On the marginal excess burden of taxation in an overlapping generations model

We extend marginal excess burden (MEB) analysis in public finance literature to a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous households. This extension allows us to quantitatively assess efficiency ranking and incidence of taxes. Our results indicate a disparity in welfare cost and distributional consequence of different forms of taxation on capital, labor and consumption. According to our MEB ranking, capital income taxation appears to be least efficient as it results in larger marginal excess burdens, compared to labor income tax and consumption tax. The tax incidence analysis shows variation of tax burdens across households, depending on their age, income type and generation. In particular, older households with higher income bear the highest burden of company income tax; meanwhile, future born households bear the highest burden of personal income tax. Hence, our MEB analysis demonstrates a fruitful approach to better understanding efficiency and incidence of tax reforms in one unified framework.     

Taxes,Strikes and Wages

A union and a firm bargain about wage increases. The firm possesses private information about its revenues. A two-period screening model is used to derive equilibrium wage demands by the union and to calculate measures of strike activity. Changes in wage demands and dispute probabilities due to alterations in various taxes are analysed. A more progressive income tax, a lower level of income taxes and higher payroll taxes reduce wages and strike activity. Hence, tax policy can be used not only to affect wages and employment, but lso to influence strike incidence.     

Foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes

Governments impose multiple taxes on foreign investors, though studies of the effect of tax policy on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes. This paper examines the impact of indirect (non-income) taxes on FDI by American multinational firms, using affiliate-level data that permit the introduction of controls for parent companies and affiliate industries. Indirect tax burdens significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of foreign affiliates of American companies. Estimates imply that 10% higher local indirect tax rates are associated with 7.1% lower affiliate assets, which is similar to the effect of 10% higher income tax rates. Affiliate output falls by 2.9% as indirect taxes rise by 10%, while higher income taxes have more modest output effects. High corporate income tax rates depress capital/labor ratios and profit rates of foreign affiliates, whereas high indirect tax rates do not. These patterns reveal the impact of indirect taxes and suggest the mechanisms by which direct and indirect taxes affect FDI.     

Global capital markets,direct taxation and the redistribution of income

Standard fiscal theory suggests that taxation should be heaviest on the least mobile factors of production – for both efficiency and revenue reasons. A shift in tax burdens from capital to labour as economies become globally integrated is thus justified. This theoretical tradition (founded by Ramsay and continued by Mirrlees and Lucas) assumes by construction that profit taxes reduce investment and growth; and while sensitive to inter-generational equity, sidesteps the issue of income distribution within generations. In contrast, starting from Keynes’ critique of these assumptions and building on modern endogenous growth models, it can be shown that profit taxation is not necessarily injurious to productive investment. In practice, moreover, the effect of globalisation has not been to reduce tax rates on capital, but rather to erode the tax base itself (i.e. ‘tax evasion’). Improved information exchange between tax authorities, which is now being driven by fiscal insolvency in developed countries, would allow tax incidence to be shifted so as to improve income distribution within OECD countries. Such cooperation could also permit the replacement of the current discretionary system of fiscal transfers from rich to poor countries (‘development aid’) by equitable sharing of global capital tax revenue.     

间接税归宿对城乡居民收入分配影响研究

使用全国城乡家庭消费和收入微观数据考察间接税对于城乡收入差距和收入分配的影响发现:平均来看,全国居民负担的税收占收入的比例是10.6%;不论在全国范围来看还是分别在城乡内部来看,间接税负担都呈现累退:低收入的负担率高于高收入的负担率。在城乡之间,城镇居民的税收负担率高于农村居民的税收负担率。间接税增加了城乡内部不平等,降低了城乡之间的不平等。间接税主要对低收入群体影响较大,略微恶化了整体收入不平等。     

间接税归宿对城乡居民收入分配影响研究

使用全国城乡家庭消费和收入微观数据考察间接税对于城乡收入差距和收入分配的影响发现:平均来看,全国居民负担的税收占收入的比例是10.6%;不论在全国范围来看还是分别在城乡内部来看,间接税负担都呈现累退:低收入的负担率高于高收入的负担率。在城乡之间,城镇居民的税收负担率高于农村居民的税收负担率。间接税增加了城乡内部不平等,降低了城乡之间的不平等。间接税主要对低收入群体影响较大,略微恶化了整体收入不平等。     

Taxation Reform: Some Economic Issues

The Australian system of Commonwealth and State taxes is in need of comprehensive reform. It fails the criteria of neutrality, horizontal equity and simplicity, it is not as progressive as often thought, and the future revenue base is declining. Many of the problems stem from the absence of comprehensive tax bases as applied to income, expenditure and assets, and related choice options are subjected to very different effective tax burdens. Important choice options facing different effective tax rates include: work and leisure; consumption and saving; different saving and investment options; form of labour remuneration; different ways of production; the mix of goods and services produced and consumed; and, domestic or overseas location.
A comprehensive income tax base is required, especially as applied to the taxation of capital income. The options of a nominal income, real income or expenditure base are explored.
It is argued that reform of indirect taxes proceed along two lines. The general revenue raising purpose leads to a comprehensive base of final consumption expenditure at a single rate. Then, additional specific taxes for user pays purposes, for example for roads, and for externalities, for example tobacco, set at the supply cost or net externality would be applied.
There are conflicting arguments for and against changing the tax mix away from income to expenditure.     

Equity,efficiency, and the structure of indirect taxation

Optimal tax formulae are derived and optimal tax rates calculated for the case where there are many consumers, an income tax is impossible and the government has to trade off efficiency in order to improve the real distribution of income. Consistent aggregation assumptions are used to permit the derivation of simple tax rules depending only on the behaviour of the average consumer and of a socially representative consumer. Calculations for the U.K. in 1972 show how subsidies and taxes vary with the government's revenue requirement and with the degree of egalitarianism in the social welfare function.     

Effects of Capital Income Taxes on Welfare in an Overlapping-generations Model

This paper describes the short-run and long-run effects of various capital income taxes on welfare using an overlapping-generations model according to the 'new view'. It is in the nature of a survey, because some of the results from seminal papers in this field can be achieved, under weaker assumptions. The paper reaches the paradoxical and intriguing conclusion that the distortionary effects of a dividend tax in the long run and of capital gains tax in the short run improve economic welfare, and exceed the income effects.
JEL Classification Numbers: G3, H2.     

Consumption taxes in monopolistic competition: a comment

We show that an ad valorem tax is better than an equal-revenue unit tax when consumers spend some fixed proportion of income on taxed goods, when firms use constant mark-up pricing, and entry and exit drive per-firm profit to zero. These key assumptions implies that ad valorem taxes are superior in oligopoly as well as monopolistic competition, showing that earlier results on taxes in monopolistic competition (Schröder in J Econ 83(3):281–292, 2004) are not due to the mode of competition, but rather are due to the functional forms used.     

On Optimal Commodity Taxes When Consumption Is Time Consuming

This paper studies the problem of optimal taxation of commodities when consumption is a time‐consuming activity. This is done under two distinct preference separability assumptions: between goods and labor supply, and between goods and leisure. It argues that with the labor separability, the traditional uniform taxation results of optimal tax theory continue to hold. With leisure separability, on the other hand, consumption time is a major ingredient of optimal tax rates. However, the relationship between consumption time and optimal tax rates depends crucially on the representation of the economy. In representative consumer economies, time differences determine the pattern of optimal tax rates so that goods whose consumption take more time are subjected to higher tax rates. When individuals have different earning abilities, redistributive, incentive, and efficiency considerations also come into play resulting in a complex relationship. The paper derives formulas for optimal commodity taxes in this case on the basis of three different tax structures: linear commodity taxes in combination with linear and nonlinear income taxes, and nonlinear commodity taxes in combination with nonlinear income taxes.     

Tax Liability and Tax Evasion in a Competitive Labor Market

In a competitive labor market, a change in the legal incidence of a tax on labor will not alter employment if tax obligations are fulfilled. However, this irrelevance result may no longer apply if taxes can be evaded. In particular, a shift from payroll to income taxes will lower employment. This will be the case if workers exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, have a utility function, which is strongly separable in income and the disutility from working, and the penalty for evasion is not proportional to the amount of taxes evaded. Accordingly, tax evasion opportunities can make the legal incidence of a tax on labor an important determinant of its economic incidence.     

Indirect Taxation and Gender Equity: Evidence from South Africa

Abstract

This study adds to the growing literature on the distributional effects of indirect or consumption taxes in developing countries by exploring whether these taxes have differential gender outcomes. Using data from Statistics South Africa's 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey, the study investigates differences in tax incidence between “female-type” and “male-type” households, classified according to their demographic and economic attributes. The results suggest that zero-rating a well-targeted selection of basic foodstuffs and fuel for household use is important in protecting female-type households, especially those in the lowest quintiles and with children, from bearing an otherwise disproportionate share of the tax burden. In contrast, high taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and fuel for private transport result in a larger incidence on male-type households. The study also suggests ways in which the indirect tax structure could be refined to further reduce the large gender (and income) inequities that exist in South Africa.     

Fiscal policy under loose commitment

Due to time-inconsistency or political turnover, policymakers' promises are not always fulfilled. We analyze an optimal fiscal policy problem where the plans made by the benevolent government are periodically revised. In this loose commitment setting, the properties of labor and capital income taxes are significantly different than under the full-commitment and no-commitment assumptions. Because of the occasional reoptimizations, the average capital income tax is positive even in the long-run. Also, the autocorrelation of taxes is lower, their volatility with respect to output increases and the correlation between capital income taxes and output changes sign. Our method can be used to analyze the plausibility and the importance of commitment in a wide-class of dynamic problems.     

IMPACT OF TAX, TRANSFER, AND EXPENDITURE POLICIES OF GOVERNMENT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN CANADA

This is a study of the first order incidence of government taxation and expenditure policies on the incomes of families and unattached individuals in Canada in 1970. The specific purposes of the study are twofold. The first is to estimate for calendar year 1970 the first order incidence of governments'actual tax, transfer, and expenditure policies on spending units. The second objective is to simulate the changes in this incidence that would have occurred in 1970 if the new federal personal income tax, unemployment insurance, old age sccurity and family allowance programs had been in operation during that year. The methodology is similar to that used by W. Irwin Gillespie in his pioneering 1964 study for the Royal Commission on Taxation.
It is concluded that the 1970 incidence of the combined tax and transfer programs of all levels of government is broadly redistributive, with net incidence of federal government programs being considerably more redistributive than that of provincial and local governments. In general, the public sector provides large net benefits to families and individuals with incomes of less than $4,000, declining net benefits to families earning from $4,000 to $11,000 and levies small but increasing levels of net tax on families and individuals with incomes in excess of $11,000. This general conclusion is relatively insensitive to the precise assumptions made about the shifting of taxes and the distribution of expenditures on pure public goods. From simulation experiments, recent reforms of the federal income tax, unemployment insurance, old age security and family allowance systems were estimated to increase the amount of redistribution from the rich to the poor.     

Simple Rules for the Optimal Taxation of International Capital Income

In this paper we reconcile and extend previous results on the collectively optimal taxation of international investment income. The “weighted average” rule of Horst (1980), for example, is shown to rest on unattractive assumptions on the set of instruments available, ruling out any need for distorting taxes. The principal contribution is to establish a new and strikingly simple weighted average rule — encompassing the other key result in this area — for the general case in which lump-sum taxes are unavailable, the ability to tax pure profits is perhaps restricted and distorting taxes on both domestic and border-crossing capital income are optimally deployed.     

Tax Ratios in Macroeconomics: Do Taxes Really Matter?

In various empirical studies so-called tax ratios (tax revenues expressed as a ratio of some aggregate tax base) are employed as approximations for tax burdens. The most difficult problem in calculating tax ratios is the way in which personal income tax revenues are attributed to labour and capital. We argue that the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994) is seriously flawed in this respect. Using information from national sources, we calculate more accurate tax ratios for eight OECD countries that differ substantially from those of Mendoza et al. (1997). Still, the results of the empirical analysis of Mendoza et al. (1997) do not change significantly if we use our tax ratios instead of those of Mendoza et al.. However, the results change once country specific effects are taken up in the model. Capital taxes are, e.g., shown to reduce economic growth. We find that the results of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) are neither sensitive to the use of the tax ratios nor to the specification of the model: high labour taxes have increased unemployment in Europe.     

The taxation of capital income in an open economy: the importance of resident-nonresident tax treatment

The authors develop a simulation model of the United States and the rest of the world to demonstrate how international capital mobility alters the incidence and capital formation incentives of taxes on capital income. The model explicitly recognizes that U.S. and foreign investors hold a different mix of assets in each country. Only a modest degree of international mobility is necessary to substantially alter closed-economy patterns of tax incidence. Differences in the tax treatment of residents and foreigners are particularly important in evaluating tax reductions at the individual level or the integration of corporate and individual income taxes.     

Taxation and employment in general equilibrium: A two-sector analysis

The literature on public finance has so far completely ignored the question of unemployment. In this paper, the traditional two sector model of tax incidence is utilized to develop a model in which the effect of various taxes can be analyzed and compared. On the basis of this model, we have compared and studied the effect on employment of various equal-yield and equal-rate taxes. Also, on the basis of reasonable empirical assumptions certain policy conclusions are stated.     

Externalities and optimal taxation

This paper reexamines the optimal tax design problem (income and commodities) in the presence of externalities. The nature of the second–best, and the choice of the tax instruments, are motivated by the informational structure in the economy. The main results are: (i) environmental levies (linear or nonlinear) differ in formula from Pigouvian taxes by the expressions for the optimal tax on private goods; (ii) externalities do not affect commodity tax formulas (linear and nonlinear) for private goods; (iii) externalities do not affect the income tax structure if commodity taxes are nonlinear and affect it if commodity taxes are linear; and (iv) a general income tax plus strictly Pigouvian taxes are sufficient for efficient taxation if individuals of different types have identical marginal rates of substitution (at any given consumption bundle).