Stabilizations, crises and the “exit” problem – A theoretical model

Exchange-rate-based stabilizations, even if successful, usually lack credibility initially. This is reflected in high (ex post) real interest rates and some degree of real exchange rate appreciation. Empirical observation suggests that wage inflation declines smoothly over time whilst interest rates are volatile. Our model captures these features and provides insights into: the eruption of exchange rate crises after a long period of apparently successful stabilization; the potential advantages of a heterodox approach; when to delay a stabilization attempt; and the optimal date for “exit” to a floating exchange rate.     

A COMMENT ON “PRICE DISPERSION,INFLATION, AND WELFARE” BY A. HEAD AND A. KUMAR*

The principal results of Head and Kumar's article are derived under the natural assumption that the number of price offers received per period by buyers is distributed Poisson. This case is of interest for two reasons. First, because the infinite sums and integrals that enter the equilibrium conditions can be solved in closed form, the derivations of the model's implications are straightforward. Second, by regarding the arrival rate as the relevant measure of search intensity, the analysis of endogenous search effort is simplified.     

A Comment on Dehez and Tellone, “Data games: sharing public goods with exclusion”

This comment shows that the data cost game introduced in Dehez and Tellone (Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2013) coincides with the nonadditive component of the library cost game studied in Driessen, Khmelnitskaya, and Sales (TOP, 2012) where the core, nucleolus, and Shapley value were also investigated.