The Simple Welfare Economics of Network Externalities and the Uneasy Case for Subscribership Subsidies

The goal of universal service has dominated the telecommunications policy landscape for at least the past half century. This policy objective has been promoted with cross subsidies from long-distance telecommunications services to subscribers to local telecommunications service. The economic rationale for these cross subsidies is network externalities. In this paper, we show that: (1) the presence of network externalities, even if substantial in overall magnitude, does not generally justify a subscribership subsidy, even a well-designed one; and (2) the empirical realities of telecommunications markets make it unlikely that subscribership subsidies of any kind will increase social welfare.     

The Welfare of Investment Deductibility Under a Flat Tax

This paper analyses the welfare effects of investment deductibility in a contest of endogenous growth generated by learning–by–doing and knowledge spillovers. We present a model where a set of revenue neutral fiscal policies, each characterized by different degrees of investment deductibility and different uniform tax rates on income, have been introduced. We show that, given the ratio of public expenditures to national product, partial investment deductibility turns out to be welfare enhancing when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is sufficiently small. Our result means that a pure consumption tax—although ensuring more saving and faster growth—is not always preferable to a revenue neutral tax system in which both consumption and investment are taxed.     

Tax Policy and Tax Administration in Russia: The Case of the Banking Sector

The 'informal' sector of an economy is generally seen as a private sphere, where agents seek to escape the reach of the state and, in particular, the tax organs. However, given the weakness of the Russian state and the enormous scale of informal economic activity, the fiscal authorities try to cope, at least in part, by adopting informal strategies of their own. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of how this informal fiscal system actually works. While the analysis here focuses on the banking system, its implications for tax and accounting reform extend far beyond the banking sector.     

分税制下的地方财政收入——以陕西省为例的实证分析

中国在20世纪90年代中期进行了分税制改革以及政府间财政转移支付制度改革,建立了较为规范的预算管理体制和政府间财政转移支付体系.分税制改革对地方财政收入产生了深远影响.本文以陕西省为例,对1994-2006年陕西省财政收入数据进行实证分析,并依据分析结论评价分税制对地方财政收入的影响.本文的结论是:分税制改革促进了地方财政收入增长,但财政集中程度不高;地方财政收入和财政集中程度差异明显;财政收入在各级政府间分配不平均,转移支付政策调节作用不显著.     

个人所得税的累进性改革问题——基于单一个人所得税改革的前景分析

按照与市场经济运行机制相适应的要求,对个人所得税制度进行一次比较彻底变革,除了应在税基方面建立起分类与综合相结合的个人所得税制以外,一个核心的问题就是重构个人所得税的税率结构。我国可实行分两步走的渐进改革方案和一步到位的单一税改革方案。改革后的个人所得税制应该是按照递增的平均税率但又是递减的边际税率对全部所得课税这两方面的结合。中国具备实施单一税改革的政治、财政与技术条件,目前改革的时机也是合适的。     

Emission Trading with Fiscal Externalities: The Case for a Common Carbon Tax for the Non-ETS Emissions in the EU

A government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first-best level of public spending. When involved in emission trading, a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales. This fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries. Our theory explains how, and when, fiscal externalities may be expected to arise. Moreover, we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities, the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect: (1) the price of emission permits, (2) the global distribution of abatement effort, and (3) total greenhouse gas mitigation costs. This is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets. Our findings are especially relevant for the EU which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between EU member countries for all emissions outside the European Emissions Trading System.     

Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia

In a centralized federation, in which tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal government, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities. In this article, we test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federation. Russia's regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspected of tax auditing manipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s, increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the federal centre. Our findings confirm the existence of strategic tax collection for the Yeltsin period; the results for the Putin period are however ambiguous.     

The Tax Man Cometh: Constitutional Principles for Tax Enforcement

Passage of an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) overhaul bill in 1998 reflects the depth of American taxpayer frustration with the agency. We bring a constitutional, or rules of the game, perspective to tax enforcement. We examine political costs and benefits and agency discretion as reasons why tax enforcement by the government might deviate from the preferences of a representative citizen. We also examine prospects for reform. Lasting reform must alter the rules for deciding tax enforcement policy or the political pressures which yield excessive enforcement today will reemerge in the future.     

The BRICs and International Tax Governance: The Case of Automatic Exchange of Information

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the BRICs’ involvement in the adoption of Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) by the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a major breakthrough in the global fight against tax evasion. Our main questions concern the BRICs’ willingness to accept AEoI, and their agreement to the Western-dominated OECD as its institutional forum. First, we examine the domestic drivers for BRICs’ participation, as their statist model of capitalism reveals strong disincentives to join this regime and the fact that the budgetary consequences of the global financial crisis were less severe than in Western states. We argue that their agreement on AEoI results more from their persistent balance-of-payments vulnerability to illicit capital than from fiscal weakness, while also discussing the possibilities for mock compliance. Second, we review the role of the non-reciprocal US foreign account tax compliance act (FATCA) in shaping the BRICs’ preference for a multilateral AEoI-regime centred around the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS). Last, we show that the BRICs’ acceptance of the OECD resulted from pragmatic interests and receiving ownership over the process, together with the absence of coercive mechanisms within the CRS-regime that could fundamentally undermine their sovereignty in this domain.     

Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains From Nondiscrimination: the Case of Interest Taxation in Europe

This paper uses a game–theoretic approach to analyse the taxation of interest income in Europe in the presence of tax evasion. The model allows us to assess the success of various reform proposals. We argue that the tax treatment of nonresidents' interest income plays a crucial role. When decisions on discrimination and on withholding tax rates are made non-cooperatively, the outcome is similar to a prisoners' dilemma. All countries discriminate, but in equilibrium internationally mobile portfolio capital evades taxation successfully. In contrast, if all governments did not discriminate, tax competition leads to less tax evasion.     

个人所得税收入能力与税收流失的实证研究——以山东省为例

本文以山东省为例,把个人所得税收入能力分为现实收入能力和潜在收入能力两个层面。山东省个人所得税现实收入能力较全国平均水平为低,更远远低于国际水平。而从潜在收入能力来看,山东省个人所得税潜在收入能力巨大,但转化能力不足,税收流失率从2000年的37.75%增加到2007年的58.70%。究其根源,信息不对称、征管权与收入归属权不匹配、纳税人遵从率低和税制的低效等是造成这一现象的主要原因。     

Energy Tax and Competition in Energy Efficiency: The Case of Consumer Durables

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of anenergy tax on technical improvements and on prices ofconsumer durables induced by strategic competition inenergy efficiency. If the gasoline tax is raised thisdoes in principle not affect the producers of carsbecause the motorist pays for it in terms of a highercost of using the car. This, however, affects the unitsales of car producers because of substitution towardsother modes of transportation. A second element ofreaction to energy price variation is an indirect oneand relates to the effect of energy prices ontechnology. Competition forces car producers todevelop more energy efficient cars in order to reducethe cost of using a car. This indirect effect canpartly offset the direct effect of higher energyprices on demand if it is profitable for theautomobile industry to engineer more energy efficientequipment. We will analyze the impact of an energy taxon energy efficiency and on the price of a durablegood. This will be done within the framework of aduopoly competing in prices and in the energyefficiency of its products. The government chooses awelfare maximizing energy tax as an incentive toinnovate. Then we will analyze a strategic two-stagedecision process in which the duopolists first decideabout energy efficiency and then compete in prices.     

The Structural Power of Business and the Power of Ideas: The Strange Case of the Australian Mining Tax

In 2010 the Australian federal government fought and lost an intense and very public battle with the country's mining industry over the introduction of a new ‘super-profits’ tax. The proposed tax was withdrawn and the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, was removed from office. Why did the government lose this battle and what can this episode tell us about the nature and determinants of business power? We argue that business power is not an objective condition but is shaped subjectively and inter-subjectively. What counts in the power equation is not whether business investment is essential for growth or whether business will disinvest if a new tax is imposed, but whether actors believe this to be the case. One reason why the structural power of business varies is because actors’ normative and causal ideas about the value and determinants of business investment vary. In the Australian case ministers did not believe that the introduction of a new tax would jeopardise investment. Ministers did however come to believe that the mining industry had successfully persuaded a large number of voters that the introduction of a new tax would jeopardise investment, employment and growth. This is why the tax was eventually abandoned.     

确立财产税在地方税中的主体地位初探

探讨财产税作为地方税主体税种的理论及现实原因，分析我国现行财产税的缺陷，有利于建立与完善我国财产税体系。     

Assessing the Welfare Impact of Tax Reform: A Case Study of the 2001 U.S. Tax Cut

This note acknowledges a programming error in our paper, “Assessing the Welfare Impact of Tax Reform: A Case Study of the 2001 U.S. Tax Cut” (Review of Income and Wealth, 58(2), 233–56, 2012). Correcting the error primarily has the effect of scaling the calculated family welfare impact of 2001 U.S. Tax Cut. The primary conclusions from the analysis, however, are unaffected.     

税式支出管理的国际经验与我国的选择

目前我国财税改革的重心在于税收管理,而税收管理的关键则在于税收优惠管理.加强对税收优惠的管理可采用多种方式,但最有效的方式是借鉴国际成功经验,全面推行税式支出管理制度.国际上许多国家都建立了这项管理制度,并在统计、评价税收优惠,提升税收优惠政策有效性、合理化方面取得了较好的效果.本文在对税式支出管理的国际经验进行归纳总结的基础上,分析了我国税式支出管理的现实状况,并重点从科学合理确定税式支出范围、提升税式支出的法制化和规范化、建立完善的税式支出统计制度以及加强对税式支出进行成本效益分析等方面,提出了构建既与国际惯例接轨又具有中国特色的税式支出管理制度框架的设想.     

略论单一税视野中的新一轮税制改革

"单一税" 的税制设计模式,体现了拓展税基、降低税率、简化征管的中性税收思想.在我国税制改革中引入单一税的理念,符合社会分工演进中的税制调整趋势,有助于免除经济性重复征税.我国连续多年的预算超收,也具备了启动单一税改革的财力基础.在改革路径上,需要结合现实国情,逐步调整主体税种结构,实行长期性的低税政策.     

不能承受之税

策划前言 曹小姐花了数天时间,终于明白除了一张薄薄的个税单,她还要为增值税、关税、营业税埋单。但曹小姐至今没明白中国究竟有多少个税种,财政部和税务局说法不一,究竟是1 9个,还是20个,还是25个？