Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?

Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Antecedents and consequences of opportunism in buyer–supplier relations: Research synthesis and new frontiers

Buyers and suppliers must concern themselves with opportunism, a phenomenon empirically established in exchange relationships. What causes firms to behave opportunistically? What are the consequences of firms' opportunistic behavior? To date, these antecedents and consequences have not been comprehensively synthesized. Herein, the opportunism phenomenon is revisited to expose research gaps and chart new directions that will enhance our understanding of buyer–supplier relationships. First, we provide a brief review of two critical theories of exchange that provide a theoretical foundation for opportunism. We next provide an overview of opportunism. Then each of the antecedents and consequences is discussed with emphasis on the contribution of each finding. Finally, and most importantly, several promising paths for further research are proposed.     

Examining the performance effects of post spin‐off links to parent firms: should the apron strings be cut?

Little research has examined the performance implications of the parent‐child relationship post spin‐off. Although the parent provided oversight of the child prior to the spin‐off, effects of post spin‐off links to the child remain unclear. Applying transaction cost and agency theories, our study of 142 firms spun‐off between 1986 and 1997 examines how oversight and ownership by the parent firm influence stock market performance post spin‐off. We find that while child firms benefit from some links to the parent, having too many links is negatively related to performance. The findings suggest that there is a balance between having too much parental involvement and not enough. Our study extends understanding of post spin‐off child firm performance and provides valuable insights for both parent and child firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are joint ventures positive sum games? The relative effects of cooperative and noncooperative behavior

Are joint ventures (JVs) characterized mainly by cooperative behavior or noncooperative behavior? In this research, we address this question by examining the interrelationship between the values created for two partners when they announce a JV. We argue that, on average, if cooperative behavior and common benefits are more influential than noncooperative behavior and private benefits, there will be a positive association between the values created for the two partners. Conversely, if private benefits and noncooperative behavior are more influential, there will be a negative association as partners derive value at the expense of each other rather than by creating new opportunities through the JV. Using a sample of 344 JVs we find evidence of a positive association between the values created for the two partners after controlling for various factors. This suggests that the stock market perceives JVs to be positive sum games rather than zero sum games, and that value creation in JVs is mainly attributable to synergies rather than appropriation of resources. Our analysis also reveals other conditions under which cooperative behavior and noncooperative behavior become dominant, such as the strength of the resources of the two partners, product market competition, and JV experience. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Where can capabilities come from? network ties and capability acquisition in business groups

While strategy researchers have devoted considerable attention to the role of firm‐specific capabilities in the pursuit of competitive advantage, less attention has been directed at how firms obtain these capabilities from outside their boundaries. In this study, we examine how firms' multiplex network ties in business groups represent one important source of capability acquisition. Our focus allows us to go beyond the traditional focus on network structure and offer a novel contingency model that specifies how different types of network ties (e.g., buyer‐supplier, equity, and director), individually and in complementary combination, will differentially affect the process of R&D capability acquisition. We also offer an original analysis of how other aspects of network structure (i.e., network density) in business groups affect the efficacy of network ties on R&D capability. Empirically, we provide an original contribution to the capabilities literature by utilizing a stochastic frontier estimation to rigorously measure firm capabilities, and we demonstrate the value of this approach using longitudinal data on business groups in emerging economies. We close by discussing the implications of our supportive results for future research on firm capabilities, organizational networks, and business groups. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

排污权交易市场机制设计的实验研究

排污权交易制度在很大程度上从理论研究和实践操作两个层面推动了环境规制理论与政策的不断发展与完善。本文采用规范的实验经济学研究方法,建立排污权交易市场机制设计实验研究的理论模型,并通过实验研究发现双向拍卖与分散交易两种不同交易制度对排污权交易市场效率高低存在影响,同时交易费用对市场运行效果也有影响。在此基础上,本文指出今后排污权交易实验研究的方向。     

When can you trust “trust”? Calculative trust,relational trust,and supplier performance

Our research empirically assesses two distinct bases for trust: calculative trust, based on a structure of rewards and penalties, versus relational trust, a judgment anchored in past behavior and characterized by a shared identity. We find that calculative trust and relational trust positively influence supplier performance, with calculative trust having a stronger association than relational trust. Yet, important boundary conditions exist. If buyers invest in supplier‐specific assets or when supply side market uncertainty is high, relational trust, not calculative trust, is more strongly associated with supplier performance. In contrast, when behavioral uncertainty is high, calculative trust, not relational trust, relates more strongly to supplier performance. These results highlight the value of examining distinct forms of trust. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.