“Am I Getting It or Not?” The Practices Involved in “Trying to Consume” a New Technology

In recent years, high rates of failure of technology‐based products have spurred interest in understanding the psychological and sociological barriers to consumer learning of technological innovations. The main focus of this research was to examine the learning process and consumers’ coping mechanisms when they encounter technological innovations. A study was designed to understand the learning process in real time as consumers engaged in a set of activities associated with the novel interface. The goal was to investigate how consumers cope with high levels of complexity during their initial interactions with a technology‐based product and how their coping strategies may hinder the learning process. Verbal protocol measures were used in order to understand the consumer's learning process as he or she interacts with a technology‐based product in real time. They were told that they would have to think aloud while performing certain tasks and that their thoughts would be recorded for further analysis. The personal digital assistant (PDA) with handwriting recognition as its interface was chosen for this study. The main task for the participants was to learn how to use Graffiti writing—i.e., the product's handwriting recognition software. We proceeded to a thematic analysis in which interpretations were generated by the researchers going back and forth between the transcribed texts, the developing interpretation, the new interface itself, and also the relevant literature. The results suggest that the new product's interface serves to structure the consumer's learning process even as he or she responds in relatively unstructured ways. The findings identify three basic factors that interfere with the learning process during consumers’ initial interactions with a technological innovation: interface and functionality practices, social influence, and causal attributions. Specifically, the results suggest that in designing technology‐based products there is a gap between the levels of know‐how between the manufacturer and the user. The challenge for manufacturers is to understand the consumer's learning experience and coping strategies and provide mechanisms that would make the transition easy and intuitive. This could be achieved by incorporating into the new interface some degree of flexibility that will allow consumers to modify tasks based on their preferences, or by including indicators that will provide feedback to the user. Furthermore, in the context of communication strategies, in order to minimize the negative impact that prior knowledge and social influence may have on learning, marketers could communicate specific steps describing how to use the new interface.     

Who Is “Misleading” Whom in Real Estate Transactions?

The observation that real estate agents sell their clients' homes cheaper and faster than their own homes has been well identified in the literature and interpreted as evidence of an agency problem originated from information asymmetry. This article studies whether this well‐known result holds true for all types of agents and clients, and whether information asymmetry is the full story. By using the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data from Indiana, we find that, after controlling for observables, mainly homes owned by institutional clients are sold cheaper and faster than agent‐owned homes, and the differences are mainly driven by less and moderately experienced agents. Besides information asymmetry, we also find evidence of motivation heterogeneity—institutions themselves are very motivated to sell, and therefore are willing to sell cheaper in order to sell faster.     

Ain't it “suite”? Bundling in the PC office software market

Research Summary: We examine the importance of office suites for the evolution of the personal computer (PC) office software market in the 1990s. An estimated discrete‐choice model reveals a positive correlation of consumer values for spreadsheets and wordprocessors, a bonus value for suites, and advantages for Microsoft products. We employ the estimates to simulate various hypothetical market structures to evaluate the profitability, welfare, and competitive effects of suites under alternative correlation assumptions. We find that firms benefit greatly from bundling components (i.e., a spreadsheet and a word processor) when the correlation of consumer preferences over the components in the bundle is positive. Our work adds another aspect to the recent work in the strategy literature that examines benefits from bundling when there are complementary relationships across the products in the bundle. Managerial Summary: Our research helps managers understand the conditions under which product bundling is likely to be most profitable. We show that one key to enhanced profitability is the correlation in consumer preferences over the individual products. We consider the performance implications of bundling under a variety of alternative market structures and competitive environments. Our analysis reveals that firms benefit greatly from bundling when the correlation of consumer valuations over the products is positive. Consumers benefit as well. Hence, bundling is a win‐win for firms and their customers. Since profits increase by more than consumer surplus, bundling leads to increased value capture by the firms. Consequently, it may be profitable for firms to invest in actively increasing the correlation in consumer preferences over products in the bundle.     

Is there a “Dark Side” to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness

Research summary: W e investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A ) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997 to 2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a “raise all boats” view of monitoring. We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double‐edged sword that limits CEO discretion to undertake both value‐destroying M&A deals and value‐creating ones. Our findings indicate that the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed. Rather than “raising all boats” in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains . Managerial summary: M ergers and acquisitions (M&A s) are a quintessential corporate activity. There were $3.8 trillion worth of M&A deals in 2015, despite scholars and practitioners reporting that M&A s often perform poorly. We question the widespread belief that more vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and large shareholders will raise M&A performance, overall. Put differently, does monitoring constrain CEO s' discretion to pursue bad deals, while simultaneously encouraging them to pursue good ones? We find that monitoring limits both large M&A losses and large M&A gains. Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that constraining executives' ability to pursue value‐destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or enable CEO s to pursue value‐creating deals . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mass or Only “Niche Customization”? Why We Should Interpret Configuration Toolkits as Learning Instruments

In order to configure individual products according to their own preferences, customers are required to know what they want. While most research simply assumes that consumers have sufficient preference insight to do so, a number of psychologically oriented scholars have recently voiced serious concerns about this assumption. They argue that decades of consumer behavior research have shown that most consumers in most product categories lack this knowledge. Not knowing what one wants means being unable to specify what one wants—and therefore, they conclude, the majority of customers are unable to use configuration toolkits in a meaningful way. In essence, this would mean that mass customization should rather be termed “niche customization” as it will be doomed to remain a concept for a very small minority of customers only. This pessimism stands in sharp contrast to the optimism of those who herald the new possibilities enabled by advances in communication and production technologies as the dawn of a new era in new product development and business in general. Which position is right? In order to answer this question, this research investigates the role of the configuration toolkit. Implicitly, the skeptic position assumes that the individual customers' knowledge (or absence of knowledge) of what they want is an exogenous and constant term that does not change during the interaction with the toolkit. However, learning theories suggest that the customers' trial‐and‐error interaction with the configuration toolkit and the feedback information they receive should increase their preference insight. If this was true and the effect size strong, it would mean that low a priori preference insight does not impede customers to derive value from mass customization. Three experiments show that configuration toolkits should be interpreted as learning instruments that allow consumers to understand their preferences more clearly. Even short trial‐and‐error self‐design processes with conventional toolkits bring about substantial and time‐stable enhancements of preference insight. The value of this knowledge is remarkable. In the product category of self‐designed watches, the 10‐minute design process resulted in additional preference insight worth 43.13 euros on average or +66%, measured by incentive‐compatible auctions. A moderator analysis in a representative sample shows that the learning effect is particularly strong among customers who initially exhibit low levels of preference insight. These findings entail three contributions. First, it becomes evident that the interaction with mass customization toolkits not only triggers affective reactions among customers but also has cognitive effects—a response category not investigated before. Second, it suggests that the pessimism regarding the mass appeal of these toolkits is not justified—mass customization has the potential to truly deserve its name. The prerequisite for this, and this normative conclusion is the final contribution, is that the toolkit should not be interpreted as a mere interface for conveying preexisting preferences to the producer. Rather, it should be treated as a learning instrument. Several suggestions are made for how firms employing this innovative business model could design their toolkits towards this end.     

“We do what we must,and call it by the best names”: Can deliberate names offset the consequences of organizational atypicality?

Research summary: This article focuses on organizational naming as a strategic choice organizations make to overcome liabilities of atypicality. We argue that, in markets presenting an “illegitimacy discount,” atypical organizations may use deliberate names—names that communicate the market categories to which organizations claim membership—to offset the consequences of atypicality. Using data from the global hedge fund industry, we show that atypical hedge funds are more likely than typical funds to have deliberate names. Importantly, the selection of a deliberate name is economically significant. First, funds with deliberate names grow faster than funds without deliberate names, especially among atypical funds. Second, while atypicality heightened the likelihood of failure during the recent financial crisis—even after controlling for fund performance—having a deliberate name mitigated this effect. Managerial summary: Differentiation is a core element of many organizations' competitive advantage. Nevertheless, as differentiation implies being atypical among one's competitors, differentiation strategies can also lead to an “illegitimacy discount” whereby differentiators are at risk of being misunderstood, miscategorized, and ignored by consumers. Here we investigate how atypical hedge funds—funds that differentiate themselves from their competitors by investing in notably unique ways—use names to offset the potential consequences associated with the “illegitimacy discount.” Our analysis of more than 12,000 hedge funds over 12 years highlighted a trend whereby atypical hedge funds were more likely to choose names that unambiguously associated them with a known investment strategy—for instance, choosing the name “Apex Global Macro Capital” over simply “Apex Capital.” Importantly, name selection proved to be economically significant. For example, among atypical hedge funds, those with unambiguous names grew faster than those without. Furthermore, while being atypical increased the level of disinvestment during the recent financial crisis, having an unambiguous name reversed this effect. Organizational names play an important communication role with consumers, which, while highly symbolic, may also help resolve the dual organizational need to both conform to consumer expectations and differentiate from market competitors. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“To Own or Not to Own?” A Study on the Determinants and Consequences of Alternative Intellectual Property Rights Arrangements in Crowdsourcing for Innovation Contests

Firms are increasingly engaging in crowdsourcing for innovation to access new knowledge beyond their boundaries; however, scholars are no closer to understanding what guides seeker firms in deciding the level at which to acquire rights from solvers and the effect that this decision has on the performance of crowdsourcing contests. Integrating property rights theory and the problem‐solving perspective while leveraging exploratory interviews and observations, we build a theoretical framework to examine how specific attributes of the technical problem broadcast by firms affect the seekers’ choice between alternative intellectual property rights (IPR) arrangements that call for acquiring or licensing‐in IPR from external solvers (i.e., with high and low degrees of ownership, respectively). Each technical problem differs in the knowledge required to be solved as well as in the stage of development of the innovation process and seeker firms pay great attention to such characteristics when deciding about the IPR arrangement they choose for their contests. In addition, we analyze how this choice between acquiring and licensing‐in IPR, in turn, influences the performance of the contest. We empirically test our hypotheses analyzing a unique dataset of 729 challenges broadcast on the InnoCentive platform from 2010 to 2016. Our results indicate that challenges related to technical problems in later stages of the innovation process are positively related to the seekers’ preference toward IPR arrangements with a high level of ownership, while technical problems involving a higher number of knowledge domains are not. Moreover, we found that IPR arrangements with a high level of ownership negatively affect solvers’ participation and that IPR arrangement play a mediating role between the attributes of the technical problem and the solvers’ self‐selection process. Our paper contributes to the open innovation and crowdsourcing literature and provides practical implications for both managers and contest organizers.     

Has the “CEO effect” increased in recent decades? A new explanation for the great rise in America's attention to corporate leaders

We introduce a new explanation for one of the most pronounced phenomena on the American business landscape in recent decades: a dramatic increase in attributions of CEO significance. Specifically, we test the possibility that America's CEOs became seen as increasingly significant because they were, in fact, increasingly significant. Employing variance partitioning methodologies on data spanning 60 years and more than 18,000 firm‐years, we find that the proportion of variance in performance explained by individual CEOs, or “the CEO effect,” increased substantially over the decades of study. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this finding. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When does (not) a coopetitive relationship matter to performance? An empirical investigation of the role of multidimensional trust and distrust

Despite substantive evidence showing mixed results on the association between a coopetitive relationship and performance, surprisingly little theory explains the contingencies under which a coopetitive relationship does (or does not) matter to performance. By combining insights from the trust-distrust literature and 18 in-depth managerial conversations, this study unpacks the multidimensional nature of trust (i.e., goodwill and competence) and distrust (i.e., malevolence and discredibility) and suggests that the effect of a coopetitive relationship matters to performance, when both trust and distrust are present (at moderate to high levels), but fails to do so when one of them is low and the other is high. The results based on a sample of Swedish firms provide full support for the hypotheses. In terms of theoretical contributions, this study challenges the old wisdom suggesting trust as good and distrust as bad, extends the current understanding of trust and distrust beyond their one-dimensionality, and provides a novel approach to understanding when a coopetitive relationship performs well and when it does not. In terms of practical relevance, it suggests that firms adopt a paradox mindset (with a focus on both trust and distrust) to unlock the positive potential of a coopetitive relationship.     

When do firms change technology‐sourcing vehicles? The role of poor innovative performance and financial slack

This paper examines the adjustments firms make to the composition of their portfolios of technology‐sourcing vehicles (i.e., alliance, acquisition, or go‐it‐alone) in response to poor innovative performance. We advance a behavioral perspective on the make/buy/ally question, suggesting that differences in financial slack will generate different portfolio decisions. Specifically, we posit that firms with greater levels of financial slack are more likely to respond to poor innovative performance by opting for (1) greater vehicle diversification, and (2) new sourcing vehicles, while firms with less financial slack will respond by (1) downscoping their portfolio of sourcing vehicles, and (2) reverting to more familiar vehicles. We find support for our predictions using extensive data from the population of U.S. public pharmaceutical firms from 1992 to 2006. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who's in charge here? Co‐CEOs,power gaps,and firm performance

At the pinnacles of organizations, comparative tests of unity of command and shared command are nearly impossible because only one individual sits atop most organizations. In organizations led by co‐CEOs, however, such a test is possible because co‐CEOs can truly share power. But do they? Our research pits the unity‐of‐command principle against the shared‐command principle and finds overall support for the former, even within the co‐CEO context. Our sample of 71 co‐CEO pairs at publicly traded U.S. firms shows that increasing power gaps between co‐CEOs are positively associated with firm performance. This positive association wanes and turns negative, however, as power gaps become very large. We conclude that whatever benefits the co‐CEO structure might offer likely lie outside the shared command paradigm. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Meet the New Boss … Same as the Old boss?’ Technology,toil and tension in the agrofuel frontier

Agrofuels are increasingly sourced and sold as a socially and environmentally beneficial solution to oil dependence. The promotion of sugar‐derived ethanol as a substitute for petroleum has thus been key to state development and international trade policies by Brazil and the European Union, respectively, and subsequent investment by leading energy and food transnational corporations has transformed socio‐spatial relations in the new sites of production. Brazilian rural worker testimonies, however, point to large‐scale labour exclusion rather than reform and a deepening, rather than disruption, of historic power inequalities in the sector. Labour contestation challenges a converging institutional discourse of responsible technological innovation and social upgrading associated with emerging commodity chains and the ‘green’ economy. Although corporate and statutory response has been market‐orientated certification and ‘more technology’ the idea of the ‘techno‐institutional fix’ provides a power relation‐attentive analysis that invites the further exploration of socially committed alternatives to food and energy production.     

Do technology and manufacturing strategy links enhance operational performance? Empirical research in the auto supplier sector

Although much of the literature on manufacturing strategy (MS) and technology studies the implementation and impact of these manufacturing programs in isolation, this paper goes further by assessing the joint implementation and effect of these two manufacturing programs on performance, even when some contextual factors are present. Thus, this paper investigates how plants from the auto supplier sector make use of some operations practices from manufacturing strategy (MS) and from both product and process technology, by testing the effectiveness of both sets of practices, with the ultimate goal of enhancing operational performance. The results suggest that there are only very minor differences between high and standard performers on the aggregated level for technology practices, which may be the reason why technology does not result in significant performance differences between the two plant types. On the other hand, on the aggregated levels, there are somewhat greater differences for MS practices than for technology in both plant types, leading to larger differences in performance. While this study provides a foundation for examining MS, technology and context within a single framework, it is only through further research that a full understanding of the relationship between them will be obtained.     

R&D as a business – what are the implications for performance measurement?

There have been considerable changes in the way that Research and Development (R&D) has been managed over recent years, many of which have been influenced by the external environment. These have been discussed in a number of publications with much of the debate centring around the movement from the so‐called first generation to fifth generation models of R&D management.
What has not been debated to the same extent are the implications of recent and likely future trends in R&D management for the way performance is, and should be, measured. In this paper we focus on these implications, drawing upon both the existing literature on performance measurement (PM) in R&D and our own research into organisations which have chosen to move towards a more profit‐centred approach to the management of their technical resources.
Finally, we present and discuss the findings of our review, which indicate that although there are common features, some differences, requiring careful consideration by management, can be identified when movement from a cost‐ to a profit‐centred approach occurs.