价格歧视的特殊案例分析

联想旗下的TP笔记本国内价格远远高于国外价格，明显采取了价格歧视的定价策略，并且是三级价格歧视。阐明联想的价格策略的原因和带来的结果，并给其他企业以启发。     

价格歧视理论在出租车行业的应用研究

现阶段,我国出租车行业普遍采用较为单一的资费标准,这对于充分利用有限的交通资源来满足不同类型消费者出行需求,缓解交通压力都极为不利。因此,如何在现有交通供给水平下解决这一矛盾便具有重要的现实意义。文章从经济学中的价格歧视理论出发,分析了出租车行业可能采取的时间、质量、空间价格歧视策略,以期在现有出租车供给情况下,改善交通资源配置状况,提升出租车司机和消费者的福利水平。     

价格歧视理论中的若干问题

价格歧视理论在传播和应用中存在着含糊不清甚至是谬误的问题,文中重新界定了价格歧视的概念,规范了实施价格歧视的前提条件,对价格歧视中的社会利问题进行了分析,同时指出了价格歧视理论中的两个常见错误。     

我国奢侈品贸易价格歧视现象分析

通过伯川德双寡头垄断价格竞争模型,分析了国外奢侈品厂商在我国市场订立高价、实施三级价格歧视的经济条件。模型显示,基于当前假设,国外厂商在我国实现三级价格歧视的经济条件并不完备;不过,在我国奢侈品消费者旺盛的需求下,国外厂商的商品在国际市场的销售会改善。但从长期看,目前国外厂商通过订立高价、提高产品炫耀性效用的情况难以持续。     

价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

价格歧视在旅游产品定价中的应用

文章在阐述消费者剩余理论和价格歧视理论的基础上 ,结合旅游产品的特点 ,把价格歧视理论应用到旅游产品的定价分析中 ,提出了旅游产品定价的四种模式。强调只要应用恰当的旅游产品定价模式 ,最终达到供求双赢的局面是可能的     

价格歧视理论与网络经济定价策略

通过对价格歧视理论进行分析,指出消费者需求弹性、消费者效用差别是影响歧视定价的重要因素,而影响消费者需求弹性和消费者效用差别的各种因素是在网络经济条件下制定价格策略时需要考虑的主要因素。由此,网络经济条件下通过市场调查分析消费者的消费行为成为制定网络经济价格策略的重要措施,政府应当对价格进行适当管理和规范。     

基于不完全信息的价格歧视研究

价格歧视理论研究存在一些不完善或缺陷,文章重新界定了价格歧视的概念,深化了对价格歧视实施的前提条件的认识。重点分析了不完全信息对价格歧视的影响,并基于不完全信息考察了现实中的价格歧视策略,指明了价格歧视理论研究的未来方向与工具。     

基于消费者个人身份信息的价格歧视行为分析

价格歧视理论表明,厂商可以根据不同消费者群体需求曲线来实施价格歧视。然而现实情况中,厂商并不能直接了解消费者的经济特征,即需求曲线,而是依据一些消费者个人非经济信息,比如个人身份信息,如性别、来源地等来把消费者区分为不同的消费群体,并实施价格歧视。文章将分析厂商以消费者的个人身份信息为基础的价格歧视行为,通过分析,可以较清楚地理解消费者与厂商在交易中的信息披露与逆向选择行为。     

价格歧视和网络营销

本文运用经济学理论对价格歧视的种类、必要条件和依据进行了分析 ,并在此基础上论证了网络营销中也能对消费者实行价格歧视。最后阐述了网络营销中的二部定价方法。     

Price discrimination and economics journals

An analysis of pricing by economics journal publishers shows that most publishers initially charge libraries and individual subscribers the same price. Over time, however, almost all eventually engage in price discrimination. The few publishers that never price-discriminate seem to be purchasing an explicit non-profit-maximizing pricing strategy. Once discrimination occurs, library prices rise faster than individual subscriber prices. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions.     

Price discrimination and efficient matching

This paper considers the problem of a monopoly matchmaker that uses a schedule of entrance fees to sort different types of agents on the two sides of a matching market into exclusive meeting places, where agents randomly form pairwise matches. We make the standard assumption that the match value function exhibits complementarities, so that matching types at equal percentiles maximizes total match value and is efficient. We provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for the revenue-maximizing sorting to be efficient. These conditions require the match value function, modified to incorporate the incentive cost of eliciting private type information, to exhibit complementarities in types.JEL Clalssification Numbers C7, D4We thank Jonathan Levin, Tracy Lewis, and the seminar audience at University of California at Los Angeles, University of British Columbia, Duke University, and 2003 Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting for comments and suggestions. We are also grateful for helpful suggestions from the referees and the Editor     

Price discrimination and quality improvement

This paper models quality improvements when multiple quality levels can sell, owing to differences in consumers' valuations of quality improvements. Firms can collude to price discriminate, so that consumers with high valuations pay a price premium, while others receive a quality level below the highest available. Imposing minimum quality standards or price ceilings can ensure that only the highest quality level of each product is sold. Such intervention reduces the quality‐adjusted price paid by consumers but also reduces the incentives for firms to innovate. When enough consumers have high valuations, such intervention must be welfare reducing, owing to reduced innovation. JEL Classification: O31, L16 Discrimination par les prix et amélioration de la qualité. Ce mémoire présente un modèle d'amélioration de la qualité quand on peut vendre des produits à divers niveaux de qualitéà cause des différences dans les évaluations d'amélioration de qualité par les consommateurs. Les entreprises peuvent entrer en collusion pour faire de la discrimination par les prix de manière à ce que les consommateurs qui apprécient davantage la qualité paient une prime pendant que les autres consommateurs reçoivent une qualité au‐dessous de ce qui est la meilleure qualité disponible. Si on impose des normes de qualité minimale ou des plafonds aux prix, on peut s'assurer que seuls les produits de la plus haute qualité seront vendus. De telles interventions réduisent le niveau de prix ajusté pour la qualité payé par les consommateurs, mais réduisent aussi les incitations des entreprises à innover. Quand un nombre suffisant de consommateurs apprécient beaucoup la qualité, de telles interventions peuvent réduire le niveau de bien‐être à cause des innovations moins importantes.     

Price discrimination via information provision

We study price discrimination where different prices are offered as a bundle with different levels of information about a product. The seller’s price discrimination induces high valuation buyers to purchase a good without information and low valuation buyers to purchase with information. Our analysis highlights several interesting results about price discrimination: (i) the seller’s choice of information provision is the combination of full information and no information, (ii) products can be cheaper without information provision than with information provision, (iii) as a result of price discrimination, prices can be more dispersed as buyers’ valuations become largely similar, and (iv) the high valuation buyers purchase a damaged good and may earn negative surplus. Furthermore, we investigate under which circumstances price discrimination is more profitable than uniform pricing. We show that a decline in transportation costs which facilitate price discrimination can be welfare reducing.     

Price discrimination of digital content

This paper considers the simplest DRM, which permits either free or no copying, with incomplete information about the type of consumer. We first obtain results concerning separability of consumers in a general situation, and show that there is a critical type of consumer. A higher utility type selects a menu of free copying whereas a lower one chooses not to copy. In a two-type model we indicate that optimal pricing for a producer is different from that under two-part tariffs. This price strategy brings about greater profits and social welfare if, and only if, self-production is more efficient than that of a producer.     

Price discrimination with a resource constraint

Introducing an aggregate resource constraint into Mussa and Rosen's [Mussa, M., Rosen, S., 1978. Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory 18 (2), 301–317] model of monopoly price discrimination induces an upwards distortion in product quality for high valuation consumers because the standard downward distortions in product quality for other consumers relax the resource constraint.     

Price discrimination: A classroom experiment

In this article, the authors describe a classroom experiment aimed at familiarizing students with different types of price discrimination (first-, second-, and third-degree price discrimination). During the experiment, the students were asked to decide what tariffs to set as monopolists for each of the price discrimination scenarios under consideration. The objective was to allow the students to work empirically, through trial and error, selecting tariffs for each type of discrimination that would maximize a monopolistic entrepreneur's profits. The purpose of the exercise also was to enable the students to differentiate each type of price discrimination and to set tariffs in each case, as well to help them understand the repercussions in terms of welfare for each type of price discrimination.     

Price discrimination and price dispersion in a duopoly

This paper analyses the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences both over a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). Discriminatory contracts are characterized for different market structures. It is shown that price dispersion, i.e. the observed range of prices for each class of customers, increases almost everywhere as competition is introduced in the market.     

Price discrimination using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously

Price discrimination practiced by using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously raises the average price for heterogenous consumers paying linear price but lowers for homogeneous group who pay nonlinear price. Discrimination lowers consumer surplus for both groups but increases total surplus.     

Price discrimination in Cournot–Nash oligopoly

The standard Cournot–Nash oligopoly model is extended to encompass price discrimination, where firms charge more than one price for the same product based on willingness to pay. In the linear, symmetric case, the average price is not dependent on the extent of price discrimination.