Liquidity risk and bank portfolio management in a financial system without deposit insurance: Empirical evidence from prewar Japan

Using data from prewar Japan, this paper investigates the impact of a liquidity shock induced by depositors' behavior on bank portfolio management during financial crises in a system lacking deposit insurance. It is found that banks reacted to the liquidity shock sensitively through an increase in their cash holdings not by liquidating bank loans but by selling securities in the financial market. Moreover, banks exposed to local financial contagion adjusted the liquidity of their portfolio mainly by actively selling and buying their securities in the financial market. Finally, there is no evidence to conclude that the existence of the lender of last resort mitigated the liquidity constraints in bank portfolio adjustments.     

Short Selling Pressure,Reporting Transparency,and the Use of Real and Accruals Earnings Management to Meet Benchmarks

Abstract

Prior literature finds that short selling is beneficial to the market because it increases liquidity and helps to discipline optimistic market prices. The authors use 2 controlled experiments to examine the potential for an unintended consequence of allowing short selling or easing short selling restrictions. Because prior research identifies short sellers as sophisticated market participants who have the ability to see through accrual earnings management choices, we predict and find that, when reporting is transparent, managers are more likely to use real earnings management relative to accrual earnings management when short selling restrictions are relaxed. This is consistent with the idea that real earnings management activities are more defensible as the result of legitimate operating decisions and are therefore more likely to hold up to scrutiny from short sellers. Overall, the results suggest that regulations that are unrelated to financial reporting can affect how managers respond to the transparency that arises from financial reporting regulations.     

Capital Controls,Global Liquidity Traps,and the International Policy Trilemma*

The zero bound on interest rates introduces a new dimension to the trilemma in international policy. The openness of the international financial market might render monetary policy ineffective, even within a system of fully flexible exchange rates, because shocks that lead to a liquidity trap in one country are propagated through financial markets to other countries. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy can be restored by the imposition of capital controls. We derive the optimal response of monetary policy to a global liquidity trap in the presence of capital controls. We show that, even though capital controls might facilitate effective monetary policy, capital controls are not generally desirable in terms of welfare.     

#br# 融资融券加大了沪深股市波动吗*

融资融券设计初衷是通过融资加强市场流动性和通过融券提供投资者规避价格下跌风险的金融工具，改善由供求关系严重失衡导致市场巨幅震荡的局面，实现资本市场长期稳定的目标。实际操作中，融资融券疏通货币市场和资本市场间的资金流动，撬动巨额资金涌入股市；融资规模扩张过快而融券做空力量薄弱，业务结构发展严重失衡，导致两融业务具有“小冲击、大波动”的金融加速效应，放大了外部冲击引起股价上涨和下跌的幅度。协整回归分析表明，两融业务规模的扩张和收缩对上证指数涨跌具有显著的同向影响。TGARCH事件模型结果进一步证实融资融券从稳定股价到加剧波动的功能变化。随着标的股票扩容和业务常规化，两融业务导致股市投机过度，加剧了沪深两市的资产价格异动，没有达到平抑波动的设计预期。     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

Liquidity default,liquidity management and smooth dividends policy

Our article models liquidity financing constraints with the real options framework. By conducting a comprehensive investigation of the effects of shocks to liquidity constraints on the firm’s optimal investment, financing and dividend policies, our model highlights the importance of liquidity management and extends the liquidity management approach to hedge liquidity default risk. We find that being concerned about liquidity default risk will significantly change a firm’s behaviours, including those related to investment and the optimal capital structure. A firm that is concerned about its liquidity default risk will become more cautious: it will choose to delay investment and have higher leverage when internal liquidity is very low, but choose earlier investment and lower leverage when liquidity is high enough. The dividends policy can alleviate risks from both the external market and internal project volatility and provides an alternative explanation for the ‘smooth dividends policy puzzle’ commonly reported in empirical research.     

Asset Markets and Endogenous Liquidity

In financial markets characterized by imperfect depth, speculative trading will have transitory effects on the market price as market makers must be compensated for the risk of holding the asset. The number of people providing liquidity to a market will generally be endogenously determined by the quantity of liquidity demanded. This paper looks for evidence of endogenous liquidity provision in several international stock and bond markets. Evidence shows strong support for these speculative dynamics in the stock markets. The evidence for these dynamics is less striking with fixed‐income prices, consistent with the less speculative nature of these markets.     

Liquidity risk and financial competition: Implications for asset prices and monetary policy

This paper studies the implications of banking competition for capital markets and monetary policy. In particular, I develop a two-sector monetary growth model in which a group of agents is exposed to liquidity shocks and money is essential. Banks insure depositors against such risk and invest in the economy's assets. In this setting, I compare an economy with a perfectly competitive banking sector to an economy with a fully concentrated financial sector. Unlike previous work, banks can have market power in both deposits and capital markets. Compared to a perfectly competitive financial sector, I demonstrate that a monopolistic banking system can have substantial adverse consequences on capital formation, assets prices, and the degree of risk sharing. Furthermore, multiple steady-states can emerge and the economy becomes subject to poverty traps. More importantly, market power in financial markets may overturn the Tobin effect present under a perfectly competitive financial sector. This necessarily happens in economies with high degrees of liquidity risk and low levels of capital formation.     

市场竞争、银行市场势力与流动性创造效率—来自中国银行业的证据

商业银行是中国社会融资的主要渠道,银行向社会提供流动性的效率直接决定了社会融资的效率.为弥补流动性创造研究在效率和中观层面的不足,文章采用中国商业银行2000?2015年微观数据,探讨了市场竞争、银行市场势力与流动性创造效率之间的关系,得到以下结论:(1)市场竞争与流动性创造效率之间存在倒U形关系,中国银行业存在最优的市场结构;(2)银行市场势力过强是中国商业银行流动性创造效率较低的重要原因,银行市场势力越强,其流动性创造效率越低;(3)市场竞争程度与市场势力的流动性创造效率系数之间存在不显著的负相关关系,寄希望于通过增强中国银行业竞争程度来改善银行市场势力过强所导致的流动性创造效率过低,作用可能非常有限.中国应沿着"增强商业银行流动性创造能力,扩大直接融资规模"的改革方向继续前进.文章的研究丰富了已有文献,而且为中国银行体系改革的顶层设计提供了重要参考.     

The Macroeconomics of Financial Crises: How Risk Premiums and Liquidity Traps Affect Policy Options

The paper offers an overview of what structural models of the IS-LM and Mundell-Fleming variety can tell about the macroeconomics of economic crises. In addition to demonstrating how the emergence of risk premiums in money and capital markets can generate liquidity traps at positive interest rates and may drive economies into recessions, it shows the following: (1) Fiscal policy works even in a small, open economy under flexible exchange rates when the country is stuck in a liquidity trap; (2) Near the fringe of liquidity traps, there may be perfect traps, in which neither monetary nor fiscal policy works when used in isolation but policy coordination is called for; and (3) Massive financial crises in the domestic money market may even destabilize the economy.     

Real Exchange Rate Overshooting and Capital Controls in a Crisis

This paper investigates the impact of a financial crisis on the attitude towards financial reforms, in an economy partially integrated with the global capital market. I identify conditions under which a crisis induces greater financial openness, mitigating the real exchange rate overshooting. The welfare gains from alleviating the shortage of funds in the sort run should be balanced with the cost of selling domestic equities at a discount. Even if the net gain from opening up the capital market is significant, it will exceed the gain from temporary capital controls only if the FDI is associated with significant favourable productivity effects. JEL Classification Numbers: F21, F23, F32, F34, F36.     

我国国际资本流动性程度和非流动性原因的度量与检验--来自中美日三国消费模式对比的经验证据

加入WTO以后,我国的国际资本流动性开始有所加强,流动方式也有所改变。文章选择中国、美国和日本的消费和收入数据,在国家之间实际利率均衡的假设下,通过国家消费模式的考察和对比,发现我国的经济运行并不满足国际资本完全流动性假说,其原因既出于我国资本市场与国际资本市场之间存在进入限制,也出于我国资本市场与国际资本市场的非完全整合。这些经验发现表明,我国经济中的名义利率、汇率和资本市场仍然处于有限管制过程中,必须通过深化国内金融体制改革和逐步实现资本市场开放等有力措施来增强我国国际资本的流动性,进而保持我国快速经济增长和提高整体资源配置效率。     

Liquidity in Asian markets: Intensity of Regional and global linkages

This study investigates cross-market linkages and the intensity of liquidity spillovers across nine Asian markets and five developed markets during 2006 to 2016. Further, the study examines the contagion caused by recent global financial crisis and its impact on the market liquidity. The direction and intensity of spillovers has been measured using forecast error variance decomposition method as suggested by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). Among the developed markets, the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom significantly affect liquidity changes in Asian countries like India, China, Singapore and Japan. The results revels that on average, each Asian market receives 7% spillover from the global markets and 16% from regional markets. During the financial crisis, the average regional spillover increased to 20% and the global spillover increased to 11%. Thus, in Asia, the regional spillover is higher than the global spillover. Our results support the demand side hypothesis and suggest that it is the trade and portfolio investments that drive the liquidity spillovers. Our findings have potential implications for international investors, policy makers and market regulators.     

优化金融供给结构防范流动性风险*

2018年以后，中国经济金融运行中出现了三对相互关联的“两难选择”：“去杠杆”与“稳增长”之间的矛盾、资金“脱实向虚”与“脱虚向实”之间的矛盾、金融整治与防风险之间的矛盾。实施宽松的货币政策、加大向经济金融运行注入流动性，难以破解这些“两难选择”，甚至有可能引致南辕北辙的效应。破解之策在于：拓展商业票据市场、债券市场和股票市场，允许城乡居民和实体企业以资金供给者和资金需求者的身份直接进入金融市场；加快发展资产管理市场，将金融服务对象从法人机构向居民家庭扩展，推动实体企业的暂时闲置资金从存款（尤其是定期存款）转向现金管理（或资金管理）；形成以负面清单为基础的行为监管机制和监管沙盒机制。     

融券制度与内部人寻租——来自准自然实验的经验证据

内部人寻租一直以来是理论与实务界关心的重点,如何有效抑制内部人寻租行为是资本市场的重大课题。本文以内部人交易度量内部人寻租,分析了融券制度对内部人寻租的影响。研究发现:(1)融券制度对内部人寻租有显著抑制作用,并且融券规模越大,内部人寻租越少。(2)相比于国有企业,非国有企业当中融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用更加明显。本文还将内部人交易分方向进行回归,结果显示融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用主要体现在卖出方向上。本文进一步分析了融券制度影响内部人寻租的路径,发现“竞争效应”和“信息效应”是融券制度影响内部人寻租的两条重要路径。本文考虑了竞争性解释——分析师关注的作用,发现分析师关注并不能影响本文结论的正确性;本文还利用反面事实推断、倾向得分匹配、反向因果检验等方法,确保实证结论的稳健性。本文的研究结果,丰富了内部人寻租的特征及影响因素研究,有利于市场监管部门加强对内部人寻租行为的控制;扩充了有关融券制度的文献,为卖空制度的推行及完善提供理论依据。     

中国流动性过剩应对策略——基于2000—2007年数据的研究

进入21世纪,全球性的货币扩张带来了全球性的流动性过剩,中国因储蓄倾向较高、外汇管理体制、经济的高速增长、金融产品供给的不足和国际资本的不断进入导致了较为严重的流动性过剩。对此应采取扩大消费需求,大力发展中国的资本市场,改革中国外汇储备管理体制、汇率体制及提高货币政策的有效性等措施。     

When expectations become aspirations: reference-dependent preferences and liquidity constraints

A large body of literature suggests that consumers derive utility from gains and losses relative to a reference point. This paper shows that such reference dependence can affect savings in opposite directions depending on whether people face liquidity constraints. Existing models for wealth and intertemporal choice predict that reference dependence reduces savings, but these models abstract from liquidity constraints. Introducing a liquidity constraint, I find that reference dependence can increase optimal savings for people without access to credit. Ex post, after reference points have been formed, liquidity constraints force consumers to take part of an income loss in early periods, inducing those who are reference dependent to concentrate the full loss in early periods and save in order to eliminate future losses. Further, anticipating a liquidity constraint raises the expected level of future consumption and thus the expectations-based reference point for future periods, creating an ex-ante savings motive. These findings underscore that it is important to account for financial market imperfections when applying or testing reference-dependent models in low-income settings, and potentially explain heterogeneity in how much the poor save when facing binding liquidity constraints.     

DEGREASING THE WHEELS OF FINANCE

Can there be too much trading in financial markets? We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model, where agents face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. A financial market allows agents to adjust their portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets in response to these shocks. The optimal policy is to restrict access to this market because portfolio choices exhibit a pecuniary externality: Agents do not take into account that by holding more of the liquid asset, they not only acquire additional insurance against these liquidity shocks, but also marginally increase the value of the liquid asset, which improves insurance for other market participants.     

How do financial frictions affect the spending multiplier during a liquidity trap?

We show that credit market imperfections substantially increase the government-spending multiplier when the economy enters a liquidity trap. This finding is explained by the tight association between capital goods and firms? collateral, a relationship that we highlight as the capital-accumulation channel. During a liquidity trap, a government spending expansion reduces the real interest rate, leading to a period of cheap credit. Entrepreneurs use this time to accumulate capital, which persistently improves their balance sheets and reduces their future costs of credit. A public spending expansion can thus encourage private investment, yielding consequently a large spending multiplier. This effect is further reinforced by Fisher?s debt-deflation channel.     

Model uncertainty and liquidity

Extreme market outcomes are often followed by a lack of liquidity and a lack of trade. This market collapse seems particularly acute for markets where traders rely heavily on a specific empirical model such as in derivative markets like the market for mortgage backed securities or credit derivatives. Moreover, the observed behavior of traders and institutions that places a large emphasis on “worst-case scenarios” through the use of “stress testing” and “Value-at-Risk” seems different than Savage expected utility would suggest. In this paper, we capture model-uncertainty using an Epstein and Wang [Epstein, L.G., Wang, T., 1994. Intertemporal asset pricing under Knightian uncertainty. Econometrica 62, 283–322] uncertainty-averse utility function with an ambiguous underlying asset-returns distribution. To explore the connection of uncertainty with liquidity, we specify a simple market where a monopolist financial intermediary makes a market for a propriety derivative security. The market-maker chooses bid and ask prices for the derivative, then, conditional on trade in this market, chooses an optimal portfolio and consumption. We explore how uncertainty can increase the bid–ask spread and, hence, reduces liquidity. Our infinite-horizon example produces short, dramatic decreases in liquidity even though the underlying environment is stationary. We show how these liquidity crises are closely linked to the uncertainty aversion effect on the optimal portfolio. Effectively, the uncertainty aversion can, at times, limit the ability of the market-maker to hedge a position and thus reduces the desirability of trade, and hence, liquidity.