A theory of multihoming in rideshare competition

We examine competition among ridesharing platforms, where firms compete on both price and the wait time induced with idled drivers. We show that when consumers are the only agents who multihome, idleness is lower in duopoly than when consumers face a monopoly ridesharing platform. When drivers and consumers multihome, idleness further falls to zero as it involves costs for each platform that are appropriated, in part, by their rival. Interestingly, socially superior outcomes may involve monopoly or competition under various multihoming regimes, depending on the density of the city, and the relative costs of idleness versus consumer disutility of waiting.     

Foreclosure with Incomplete Information

We investigate the robustness of the new foreclosure doctrine and its associated welfare implications to the introduction of incomplete information. In particular, we let the upstream firm's marginal cost be private information, unknown to the downstream firms. The previous literature has argued that vertical integration is harmful because it allows an upstream monopolist to limit output to monopoly levels, whereas a disintegrated structure will "over-sell," producing more in equilibrium. By contrast, we find that with incomplete information, high-cost firms will often "under-sell" in equilibrium, that is, supply less than their monopoly output. Low-cost firms continue to over-sell, so all types of firms have a reason to integrate downstream, but this is socially harmful only for low-cost types. For high-cost firms vertical integration can be Pareto-improving, resulting in higher output, profits, and consumer surplus.     

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY

Abstract. This paper examines two important recent developments in the theory of natural monopoly, or more generally the theory of market structure. The first is a series of papers, involving Baumol with various co-authors, investigating the theory of industry structure, whilst the second is particularly associated with the names of Shaked and Sutton, and the relationship they develop between product differentiation and industry structure. The paper surveys and to some extent contrasts these two new approaches.
Baumol et al. 's contribution is seen to be in the area of clarifying the concept of natural monopoly, refining the definitions of multiproduct costs, and developing a notion of social efficiency applicable to industries where economies of scale are important. Shaked and Sutton employ a new definition of natural monopoly unrelated to market size and utilize information about consumers'income distributions to develop their notion of vertical product differentiation and natural oligopoly.     

A limit to price-increasing competition

Differentiated entry may cause an incumbent firm to increase its price if the entering brand attracts price-sensitive consumers. This paper generalizes from the known cases with one-dimensional and two-dimensional products, showing for a finite number of attributes that there is scope for price-increasing competition, depending on the entrant’s product positioning. The extension is critical because it leads to a reversal that has not been considered. The highest possible duopoly price converges to the monopoly price as the dimensionality increases. Intuitively, when the product is more complex, tastes in the intersection of two brand markets (at any prices) are more specific and less frequent. This thinning of the fringe diminishes the effect of competitive entry.     

REGULATION BY DUOPOLY

This paper analyzes, within the framework of the new regulatory economics that emphasizes asymmetries of information, the optimal structure of an industry. The duplication of fixed costs incurred in a duopoly structure may be socially justified in a static model by three effects: the sampling effect, the yardstick competition effect, and the increasing marginal cost effect.
We show that in general, asymmetric information favors duopoly when the market structure is decided before firms discovers their cost characteristics (a common situation in dual sourcing for procurement), and favors monopoly when the market structure is decided after firms discover their cost characteristics (the case of split-award auctions).     

Quantity and price controls by the firm under demand uncertainty and welfare implications

A monopoly facing an uncertain demand can affect its profit distribution through the choice of ex ante controls. This paper compares two modes of behavior - price-setting and quantity-setting - in the context of a mean-variance model. The main results are: (a) With nonlinear cost, the monopoly will not be indifferent between the two modes. In the particular case of quadratic cost, conditions for the dominance of price-setting over quantity-setting behavior are derived. (b) Whereas it is well-known that the risk averse, quantity-setting monopoly will produce less under uncertainty than under certainty (or risk neutrality), the price-setting monopoly increases its expected output when faced by uncertain demand, possibly exceeding even the competitive output under uncertainty. (c) Using expected social surplus as a welfare criterion, price-setting emerges as the welfare-dominant behavior when there is a conflict between the privately and the socially preferred modes. (d) Finally, there exist conditions where price-setting monopolies welfare-dominate a competitive industry facing the same random demand.     

On the corporate use of green bonds

When do wholesalers issue green bonds to finance their socially responsible activities instead of charging a premium for the products they produce? We show that in less competitive retail markets when retailers can “skim” more of the premium that end consumers pay for socially responsible products, green bonds provide additional funds to help cover the cost of a wholesaler's socially responsible activities. Similar incentives arise if the wholesaler's input is a small component of the end consumers’ product, or if it is difficult for end consumers to identify the wholesaler's socially responsible activities.     

Better Late than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology

After the initial breakthrough in the research phase of R&D, a new product undergoes a process of change, improvement, and adaptation to market conditions. We model the strategic behavior of firms in this development phase. We emphasize that a key dimension to this competition is the innovation that leads to product differentiation and quality improvement. In a duopoly model with a single adoption choice, we derive endogenously the level and diversity of product innovations. We demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which one firm enters early with a low-quality product while the other continues to develop the technology and eventually markets a high-quality good. In such an equilibrium, no monopoly rent is dissipated and the later innovator makes more profits. Incumbent firms may well be the early innovators, contrary to the predictions of the "incumbency inertia" hypothesis.     

Outsourcing with labor management

A vertically integrated Labor Managed (LM) monopoly is compared to a decentralized market arrangement where production is segmented among an upward LM firm producing an input and a downstream LM manufacturer of the final good. Unlike what usually occurs among profit maximizing firms, the vertical arrangement with outsourcing is socially superior to the vertically integrated one. However, the upstream section has an incentive to outsource, while the downstream section would rather oppose it.     

Interfirm and Intrafirm Switching Costs in a Vertical Differentiation Setting: Green versus Nongreen Products

In a vertical differentiation model where both duopolists supply the same two qualities of an otherwise homogeneous product, we derive the critical level of the interfirm switching cost needed to sustain monopoly pricing. In particular, we show how a decrease in the intrafirm switching cost may cause a decrease in this critical value, thereby facilitating monopoly pricing. We apply the results to a setting with green and nongreen products—in particular electricity—and discuss implications for policy measures intended to stimulate the production and consumption of green products.     

New product introduction under demand uncertainty in competitive industries

A game-theoretic model is employed to examine the conditions under which firms in a duopoly, faced with a new product introduction opportunity of uncertain profitability (because of uncertainty in demand), choose to enter the market immediately or, alternatively, decide to wait, thereby avoiding the risk of failure. The implications for a firm's strategic behavior are contrasted with situations in which the competitor is believed to be (1) passive, implying that the firm expects to enjoy indefinite monopoly status if it introduces the new product, and (2) committed to a waiting strategy, implying monopoly status for a limited time period, if the new product is successful.     

天水旅游形象定位分析——突出文化性

一个个性、良好、鲜明的旅游地形象可以形成长期的垄断地位,其垄断力来源于产品与服务的差异化。本文通过分析天水自然地理、人文历史等旅游资源条件,从文化特质、旅游功能、市场定位入手,为天水旅游形象的定位提出建议。     

On the Centenary of Progress and Poverty

A bstract . Henry George was more fortunate than many authors of classics. His Progress and Poverty won understanding, appreciation and recognition from the start. The book presented a theory of the business cycle based on monopoly of which theorists must take account. It also represented the peak of the development of the classical school. George shared with the school's great figures, particularly Adam Smith and David Ricardo , a Utopian vision of a free economy. But George went beyond them in envisioning a free society in a new moral order; he was one of the great libertarian philosophers. Moreover, as Teilhac has shown, he projected into economics a social rationalism that opened the way for a reborn political economy based on scientific method. Though his is one of the enduring creations of the human mind which spur the species on to greater cultural achievements, it is, first and foremost, an economic classic. Insofar as George pointed to monopoly and privilege as socially disastrous institutions , his teaching has been adopted by economists everywhere. His doctrine that all men share a common right to the earth now rules space exploitation—that is, the universe —and the deep oceans and it is winning grudging recognition in the one-fourth of the earth humanity inhabits.     

Learning quality through prices and word‐of‐mouth communication

This paper studies the effect of word‐of‐mouth communication on the optimal pricing strategy for new experience goods. I consider a dynamic monopoly model with asymmetric information about product quality, in which consumers learn in equilibrium from both prices and other consumers. The main result is that word‐of‐mouth communication is essential for the existence of separating equilibria, wherein the high‐quality monopolist signals high quality through a low introductory price (lower than the monopoly price), and the low‐quality one charges the monopoly price. The intuition is simple: low prices are costly, and will only be used by firms confident enough that increased experimentation (and therefore communication among consumers) will yield good news about quality and increased future profits. Additional results are the following: for the high‐quality seller, the expected price (quantity) is increasing (decreasing) over time; whereas for the low‐quality one, the opposite is true. Moreover, signaling becomes more difficult when consumers pay less attention to their peers' reports and more attention to past prices. Finally, word‐of‐mouth communication improves consumer welfare.     

Demand for Customized Products, Production Flexibility, and Price Competition

We examine markets where, in addition to production of standard (core) products, mass customization is technologically feasible. We compare a setting where a monopolist provides both standard and custom goods to a setting where an entrant joins the custom market and find customers' tastes affect the social desirability of entry. The entrant is unconcerned about the impact of its custom production on the incumbent's core product market and in some cases may supply more custom products than is socially desirable. Entry enhances (reduces) social welfare if consumers' core valuations are positively (negatively) related to their value added for customization.     

Implications of quality standard regulation for multiproduct monopoly pricing

An important concern of regulatory agencies is the quality and variety of products offered for sale. This paper considers the effects of introducing quality standards in a monopolized market where the monopoly sells a range of qualities of a product to consumers with varying taste for quality. The introduction of a minimum acceptable quality can alter the entire price and quality schedule offered by the monopolist. Both a uniform and a more general distribution of consumers are studied to examine these changes and their implications for general welfare.     

数字信息产品的定价机理研究

本文在系统分析数字信息产品的市场结构特点的基础上,分别给出了此种产品在两种垄断性市场结构中不同的定价模型,并分析模型在实际中的应用。     

The joint determination of ‘Quality’ and price in standardized products: A comparative dynamic analysis

Every supermarket provides many examples of attempts lo develop more economical standardized products which will attract additional customers while guaranteeing the user that the quantity will be acceptable. We assume this process involves development costs incurred in reducing the amount incorporated in a monopoly product of its dominant product-characteristic. A comparative dynamic analysis is used to explore the search for lower prices and higher output. The heightened vulnerability of the firm to market forces and some policy implications of the analysis are brought out.     

Matching rules

Institutions often utilize matching rules to achieve cooperative outcomes. However, the equilibrium induced by a matching rule may not be socially optimal. After presenting the case in which matching rules yield privately and socially optimal levels of cooperation, this article identifies the conditions which generate inefficient cooperation. Matching rules undershoot (i.e. parties cooperate less than is socially optimal) in one group of cases. In a second, more puzzling case, matching rules overshoot (i.e. parties that interact under a matching constraint are induced to cooperate more than is socially optimal). This paper identifies the conditions for such occurrences. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On how size and composition of customer bases affect equilibrium in a duopoly with switching costs

Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric size of customer bases makes monopoly pricing more difficult. Adding consumer heterogeneity to the model we demonstrate that also composition of each firms customer base affects pricing, and this composition may aggravate or ease the incentives to break out of the monopoly pricing equilibrium.Received: 16 August 2001, Accepted: 27 September 2004, JEL Classification: D43, L10, L13This research has been sponsored by Telenor, through the Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration. We thank participants at the 2002 EARIE conference in Madrid, Matthew Jackson and an anonymous referee for helpful and constructive comments to an earlier version. The usual disclaimer applies.