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1.
Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Max R. Blouin 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):245-262
Summary. This paper deals with trade volume and distribution of surplus in markets subject to adverse selection. In a model where
two qualities of a good exist, I show that if trade is decentralized (i.e. conducted via random pairwise meetings of agents),
then all units of the good are traded, and all agents have positive ex-ante expected payoffs. This feature is present regardless
of the quality distribution, and persists in the limit as discounting is made negligible. This offers a sharp contrast to
models of centralized trade with adverse selection (Akerlof, Wilson).
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research was funded by a grant from UQAM. I wish to thank Roberto Serrano and seminar participants at UQAM, Queen's
University at Kingston, the 2001 CEME General Equilibrium Conference (Brown University), and the 2001 North American Summer
Meeting of the Econometric Society (University of Maryland) for comments. 相似文献
2.
Summary. We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational agents interact locally in order to play a coordination
game. Agents differ in their mobility with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents
enjoy a higher payoff and always benefit from increased mobility, while immobile agents benefit from increased mobility at
low levels of mobility only. This wedge in payoffs weakly increases as mobility increases. Some extensions are discussed.
Received: January 10, 2001; revised version: December 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank, without implicating in any way, George Mailath for helpful discussions. Some of the ideas in this paper were
developed during the V Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in Ischia, Italy. The NSF provided
financial support.
Correspondence to: T. Temzelides 相似文献
3.
Shasikanta Nandeibam 《Economic Theory》2003,22(3):569-581
Summary. This paper considers a team production model in which the final output is a function of one or more observable intermediate
variables that are functions of the actions of the team members. When there is only one intermediate variable, our model essentially
reduces to the standard models in which only the final output is observable. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition
for implementing an outcome. This condition imposes restrictions on the possible deviations from the outcome that can be caused
by every member of the team unilaterally. As a consequence of this characterization, when there are more than one intermediate
variable, we are able to show that in a broad class of problems these intermediate variables may be sufficiently informative
to allow sharing rules that implement efficient outcomes.
Received: March 26, 2001; revised version: August 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"I would like to thank Parimal Bag, Craig Brett, Greg Dow, Hugo Hopenhayn, Ashok Kotwal, Dilip Mookherjee, Santanu Roy,
Sudhir Shah, Guofu Tan and John Weymark for helpful discussions on earlier versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
4.
Summary. In the context of differential information economies, with and without free disposal, we consider the concepts of Radner
equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium, private core, weak fine core and weak fine value. We look into the possible
implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian or sequential equilibria of noncooperative dynamic formulations. We construct
relevant game trees which indicate the sequence of decisions and the information sets, and explain the rules for calculating
ex ante expected payoffs. The possibility of implementing an allocation is related to whether or not it is incentive compatible.
Implementation through an exogenous third party or an endogenous intermediary is also considered.
Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: April 17, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper comes out of a visit by Nicholas Yannelis to City University, London, in December 2000. We are grateful
to Dr A. Hadjiprocopis for his invaluable help with the implementation of Latex in a Unix environment. We also thank Leon
Koutsougeras and a referee for several, helpful comments.
Correspondence to: N.C. Yannelis 相似文献
5.
Nigar Hashimzade 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):907-912
Summary. In this paper I analyze the general equilibrium in a random Walrasian economy. Dependence among agents is introduced in the
form of dependency neighborhoods. Under the uncertainty, an agent may fail to survive due to a meager endowment in a particular
state (direct effect), as well as due to unfavorable equilibrium price system at which the value of the endowment falls short
of the minimum needed for survival (indirect terms-of-trade effect). To illustrate the main result I compute the stochastic
limit of equilibrium price and probability of survival of an agent in a large Cobb-Douglas economy.
Received June 7, 2001; revised version: January 7, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar and Thomas DiCiccio for helpful discussion and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions. 相似文献
6.
Stefan Maus 《Economic Theory》2003,22(3):613-627
Summary. A condition is given that is equivalent to balancedness of all NTU-games derived from an exchange economy with asymmetric
information when endowments are variable. The condition is applicable to the ex-ante model with expected utilities, but also
to the more general model of Arrow-Radner type economies without subjective probabilities. Differences in the interpretation
of measurability assumptions between these two models are discussed, and another model with information consistent utility
functions is developed in which the result would also hold.
Received: December 12, 2001; revised version: November 1, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"I thank two anonymous referees whose comments led to an improvement of the paper. 相似文献
7.
John Quiggin 《Economic Theory》2003,22(3):607-611
Summary. In this paper, it is shown that, for a wide range of risk-averse generalized expected utility preferences, independent risks
are complementary, contrary to the results for expected utility preferences satisfying conditions such as proper and standard
risk aversion.
Received: August 10, 2001; revised version: June 18, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"I thank Simon Grant and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and criticism. This research was supported by an Australian
Research Council Senior Fellowship and Australian Research Council Large Grant A79800678. 相似文献
8.
Jiazhong You 《Empirical Economics》2003,28(1):61-73
Both standard and robust methods are used here to estimate models of Engel curves for three household commodities, namely,
food, transport, and tobacco and alcohol in Canada. The income elasticities of demand computed from the various methods differ
significantly for the transport and tobacco-alcohol consumption where there are obvious outliers and zero expenditures problem.
Robust estimators point to lower income elasticities and have better performance than the standard LS and Tobit estimator.
These results are analyzed in the light of the information on finite-sample performance obtained in a previous Monte Carlo
study.
First version received: July 2000/Final version received: July 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I wish to thank Victoria Zinde-Walsh, John Galbraith, Clint Coakley, two anonymous referees and an associate editor
for helpful comments. I would also like to thank Anastassia Khouri for kindly providing the 1992 Family Expenditure Survey
of Canada data. 相似文献
9.
Alvaro Sandroni 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):423-433
Summary. In this paper I consider a dynamically complete market model without intrinsic uncertainty. Agents' beliefs are different,
but correct in the limit. Some agents are more patient than others. I show that infinitely often share prices are low and
the economy stagnates. Also, infinitely often share prices are high and the economy grows. The changes from growth to stagnation
and from stagnation to growth are not caused by exogenous shocks. They are caused by speculative trade among agents with different
propensities to save and invest.
Received: January 8, 2001; revised version: April 11, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science
Foundation. 相似文献
10.
Firm reputation with hidden information 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Steven Tadelis 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):635-651
Summary. An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated
by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by
clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis
links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting
themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success
and decrease after failure.
Received: July 31, 2001; revised version: December 20, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Jon Levin, Eric Maskin and Drew Fudenberg for valuable discussions, and Heski Bar-Isaac for comments on an
earlier draft. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (NSF grants SBR-9818981 and SES-0079876) is gratefully
acknowledged. This paper replaces an older (and incomplete) working paper titled “Reputation with Hidden Information”. 相似文献
11.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
12.
John Geanakoplos 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):585-603
Summary. The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani's
Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when
there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,”
i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.”
Received: July 9, 2001; revised version: February 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Don Brown, and Andreu Mas-Colell for helpful comments. I first thought about using Brouwer's
theorem without Kakutani's extension when I heard Herb Scarf's lectures on mathematical economics as an undergraduate in 1974,
and then again when I read Tim Kehoe's 1980 Ph.D dissertation under Herb Scarf, but I did not resolve my confusion until I
had to discuss Kehoe's presentation at the celebration for Herb Scarf's 65th birthday in September, 1995.
RID="*"
ID="*"Correspondence to: C. D. Aliprantis 相似文献
13.
Counterfactual conditional statements are ubiquitous in any scientific endeavour. This paper contains an analysis of the
nature of counterfactual conditionals and the conditions under which they are considered assertable by scientists. The paper
then applies this analysis to the use of counterfactuals in evolutionary economics, arguing that because evolutionary economics
is inherently concerned with historical processes it cannot avoid the use of counterfactual history as one of its tools of
empirical analysis. We discuss the strengths and pitfalls of counterfactual history. We argue that because evolutionary economics
starts from the foundation that randomness may be inherent in any economic system, the very aspects of evolutionary economics
that make counterfactual history a desirable empirical tool also make that tool difficult to employ.
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank the participants of the International Seminar on Evolutionary Economics as a Research Programme in Stockholm, May 1997, for many helpful comments. We also thank Lorri Baier for many helpful substantive and textual comments.
Correspondence to: R. Cowan 相似文献
14.
In this paper, we provide new evidence on how to model unemployment durations in the presence of temporary layoffs. Two different
types of econometric models are used: the multiple phase duration model and the competing risks model. Special attention is
paid to the possibility of time-varying or non-proportional effects of the explanatory variables on the hazard function. The
results show that instead of using the multiple phase duration model as an alternative to the competing risks model, it may
be more fruitful to use it to extend the specification of the competing risks model.
First version received: August 2000/Final version accepted: July 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" Financial support from the Danish National Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Gerard van den
Berg, Per-Anders Edin, Niels Haldrup, Winfred Pohlmeier and anonymous referees for useful comments. We also thank Jens Chr.
Thellesen for research assistance. 相似文献
15.
Christian Ewerhart 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):415-418
Summary. When the price of an input factor to a production process increases, then the optimal output level declines and the input
is substituted by other factors. Marshall's rule is a formula that determines the own-price elasticity for one factor as a
weighted sum of the elasticities of output market demand and factor substitution. This note offers a proof for Marshall's
rule that is significantly shorter and somewhat more intuitive than existing derivations.
Received: February 19, 2001; revised version: April 3, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Charalambos Aliprantis, John Moore, Patrick Schmitz, and the anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Support
by the German Academic Exchange Service is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
16.
Maarten F. Cornet 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):845-862
In the partition function bargaining problem the value of a coalition depends on the coalition structure in which it is embedded.
This paper applies the demand-making bargaining game of coalition formation to the three-player partition function bargaining
problem. The values of some embedded coalitions appear to be strategically irrelevant. The strategically relevant values constitute
a coalition function bargaining problem. A classification in terms of the associated coalition function bargaining problem
is provided. For one of the three classes that are distinguished the set of equilibrium outcomes closely relates to the core
of the associated coalitional problem. For another class of problems the equilibrium outcome corresponds to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern
outcome.
Received: February 14, 2000; revised version: December 13, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I would like to thank Harold Houba and Gerard van der Laan for valuable discussions, and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments. This research was conducted while I was at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 相似文献
17.
The economic effects of restrictions on government budget deficits: imperfect private credit markets
Summary. The present paper is an extension of Ghiglino and Shell [7] to the case of imperfect consumer credit markets. We show that
with constraints on individual credit and only anonymous (i.e., non-personalized) lump-sum taxes, strong (or “global”) irrelevance
of government budget deficits is not possible, and weak (or “local”) irrelevance can hold only in very special situations.
This is in sharp contrast to the result for perfect credit markets. With credit constraints and anonymous consumption taxes,
weak irrelevance holds if the number of tax instruments is sufficiently large and at least one consumer's credit constraint
is not binding. This is an extension of the result for perfect credit markets.
Received: August 28, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Todd Keister, Bruce Smith, and two referees for helpful comments.
Correspondence to: C. Ghiglino 相似文献
18.
Massimiliano Amarante 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):353-374
Summary. In each stage of a repeated game with private monitoring, the players receive payoffs and privately observe signals which
depend on the players' actions and the state of world. I show that, contrary to a widely held belief, such games admit a recursive
structure. More precisely, I construct a representation of the original sequential problem as a sequence of static games with
incomplete information. This establishes the ground for a characterization of strategies and, hence, of behavior in interactive-decision
settings where private information is present. Finally, the representation is used to give a recursive characterization of
the equilibrium payoff set, by means of a multi-player generalization of dynamic programming.
Received: February 11, 2002; revised version: July 22, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I am very grateful to In-Koo Cho, Larry Epstein, Denis Gromb, Stephen Morris, Paolo Siconolfi, Lones Smith and Max
Stinchcombe for several insights and suggestions. A referee's comments helped improving the exposition. Finally, I wish to
thank the participants to the seminars at MEDS, NYU, Columbia University, Caltech, UCLA, University of Rochester, University
of Texas-Austin, Northwestern Summer Microeconomics Conference 98, Summer in Tel Aviv 98, and NASM98. 相似文献
19.
Gautam Bose 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):457-467
Summary. An explanation is provided for the evolution of segmented marketplaces in a pairwise exchange economy. Large traders operating
in a pairwise exchange market prefer to meet other similar traders, because this enables them to trade their endowments in
a smaller number of encounters. Large and small traders, however, cannot be distinguished a priori, and the existence of the small traders imposes a negative externality on the large traders. We show that, under conditions
which are not very restrictive, establishing a separate market (perhaps with an entry fee) designated for the large traders
induces the two types of traders to segment themselves. However, this segmentation is not necessarily welfare improving.
Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: July 17, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I wish to thank the participants in the Friday Theory Workshop at the University of Sydney, and the participants at
the 17th Australian Theory Workshop at the University of Melbourne for comments and discussion. John Hillas and Stephen King
pointed out an omission in an earlier version, and Catherine de Fontenay and Hodaka Morita made extensive comments on earlier
drafts. This work was initiated while I was a short-term visitor at the University of Southern California. 相似文献
20.
Dictatorial domains 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Summary. In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined
on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates
that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide
an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial
and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.
Received: July 12, 2000; revised version: March 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their detailed comments.
Correspondence to: A. Sen 相似文献