Institutionalism and Fiscal Policy at Midcentury

This article analyzes the career and contributions of Roy Blough (1901–2000) as a case study of Wisconsin institutionalism in government policy-making at midcentury. As a faculty member at Cincinnati, Chicago and Columbia, editor of the National Tax Journal, director of the research division of the U.S. Treasury and member of the Council of Economic Advisors, Blough played a significant role in the development of fiscal policy. The article also considers Blough’s contributions to tax policy and his views on Keynesian public finance. It further identifies the contributions of Wisconsin institutionalism to modern fiscal policy.     

Wallace C. Peterson: A Post-Keynesian Institutionalist

Wallace C. Peterson was an exemplary post-Keynesian institutionalist. He wrote about the foundations of economics in a manner that paved the way for today’s post-Keynesian institutionalism. He analyzed the U.S. economy with a keenness that not only shed new light on the macroeconomic issues of his day, but also put him decades ahead of other economists on the problem of United States’ silent depression. Furthermore, he identified policy issues that continue to spark widespread public interest and discussion. I examine his contributions in each of those areas (foundations, analyses, and policy).     

Constraining Leviathan

This article commemorates James M. Buchanan and his contributions to public choice and constitutional political economy. It focuses on what Buchanan had to say about constraining the State, or as he often referred to it, Leviathan. It concentrates on a handful of his major works that I think capture important elements of his thinking. It discusses Buchanan’s writings on public debt and government deficits; the size of the state; federalism; and taxation, among other things. It is argued that the main emphasis in Buchanan’s work as it pertained to constraining the State was to include provisions in the constitution that could achieve this end. These included a balanced budget amendment, rules governing the expansion of the money supply, constraints on the types of taxes that could be levied, linking expenditure proposals to the taxes that would finance them, earmarked taxes, and a generality principle, which would avoid a majority coalition’s exploitation of a minority. The article also includes a discussion of the current constitutional crisis in the United States.     

From theory to practice: Canadian economists’ contributions to public finance

We survey Canadian economists’ contributions to the field of public finance from the mid‐1980s to 2016. We highlight the development and extension of the models and tools of public economics and the empirical studies that have deepened our understanding of the efficiency and distributional issues over a wide range of public finance issues. We also highlight contributions to the development of policies through commissioned reports and the important role that Canadian institutions—the Canadian Tax Foundation, the think tanks and the federal and provincial departments of finance—have played in shaping tax and fiscal policies.     

Buchanan and public finance: The tennessee years

James Buchanan’s views on public finance have already been analyzed and they are quite well known, as are their origins and roots. However, nothing has ever been said about why Buchanan chose public finance in the first place. The first goal of this paper is to show that Buchanan had made this choice before arriving at Chicago. We show how Carlton C. Sims and Charles P. White influenced him. We also show, by analyzing Buchanan’s M.A. thesis, that he was not only interested in public finance but was also primarily concerned by ethical questions and defended a bureaucratic centralized solution to solve the problem he was discussing – how to share the benefits collected from a gasoline tax among Counties. This helps to understand that Buchanan did not choose to study public finance to learn how to fight government intervention. Quite the contrary: it was to legitimate it. Second, we also demonstrate that a lot of the ideas that will matter for Buchanan in his career – the importance of ethics and the principle of an equal treatment for equals, the need to link taxes to benefits, the importance to adapt the scale of provision of a public good to the type of public good – were already present in this first work.

     

Strategies for Fiscal Reform in the Context of the EMU: the Case of Portugal

The authors use an endogenous growth dynamic general‐equilibrium model, which accommodates the institutional constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact, to study tax reform in Portugal. Simulation results suggest that tax cuts financed in a nondistortionary way increase long‐term GDP; i.e., they are efficiency improving, but do not always increase welfare. The tradeoff between efficiency and welfare is alleviated when reductions in public spending or increased public indebtedness finance the tax cuts. Since these mechanisms are not realistic under the institutional setting of the Stability and Growth Pact, tax reform in Portugal must involve trading off distortionary tax margins. In this case, the best strategy to increase both efficiency and welfare is to increase investment tax credits and finance them either through personal income taxes or through employers’ social security contributions.     

Indirect taxes: A comparative study of Greece and the EEC

Financing ever-growing governmental services in a non-inflationary manner is one of the main problems of public policy for all governments, including those of Greece and the EEC countries. The accession of Greece to the EEC would require tax reforms, especially in indirect taxes, which include tariffs and turnover or value added taxes. A regression analysis for the postwar years indicate that ‘imports’ is a far more important variable in explaining changes in indirect taxes than ‘private consumption’ and ‘inflation’. Such empirical findings may be useful to related policies on public finance of the countries considered, as well as other countries with similar economic problems.     

Core Concepts of Institutionalist Public Finance: Problem Solving,Institutional Analysis,Strategic Choice,and Stakeholder Engagement

Citizens and policymakers in many nations are becoming increasingly concerned about large budget deficits and mounting long-term fiscal policy challenges. At the same time, slow economic growth in the United States and Europe is causing some people to demand more government spending (and lower taxes) and others to question the efficacy of fiscal policy. Against that backdrop, institutional economists are exhibiting renewed interest in the field of public finance. This article responds by outlining four core concepts of institutionalist public finance: problem solving, institutional analysis, strategic choice, and stakeholder engagement. What distinguishes the perspective of institutionalism from that of neoclassical economics, today’s dominant economic paradigm, is described in the course of the discussion. The core concepts of institutionalist public finance offer a coherent approach to the study of fiscal policy questions. Those concepts were first fashioned decades ago, but remain relevant: institutionalism continues to provide a solid basis for constructive analyses of fiscal challenges.     

Institutional Economics and Chock-Full Employment: Reclaiming the “Right to Work” as a Cornerstone of Progressive Capitalism

In the United States, the “right to work” originally referred to a progressive call for the right to employment. For example, from the perspective of John R. Commons, the right to work included “the right of the unemployed to have work furnished by the government.” For Commons, that right was a logical outgrowth of Americans’ constitutional rights to life and liberty, “the next great human right.” This article reviews Commons’s right-to-work stance, the history of federal efforts to establish government as employer of last resort, and some key postwar institutionalist contributions to the literature on achieving jobs for all. Then it presents the case for reclaiming the right to work as a cornerstone of progressive capitalism.     

Collective Action and the Institutionalist Approach to Financial Regulation

Drawing on the institutionalist approach to a capitalist economy as a money economy, I regard financial regulation and supervision as a collective action problem. I argue that, given the basic characteristics of such an economy, a financial system may be considered as a public utility and financial stability as a public good. I then maintain that the provision of the latter could not rely on private market mechanisms, such as self-regulation and price-directed incentives. As capitalism develops through more financialized forms, new institutions and regulatory rules must be designed to reframe the market’s boundaries in order to consolidate systemic stability, which is a basic condition for continuous and sustainable economic relations in society. I then suggest a precautionary-principle-based macro-prudential approach to financial regulation in order to ensure a sustainable provision of finance and financial stability that is consistent with the characteristics of a money economy.     

Institutionalism and the “Common Man” Through the Lens of Philip Klein: Business Cycles,the Public Sector,and Keynes’s Economics

This article reviews and assesses Philip Klein’s work on business cycles and macroeconomics, the public sector, and the economics of John Maynard Keynes. The article makes several findings. First, Klein built on the pioneering efforts of Wesley Mitchell to advance the development of cycle indicators and to outline an eclectic theory of cycles that remains useful for synthesizing a broad literature. Second, Klein’s essays on macroeconomics contain enduring discussions of the malleability of the “natural” rate of unemployment and the value of a behavioral approach to expectations. Third, he refocused the institutionalist attention on the public sector by introducing “higher efficiency” and other concepts to help explain how government policy plays a role in economic life. Fourth, Klein emphasized the role of fiscal policy in moderating business cycles. Fifth, his work points in the direction of today’s post-Keynesian institutionalism, both by stressing that Keynes was “profoundly institutionalist” in his approach and by arguing that conjoining Keynes and institutionalism would provide a stronger foundation for macroeconomic theory and policy.     

Environmental Funds,Public Abatement,and Welfare

This paper addresses some features of environmental funds that the government uses to finance public abatement with pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue. I find that when the pollution tax rate and the tariff rate are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal pollution tax rate is higher than the Pigouvian tax rate under public abatement financed by tariff revenue, and lower when public abatement is financed by pollution tax revenue. Furthermore, I show that the optimal tariff rate is positive regardless of which tax revenue is used to finance public abatement. These results are relevant for countries where the government seeks revenues earmarked for the financing of environmental funds.     

"The Reality of the Present and the Challenge of the Future": J. Fagg Foster for the Twenty-First Century

This paper revisits J. Fagg Foster’s early assessment of the relevance of John Maynard Keynes’s theory of institutional economics. In his view, neither institutionalists nor most of Keynes’s followers really recognized the importance of Keynes’s theoretical insights. I examine Foster’s views on economic theory, with a particular focus on monetary theory. I apply Foster’s approach to what is now called modern money theory, an approach developed by heterodox economists working in the institutionalist and post-Keynesian traditions. I argue that this approach is consistent with Foster’s, and it offers a way forward to policy formation for the twenty-first century.     

Achieving the triple dividend in Portugal: a dynamic general-equilibrium evaluation of a carbon tax indexed to emissions trading

Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we simulate the environmental, economic, and budgetary effects in Portugal of a new carbon tax indexed to the carbon price in the European Union’s Emissions Trading System market. Through careful recycling of the carbon tax revenues to finance lower personal income taxes, lower Social Security contributions, and higher investment tax credits – in particular when changes are directed at promoting energy efficiency – we show that it is possible to design a carbon tax reform that boosts economic growth and strengthens fiscal consolidation. These results served as the basis for a new carbon tax eventually approved by the Portuguese Parliament.     

The optimal treatment of tax expenditures

This paper analyzes the optimal treatment of tax expenditures. It develops an optimal tax model where individuals derive utility from spending on a “contribution” good such as charitable giving. The contribution good has also a public good effect on all individuals in the economy. The government imposes linear taxes on earnings and on the contribution good so as to maximize welfare. The government may also finance directly the contribution good out of tax revenue. Optimal tax and subsidy rates on earnings and the contribution good are expressed in terms of empirically estimable parameters and the redistributive tastes of the government. The optimal subsidy on the contribution good is increasing in the size of the price elasticity of contributions, the size of the crowding out effect of public contributions on private contributions, and the size of the public good effect of the contribution good. Numerical simulations show that the optimal subsidy on contributions is fairly sensitive to the size of these parameters but that, in most cases, it should be lower than the earnings tax rate.     

J.M. Clark and Institutional Economics: Remarks on the Receipt of the Veblen-Commons Award

This paper outlines the contributions of J.M. Clark to institutional economics. Clark is sometimes seen as standing between institutional and neoclassical economics, but I argue that this view is not accurate. Clark was intimately involved in the definition, promotion, and defense of institutional economics in sessions of the American Economic Association and in a variety of other forums. No other member of the institutionalist group was as much involved in the professional discussion of institutional economics as J.M. Clark. In addition, Clark made a number of key contributions to institutionalist theory in the areas of psychology and economics, the costs of decision-making, overhead costs and business-pricing behavior, the accelerator mechanism and business cycles, workable and effective competition and competition policy, and social control. These contributions, together with the graduate students he trained at the University of Chicago and Columbia University, serve to place him in the center of the institutionalist movement and not on its periphery.     

The Role of Culture,Historicity, and Human Agency in the Evolution of the State: A Case Against Cultural Fatalism

I examine how the nature of the state and its relationship to its people are determined and evolve. I bring together differing contributions of traditional institutionalism to further an emerging evolutionary-institutionalist discourse concerning the role played by culture and historicity, on one hand, and by individual actions and awareness, on the other, in shaping and reshaping the nature of the state. Such discourse is significant in understanding that, although inherited culture plays an important role in influencing the character of the state in a given society, the future of the state is not fully determined by its history. In equal measure, it depends on the volition of individuals who purposefully amend the state’s institutions through rearranging power distribution. Using Russia’s authoritarian state as a case in point, I demonstrate how this emerging evolutionary-institutionalist discourse can circumvent ideological misuse of the institutionalist paradigm in non-democratic societies.     

Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the outcome of tax competition between autonomous fiscal authorities. It treats the case of a two-region economy, where an origin-based commodity tax is levied by each region on some private good to finance a local public good. A second private good is untaxed.We first describe ‘regional market equilibria’, whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices, taxes, and transportation costs. Next, regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived, the tax of the other region being held constant. Fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other.A ‘noncooperative fiscal equilibrium’ (NCFE) is then defined as the pair of fiscal choices such that each region's tax and public good supply are optimal for itself, given those of the other region. After examining the conditions for the existence of a NCFE, its efficiency properties are considered. Pareto efficient tax levels are computed and compared with the NCFE ones, showing the sources and nature of fiscal externalities. Finally, it is established that, in this model, fiscal choices that are Pareto improving with respect to a NCFE never reduce the taxes in both regions, and always increase the tax of a tax importing region.     

鼓励自主创新的财税政策研究

公共财政支持自主创新对于一国技术创新和经济发展具有重要意义。本文首先分析公共财政为什么要支持自主创新，其次在借鉴美国创新政策的基础上，提出支持自主创新的财税政策：财政支出政策、税收激励政策和相关配套政策。