Macroprudential policy and imbalances in the euro area

Since its creation the euro area suffered from imbalances between its core and peripheral members. This paper checks whether macroprudential policy applied to the peripheral countries could contribute to providing more macroeconomic stability in this region. To this end we build a two-economy macrofinancial model and simulate the effects of macroprudential policy (regulating the loan-to-value ratio) when the core and the periphery are exposed to asymmetric shocks. We find that macroprudential policy is able to substantially lower the amplitude of credit and output fluctuations in the periphery. However, for the policy to be effective, it should be decentralized. Very similar conclusions hold when welfare is considered as the optimality criterion.     

Optimal Macroprudential Policies and House Prices in Korea

This article investigates the impacts of the macroprudential policy of limitation on credit growth in housing market on Korean economy to find empirical and theoretical implications. Empirical results based on VAR models show that macroprudential policies like LTV and DTI in Korea have significant and persistent effect on real household credit and real house price. This article further addresses implications of optimal macroprudential and monetary policy in Korea by employing a standard DSGE model. The results suggest that the time-varying macroprudential policy responding to the borrower’s debt to income ratio is most effective in stabilizing household debt among the macroprudential policy rules considered, but produces a moderate downturn of the economy.     

Heterogeneous effects of macroprudential policies on firm leverage and value

We empirically investigate the effect of financial institution-targeted macroprudential policies on firms using a comprehensive macroprudential policy dataset and corporate panel data across 35 countries. We find that tightening of macroprudential measures persistently curbs the leverage of firms, while loosening is related to the increase in leverage. We also find that this effect on leverage is heterogeneous across firms, as net macroprudential policy actions reduce the procyclicality of leverage more significantly for small firms and firms with high leverage. Also, we estimate the effect of macroprudential policies on firm value to evaluate potential policy trade-offs as the policies restrict the firms' access to credit during economic booms while protecting them from future financial crises. The effect of macroprudential policies on firm value is generally positive despite the policies' restrictive nature. Further, the effect on firm value is heterogeneous depending on firm characteristics: the positive effect becomes stronger as firms are less leveraged, but this positive effect is weaker for firms that grow faster, suggesting potential costs of macroprudential policies for these firms.     

Optimal macroprudential policy and rational bubbles

We provide a microfounded framework for the welfare analysis of macroprudential policy within a model of rational bubbles. For this, we posit an overlapping generation model where productivity and credit supply are subject to random shocks. We find that when real interest rates are lower than the rate of growth, credit financed bubbles may be welfare improving because of their role as a buffer in channeling excessive credit supply and inefficient investment at the firms’ level, but their sudden price decrease may cause a systemic crisis. Therefore, a well designed macroprudential policy plays a key role in improving efficiency while preserving financial stability. Our theoretical framework allows us to compare the efficiency of alternative macroprudential policies. Contrarily to conventional wisdom, we show that macroprudential policy (i) may be efficient even in the absence of systemic risk, (ii) has to be contingent on productivity shocks and (iii) must be contingent upon the level of real interest rates.     

宏观审慎政策与银行风险承担研究

针对宏观审慎政策中的逆周期政策工具对银行风险承担产生的影响进行了分析。在理论上研究了逆周期政策工具所带来的宏观和微观效应,并运用动态面板数据广义矩估计方法进行了实证分析。研究发现,在信贷扩张期杠杆率、贷款损失准备金率的上升会使银行的当期风险承担水平增加,资本充足率的提高使风险承担降低。而滞后六个月的资本充足率、杠杆率、贷款损失准备金率的上升可以显著降低当期的风险承担水平,宏观审慎政策工具的宏观效应和微观效应一致。     

宏观审慎政策的国际协调问题研究--基于我国的DSGE模拟分析

本文在两国模型的DSGE框架下引入宏观审慎政策监管机制,把金融摩擦、国际资本流动和宏观审慎政策纳入同一个一般均衡分析框架。通过国际贸易和国际资本流动机制,考察宏观审慎政策的国际影响机制。基于我国的模拟分析结果表明,第一,对于我国来说,宏观审慎政策的国际合作不仅能够有效地应对国内经济冲击,也有助于抵御外部经济冲击。第二,我国推动构建国际宏观审慎政策长效合作机制,有助于积极应对国际资本流动,促进我国资本市场进一步开放。第三,我国宏观审慎政策存在国际溢出效应,但是对其他国家的影响并不明显。     

Macroprudential measures and developments in bank funding costs

In this paper, we study how the use of macroprudential policy instruments is associated with bank funding costs. To accomplish this, we develop several macroprudential indices based on policy objectives and include different macroeconomic and bank-level variables, while we also separately analyse the cost of debt and overall cost of funding. Our analysis relies on bank-level data in 43 European countries for the period between 2000 and 2017, and a macroprudential policy dataset based on an IMF survey. The results show the activation of macroprudential policies is chiefly related with lower bank funding costs, with this association being stronger for developed countries than emerging ones. The results also reveal positive links with certain macroprudential measures to bank cost of funding, offering further insight into the repercussions of calibrating and selecting macroprudential tools.     

Managing price and financial stability objectives in inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific

Many central banks have adopted explicit objectives for financial stability, raising the possibility of trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. Based on structural vector autoregressions that incorporate both monetary and macroprudential policy shocks for four inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific, we analyse the role of each policy shock in explaining deviations from the other policy’s objective, by applying historical decompositions. The macroprudential measures used in the study affect credit extended to the private sector. We find that there are periods when macroprudential policy shocks have contributed to pushing inflation away from the central bank’s inflation target and when monetary policy shocks have contributed to buoyant credit, suggesting that there have been short-term trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. However, we also find periods when macroprudential policy shocks helped stabilise inflation and monetary policy shocks contributed to financial stability.     

Macroprudential policy in the EU: A political economy perspective

In response to the lessons of the global financial crisis, macroprudential policy is now firmly established as a financial policy area to prevent excessive risk taking in the financial sector and mitigate its effects on the real economy. However, macroprudential policy is facing several challenges relating to its political sensitivity and institutional context. These include political and interest group resistance, weaknesses in the governance framework, and limited institutional memory among policy makers. This article seeks to contribute to the contextual understanding of macroprudential policy by exploring how factors relating to these challenges influence policy in the EU. More specifically, it develops and empirically tests a number of hypotheses on how wider institutional and structural factors influence the actual use of macroprudential measures across Europe. The findings yield considerable support for theoretical predictions that institutions and contexts matter - Political pressure and interest group resistance tend to influence the intensity of macroprudential policy stances. Weaker policy stances characterise countries where banking systems depend on domestic banks, whereas the opposite holds for financial systems with significant market shares of other financial intermediaries. Results on institutional arrangements show that governance arrangements on relating to transparency influence policy stances. The results also indicate that policy makers' inertia is best counteracted by appointing a single macroprudential authority. The results differ somewhat depending on whether countries are based in the Euro zone or not. This suggests that policy frameworks that are multi-layered and complex pose tricky conundrums on how to ensure sufficient institutional autonomy, policy capacity and discretion among macroprudential authorities. This also has implications on other policy areas macroprudential policy, such as microprudential policy, crisis management and fiscal policy.     

对货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架内在逻辑的思考

本轮国际金融危机以来,金融稳定在中央银行政策目标中的重要性再次得到强化。随着具有顺周期波动特征的金融市场和金融资产规模显著增大,金融管理政策需要更加关注金融稳定和系统性风险问题,货币稳定和金融稳定“双目标”的重要性凸显出来。政策目标的变化相应要求优化和完善政策工具箱,需要健全宏观审慎政策框架作为应对系统性风险的工具,并与货币政策相互配合,形成由货币政策和宏观审慎政策“双支柱”支撑起“双目标”的基本框架,共同维护好货币稳定和金融稳定。在此框架中,货币政策和宏观审慎政策都不可或缺,须相互补充,形成合力,产生“一加一大于二”的政策效应增进效果。健全货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架,有利于把经济周期和金融周期更好地结合起来,把维护经济稳定与促进金融稳定更好地结合起来。下一阶段应进一步健全宏观审慎政策框架,并完善货币政策和宏观审慎政策协调配合的体制机制。     

宏观审慎政策理论基础解析

宏观审慎政策是在本次金融危机后由国际清算银行牵头,于2010年在G20国家峰会上通过的未来全球金融监管通行规则。现有中文文献多将目光聚焦在对宏观审慎政策的目标、工具与有效性的认识和解释上,本文则是从宏观审慎政策的理论基础出发,从不同的角度和侧面来描述刻画宏观审慎政策的目标和内容,厘清其完整脉络,为全面实施宏观审慎监管提供理论依据。     

Effects of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies—Evidence from Four Inflation Targeting Economies

We examine the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies in the Asia‐Pacific region, where many inflation targeting economies have adopted macroprudential policies in order to safeguard financial stability. Using structural panel vector autoregressions that identify both monetary and macroprudential policy actions, we show that tighter macroprudential policies used to contain credit growth also have a significant negative impact on macroeconomic aggregates such as real GDP and the price level. The similar effects of monetary and macroprudential policies may suggest a complementary use of the two policies at normal times. However, they could also create challenges for policymakers, especially during times when low inflation coincides with buoyant credit growth.     

货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调

本文在梳理学术文献和国际经验基础上,讨论了货币政策与宏观审慎政策之间的潜在冲突和协调机制。国际文献的初步结论是,为了同时实现价格稳定和金融稳定目标,大部分情况下需要货币政策与宏观审慎政策反向操作(由于政策的替代性),但有时也需要两者同向操作(由于政策的互补性),最优政策组合取决于宏观冲击的类别和风险的来源。本文认为,选择最优组合是一个复杂的理论和实证问题,除了冲击类别和风险来源外,不同的金融体制和经济周期阶段也会影响选择结果。因此,货币政策当局与宏观审慎当局之间需要建立有效的协调机制,并加强对货币政策和宏观审慎政策“溢出效应”的分析能力。基于上述理论,针对我国“双支柱”决策的现状和问题提出如下改革建议:一是从法律上明确中央银行的金融稳定职责。二是建立在同一框架内分析货币政策与宏观审慎政策的方法和工具。三是将金融监管部门的主要宏观审慎政策决策权集中至中央银行。四是建立货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调流程与机制。     

Benchmarking macroprudential policies: An initial assessment

In recognition of the severe consequences of the recent international financial crisis, the topic of macroprudential policy has elicited considerable research effort. The present study constructs, for 46 economies around the globe, an index of the capacity to deploy macroprudential policies. Building on elements that have been the subject of recent research, we develop an index that aims to represent the essence of what constitutes a macroprudential regime. Specifically, the index quantifies: (1) how existing macroprudential frameworks are organized; and (2) how far a particular jurisdiction is from reaching the goals established by the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The latter is a benchmark that has not been considered in the burgeoning literature that seeks to quantify the role of macroprudential policies.     

Joint Dynamics of House Prices and Foreclosures

This paper studies the joint transitional dynamics of the foreclosures and house prices in a standard life‐cycle incomplete markets model with housing and a realistic long‐term mortgage structure. We calibrate our model to match several long‐term features of the U.S. housing market, and analyze the effects of several unexpected and permanent shocks on the house price and the foreclosure rate both across the steady states and along the transition between the steady states. We examine permanent, unexpected shocks to the risk‐free interest rate, the minimum down‐payment ratio, and unemployment. During the transition, these shocks create large movements in house prices. More importantly, the foreclosure dynamics are quite significant along the transition compared to the steady‐state changes, and there are strong feedbacks between foreclosures and house prices. We assess the effects of a temporary reduction in the risk‐free interest rate, which has moderate effects on house prices but little effect on foreclosure dynamics. We also study the effects of an ex ante macroprudential policy, which establishes a minimum down‐payment requirement at a higher threshold. Such a macroprudential policy helps substantially stabilize both house prices and foreclosures.     

Macroprudential policy and intra-group dynamics: The effects of reserve requirements in Brazil

We examine whether liquidity dynamics within banking groups matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using matched bank headquarters-branch data for identification, we find a lending channel of reserve requirements for municipal branches whose headquarters are more exposed to the policy tool. The result is driven by the 2008–2009 crisis and is stronger for state-owned branches, especially when being less profitable and liquidity constrained. These findings suggest the presence of cross-regional distributional effects of macroprudential policies operating via internal capital markets.     

宏观审慎政策的角色

本文基于宏观审慎目标、理论动因和风险传播渠道,探讨了是否应该追加全局性资本金以平抑经济周期。全局性资本金追加要求可以一刀切或者区别对待,区别对待的方法有利于更好地掌控风险,但必须慎重考量区别对待的适度水平,可通过一系列定量和定性指标来调校全局性资本金追加标准;宏观审慎决策需要一定的相机抉择,但必须对其施加相应的约束以保障政策的透明度、责任性和前瞻性,建议制定完备的责任约束机制,从而形成"有约束的相机抉择"的宏观审慎机制;一国宏观审慎制度需要得到国际合作与配合才能充分地发挥效力。     

宏观审慎政策与货币政策目标协调研究

宏观审慎政策与货币政策之间的关系是当前理论研究的前沿,国内外对于宏观审慎政策与货币政策目标之间的关系、协调研究还很少.本文在回顾国内外研究的基础上,对宏观审慎政策与货币政策目标进行了比较,比较了两者目标的共同点、不同点,并分析了宏观审慎政策与货币政策目标协调的必要性:两者目标联系紧密、互相影响、具有互补性、需要关注潜在冲突,最后基于前述研究的基础上提出了对策建议.     

LTV policy as a macroprudential tool and its effects on residential mortgage loans

Since the early 2000s, macroprudential policy has increasingly become part of the regulatory and supervisory framework. Likewise, the housing market has been at the center of the debate on systemic financial risk prevention. Among macroprudential tools, the purpose of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is to constrain mortgage loan creation. This paper is unique in that it analyzes the effectiveness of LTV on mortgage lending moderation using a large sample of more than 4000 banks from 46 countries. The analysis suggests mortgage loans have been successfully curbed in countries with a LTV policy. Size and non-performing loans are the two key characteristics to the effectiveness of LTV. When nonlinearities are considered, the average effect of LTV can be very large; however, it becomes much less effective with large banks and banks with bad loans. Our results suggest the inclusion of other macroprudential tools may have complementary effects to LTV, and for large size banks in particular.