声誉激励、社会监督与质量规制——城市垃圾处理行业中的博弈分析

我国实施市政公用事业市场化改革以来,民营企业通过竞标等方式从政府手中获取特许经营权,凭借其垄断地位和信息优势降低服务标准,导致垃圾处理行业陷入质量规制的困境。本文针对城市垃圾处理行业的问题,先是构建以规制机构与垃圾处理特许经营企业为参与者的博弈模型,分析了声誉激励和社会监督对博弈参与双方损益及其策略的影响;然后构建纳入举报机制的由社会民众、规制机构和特许经营企业三方参与的序列博弈模型。研究得出四点结论：（1）减少规制成本,增加对违规垃圾处理企业的惩罚力度,可减少企业违规概率;（2）声誉激励和社会监督均可减少垃圾处理特许经营企业违规概率;（3）社会监督有助于节约规制成本,减弱规制机构与企业间信息不对称程度,提高规制效率;（4）规制机构的检查行为与公众举报行为之间存在明显的互补性。最后针对性地提出了提高城市垃圾处理行业质量规制效果的政策建议。     

强自然垄断定价理论与中国电价规制制度分析

强自然垄断行业由于其定价方面的两难困境 ,需要规制者对其产品定价进行规制以在厂商利润与社会福利之间进行权衡。边际成本定价原则并不适合于自然垄断厂商。本文在规制定价理论以及激励规制理论的基础上 ,对中国电力定价问题进行了分析 ,认为电价改革的第一步应在发电环节中引入竞争的基础上 ,对不同效率类型的电力厂商设计不同激励强度的定价机制 ,另外本文尝试着对不同技术效率的电力厂商列出了不同激励强度的价格规制方案菜单     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.     

传统自然垄断理论与现代自然垄断理论的比较及其启示

自然垄断产业具有特殊性质,在国民经济中具有举足轻重的作用。传统自然垄断理论和现代自然垄断理论对自然垄断产业有着不同的看法,两者判断自然垄断的标准分别是规模经济和成本弱增性。自然垄断理论的演进过程表明自然垄断产业的运作方式已经发生了改变。为了适应中国自然垄断产业的进一步发展,政府必须转变职能并实行政企分开,积极引入民间资本以推动自然垄断行业发展。     

管制范围的经济分析——基于自然垄断性维度的思考

经济学理论认为自然垄断性是政府管制的重要原因,从新制度经济学角度上看,规模经济和资产专用性才是自然垄断性的深层次原因。而现代经济学理论进一步发展了自然垄断性的概念,认为自然垄断性的决定因素是成本弱增性,从而改变了对自然垄断边界的认识,同时也带来了对管制范围和管制方式认识上的变化。     

COMPETITION VS. FRANCHISE MONOPOLY IN CABLE TELEVISION

A modern defense of public utility regulation has arisen from the “transactions costs” literature. Traditional economic theorists called for government to establish regulated, franchise monopolies to guard against over-investment and wasteful duplication in natural monopoly (i.e., cost subadditive) markets. However, the new view is that monopoly licenses are issued to promote investment into markets where suppliers must sink considerable sums of specific…nonsalvageable…capital. Consumers, in this scenario, “delegate” their choice-making to political or bureaucratic agents, who administer day-to-day and year-to-year arrangements with a monopoly producer in a long-term exclusive-dealing arrangement. This may be a plausible explanation for the issuance of legal monopoly rights. But the troubling question regarding the public agency is: why should self-interested political agents create proconsumer regulatory contracts? They might instead be expected to maximize political clout by erecting monopolistic restrictions and directing excess returns to effective distributional coalitions. These competing explanations for the political issuance of monopoly franchises are contrasted in this paper through the use of legal and economic evidence in the cable television industry.     

平台经济反垄断研究的热点演进与理论框架——基于文献计量方法的分析

平台经济是连接多个用户群体进行信息与资源交换的新型商业模式,近年来其垄断形势愈演愈烈,对现有监管模式和反垄断研究理论提出了新的挑战。文章利用Citespace V科学计量工具,对2003—2022年中国知网数据库中中文社会科学引文索引（CSSCI）来源期刊的平台经济反垄断研究进行知识图谱可视化研究,在探究该领域的研究热点演化路径的基础上,构建了平台经济反垄断的理论框架。研究发现,平台经济反垄断研究主题经历了从传统双边产业反垄断与反垄断法构建,到双边市场特征与相关市场界定问题,到算法、大数据引发的垄断治理困境,再到超级平台形成、“二选一”独占交易协议4个阶段的演变。总的来看,平台经济反垄断理论框架由垄断形成机理、垄断演进趋势和反垄断规制体系三个部分组成。平台经济的规模效应、网络效应和锁定效应三种特征诱致垄断发生,垄断竞争理论、双边市场理论和产业组织理论是这一问题的重要研究视角;在技术与规模驱动下,平台经济呈现“厂商垄断-平台垄断-场域垄断”的主体变迁和“价格垄断-算法垄断-数据垄断”的形式升级;对此,应当构建价格监管、算法规制与数据治理相结合的综合规制体系。     

论港口业务领域的分类规制政策

港口产业是国民经济的战略性基础产业和自然垄断产业改革的重要对象。对港口产业经济特性的传统认识使之长期以政府规制和公共经营为主导发展特征,但这却导致港口服务低效率和高成本。以往研究港口产业经济特性时,一般是从整体的角度来描述其自然垄断性,并认为有必要由政府施加经济规制。但实际上,对港口业务应该做进一步细分,以更准确地认识其经济特性。根据对港口不同业务领域规制需求的分析,在港口产业规制改革的具体过程中应该实行分类规制政策。为保障港口民营化改革的成功实施,基于对港口各业务环节不同经济特性的分类识别,提出了港口规制改革政策的基本模式,即在仍具有自然垄断特征的基础设施环节保持内生规制和引进接入定价规制,在竞争性环节放松或取消规制、实行竞争强化战略,在中间领域引入激励性规制。     

西方竞租理论发展过程与最新拓展

竞租理论源于农业竞租理论,其中做出突出贡献和影响的是屠能。随着城市的发展,城市竞租理论得以快速发展,在阿隆索之前,新古典经济学、土地经济学、生态经济学等学派均形成了自己的主要观点。阿隆索继承新古典经济学的思想建立了经典的城市竞租模型,成为了城市经济学重要的基础理论之一。随着新的城市问题的出现,城市竞租理论在城市特征、交通成本、效用等模型方面以及在经验检验方法方面均有拓展。我国的城市问题与西方国家有所不同,文章也指出了竞租理论在我国应用的拓展展望。     

天然气行业垄断行为的经济学分析

作为关系国计民生的天然气行业一直受政府的规制，实行国有垄断经营。应规避天然气行业的垄断弊端，对该行业进行天然气定价机制、打破行业垄断、建立合理管理体制，加强法制建设，以确保天然气行业健康、快速地发展。     

Cost-Padding in Profit-Regulated Firms*

When entry into an industry is restricted, economic regulation of that industry is often directed at preventing existing firms from monopoly pricing behaviour. One form of such regulation is to set prices so as to control the level of profits earned by these firms. This paper briefly reviews the relevant economic literature and presents a model of the regulated firm in which such price-setting procedures provide an incentive to inflate costs above minimum levels. The welfare cost of this form of regulation can then exceed that occurring at the unconstrained monopoly outcome. The setting of air fares under the Two-Airline Policy and the regulation of natural gas in NSW are discussed in the context of this analysis.     

Price-cap versus rate-of-return regulation

Rate-of-return regulation has been criticized for providing inappropriate incentives to regulated firms and for being costly to administer. An alternative is price-cap regulation, by which ceilings (caps), based on indices of price and technological change are imposed, below which the regulated firm has full pricing freedom. The differences and similarities of the two are reviewed herein in the light of recent literature. In practice, price-cap is not distinct from rate-of-return regulation. Especially for the multiproduct firm, information requirements—the ultimate source of problems with rate-of-return regulation—are comparables. Price-cap regulation fails to address the real regulatory issue of whether an industry is, in whole or in part, a natural monopoly.     

TO REGULATE OR TO DEREGULATE? THE ROLE OF DOWNSTREAM COMPETITION IN UPSTREAM MONOPOLY VERTICALLY LINKED MARKETS

This paper attempts to cast light to the effect of monopoly regulation in Cournot markets compared to its effect in Bertrand markets. To this purpose, we use a simple model of a vertically linked market, where an upstream regulated natural monopoly is trading via two‐part tariff contracts with a downstream duopoly. Combining our results to those of the existing literature on deregulated markets, we argue that when the downstream competition is in prices, efficiency dictates regulating the monopoly with a marginal cost based pricing scheme. However, this type of regulation leads to significant welfare loss, when the downstream market is characterized by Cournot competition.     

Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs

We study the competition between two owners of identical goods who wish to sell them to a pool of potential buyers. The sellers compete simultaneously setting reserve prices for their second price sealed bid auctions. Upon observing the set reserve prices, the buyers decide simultaneously in which auction to bid. We show that this game has (at least) one equilibrium and that all equilibria are inefficient: reserve prices are not driven to zero (cost). We also discuss where and why the parallel between optimal auction design and optimal pricing in the case of monopoly breaks down for oligopoly.     

Welfare Effects of Price Integration in Local Public Transport

Abstract ** :  In metropolitan areas collective transport is often supplied by many firms and in many modes. The paper focusses on the merging of decisions about prices in two market regimes: monopoly and benevolent regulation through Ramsey pricing. The results confirm that centralization entails efficiency gains under monopoly whenever a unique supplier substitutes many firms serving each link of a network. Under benevolent regulation, instead, centralization entails efficiency gains only under certain conditions. Moreover, efficiency improvements under Ramsey pricing involve the introduction of cross subsidies among previous regulatory jurisdictions. Hence some users gain while others lose. Both the theoretical and empirical literature suggest that periphery residents are the main beneficiaries of centralization .     

Pareto-Improving Redistribution in a Monopoly

This paper discusses the impact of income transfers between consumers of a monopoly. In this context, redistributing the incomes could induce an increase of the demand elasticity which leads to a lower monopoly price, beneficial to any consumer. Under mild assumptions on the demand function, we prove the existence of a transfer maximizing the market coverage which remains advantageous for any contributing consumer. It is proved that the producer is also better off. Then the transfer is Pareto-improving. In the linear demand case, analytical results are found. Extensions to Cournot oligopoly and natural monopoly pricing are considered.
JEL Classification Numbers: D31, D64, H2, L13     

金融管制理论和方法的演进

管制经济学通常包括经济性管制、社会性管制和反托拉斯管制三大部分。其中经济性管制研究的是自然垄断领域和存在严重信息不对称领域,后者典型的表现形式如金融业。一般的管制经济学因金融业内容丰富,需要独立的研究而较少涉及。而多数金融业管制研究侧重于监管的层面。文章从管制思想的演进、管制理论对金融业的实证研究、金融业管制经济分析和金融管制方法最新进展四个方面对金融管制经济理论进行分析和评述。     

基于价格上限的输配电价格管制模型改进研究

由于输配电环节具有自然垄断特性,因此必须接受监管,但随着电力的市场化改革,旧有的监管机制存在一定缺陷,而基于绩效的价格管制模型又不能直接适用于我国的国情。本文提出了一种基于价格上限的价格管制改进模型,在一般价格上限模型中引入电能质量因子,从而很好地克服了该模型导致质量恶化的缺陷,提高了模型的适用性。文中还详细介绍了电能质量因子的确定问题,并对该质量因子进行了算例分析。     

自然垄断的"三位一体"理论

传统自然垄断理论是建立在规模经济、范围经济和成本劣加性基础之上的，本文认为社会总价值或总效用和社会净收益的优加性是比成本劣加性更好地定义自然垄断的概念，并在对规模经济、范围经济和网络经济重新定义的基础上，从规模经济、范围经济、网络经济“三位一体”角度重新解释了自然垄断概念，提出了自然垄断的“三位一体”理论，为自然垄断产业规制及其改革奠定理论和实证基础。     

Firm/interruptible gas pricing patterns in a regulated environment

Conclusion This study provides empirical tests for the effects of rate base regulation, curtailment priorities, fuel clauses, and elected commissioners on firm/interruptible gas pricing patterns. These regulations do alter observed pricing patterns with curtailment priorities, fuel clauses, and elected commissioners all producing net social gains. Rate of return regulation imposes social costs resulting in a net decrease in social welfare. Ignoring the political influences upon regulators, regulation generally encourages consumption at the peak relative to the off-peak. Nonetheless, overall social welfare is improved if all four types of regulatory characteristics are present, since most rates are reduced from their monopoly levels.