's conception of indeterminism and his general theory of abstractions. Popper's general theory concerns the role of abstractions and rule-governed, hierarchical systems of abstractions in structuring an indeterministic and uncertain world. He applies his general theory to science.Popper maintains that science is an abstract, rule-governed, linguistic process that facilitates criticism as a way of learning about our world. Popper calls this the growth of knowledge function of science. Popper's general theory can be applied to Keynes' General theory. Following Popper, I argue for a conception of the economy as a rule-governed, monetary language of commerce that facilitates critically minded inquiry in the domain of ordinary economic transactions. A monetary system facilitates the growth of commonsense knowledge in the economy. I call this the growth of knowledge function of money. An awareness of indeterminism and a growth of knowledge like function of money seem to pervade Keynes' General theory.     

Wicksell,Ramsey and the theory of interest *

The article discusses Wicksell's assessment of the controversy between Böhm-Bawerk on one side, and Fisher and Bortkiewicz on the other, on the role of productivity (the ‘third reason’) in the determination of the rate of interest. It is shown that in the process of arguing out the third reason Wicksell came remarkably close to Frank Ramsey's view of the determinants of saving in economies with a positive subjective rate of discount. The similarities between Wicksell and Ramsey result from the fact that – in contrast with Fisher and Böhm-Bewerk – they assumed reinvestment, with the corollary that maximum permanent consumption will be reached at zero interest if the subjective rate discount of future utility is zero. Wicksell used his Ramsey–like saving rule to explain the interaction betwen Böhm–Bawerk's three reasons in either dynamic or stationary conditions, which enabled him to reformulate the third reason as the ‘marginal productivity of waiting’. Finally, the relevance of Wicksell's savings rule for the perennial debate on ‘Wicksell's missing equation' is considered in the last section of the article.     

The Affluent Society after Twenty-five Years

This paper places Commons and his friend, Edward Alsworth Ross, in the context of the attack by Richard T. Ely and Lester Frank Ward on a conception of history that attributed all progress in human welfare to natural processes — Darwinian natural selection and market mechanisms. According to this conception, interference with these natural processes would be counterproductive. Ward, a confirmed Darwinian, coined the term "artificial selection" when he proposed an alternate conception that attributed most progress to the disciplined application of human intelligence. Ross adapted Ward's artificial-natural distinction to the problem of social order, arguing that random variation and survival of the fittest can generate social controls that preserve order in small communities, but that only artificial social controls can keep order in complex societies. Ross's distinction made its way into the Legal Foundations of Capitalism and Institutional Economics where Commons focused on the evolution of what Ross labeled artificial social controls — laws governing the wage bargain and the behavior of corporations. In the process Commons confronted the problem of deliberation, the problem of obtaining intelligent actions and decisions from passionate, biased humans organized in democratic societies.     

Main Currents of Marxism

We present a three-fold test for sustainability on policies addressing environmental and natural resource management. The first — ecological holism — requires that management of natural systems not only ensure the long term viability of ecosystem functions and enhanced diversity of wildlife within that ecosystem, but also facilitate the provision of renewable energy and material resources. The second — community centeredness — is an assessment of the improvement (or reduction) in economic wellbeing of local populations measured by employment and income and in quality of life for the larger community resulting from that policy. The third — institutional legitimacy — evaluates the level of justice that a policy and its outcome(s) bring to the entire community (here, just policies will satisfy Rawls's "veil of ignorance" test). Three policies for National Forest management on Washington's Olympic Peninsula are examined and results are compared: the Northwest Forest Plan, the Wild Olympics Wilderness and Scenic Rivers Act of 2012 (Wild Olympics), and The Third Way (an alternative forest management option). Each policy satisfies the first test of ecological holism, but not in equal measures. Success in this regard can be differentially ranked because the relative impacts are not neutral. Both the Northwest Forest Plan and Wild Olympics fail the test of community centeredness. In contrast, The Third Way promotes community centeredness and ecological holism. We assert that, as a result, it would satisfy John Rawls's test for justice, and it is institutionally legitimate.     

Degrees of Connection: A Critique of Rawls’s Theory of Mutual Disinterest

John Rawls's solution to the problem of justice between generations is premised on the idea that “a generation cares for its immediate descendants, as fathers say care for their sons” (John Rawls 1971: 288, emphasis added). This paper brings mothers into the Rawlsian social contract. I argue that, when children have more than one parent, there is a contradiction between the assumption of concern for descendants, which underpins Rawls's account of justice between generations, and the mutual disinterest assumption, which characterizes parties negotiating in the “original position.” Concern for descendants creates connections within generations as well as across generations. The critique is internal and nonradical, but its implications are subversive. It demonstrates that an “add women and stir” liberal feminist reworking of Rawls's theory cannot be successful; bringing sexual reproduction out of the realm of nature and into the social contract necessitates a radical reconstruction of Rawls's theory.     

Schumpeter on the integration of theory and history

This paper assesses Joseph Schumpeter's agenda for the integration of theory and history. On the basis of a critical realist conception of the nature of historical theory it is argued that Schumpeter's aims are at odds with his analytical strategy: his implicit ontology cannot be reconciled with his conception of theory. An illustration is provided as to how this mismatch is reproduced in Schumpeter's substantive attempts to integrate theory and history, and brief reflections are offered as to why this mismatch arose and endured.     

Thoreau's economic philosophy

Abstract

This paper provides an encompassing portrayal of Thoreau's economic thought. It is analyzed against the background of the history of economic thought and the economic thinking of his time. Thoreau's economic thought is an extensive examination of the ideas of classical political economy, and particularly of Jean-Baptiste Say, and it is a fundamental critique thereof. Thoreau recognizes that some aspects and foundations of the modern conception of the economy lead to an alienation of the human being from itself as well as to an alienation from nature. I demonstrate that this critique is a result of Thoreau's specific approach to the economy, which, based on his particular understanding of the human being and his philosophy of nature, seeks the meaning of the economy for human life and for nature. In this philosophical approach, which I characterize as an economic philosophy, Thoreau's deeper defiance of classical political economy and his original place within the history of economic thought are grounded. It leads Thoreau to an alternative conception of an economy of moderation, which is identified and described in detail. I conclude with considerations on the potential meaning of Thoreau's thought for current economic research.     

Pigou on philosophy and religion

Abstract

This article discusses a group of essays on ethical issues written by Pigou between 1900 and 1908. It is argued that they contain the foundations of his economic philosophy. Pigou's research on the meaning and content of the good merged into his definition of welfare, and his interest in religion as a subjective experience resurfaced in the subjective framework of his economics. A methodological pragmatism informed his economics as well as his ethics; moreover, the endorsement of interpersonal comparisons of the good in the ethical texts was consistent with Pigou's adoption of utility comparisons in welfare economics. Pigou's philosophical pessimism was reflected in his analysis of the economic evils of society, eventually leading to his advocacy of governmental intervention to foster economic welfare. The article contends that Pigou's philosophy derived not only from Sidgwick, as commonly believed, but also from G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica.     

Announcement

The paper focuses on Blaug's distinction between rational and historical reconstruction within the historiography of economics. Blaug's distinction is shown to be sterile and misleading and his definitions of no avail to clear thinking. Historical reconstruction (as defined by Blaug) is en empty box for reasons which are basically theoretical and not simply practical (as Blaug seems to hold). Moreover, Blaug's primary polemical target is Whig historiography and not rational reconstruction: the two concepts coincide only by means of an ad hoc definition. Blaug's criticism does not apply to other uses of the concept of rational reconstruction such as that proposed by Lakatos.     

The Counterfactual Method of Marx's Theory of Surplus

The aim of this paper is to show that Marx supports his theory of surplus value by developing a counterfactual argument, that is, by comparing the 'normal' state of a capitalist economy against a hypothetical state in which no surplus is produced. Marx then divides his analysis of value into three successive steps. The first deals with the production of new value in the sphere of production; the second with the process of creation of surplus value, both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of circulation; and the third with the process of equalisation of the rate of profit, which is accomplished via capitalist competition in the sphere of circulation. The paper proposes a formalisation of the three-step analysis and of the counterfactual argument. Marx's three-step analysis is shown to be a scientific analysis of the hidden connections between social relations (expressed in labour flows) and commodity exchange; thus it is not a useless detour.     

Adolph Lowe on Freedom,Education and Socialization

The lifework of Adolph Lowe (1893–1995) was greatly motivated by his struggle with the problem of “freedom and order”. This paper explores Lowe's largely overlooked and under-examined writings on education and political philosophy, important components of his “political economics”. Lowe's concern with the socialization function of education is highlighted and related to his notion of “spontaneous conformity, as well as the ideas of Vygotsky on imaginative children's play and C. S. Peirce on habit-change. Taking Gorman's critique of Schutz's conception of freedom as a point of departure, and drawing on the work of C. Wright Mills, Lowe's own conception of freedom is critically examined. For Lowe, the stronger the commitment to community, the greater is the possibility for individual autonomy without the threat of social disruption.     

Marx's socialism in the context of his typology of economic systems

This paper restates the major structural properties of Marx's conception of socialism in the broader context of his typology of economic systems, commencing with feudalism and ending with his unique vision of postcapitalist economy. It also discusses briefly some of the major applications of this typology to contemporary practice, notably to Soviet experience. Clarification and systematic examination of Marx's views on the basic organizational properties of socialism in the broader context of Marx's views on economic systems, although important in its own right, can also sharpen critical understanding of debates concerning relations between the classical Marxian vision and contemporary practice.     

The Institution,the Economy and the Market: Karl Polanyi's Institutional Thought for Economists

This paper aims to clarify the logical structure of Karl Polanyi's concept of institution, especially with regard to his most important contribution to political economy—the conception of self-regulating markets as institutions. Although Polanyi did not provide a well-developed concept of institution, this article argues that such a concept exists in his work. Moreover, there is in Polanyi's work a sophisticated institutionalist account of the self-regulating market that has been largely overlooked as Polanyi does not present it explicitly. Analyzing the economy as an institutionalized process, as Polanyi does, reveals that the market is neither a natural nor a spontaneous phenomenon—a conclusion that runs counter to conventional economic thinking. Polanyi's approach enables us to view capitalism (the ‘market society’ in Polanyi's language) through a highly specific cultural fact: the fiction of the self-regulating market. This institutional perspective needs to be reassessed beyond new-institutionalist theoretical constructions.     

Marx's analysis of the falling rate of profit in the first version of Volume III of capital

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of the Hodgskin section of Theories of Surplus Value and the general law section of the first version of Volume III of Capital. It then considers Part III of Volume III, the evolution of Marx's thought and various interpretations of his theory in the light of this analysis. It is suggested that, as late as the 1870s, Marx had hoped to be able to provide a demonstration that the rate of profit must fall. The main conclusions are that (1) Marx's major attempt to show that the rate of profit must fall occurred in the general law section, (2) Part III does not contain a demonstration that the rate of profit must fall and (3) Marx was never able to demonstrate that the rate of profit must fall and he was aware of this.     

The contribution of Gerald Shove to the development of Cambridge Economics

Frank Gerald Shove was a close friend of Keynes and the other protagonists of the economic debates in Cambridge during the 1920s and 1930s. Shove's influence on those debates is not well documented because he published little and had all his notes destroyed after his death. This paper looks at Shove's most significant contributions to the debates of the 1930s. Attention is concentrated on the debates over increasing returns and imperfect competition. Shove emphasized the complexity of economic phenomena and the need to develop tools to deal with it. He found his analytical and methodological inspiration in Marshall's work. This position led him to clash with younger economists, in particular Joan Robinson, whose work on imperfect competition and whose efforts to achieve rigorous and ‘precise’ results failed, in his view, to capture the working of actual markets. The final section of the paper discusses the similarity of Shove's methodological outlook to that of Keynes. Both were well aware of the need to go beyond Marshall, but they wanted to retain the richness, complexity and realism of Marshall's approach.     

SEN ON FREEDOM AND GENDER JUSTICE

Abstract

This comment on the special double issue of Feminist Economics on Amartya Sen's work discusses a number of themes and evaluates certain criticisms and claims in the volume. Sen's work involves a complex differentiation of distinct aspects of freedom. This differentiation is relevant to a number of criticisms. It is particularly helpful in evaluating various claims about Sen's focus on and the adequacy of his account of freedom. The article also considers claims about Sen's neglect of issues relating to interdependence and agency. To the degree that it is argued that some of these claims and criticisms can be addressed within Sen's conceptual framework, this article constitutes a qualified defense of his work. However, it does not claim that Sen's framework addresses all the criticisms that are leveled at it in the volume. Possible themes for future research are also briefly discussed.     

Probabilising the consumer: Georgescu-Roegen,Marschak and Quandt on the modelling of the consumer in the 1950s

It is the purpose of this article to confront three attempts by economists at developing models of individual choice that go beyond standard ordinalist utility theory through introducing principles of probabilistic behaviour. We discuss first Georgescu-Roegen's neglected contributions to this subject, though he pioneered the definition of probabilistic preference in 1936 and came back on the subject intensively in the 1950s. We then present Marschak's (and his co-authors) attempts at axiomatising a probabilistic model of choice in the same period. The third contribution studied is that of Quandt, who provides a more operational style of modelling. This set of contributions is discussed against a general background of transformations of the theory of rational behaviour and of the methods proper to it.