员工持股计划中的高管认购研究

自2014年监管层对员工持股计划推出新规之后,实施员工持股计划的上市公司在逐渐增多,其中普遍存在的高管认购行为及其影响因素,有待理论探索.本文结合现实情况从高管对认购股份的获利预期和对激励方案的影响力出发,关注了管理者权力和管理者是否具有自利倾向两个关键公司治理因素对高管认购的影响.检验结果表明,事先异常在职消费较低时,管理者权力并不影响高管认购;只有管理者权力大且事先异常在职消费较高时,才会有较多的高管认购.而高管认购较多并没有在事后形成较好的激励效果.这一研究发现对辨析员工持股计划在激励分配上应更注重激励高管还是激励员工,具有重要的理论启示和现实借鉴意义.     

国有商业银行员工持股计划探析

2007年7月,中国建设银行在香港交易所发布公告,宣布已经制定了<中国建设银行股份有限公司员工股权激励方案>,并于公告之日起开始实施第一期激励方案,符合资格的约27万名员工获得总计8亿股的建行股份.此方案的公布,引起了社会各方的广泛关注和议论,各种声音的存在充分说明了大家对国有控股商业银行实行员工持股计划这一激励措施的关注程度.2007年8月27日,中国人民银行在其官方网站发布<坚定不移地深化国有商业银行改革>的长文,明确提出将从多方面继续深化国有商业银行改革,并要求尽快形成员工持股、高管层股票期权等在内的激励约束机制,央行的表态为国有商业银行进行股权激励指明了方向.     

上市公司员工持股计划的效果和问题研究

实施员工持股计划,是企业鼓励其员工持有本公司股票的一种有效方式,有利于完善员工与企业的利益共享机制。本文针对376家已实施员工持股计划的上市公司的研究表明:股权集中度高、盈利能力强的企业更倾向于实施该计划,实施该计划的公司市值增速和负债增速均显著高于未实施的公司;TMT(Telecommunication,Media,Technology)行业实施该计划,能显著提高公司的现金流量增速以及盈利增速。员工持股计划总体上受到市场正面评价,但在实践中也存在高杠杆风险、企业行为短期化等问题。建议将员工持股计划作为混合所有制改革的抓手加快推进实施,扩大行业覆盖面,加强事中、事后监管,完善员工持股计划的激励约束机制,建立多维度的税收优惠体系。     

Investment Plans and Stock Returns

When the discount rate falls, investment should rise. Thus with time-varying discount rates and instantly changing investment, investment should positively covary with current stock returns and negatively covary with future stock returns. Aggregate nonresidential U.S. investment contradicts both these implications, probably because of investment lags. Investment plans, however, satisfy both implications. These investment plans, from a U.S. government survey of firms, are highly informative measures of expected investment and explain more than three-quarters of the variation in real annual aggregate investment growth. Plans have substantial forecasting power for excess stock returns, showing that time-varying risk premia affect investment.     

Employee Stock Options and Investment

Exercises of employee stock options generate substantial cash inflows to the firm. These cash inflows substitute for costly external finance in those states of the world in which the demand for investment is high. Using the fact that the proceeds from option exercises exhibit a distinct nonlinearity around the point where options fall out of the money, we estimate that firms increase investment by $0.34 for each dollar received from the exercise of stock options. Firms that face higher external financing costs allocate more of the proceeds from option exercises to investment.     

Regulator Scrutiny and Bank CEO Incentives

This study analyzes the effects of monitoring intensity on compensation and turnover for CEOs of publicly-traded banks. Using a sample of banks from 1992 to 2004, I find that monitoring intensity plays a significant role in compensation levels, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and CEO turnover. The results show that CEOs from highly-rated institutions receive smaller pay than CEOs from competing institutions, and that monitoring intensity, as proxied by CEO age, influences the relationship between market performance and executive incentives. These findings suggest that regulatory ratings and CEO age impact optimal bank governance structure by varying incentive sensitivity to market performance.

股权激励与审计意见购买研究

上市公司股票期权激励计划公告日前,管理层有进行向下盈余管理的动机,以获取更低的行权价格.因此,管理层有强烈的审计意见购买动机以获得"清洁"审计意见.审计意见购买行为直接损害了审计质量和注册会计师的独立性,危及审计市场及社会经济的有效运行.本文站在独立研究者的角度,阐述了股权激励下审计意见购买的动机和方式,并提出相关防范...     

CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.     

IQ and Stock Market Participation

Stock market participation is monotonically related to IQ, controlling for wealth, income, age, and other demographic and occupational information. The high correlation between IQ and participation exists even among the affluent. Supplemental data from siblings, studied with an instrumental variables approach and regressions that control for family effects, demonstrate that IQ's influence on participation extends to females and does not arise from omitted familial and nonfamilial variables. High‐IQ investors are more likely to hold mutual funds and larger numbers of stocks, experience lower risk, and earn higher Sharpe ratios. We discuss implications for policy and finance research.     

Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation

We introduce explicitly the effort as a choice variable in a continuous time utility maximisation framework of an executive who is partly compensated with stock options. We solve the model in the case where the executive is not allowed to trade in the company’s stock but is able to achieve a partial insurance through trading in a correlated market portfolio. We define the executive’s value of the options through a certainty equivalence approach both in the case of European call options and non-standard capped stock options and study the behaviour of the reservation price as relevant parameters change.JEL Classification: G13, G30, G32, J33, M12     

Employee Stock Option Exercise and Firm Cost

We develop an empirical model of employee stock option exercise that is suitable for valuation and allows for behavioral channels. We estimate exercise rates as functions of option, stock, and employee characteristics using all employee exercises at 88 public firms, 27 of them in the S&P 500. Increasing vesting frequency from annual to monthly reduces option value by 11% to 16%. Men exercise faster, reducing value by 2% to 4%, while top employees exercise slower, increasing value by 2% to 7%. Finally, we develop an analytic valuation approximation that is more accurate than methods used in practice.     

Awareness and Stock Market Participation

The paper documents lack of awareness of financial assets in the 1995 and 1998 Bank of Italy Surveys of Household Income and Wealth. It then explores the determinants of awareness, and finds that the probability that survey respondents are aware of stocks, mutual funds and investment accounts is positively correlated with education, household resources, long-term bank relations and proxies for social interaction. Lack of financial awareness has important implications for understanding the stockholding puzzle and for estimating stock market participation costs. We thank Raman Uppal, the referee, Raffaele Miniaci and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the U.K. Financial Service Authority (FSA), the Universities of Padua, Salerno, Tilburg, Turin, and Venice for helpful comments. This work has been supported by the European Community’s Human Potential Programme under contract HPRN-CT-2002-00235 (AGE) and by the Italian Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR).     

股权质押、员工持股计划与大股东自利行为

现阶段,作为激发员工积极性及实现效率提升的员工持股计划出现了大量的"倒挂"现象.本文以我国2013-2017年全部A股上市公司为研究样本,研究探析倒挂现象背后的大股东行为逻辑和利益链条.研究发现员工持股计划的信号作用很可能成为大股东进行自利的工具.具体表现为:股权质押情况越多,则大股东自利动机越大,员工持股计划实施的次数越多、范围越大.其次,在股权质押企业中,员工持股计划能够短期拉升股价,并且当股权质押面临平仓风险时,员工持股计划的动机越大.第三,股权质押会增加股票来源于定向转让员工持股计划的实施,继而达到大股东减持的目的,同时大股东会把通过减持获得的资金用于赎回质押股票.上述结论对员工持股计划"倒挂"的现象给出了一种解释,在存在股权质押的企业中,员工持股计划的实施可能是大股东自利的工具,即为了实现大股东利益最大化.     

职工养老保险、隐含税收与提前退休激励

本文借鉴隐含税收理论构建职工养老保险退休激励精算模型,同时利用CFPS (中国家庭追踪调查数据)建立退休决策计量模型,考察我国职工养老保险制度对劳动者提前退休的激励效应。结果表明:养老保险存在显著的提前退休激励,代表性"中人"的最优退休年龄早于53岁;"视同缴费"是促发提前退休激励的重要制度原因;"缴费挤出效应"和"待遇拉动效应"是养老保险诱导劳动者提前退休的两个核心机制;男性、低收入、低教育水平、非党员劳动者面临更强的提前退休激励;降低缴费率、规范养老金增长机制、提高个人账户投资收益率是缓解养老保险制度提前退休激励的有效举措。     

Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options

We introduce a model that captures the main properties thatcharacterize employee stock options (ESO). We discuss the likelihoodof early voluntary ESO exercise, and the obligation to exerciseimmediately if the employee leaves the firm, except if thishappens before options are vested, in which case the optionsare forfeited. We derive an analytic formula for the price ofthe ESO and in a case study compare it to alternative methods.     

股市理性泡沫与创新激励

理性泡沫是一种在经济达到均衡状态时能够稳定存在的泡沫.本文重新讨论了理性泡沫的存在条件,与Tirole(1985)的结论有所不同.本文认为在经济动态有效的情况下,泡沫是仍然可以存在的.泡沫的出现对技术创新有一定影响,表现在对劳动型技术创新有促进作用,但是对于资本性技术创新则起到了消极的作用.     

An Analysis of Bank Charter Value and Its Risk-Constraining Incentives

Valuable bank charters have been hypothesized to provide bank managers self-regulatory incentives to constrain their risk taking. However, this paper presents evidence that charter value itself may derive from high-risk activities, indicating that minimizing risk taking also would limit the value of the charter. During economic expansions, bank charter values increase to reflect growth opportunities. In turn, high-charter-value banks gain easier access to equity capital sources for expansion. The result is a positive relationship between charter value and capital ratios during expansions. However, this relationship may invert during economic contractions. Panel regressions demonstrate that the charter value and bank leverage relationship is sensitive to market conditions.     

Analyzing the Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options

Employees tend to exercise stock options when corporate taxable income is high, shifting corporate tax deductions to years with higher tax rates. If firms paid employees the same dollar value in wages instead of stock options, the average annual tax bill for large U.S. companies would increase by $12.6 million, or 9.8%. These direct tax benefits of options increase in the convexity of the tax function. In addition, profitable firms can realize indirect tax benefits because stock options increase debt capacity. Although tax minimization is probably not the main motive for option grants, firms with larger potential tax benefits grant more options.     

Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises

This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings-per-share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities.