生活中价格歧视经济现象

价格歧视是经济学概念,"歧视"有别于我们通常的理解并无贬义。以不同的价格销售同一种商品,即为价格歧视。价格歧视最早由英国经济学家庇古提出来,根据价格歧视的程度高低,可以分成一级、二级和三级价格歧视。本文将从生活中常见的现象出发,分析经济歧视在生活中的应用,为我们的生活带来帮助。     

关于团购的经济学分析

随着电子商务的迅猛发展，诞生了一系列的团购网站。通过网站，人们可以以较低的价格，选取自己所需要的东西。例如，人们旅游需要订购酒店房间时，可以通过团购网站，以较低的价格满足自己的需要。也就是，同样是订一间房间，在酒店里现场订购和通过网上团购价格不同（在两个房间没有区别的情况下），这种现缘在经济学中就称作价格歧视。一、价格歧视的定义及分类价格歧视就是以不同的价格销售同一产品。应该注意的是，价格的不同并不是由于成本的差异。当然，并不是所有的商品只要厂商愿意都可以实行价格歧视，来增加厂商利润。     

运用价格歧视指导企业的差别定价

<正> 人们在超市中经常会发现一个似乎与常识相悖的事实:许多大包装的物品比小包装的同样物品每单位索价还要高。购买数量越多,获得的折扣越多,即更低的单价,学经济的都知道这一点。那商家为什么还要“背道而驰”呢?实际上这不过是他们所频繁使用的价格歧视的一种形式而已。一、价格歧视的概念在经济学中,价格歧视(PriceDiscrimination)是指对同样商品向不同的群体索取不同价格的作法。产品是指     

智利的消费者服务组织

在智利,有关法律明确规定了消费者在购买商品或接受服务时的基本权利和义务;他们有权自由选择商品或服务,及时了解真实价格和合同条件,不受歧视,能够安全消费和保护健康;如因违反法律规定而造成精神和物质上的损失,     

生产者市场价格歧视问题的博弈研究

本文运用现代产业组织理论，在生产者市场信息不完全对称的条件下，对供方价格歧视策略优化与选择问题进行研究，证明了实行价格歧视的充分必要条件及最优解与次优解。可作为我国企业在加入WTO后，从事跨国经营、全面能与国际市场竞争，制定合理的市场竞争价格策略的基本理论依据。     

价格歧视和社会福利效应分析

目前价格歧视理论在广泛的应用于企业决策和经济政策的分析中,在现实经济生活中价格歧视也是一个广泛存在的现象。定价策略的差异性会导致不同类型的价格歧视具有不同的福利效应。本文主要以三级价格歧视为例来分析其对社会福利效应的影响,最终得出价格歧视对社会效应影响的几点结论。     

价格歧视在网络营销中的应用分析

价格歧视是企业定价的一种重要的形式。文章通过对价格歧视理论的概括分析了价格歧视在网络营销中应用的依据,同时从福利角度分析了其应用的合理性。最后概括给出了在网络营销中应用价格歧视的一些影响。     

牟取暴利是不正当价格竞争的最终目的

在激烈的商品竞争中,经营者在商品销售与服务方面展开的竞争,通常以价格竞争为主。在市场经济高度发达的国家里,自由定价是自由竞争体制的固有特征。尽管每个经营者或竞争者有权根据自己的判断自行定价,但是这种权利受制于有关的法律法规。换言之,一方面并非所有商品与服务的价格全部开放由市场自动调节,实际上政府对关系国计民生的重要商品与服务的价格,主要通过反垄断法直接管理,制止价格垄断、价格歧视以及固定价格等行为。另一方面,即便是通过市场调节全部放开的物价,已制订了有关明码标价和反不正当价格竞争方面的法律法规,对物价间接管理,明确禁止价格欺诈、价格不实表示、蚀本经营与不合理低价竞争等行为。     

关于三级价格歧视理论及福利效应的思考

<正>价格歧视不仅是基本的经济学术语,而且在实践中也有着广泛的应用。本文意在使用任意需求函数和任意成本函数的情形下,运用严格的数学推理,证明三级价格歧视的定价特征,并对三级价格歧视的福利效应进行分析。     

用税率控制和稳定商品的市场价格合理调节国家、企业和消费者的利益

商品的价格足一种非常重要的市场信息,企业和消费者的行为对于这种信息及其变动都将灵敏地作出反应。商品的价格既影响国家的财政收入,同时也影响企业的盈利和消费新的支出。因此,商品的价格是对国家、企业和消费者三者的利益均有影响作用的重要的经济杠杆。社会主义国家的经济部门应当而且能够通过商品的市场供求关系运用税率来控制商品的市场价格,从而合理地调节国家、企业和消费者三者的利益。本文中我们将采用数理分析的方法来研究这种控制和调节的原理。     

Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Efficiency

The extant theory on price discrimination in input markets takes the structure of the downstream industry as exogenously given. This paper endogenizes the structure of the downstream industry and examines the effects of permitting third‐degree price discrimination on market structure and welfare. We identify situations where permitting price discrimination leads to either higher or lower wholesale prices for all downstream firms. These findings are driven by upstream profits being discontinuous due to costly entry. Moreover, permitting price discrimination fosters entry which often improves welfare. Nevertheless, entry can also reduce welfare because it may lead to a severe inefficiency in production.     

Deregulation and price discrimination in the conveyancing market

Using data from a telephone survey of solicitors in England and Wales, this paper presents data on the impact of deregulation on price discrimination in 27 local conveyancing markets. It is concluded that variations in price discrimination can be explained not only by differences by firm and market structure but also by systematic differences in firm conduct. In particular, the nature of the response within different markets to deregulation in the legal profession (advertising and licensed conveyancers) has a significant effect on the extent of price discrimination.     

PRICE DISCRIMINATION: A SURVEY OF THE THEORY

Abstract. The purpose of this survey is twofold. First, it introduces the reader to recent developments in the theory of price discrimination. Simultaneously, the exposition aims at being self-contained and accessible to the non-specialist reader. The paper is structured around Pigou's distinction between perfect, second-degree and third-degree price discrimination.     

The Interaction between a Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Price Dispersion: An Empirical Examination of the Medicaid Rebate Rules of 1990

This paper examines the effect of the MFC rules adopted by Medicaid on both price dispersion and price levels in the wholesale pharmaceutical market. Theory suggests that the regulations should reduce price dispersion and increase the average price for those products with a high initial level of price dispersion. Using data which can only measure some dimensions of price discrimination, I find that discrimination falls for products sold to hospitals, but not drugstores. Branded drugs facing generic competition have the most dispersion ex ante . Prices of these brands rise with dispersion at the implementation of the new rules. The last two results are consistent with Scott Morton (1997), where I look only at price changes due to the law. The results of this paper confirm that part of the mechanism of action for the price increase is the high level of price dispersion for some products combined with the MFC.     

基于收益管理的停车位分配模型

运用收益管理中的主要方法,对停车位分配问题进行了分析,提出了将停车位分类定价,实行车位分类控制和采用超售的策略,来改善停车场的收益.     

Monopolistic third-degree price discrimination,welfare, and vertical market structure

Review of Economic Design - This paper reconsiders the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare in a vertical market. The results indicate that monopolistic downstream...     

Price discrimination and bargaining power in the U.S. vaccine market: Implications for childhood immunization policy

The U.S. vaccine market exhibits a pricing structure in which the major purchaser of vaccines, the public sector, receives substantial discounts. This outcome is consistent with three theories of market behavior: third-degree price discrimination; bargaining power; and cost differences. The true nature of this pricing structure has important efficiency and policy implications. This paper uses a longitudinal data set of private catalog and federal contract prices to empirically determine whether price discrimination or bargaining power is being practiced in this market. I find that, while it is not possible to eliminate other factors, the results favor the bargaining power hypothesis.     

Wholesale price discrimination: Innovation incentives and upstream competition

In intermediate good markets where there are alternative supply sources, wholesale price discrimination may enhance innovation incentives downstream. We consider a vertical chain where a dominant firm and a competitive fringe supply imperfect substitutes to duopoly retailers which carry both varieties. We show that a ban on price discrimination by the dominant supplier makes uniform pricing credible and reduces retailers’ incentives to decrease the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety, leading to higher upstream profits and lower downstream welfare. Our analysis complements existing results by identifying a novel channel through which wholesale price discrimination can improve dynamic market efficiency.     

Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers

This paper studies the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three firms wherein firms may engage in behavior‐based price discrimination (BBPD). From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is twofold. First, it shows that when firms are allowed to price discriminate, the (unique) equilibrium merger gives rise to significant increases in profits for the merging firms (the ones with information to price discriminate), but has no ex‐post effect on the outsider firm's profitability, thereby eliminating the so‐called (static) “free‐riding problem.” Second, this equilibrium merger is shown to increase industry profits at the expense of consumers' surplus, leaving total welfare unaffected. This then suggests that competition authorities should scrutinize with greater zeal mergers in industries where firms are expected to engage in BBPD.     

Refusals to Deal, Price Discrimination, and Independent Service Organizations

A number of recent Canadian and U.S. antitrust cases have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. This paper provides a theory of these strategies and considers the welfare implications of judicial orders to supply. The refusals here are seen as necessary to protect manufacturers' program of price discrimination: Expensive repairs represent a way to select high-intensity, high-value users and charge them more. In addition to the usual ambiguity associated with the welfare effects of prohibitions of price discrimination, forcing competition in repairs can have the further damaging effect of reducing social welfare by inducing manufacturers to lower product quality.