GM and corporate responsibility

Only by distinguishing corporate, moral, social and legal responsibility can GM know how to weigh and respond to its various responsibilities. Corporate responsibility stems from the ends for which the corporation is formed. In addition the corporation is responsible for meeting the moral demands that come from the moral law. The corporation is responsible for meeting legitimate social demands proposed by society. If society uses the law to express its demands, the demands yield legal responsibilities. Those demands that are social but neither moral nor legal may not be legitimate demands that GM must respond to at all. Richard T. De George, University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kansas, former President of the Metaphysical Society of America, and Vice President of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, is the author of Business Ethics and contributing co-editor of Ethics, Free Enterprise and Public Policy.     

Corporate responsibility and corporate personhood

In this paper, I consider the claim that a corporation cannot be held to be morally responsible unless it is a person. First, I argue that this claim is ambigious. Person flags three different but related notions: metaphysical person, moral agent, moral person. I argue that, though one can make the claim that corporates are metaphysical persons, this claim is only marginally relevant to the question of corporate moral responsibility. The central question which must be answered in discussions of corporate moral responsibility is whether corporations are moral agents or moral persons. I argue that, though we can make a case for saying corporations are moral agents, they are not moral persons, and hence, we can hold them responsible. In addition, we need not treat them the way we would be obligated to treat a moral person; we needn't have the same scruples about holding a corporation morally responsible as we would a moral person. Rita C. Manning is Lecturer at California State College, San Bernardino. She has published in Southern Journal of Philosophy and in Informal Logic.     

Environmental integrity and corporate responsibility

Environmental disasters like Bhopal have a way of calling attention to environmental and corporate ethical issues. This paper discusses these issues in terms of a livable environment as an inalienable right and of corporate responsibility as an philosophical and social psychological disposition that enables corporations to respect that right. The corporate conscience is compared to the individual conscience and analyzed according to the moral development theories of Lawrence Kohlberg. Its moral development is recognized as problematic from the cited performance records of some leading multinational corporations and from the anti-environmental lobbying efforts of the chemical industry itself. Outreach programs in environmental health associated with research projects in corporate ethics are suggested to develop the corporate conscience for preserving environmental integrity through corporate responsibility.Richard Guerrette is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Connecticut at Hartford. He is also a Research Fellow at Yale Divinity School where he is conducting a research study in organization management process and corporate ethics. He is an author of two books on ecumenical ministry and social movement organization in the church and has published extensively in theological journals. He operates EQUIPAX, an organization/management consulting service in Farmington, Connecticut.     

Unredistributable corporate moral responsibility

Certain cases of corporate action seem especially resistant to a shared moral evaluation. Conservatives may argue that if bad intentions cannot be demonstrated, corporations and their managers are not blame-worthy, while liberals may insist that the results of corporate actions were predictable and so somebody must be to blame. Against this background, the theory that sometimes a corporation's moral responsibility cannot be redistributed, even in principle, to the individuals involved, seems quite attractive.This doctrine of unredistributable corporate moral responsibility (UCMR) is, however, ultimately indefensible. I show this in several steps. After first locating UCMR in the context of the evolving debate about corporate moral agency, the paper reexamines cases cited in defense of UCMR and takes up the attempt to defend it by identifying corporate moral agency with corporate practices. A further section explores the claim that UCMR is a convention distinct from, yet compatible with, traditional natural notions of responsibility. The final section develops a notion of combined akratic agency to provide an alternate explanation, compatible with rejection of UCMR, of the phenomena which make the doctrine attractive. Jan Edward Garrett is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Western Kentucky University, with major interests in business ethics, the metaphysics of social organizations, and ancient philosophy. He has published on Aristotle's conception of techne (craft) in The Modern Schoolman (1987) and his article Persons, Kinds and Corporations: An Aristotelian View has appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. He attended Peter French's NEH Summer Seminar on Corporate Responsibility in 1983.     

Schefflerian ethics and corporate social responsibility

This paper examines some of the essential features of Samuel Scheffler's hybrid theory of ethics. Scheffler posits and defends a moral theory which is intended to be neither act-consequentialist nor fully agent-centered. Instead, it provides an agent-centered analysis of moral thinking: one that, unlike consequentialist theories, respects the personal integrity of the moral agent. In this paper I shall do the following: (1) Sketch some of the general points of Scheffler's proposal; (2) Apply Scheffler's ethical theory to the matter of corporate social responsibility; and (3) Raise some objections to this Schefflerian corporate social responsibility theory, along with some modifications of this hybrid theory of corporate social responsibility which are intended to evade such criticisms.The significance of this paper is that it shows that Scheffler's quite innovative ethical theory is problematic as a foundation for a theory of corporate social responsibility. J. Angelo Corlett is a research fellow in philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He has published philosophy papers in the Journal of Business Ethics, Business & Professional Ethics Journal, Public Affairs Quarterly, and the American Psychologist among other journals. His areas of interest include Social/Political Philosophy, Ethics and Value Theory. He is currently working on a book entitled Liberty and Equality: Analyzing Nozick and Rawls.     

The moral authority of transnational corporate codes

Ethical guidelines for multinational corporations are included in several international accords adopted during the past four decades. These guidelines attempt to influence the practices of multinational enterprises in such areas as employment relations, consumer protection, environmental pollution, political participation, and basic human rights. Their moral authority rests upon the competing principles of national sovereignty, social equity, market integrity, and human rights. Both deontological principles and experience-based value systems undergird and justify the primacy of human rights as the fundamental moral authority of these transnational and transcultural compacts. Although difficulties and obstacles abound in gaining operational acceptance of such codes of conduct, it is possible to argue that their guidelines betoken the emergence of a transcultural corporate ethic. William C. Frederick is Professor of Business Administration, Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. He is President (1990) of the Society for Business Ethics, former chair of the Social Issues in Management division of The Academy of Management, and was the Charles Dirksen Professor of Business Ethics at Santa Clara University in 1980–81. He is coauthor of Business and Society: Corporate Strategy, Public Policy, Ethics (McGraw-Hill, 1988).     

The foundations of corporate responsibility

The thesis of this paper is that corporate activity can best be understood on analogy with the acitivity of persons. The ground for this analogy lies in the nature of activity itself which is common to both and to find a ground therein an analysis of the features of activity is presented based upon a comparison of activity and process by Alburey Castell. Activity is said to be bi-polar with one pole the purpose or goal to be handled in utilitarean fashion and the other pole concerned with the maintenance of the presuppositions of activity.While any goal chosen will have hypothetical oughts as its conditions, it is argued that the presuppositions of activity are categorical oughts in that they cannot be denied without asserting them. And since one of these presuppositions is freedom of choice, thus giving activity the power to destroy its own possibility, these presuppositions function in the context of practice as categorical norms and are universal in their applicability as preserving the possibility of responsible activity for everyone else as well as myself. All activity whether it be other-regarding or self-regarding (self-interest in the business world) is subject to the norms of its own possibility, its enabling conditions, and this constitutes the moral ground for personal, managerial and a basis for inquiry into corporate responsibility.All of these ideas are put forth within the wider context of the problem of corporate legitimacy and constitute a prolegomena to it.     

The concept of corporate responsibility

Opening with Ford Motor Company as a case in point, this essay develops a broad and systematic approach to the field of business ethics. After an analysis of the form and content of the concept of responsibility, the author introduces the ‘principle of moral projection’ as a device for relating ethics to corporate policy. Pitfalls and objections to this strategy are examined and some practical implications are then explored. The essay not only defends a proposition but exhibits a research style and a research program. Philosophical ethics and organizational management are joined in the process.     

Organizational attention to corporate social responsibility and corporate social performance: the moderating effects of corporate governance

Many studies have explored the antecedents of corporate social performance (CSP), such as institutional forces and stakeholder pressures. However, few studies examine CSP from a socio‐cognitive perspective. To address this research void, this study adopts an attention‐based approach to examine the relationship between managers' attention to social issues and CSP. More important, this study reports that this relationship will be moderated by governance mechanisms that constrain managerial discretion. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, this study provides empirical support for these arguments. Therefore, our study adds new insights to the literature addressing CSP from a socio‐cognitive perspective and speaks to the structural features, both inside and outside organizations, that guide managers' attention.     

Living downwind from corporate social responsibility: a community perspective on corporate practice

This paper critiques dominant corporate social responsibility (CSR) theory, which claims that commercial and social goals overlap and coincide. It is suggested that this uncritical portrayal and treatment of complex industry–community relations risks neglecting the potential tensions that may arise should these goals diverge or be in conflict. In this context, the experiences of residents in a small Western Australian town are presented to describe a long‐running conflict between community members and their corporate neighbour. The data point to a range of community impacts as a result of corporate activities and unearth strong differences between ‘local’ and ‘corporate’ understandings of CSR. Based on the perceived shortcomings of an economically underpinned CSR approach, we question the possibility of meeting local needs by means of economic efficiency. Calls are made for critical reflection on the key assumptions underlying dominant CSR theory and consideration is given to questions of guidance for CSR practitioners.     

Public relations and corporate social responsibility: Some issues arising

The paper questions current assumptions about the benefits of corporate social responsibility and the claims that corporations make on behalf of their corporate social responsibility programmes. In particular, the paper suggests that the use of corporate social responsibility for public relations ends raises moral problems over the motivation of corporations. The paper cautions that the justifications which corporations employ may either be immoral or inaccurate with regard to the empirical evidence gained from a small-scale qualitative study carried out in the UK at a time when the practice of corporate social responsibility was expanding quickly (1989). It is noticeable, in retrospect, that great emphasis is placed upon environmental rather than social responsibility. This implies that organisations are primarily reactive in their development of corporate social responsibility programmes and that they respond to external pressures rather than working out the nature of their corporate responsibilities. It might suggest that corporations only take such actions when they feel compelled to do so by consumerist and environmentalist lobbies. The paper argues that corporations do need to find moral justifications for their moral activities and to ensure that corporate social responsibility practice lives up to the claims made by public relations practitioners. The paper explores the nature of public relations and illustrates how its responsibility for corporate social responsibility extends beyond truthfulness in publicity.Jacquie L'Etang has postgraduate degrees in history, public relations, and social justice. She is a lecturer in public relations at the University of Stirling, Scotland, teaching on the M.Sc. in Public Relations full-time and distance learning courses. She teaches design and editorial management, communications, and business ethics. Her research interests are in corporate social responsibility and the history of public relations.     

Business groups and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from China

This study investigates the impact of firms' business group affiliations on their performance in corporate social responsibility (CSR) in China. We find that firms with a dual-status of being a business group member and a state-owned enterprise (SOE) at the same time have weaker CSR performance. Our finding is consistent with the view that CSR engagement is a strategy for firms to pursue political legitimacy from the government and seek legitimacy in general from the public. The business group affiliation and the SOE identity together afford legitimacy to the firm and reduce its need to conduct CSR activities.Data availabilityAll data used in the study are publicly available from the sources noted in the text.     

浅谈公司治理对企业社会责任的影响

文章从公司的治理研究入手,详细的分析了企业社会责任与公司治理的关系,并有效地进行了内部和外部的治理机制验证,得到企业社会责任的进一步升华.     

Does corporate social responsibility influence corporate innovation? International evidence

Whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects corporate innovation remains controversial in the literature. We re-examine this issue using a newly available comprehensive innovation database on 20 countries and find support for the view that CSR performance fosters innovation. This effect of CSR is reflected on corporate innovation through its environmental and social dimensions. We also show that the effect of CSR on corporate innovation is less pronounced in emerging countries, but this is driven only by the environmental dimension of CSR. Finally, in comparison to common-law countries, we report a more positive impact of CSR on innovation in civil-law countries.     

Ethical corporate social responsibility: A framework for managers

Managers encounter difficulties in developing corporate social responsibility programmes. These difficulties arise from conflicting interests and priorities. Pressures may be both internal and external and corporate social responsibility programmes usually evolve from a combination of proactive and reactive policies. The first experiences of a company are likely to be reactive, in response to requests for equipment, sponsorship or charitable donations but companies soon become aware of the benefits of planned programmes. Planning implies objectives, performance criteria and evaluation, and a rational framework for decision-taking. This paper attempts to highlight problem areas for managers and to develop a pragmatic framework of analysis which will help identify and clarify corporate social responsibilities. The paper, which is written from a UK perspective discusses the contribution of stakeholder models and highlights limitations of this approach. It develops an ethical framework focused on concepts of responsibility.Jacquie L'Etang is a Lecturer in Public Relations at the University of Stirling, Scotland and teaches on the full-time and distance learning MSc degrees in Public Relations. She has postgraduate degrees in history, public relations and social justice and her main research interests are in business ethics and the theory, history and sociology of public relations.     

The limits of corporate responsibility standards

I explore the limits of corporate responsibility standards – for example Social Accountability 8000 (SA 8000), the Global Reporting Initiative, the Fair Labor Association workplace code – by looking at these initiatives through Derrida's aporias of justice as set out in ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’. Based on a discussion of SA 8000, I uncover the unavoidable aporias that are associated with the use of this standard. I contribute to the literature on corporate responsibility standards in general and SA 8000 in particular by showing (a) that attempts to standardise corporate responsibility can only be successful insofar as we recognise that compliance with SA 8000's rules requires a ‘fresh judgement’ every time they are applied, (b) that SA 8000 should not be pushed down the supply chain as such coercion does not require a truly responsible decision by suppliers and eventually leads to moral mediocrity and (c) that the necessarily time-consuming reflections about the singular contexts within which SA 8000 is applied challenge the urgent need for implementing this standard. I discuss the implications of my analysis of SA 8000 for corporate responsibility standards in general.