Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: Old Question-New Evidence

Banks are regulated more than most firms, making them good subjects to study regulatory arbitrage (avoidance). Their latest arbitrage opportunity may be the new leverage rule covering the largest U.S. banks; leverage rules require equal capital against assets with unequal risks, so banks can effectively relax the leverage constraint by increasing asset risk. Consistent with that conjecture, we find that banks covered by the new rule shifted to riskier, higher yielding securities relative to control banks. The shift began almost precisely when the rule was finalized in 2014, well before it took effect in 2018. Security level analysis suggests banks actively added riskier securities, rather than merely shedding safer ones. Despite the risk shifting, overall bank risk did not increase, evidently because the banks most constrained by the new leverage rule significantly increased leverage capital ratios.     

Can regulators allow banks to set their own capital ratios?

Basel regulators have received widespread criticism for failing to prevent two credit crises that hit the U.S. over the last two decades. Nonetheless, banks were considerably overcapitalized prior to the onset of the 2007–2009 subprime crisis compared to those which had undergone the 1990–1991 recession. Therefore, if capital requirements were achieved prior to the subprime crisis, how could the Basel framework be blamed again for having accelerated if not caused another credit crunch? We find that the answer to this question lies in the relationship between the capital ratio and the leverage ratio which is governed by risk-weights categories determined by the Basel regulation. We show that changes to risk-weight categories which affect the correlation pattern between both ratios are not reflected in the subprime crisis. This minimizes the implication of the Basel II regulation in the crunch that succeeded its announcement, in contrast to Basel I. We demonstrate that these dynamics are governed by a formula linking the two ratios together which derives from the sensitivity of the risk-based capital ratio to a change in its risk-weight(s). One implication of our work regarding the Basel III regulation consists in validating the newly established capital increments in a mathematical rather than heuristical approach.     

金融服务实体经济的效率及影响因素研究 ——基于商业银行资产负债的实证分析

本文首先深入分析了商业银行的资产负债管理行为,构建商业银行追求利润的资产负债管理模型,从理论上分析出商业银行将资产配置到实体经济领域的影响因素。在此基础上,从金融监管的角度出发,将商业银行的资产负债项目进一步分类为杠杆类、通道类,利用25家商业银行2009到2018年的面板数据,实证分析针对商业银行的杠杆类、通道类资产负债的监管,对金融支持实体经济力度、价格的影响效果。结果显示：银行支持实体经济力度方面,银行的杠杆率对银行支持实体经济力度有显著正向效果,但是资金通道长度对银行支持实体经济力度的影响并不显著;银行支持实体经济的资金价格方面,杠杆率对银行资金价格的影响并不显著,但是通道长度则会显著增加资金成本;商业银行的国有、股份制、城商行性质对银行支持实体经济力度的影响也不显著,但是同等条件下,商业银行的国有性质会显著降低资金价格水平。     

中国商业银行脆弱性的诱发因素及监管——基于资产减值和杠杆率视角

选取2008年前上市的16家银行2008-2018年的财务数据,对商业银行脆弱性进行分析。研究发现：商业银行脆弱性虽然是多方面因素共同作用的结果,但其对杠杆率变动尤其敏感;国有商业银行对商业银行总体脆弱性贡献占比较大;股份制商业银行更易受到资产减值风险的冲击。政策模拟结果显示,增加四家系统重要性银行的权益资本并对其进行严格的杠杆率监管是降低商业银行总体脆弱性较为有效的途径。     

巴塞尔协议Ⅲ及其对我国中小银行影响研究

《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》规定了最低资本充足率要求,资本缓冲额度,反周期超额资本要求,风险资本杠杆率,监督检查和信息披露项目条款以便提高银行抗御风险能力。文章通过分析新协议对我国中小银行的影响,并提出了可行性应对策略,以便中小银行能够审慎和有效的实践新协议,从而在面对金融危机时能够立于不败之地。     

Banking system reform and investment–cash flow relation: Case of a small transition economy

This research examines the effect of banking system reform which is measured by foreign bank's presence on investment–cash flow relation in a context of a small transition economy. The U-shape relation between investment and cash flow is found. We also find evidence that the presence of foreign banks in Vietnam results in decreasing in dependence on local banks and has changed corporate investment behaviors. Company investments are less reliant on internal cash flow in the post reform period. Although overinvestment of state controlled firms is not reduced but underinvestment problem of non-state-controlled listed firms is mitigated due to better accessibility to bank loans. The investigated relation between investment and leverage is robust for this conclusion.     

The contribution of bank regulation and fair value accounting to procyclical leverage

Our analysis of how banks’ responses to asset price changes can result in procyclical leverage reveals that, for banks with a binding regulatory leverage constraint, absent differences in regulatory risk weights across assets, procyclical leverage does not occur. For banks without a binding constraint, fair value and bank regulation both can contribute to procyclical leverage. Empirical findings based on a large sample of U.S. commercial banks reveal that bank regulation explains procyclical leverage for banks relatively close to the regulatory leverage constraint and contributes to procyclical leverage for those that are not. We also show that fair value accounting does not contribute to procyclical leverage.     

The interaction of bank regulation and taxation

The tax benefit of interest deductibility encourages debt financing, but regulatory constraints create dependency between bank leverage and asset risk. Using a large international sample of banks this paper shows that banks located in high-tax countries have higher leverage and lower average asset risk-weights. This trade-off is stronger when regulation is more stringent and for banks with less capital. Non-financial firms' leverage and asset risk are positively related to tax rates, as further evidence of the regulatorily induced adjustment of portfolio risk. A difference-in-difference analysis provides support for a causal interpretation of these results. Overall, higher tax rates are positively correlated with systemic risk, suggesting that the lower asset risk does not offset the risk-inducing effect of tax rates on bank leverage.     

The IFRS option to reclassify financial assets out of fair value in 2008: the roles played by regulatory capital and too-important-to-fail status

Amendment of IAS 39 by the IASB in 2008 provided an option to reclassify investments from fair value to historical cost. We predict that too-important-to-fail (TITF) banks took less advantage of this option because the political protection they enjoyed insulated them from regulatory pressure. Banks that did not enjoy this protection had greater reason to make use of this option since doing so would protect their Tier 1 capital. As predicted, findings reveal that TITF banks made less use of the reclassification option to protect their Tier 1 capital and there is a significant moderating influence of TITF status on the incentive to reclassify investments for banks with lower regulatory capital. This finding is consistent with TITF banks placing less weight on protecting regulatory capital and thereby retaining flexibility to sell assets. Our findings provide evidence that accounting choices are affected by the importance of banks to their economies.     

Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile banks

Optimizing banks subject to runs are introduced in a macro model to study the transmission of monetary policy and its interplay with bank capital regulation when banks are risky. A monetary expansion and a positive productivity shock increase bank leverage and risk. Risk-based capital requirements amplify the cycle and are welfare detrimental. Within a class of simple policy rules, the best combination includes mildly anticyclical capital ratios (as in Basel III) and a response of monetary policy to asset prices or bank leverage.     

Why do banks choose to finance with equity?

A majority of U.S. banks between 1973 and 2012 held equity capital significantly beyond the required minimum. We study the risk-return tradeoff in connection with a bank’s capital structure, and identify several new significant market factors that drive the level of equity capital in banks. During normal growth periods, bank leverage is negatively related to a level of competition and loan portfolio diversification, while high bank leverage is associated with low past liquidity. During recessions and expansions, the roles of those factors change following distortions in risk-return tradeoff. In distress, when banks approach regulatory capital requirements, market determinants of book leverage lose their significance; however, leverage does not decrease until a bank is within 1% of the minimal capital threshold.     

A NEW APPROACH TO CAPITAL BUDGETING FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The classic approach to capital budgeting based on the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) says that the hurdle rate (or cost of capital) for any new project or investment should depend only on the riskiness of that investment. Thus, the hurdle rate, and hence the expected value of the investment, should not be affected by the financial policy of the company evaluating the project. Nor should the hurdle rate be influenced by the company's risk management policy, or by the kind of assets it already has on the balance sheet. This article argues that such a “singlefactor” model may be inappropriate for banks and other financial institutions for two main reasons:

• ? it is especially costly for banks to raise new external funds on short notice;
• ? it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings.

The single-factor CAPM ignores such costs and, in so doing, understates the true economic costs of “illiquid” bank investments. Illiquid investments require special treatment because they impose risks that, although “diversifiable” by shareholders, cannot be readily hedged by the bank and therefore require it to hold more equity capital. The authors accordingly propose a “two-factor” model for capital budgeting— one in which banks' investment decisions are linked to their capital structure and risk management decisions. One of the key implications of the two-factor model is that a bank should evaluate new investments according to both their correlation with the market portfolio and their correlation with the bank's existing portfolio of unhedgeable risks. The authors describe several potential applications of their model, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. They also compare their approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.     

Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.     

Asset liquidity,business risk,and beta

Extant literature posits that because of leverage, equity beta estimates from a single factor capital asset pricing model based on an equity-only market index are biased. We show analytically that this leverage bias is intimately related to the firm's asset structure per se, the firm's asset liquidity (i.e., cash holdings) and business risk. This is mainly because riskless cash holdings and risky real assets jointly determine the relevant risk for asset pricing. We empirically confirm that asset liquidity and business risk can marginally explain the leverage bias in the cross-section of stocks returns.     

How to make regulators and shareholders happy under Basel III

In addition to the Basel II capital ratio, Basel III requires banks to respect additional ratios, such as leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio. Banks are required to be compliant with all four constraints simultaneously. Our article provides a framework for banks to help their search for an optimal transition from Basel II to Basel III. Recognizing that banks’ return and the four constraints are of linear type, this search can be formulated as a linear program and solved by standard software. Incorporating uncertainty on future defaults, risk weights and withdrawals and formulating the problem as a Chance constrained model does not only yield optimal transition strategies but also determines the internal thresholds for the Basel III-ratios. Our approach needs two standard inputs from controlling: profit margins per product and non-financial adjustment costs to expand or cut back business. The adjustment cost can be used to calibrate the model to the current business mix. This calibration can be done by bank outsiders and allows the model to be used in impact studies to replace ad hoc strategies. To highlight its practicality, we apply our model to a typical German bank with a business mix that complies with Basel II, but not with the Basel III-, capital-, leverage- and net stable funding-ratio. Assuming that its business model is optimal under Basel II, we find that this bank would achieve compliance restructuring its funding side by replacing interbank funding by capital and retail deposits. Additional uncertainty would amplify the magnitude of the changes, but would still affect the same positions. These findings are robust against alternative margin definitions and adjustment cost levels.     

Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions

We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.     

Why ‘Basel II’ may need a leverage ratio restriction

We analyze regulatory capital requirements where the amount of required capital depends on the level of risk reported by the banks. It is shown that if the supervisors have a limited ability to identify or to sanction dishonest banks, an additional, risk-independent leverage ratio restriction may be necessary to induce truthful risk reporting. The leverage ratio helps to offset the banks’ potential capital savings of understating their risks by (i) reducing banks’ put option value of limited liability ex ante, and by (ii) increasing the banks’ net worth, which in turn enhances the supervisors’ ability to sanction banks ex post.     

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.