共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
We consider an extension of the standard Rubinstein model where both players are randomly allowed to leave the negotiation
after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of known value. We show that, when the value of the outside opportunities
is of intermediate size, there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some with delayed agreements.
Considering outside opportunities of significant value, we prove that efficient delays arise caused by the bargainers' aspirations,
in waiting for their outside, option rather than by threats. Moreover, if taking the outside option decreases the probability
that the opponent receives an outside option in the future, then it is possible that exactly two equilibrium payoffs coexist.
In this latter case, inefficiencies may be created by agreeing too early. 相似文献
2.
Summary. In this paper the alternating offer model with an exogenous risk of breakdown is taken to explicitly model the bargaining process underlying the variable threat game (Nash, Econometrica, 1953). A modified version of the variable threat game without commitment is also analysed within a dynamic context. The limit set of subgame perfect equilibria is characterized in both dynamic versions. The analysis gives rise to different results than in the two standard models. By making additional assumptions the original results can be regained, indicating that these are implicitly present in the standard analysis.Received: August 29, 1995; revised version: November 11, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
3.
Summary. We study the least core, the kernel and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that
the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of
the space of all countably additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and the least
core is non-empty. Finally, we show that the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets contain the set of all countably
additive payoff measures in the prekernel.
Received: June 6, 1996; revised version: March 1, 1997 相似文献
4.
Summary. We consider a k-player sequential bargaining model in which both the cake size and the identity of the proposer are determined by a stochastic process. For the case where the cake is a simplex (of random size) and the players share a common discount factor, we establish the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect payoff which is efficient and characterize the conditions under which agreement is delayed. We also investigate how the equilibrium payoffs depend on the order in which the players move and on the correlation between the identity of the proposer and the cake size.Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: December 31, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
5.
John Wooders 《Economic Theory》1998,11(1):215-224
Summary. We show that the equilibrium of a matching and bargaining model of a market in which there is a finite number of agents at each date need not be near the equilibrium of a market with a continuum of agents, although matching probabilities are the same in both markets. Holding the matching process fixed, as the finite market becomes large its equilibrium approaches the equilibrium of its continuum limit.Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: September 24, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
6.
Keith Waehrer 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):171-181
Summary. In the model presented, a buyer uses competitive bidding to facilitate her purchase of a good (the primary good of the exchange). Not included in the original purchase is the possible procurement of a good related to the original
purchase: the supplementary good. The primary and supplementary goods are closely related; knowing a bidder's cost of producing the primary good implies
that the buyer can infer the bidder's cost of producing the supplementary good. I show that a bidding mechanism for the primary
good will fail to ensure an efficient allocation if the buyer learns the bid of the winner and the price of the supplementary
good is determined through sequential bargaining.
Received: August 22, 1996; revised version: June 23, 1997 相似文献
7.
Prabal Ray Chaudhuri 《Economic Theory》1997,10(2):335-360
Summary. We consider a generalized assignment model where the payoffs depend on the number of matchings that take place. We formulate
a simple non-cooperative game and look for subgame perfect equilibrium of this model. Existence is established for a wide
class of games. We also look at a refinement criterion which, for the standard assignment model, selects the -optimal outcome as the unique equilibrium. We then apply these concepts to a model of technology transfer between domestic
and foreign firms.
Received: June 24, 1994; revised version October 12, 1995 相似文献
8.
Niels Anthonisen 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):143-169
Summary. The paper introduces a version of rationalizability that ignores strategies that are supported by negligible sets of beliefs,
where a negligible set is one whose Lebesgue measure is zero. The theory is developed solely for the special case of point
rationalizability; conditions are then derived under which point rationalizability entails no loss of generality. When these
conditions obtain, the predictions yielded by this approach are often (although not always) a significant reduction over what
is predicted by rationalizability.
Received: September 10 1996; revised version: July 18, 1997 相似文献
9.
Robert Wilson 《Economic Theory》1998,12(2):433-440
Summary. The sequential equilibrium of an ascending-price auction of a single item is derived explicitly for the case of log-normal
distributions and a multiplicative valuation model comprising both common and private factors, and allowing asymmetries. If
the prior distribution on the common factors is diffuse, or of the form obtained by Bayesian updating from a diffuse prior
distribution, then the equilibrium strategies are log-linear with coefficients obtained by solving a set of linear equations.
A similar construction applies to normal distributions and additive terms in the valuation model. An example illustrates the
predictions derived from the model.
Received: December 11, 1996; revised version: July 15, 1997 相似文献
10.
Mehmet Bac 《Economic Theory》2000,16(1):227-237
Summary. I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information,
strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining is over a consumption good, in
equilibrium the “strong” buyer uses a restricted offer if his optimal consumption path is conservative relative to the “weak”
buyer. A pure restricted offer may even be a costless, efficient signal. When the good is durable, a pure strategic delay
is involved in signaling a strong bargaining position if the discount factor is high.
Received: June 24, 1998; revised version: May 30, 1999 相似文献
11.
Summary. Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index,
defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces
the same index. Moreover, this index agrees with the Shapley index constructed from the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
Received: May 30, 1996; revised version June 25, 1996 相似文献
12.
Summary. We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents,
maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by
optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.
Received: October 23, 1995; revised version: June 25, 1997 相似文献
13.
Rafael Tenorio 《Economic Theory》1999,13(1):247-260
Summary. I study a multiple unit auction where symmetric risk-neutral bidders choose prices and quantities endogenously. In the model,
bidders (a) may place non-linear valuations on the auctioned units, and (b) bid for several units at the same price (“lumpy”
bids). I characterize quantity-symmetric and strictly monotone-increasing price equilibria for discriminatory and competitive
auctions, and show that (i) if quantity strategy profiles are equal across auctions revenue- equivalence holds, (ii) expected
revenue is higher if bidders bid for the entire supply rather than for shares of it, and (iii) equilibrium allocations may
fail to be Pareto-optimal.
Received: April 14, 1995; revised version: September 3, 1997 相似文献
14.
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras 《Economic Theory》1998,11(3):563-584
Summary. We introduce a new core concept, called the two-stage core, which is appropriate for economies with sequential trade. We
prove a general existence theorem and present two applications of the two-stage core: (i) In asset markets economies where
we extend our existence proof to the case of consumption sets with no lower bound, in order to capture the case of arbitrary
short sales of assets. Further, we show that the two-stage core is non empty in the Hart (1975) example where a rational expectations
equilibrium fails to exist. (ii) In differential information economies where we provide sufficient conditions for the incentive
compatibility of trades. Namely, that no coalition of agents can misreport the true state and provide improvements to all
its members, even by redistributing the benefits from misreporting.
Received: December 20, 1995; revised version: December 6, 1996 相似文献
15.
This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. We show that when outside options are independent of the actions of other players all Markov perfect equilibrium without coordination failures are efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside options, all Markov perfect equilibrium may be inefficient. This formulation encompasses many economic models, and we analyze the distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation in four illustrative applications. 相似文献
16.
Summary. In the social learning model of Banerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] individuals take actions sequentially
after observing the history of actions taken by the predecessors and an informative private signal. If the state of the world
is changing stochastically over time during the learning process, only temporary informational cascades – situations where
socially valuable information is wasted – can arise. Furthermore, no cascade ever arises when the environment changes in a
sufficiently unpredictable way.
Received: December 5, 1996; revised version: February 11, 1997 相似文献
17.
In-Uck Park 《Economic Theory》1998,11(2):413-426
Summary. In a novel formulation of revealed preference analysis, Green and Osband [8] show that for expected-utility maximizers, acts
partition the state-simplex into linear polyhedral blocks. The question naturally arises whether this characterization distinguishes
expected utility theory from non-expected utility theories. This paper investigates the weighted utility theory of Chew [2]
and shows that the corresponding partition is systematically different from the expected utility theory: the boundaries of
the partition blocks are quadratic rather than linear. This result contains useful empirical contents.
Received: May 15, 1995; revised version: November 22, 1996 相似文献
18.
Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integral 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. The Choquet integral is an integral part of recent advances in decision theory involving non-additive measures. In this article
we present two new axiomatic characterizations of this functional.
Received: January 27, 1997; revised version: April 28, 1997 相似文献
19.
Julio Dávila 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):213-223
Summary. It is shown in this note that in an incomplete markets economy with uncountably many states of the world there may be uncountably
many isolated equilibria as well as uncountably many non-isolated equilibria. Moreover, both subsets can be simultaneously
of second category. Therefore, none of the subsets can be considered negligible with respect to the other, neither from a
cardinality point of view nor from a topological one. Unfortunately, this fact prevents from claiming that these economies
may have “typically” determinate equilibria – even though uncountably many of them – as would have been desirable for comparative
statics exercises.
Received: May 19, 1995; revised version: March 24, 1997 相似文献
20.
Summary. We show that when bankruptcy, subject to penalties, is allowed, it is possible to prove the existence of equilibrium in a model with a continuum of states without imposing any assumptions on ex-post endowments.Received: November 20, 1995; revised version: September 16, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献