On the impact of a tax shock in Portugal

In 1999, Cavaco Silva, the Portuguese Prime Minister from 1985 to 1995, proposed a comprehensive tax reform package, which is to this day the basic reference in the tax policy debate in Portugal. A tax shock would consist of 4pp cuts in the corporate income tax and in the firms social security contribution rates, and a 5pp reduction in the highest personal income tax rate. These cuts would be financed by combating tax evasion, curbing wasteful public expenditure and, if necessary, by increasing the VAT rate by up to 2pp. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model to evaluate the effects of this tax shock, we find that the long-term GDP gains would be between 0.72% and 2.91% while the effects on lifetime private welfare would range between -0.99% and 0.9%. The efficiency of this tax reform package depends critically on the way the tax cuts are financed to ensure deficit neutrality. Because investment is subject to adjustment costs, to alleviate the long-run trade-off between GDP and welfare, tax policy changes must induce a significant increase in net labor income.Received: July 2001, Accepted: March 2002, JEL Classification: C68, D58, E62, H21, H30Correspondence to: Alfredo M. PereiraA previous version of this paper was presented at the Society of Computational Economics and SPiE conferences. Thanks are due to Fernando Chau, Emanuel Santos, and two anonymous referees for very insightful comments and suggestions. The views in this article are of the authors alone and do not reflect the position of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance.     

Tax competition,tax coordination and tax harmonization: The effects of EMU

There is little doubt that the step towards a monetary union in Europe will increase both the distorionary effects of existing differences in national tax systems and the intensity of tax competition for internationally mobile commodity and factor tax bases. This paper discusses selected issues of commodity and capital tax coordination that are likely to be affected by monetary unification. Starting from the distortive present scheme of value-added taxation in Europe we first analyze the effects of a switch to a general origin-based VAT as a way to maintain national tax rate autonomy over this important tax base. While an origin-based VAT would neither distort trade flows — both within the EU and with third countries — nor investment decisions in the long-run, its short-run effects are likely to be severe in the absence of exchange rate flexibility. In the field of capital taxation the focus switches to the feasibility of regional harmonization measures when there is no cooperation with the rest of the world. We argue that in a monetary union the mobility costs of capital will be significantly lower within the EU as compared to outside investments. This provides an efficiency argument for minimum source taxes on both interest income and corporate profits even if cooperation with third countries is infeasible.     

Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe

In 2001, the European Commission proposed replacing the currentsystem of taxation of multinational companies by the taxationof a consolidated base, computed at the level of all the Europeanentities of a multinational enterprise, and then distributedfor taxation purposes among the various jurisdictions in whichthese entities operate, according to pre-established criteria.In this article, we propose a discussion, especially focusingon two related issues, the choice of the formula and the compositionof the consolidating area—either the entire European Union(EU) or some Member States within an Enhanced Cooperation Agreement—,as well as on their impact on the size and distribution of taxrevenue and economic activity, and on the intensity of tax competition.Our tentative policy conclusion is that the reform deservessupport provided that (i) the formula puts emphasis on criteriathat the firm may not too easily manipulate, (ii) the activitiesof the multijurisdictional enterprise are enough mobile, (iii)the consolidation is made compulsory within the consolidatingarea and (iv) the consolidating area protects its capacity toactually levy tax by adopting a crediting system vis-à-visthe rest of the world. (JEL code: H32, H73, H87)     

Sustainability-oriented tax-based own resources for the European Union: a European carbon-based flight ticket tax

The failed attempts of several European countries to introduce a flight ticket tax and the pressure on those European Union Member States still levying such a tax clearly demonstrate the limits of national aviation taxation. Assigning a carbon-based flight ticket tax to the EU level would reduce the tax enforcement problems inherent to mobile tax bases and put a stop to harmful tax competition between EU Member States. By replacing a part of national contributions to the EU budget a flight ticket tax can strengthen sustainability-orientation of the EU system of own resources. Using a new data set, which assigns to approximately 75 to 90% of the respective intra and extra EU routes flown in the year 2014 the corresponding carbon emissions per passenger, the paper estimates the expected revenue from implementing a carbon-based flight ticket tax at the EU level for carbon tax levels between 25 and 35€ per ton of carbon emissions.     

Why Have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined? Another Look

The relative constancy of non-financial corporate tax revenuesas a share of US GDP masks offsetting trends in the ratio ofcorporate profits to GDP (declining) and the average tax rate(increasing). The average tax rate rose steadily between 1996and 2003, an increase largely attributable to the importanceof tax losses. This rise casts some doubt on the role of taxplanning activities in reducing corporate taxes. So, too, doesthe relative stability of the rate of profit (relative to netassets), which might be expected to have declined had the understatementof profits for tax purposes been increasing. (JEL code: H25,G32)     

ASSESSING THE WELFARE IMPACT OF TAX REFORM: A CASE STUDY OF THE 2001 U.S. TAX CUT

This paper implements a relatively simple methodological approach to estimate the impact on family welfare of a specific tax reform. The measured impact can differ greatly from simple marginal tax rate comparisons, and conclusions about the distribution of the welfare impact can vary depending on the basis of comparison. For example, absolute welfare gains from the 2001 U.S. tax reform were concentrated among the highest and lowest income families, whereas welfare gains measured as a share of pre‐tax income are found to be nearly monotonically declining in income.     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

EU regional policy and tax competition

The European Union (EU) provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructures, i.e. roads and railways, which link the EU member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility. This raises the question of whether EU involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies. Moreover, an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition. We analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms. We show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition. In contrast, with regard to union-periphery infrastructure, the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures. Here, the effects on tax competition are ambiguous. Our results provide a rationale for EU-level regional policy that supports the development of intra-union infrastructure.     

The case for international tax co-ordination reconsidered

In a world of high capital mobility, governments may be tempted to undercut each other's capital income taxes to attract capital from abroad. Since such tax competition may have detrimental effects for all countries, European policy makers have debated the introduction of a minimum capital income tax rate within the EU. This paper develops an applied general equilibrium model to estimate the effects of such tax co-ordination on resource allocation, income distribution and social welfare. The model allows for the concern of policy makers that a rise in capital taxes within the EU may cause a capital flight out of Europe. Capital flight will indeed reduce the welfare gain from tax co-ordination within Western Europe, but a positive net gain will remain, although it is likely to be well below 1% of GDP. The gain from co-ordination will be unevenly distributed across European countries, due to differences in economic structures and in the social preference for redistribution. Moreover, even if the median voter's gain from tax co-ordination may be small, the gains for the poorer sections of society may be quite large.     

A cost‐benefit analysis of R&D tax incentives

Abstract.  Although technical knowledge generates spillover benefits, production of technical knowledge creates congestion externalities; thus, private R&D investment could be inefficient. A computable general equilibrium model is used to rank tax incentives by their effects on research effort and measure welfare effects. Five results stand out: R&D tax credits produce relatively large increases in research effort and welfare. Lower corporate income tax rates and ITCs for downstream users of high‐tech production inputs rank second. Revenue losses from lower personal income tax rates can produce welfare losses. Ironically, ITCs for upstream producers of innovative inputs are ineffective. Incremental R&D credits dominate comprehensive credits. JEL Classification: E62, H21, O38     

Laboratory Federalism: The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

In view of the concept of laboratory federalism, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), adopted by the EU as a mode of governance, can be interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. Its iterative design and focus on good practice are captured by the behavioral rule “imitate the best.” In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare recipients, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long‐run evolutionary equilibria) and decentralized best‐response behavior (Nash equilibria). The learning dynamics leads to coordination on a strict subset of Nash equilibria, favoring policy choices that can be sustained by a simple majority of Member States.     

Striking a balance: Optimal tax policy with labor market duality

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where employers may avoid making social security contributions by offering some workers “secondary contracts.” When calibrated using aggregate tax revenue data, the model delivers estimates of secondary “off the books” employment that are consistent with survey evidence for the EU14 and United States. We investigate the fiscal and welfare effects of varying the avoidable and unavoidable shares of labor income tax while keeping the total wedge constant, and find that increasing the employer component raises hours worked, output, and welfare. Partial labor tax evasion makes tax revenues more elastic, but full tax compliance need not be a welfare enhancing policy mix.     

生态赤字税：理论与实证研究框架

文章基于生态足迹核算方法和生态服务价值理论所确定的价格体系,在核算生态赤字及其价值并提出其价值补偿的环境税方案的基础上,将生态占用作为一种要素投入,构建绿色社会核算矩阵和环境税 CGE 模型,通过数值模拟比较分析了在5%、10%和30%的补偿强度下税收方案的环境效应、就业效应、增长效应、分配效应和贸易效应。模拟结果表明：(1)生态赤字税方案具有减少生态占用和增加就业的双重红利效应;(2)各部门的总产出和中间投入总体上下降,但名义 GDP 增长,绿色 GDP 增幅更大,而实际 GDP 则下降,表明税收政策会造成价格指数一定程度的上升;(3)政府税收收入因生态赤字补偿额度较大而增长较快,且增速高于劳动和资本要素报酬的增长,但居民收入和企业收入比重略有下降。基于我国资源与环境等税收在总税收中的比重,以及 OECD 国家的税制结构和变化趋势,文章最后建议生态赤字税的补偿性税率应低于5%。     

Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging?

The statutory rate and effective tax rate imposed on corporation income—as well as the dispersion of these rates—began to decline in the 1980s. Is this due to changes in the domestic determinants of corporate taxation or increases in international pressures for tax competition?This paper finds clear evidence that the corporate tax rate is insulated from a country's revenue needs: across countries, there is no association of the expenditure-GDP ratio with the corporate statutory rate and only weak evidence of a positive association with the average rate. There is suggestive, but not definitive, evidence that the domestic role of the corporate tax as a backstop to the individual income tax is important: across countries, there is indeed a strong association between the top individual rate and the top statutory corporate rate.There is intriguing evidence about the role of international competitive pressures on corporate taxation. Measures of openness are negatively associated with statutory corporate rates, although not with revenues collected as a fraction of GDP. Strikingly, larger, more trade-intensive countries do collect more corporate tax, but this may be because these countries are more attractive venues for investment.     

Taxes and firm investment

We investigate the firm-level investment response to unanticipated narrative shocks to average personal and corporate tax rates using a universal micro dataset of publicly-traded U.S. firms for the post-1976 period. Using local projections, we show that: (i) corporate tax shocks have significant effects on investment while personal tax shocks do not; (ii) corporate income tax responses are negative overall, and this result is driven by smaller firms who face larger borrowing constraints, especially when the accompanying monetary policy is contractionary or output gap is slack; (iii) there is some evidence of positive personal income tax responses during monetary contractions by dividend-paying firms, which is consistent with the recent literature.     

An integrated tax-subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction

A carbon tax is often cited by economists as an effective instrument to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, but there is little political interest in the United States. In light of this political unpopularity, we develop and examine a net-revenue constrained carbon tax and subsidy program. The optimal revenue constrained tax and subsidy schedule based on our utility maximization model taxes energy sources with high emissions to energy price ratio, and subsidizes sources with low emissions to energy price ratios. This approach may be more palatable than a traditional carbon tax because it can change the relative price of low and high emissions energy sources while providing a mechanism to limit net tax increases and energy price increases. We find that a constrained tax/subsidy program provides welfare gains relative to a no-tax scenario. Welfare gains are estimated to be 1% and 36% of the welfare gains from a Pigouvian tax for the motor fuels industry and electric power industry, respectively. In contrast, subsidies for low-emitting energy sources funded from general tax funds rather than from high-emission energy tax revenues lead to welfare decreases substantially below our proposed tax/subsidy policy approach.     

Social investment: A guiding principle for welfare state adjustment after the crisis?

The European welfare states have undergone a significant amount of change over the last decades. In light of the unresolved tensions resulting from changed macroeconomic conditions, the emergence of new social risks as well as from the consequences of the Great Recession and its aftershocks, more adjustments are needed. The present paper investigates the current outlook on welfare state change, retracing its socio-economic drivers and the salient steps that were undertaken to reform welfare states in the last decades. Since the outbreak of the crisis, calls to adopt a social investment perspective on welfare state reform intensified, both in the academic field and at the EU policy-level. Ample space is therefore devoted to the discussion of this perspective, its conceptual basis, and implementation. For a number of reasons, social investment seems the most appropriate approach to frame the objectives that contemporary welfare states have to pursue and to devise a consistent set of policies. The objections which have been moved against the social investment perspective have however to be taken seriously. Moreover, current developments indicate diverging trends across EU Member States, with lack of progress in those countries which are most in need of a social investment strategy. To become an effective policy paradigm, the social investment perspective thus needs a stronger anchoring within the EU architecture and more co-ordinated commitment from Member States.     

税制改革、经济效率和社会福利——基于A-KOLG框架下的动态CGE模拟分析

在经典的世代交叠动态一般均衡(A-K OLG)模型的基础上,建立了一个由一系列不等式方程组所构成的"跨期动态"模型,反现实地模拟了提高间接税同时降低直接税对我国社会福利、经济效率的影响。与基期相比,减少对资本征税会带来福利增长0.34%(纯经济效率提高0.25%),减少对劳动征税会带来福利增长0.1%(纯经济效率提高0.02%)。该实证结果证明了间接税比直接税更有利于实现经济效率的理论观点。因此,提高直接税的比重是需要以一定的经济效率损失为代价的,实行该项举措应该权衡好各方面利弊、把握好改革时机。     

欧盟研发税收激励政策的实施效果设计原则及发展方向

研发税收激励已成为各国激励企业研发投入的重要政策工具之一。本文综述了欧盟成员国研发税收激励政策实施情况及其效果，欧盟成员国实施研发税收激励政策的成功经验，欧委会提出的研发税收激励政策设计应该考虑的问题和遵循的一般原则，以及欧委会提出的成员国研发税收激励政策发展的方向。     

Effects of Capital Income Taxes on Welfare in an Overlapping-generations Model

This paper describes the short-run and long-run effects of various capital income taxes on welfare using an overlapping-generations model according to the 'new view'. It is in the nature of a survey, because some of the results from seminal papers in this field can be achieved, under weaker assumptions. The paper reaches the paradoxical and intriguing conclusion that the distortionary effects of a dividend tax in the long run and of capital gains tax in the short run improve economic welfare, and exceed the income effects.
JEL Classification Numbers: G3, H2.