Information and Long‐Term Stock Performance Following Open‐Market Share Repurchases

We find that firm managers have private information when they decide on open‐market share repurchases, and that this information is significantly correlated with announcement period and post‐announcement abnormal returns. We further find that long‐term post‐announcement abnormal returns are related to private information differently for firms that actually repurchase shares when compared to firms that announce a repurchase program but do not acquire shares. Our results indicate that managers’ private information is only ambiguously revealed by the repurchase announcement, and that the market waits for the firm's subsequent actions, such as actual repurchase, to further interpret the private information.     

Investor protection,taxation, and dividends

We test the impact of taxes and governance systems on dividend payouts across countries. We show that, unlike previous studies, firms in strong investor protection countries pay lower cash dividends than in weak protection countries when the classical tax system is implemented, but they repurchase more shares to maximise their shareholders' after-tax returns. In weak protection countries, cash dividends and repurchases are low and less responsive to taxes. Our results suggest that when investors are protected, they weigh the tax cost of dividends against the benefit of mitigating the agency cost, but, when they are not, they accept whatever dividends they can extract, even when this entails high tax costs.     

A macro-analysis of financial decisions: An examination of special dividend announcements

This paper investigates macro-level explanations for why firms pay special dividends. We find both the business cycle and market condition affect the propensity and abnormal returns of special dividends. Firms are more likely to announce special dividends in market or economic downturns than upturns. They tend to use additional cash for business growth in expansions and distribute it to reduce agency costs in contractions. The signaling effect of special dividends is stronger and companies with these announcements are better performers in recessions than in expansions. This research sheds light on and enhances the understanding of why firms disburse extra cash dividends at the aggregate level.     

Elective stock and scrip dividends

We investigate firms' decisions to pay elective stock dividends, known in the UK as scrip dividends. Scrip dividends give investors the choice between receiving new shares or the equivalent value as a cash dividend. UK firms paying scrip dividends are more likely to be financially constrained, and scrip dividends are used more when access to external financing is costly. Our results are robust to using the 2008 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to credit supply. Cash preservation is the most important corporate incentive to use scrip dividends as they tend to be distributed in combination with dividend cuts and with major corporate investments such as debt-financed mergers and acquisitions. Analysis of US dividend reinvestment plans by which investors purchase new shares confirms firms' cash-preservation motives.     

Does Dividend Policy Relate to Cross‐Sectional Variation in Information Asymmetry? Evidence from Returns to Insider Trades

We examine the relation between dividends and information asymmetry by using insider returns as a proxy for information asymmetry. We find that dividends are negatively related to returns to insider trades across firms. Firms that pay consistently high dividends have lower insider returns than do firms that pay consistently low dividends. These results do not support traditional dividend signaling models. Rather, they are consistent with the proposition that firms with the highest dividends have the lowest levels of information asymmetry.     

Payout Policy with Legal Restrictions

We hypothesize that firms that face limitations on debt may use increased dividend payments to mitigate the free cash flow problem. Limitations on debt are implicit in state laws that restrict the firm from making payouts when the asset‐to‐liability ratio is low. We find that: 1) firms incorporated in states with stricter payout restrictions pay more dividends, 2) the probability of paying dividends or repurchasing shares decreases as firms approach a binding payout constraint, and 3) bonding with dividends is less prevalent with increased managerial equity holdings. In addition, antitakeover and director liability laws have a less consistent effect on payout policy.     

Stock Price Adjustment to the Information in Dividend Changes

This paper examines abnormal stock returns in the three years surrounding relatively large changes in dividends announced during the 1971 to 1990 period. The main results are that statistically and economically significant negative post-announcement abnormal returns of 11% and 17% over the post-announcement year are found for firms which decrease dividends and those which omit their dividends. Firms resuming and firms increasing dividends do not exhibit significant abnormal returns, on average, over the post-announcement year. The pattern of lagged price adjustment to negative dividend change information differs from that reported for 'earnings surprise' firms in important respects. While the dividend change firms do exhibit returns behavior consistent with year-to-year returns momentum, differences in prior year returns do not explain the differences in returns over the post-announcement period.     

Why do CEOs agree to the discipline of dividends?

This study investigates dividend initiation as the product of the imbalance of power between shareholders and management in U.S. firms from 2003 to 2012. We find that dividend initiation is associated with a stronger governance structure (strong shareholders' rights and board independence), in accordance with the outcome model. We do not identify a single motivation for dividend initiation. Dividend-initiating firms tend to rely on various forms of governance balanced by the interests and ownership of CEOs and directors. Firms with institutional owners are more likely to initiate dividends concurrent with the turnover of the CEO. Dual CEOs initiate dividends when they own more shares, and boards of directors initiate dividends with a higher personal ownership stake when shareholders' rights are weak. We also find that when initiation is due to stronger governance, it is significantly related to the firm's investment opportunities, while for weak governance firms, that relationship is not observed. We interpret this as evidence that, under weaker governance, the decision to initiate dividends is motivated by agency conflicts rather than investment or capital structure considerations.     

The Christmas effect—Special dividend announcements

This paper examines the Halloween effect in special dividend announcements. We find that firms are more likely to announce special dividends at the end of a year, especially in the months of November and December. There is a Halloween effect in the announcements, but more importantly, there is a Christmas effect in the propensity and abnormal returns of special dividends. This paper provides initial evidence on the Christmas effect of special dividend payments. It links monthly effects in stock returns and corporate events to explain the likelihood of the occurrence of special dividend announcements. The results of this paper shed light on why corporate events are more likely to occur in some periods, but less likely to occur in others.     

Productivity and payout policy

I investigate how a firm's total factor productivity (TFP) is related to its payout policy. I find that firms with higher TFP are more likely to pay dividends and repurchase shares. Such firms also pay higher dividends and repurchase more shares, even after controlling for income and other factors known to affect payout policy. Results are robust to propensity score matching and other analyses, including adoption of productivity-enhancing technology. I find that firms with higher TFP earn higher future operating income; productive firms with higher agency concerns pay back more, thus draining resources that could potentially be misused.     

PO Lock-in Agreements in the UK

When a company offers shares in an initial public offering (IPO), existing owners often enter into lock-in agreements prohibiting them from selling shares for a specified period after the IPO. There is some recent US evidence of predictable share-price movements at the time of expiry of these lock-in agreements. Using a sample of 188 firms, 83 classified as high-tech and 105 others, that went public on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) during 1992–1998, we focus on the characteristics of lock-in agreements in the UK and on the behaviour of stocks returns around the lock-in expiry date. We find that the lock-in contracts of LSE-listed firms are much more complex, varied and diverse than US contracts, which usually standardise the lock-in period at 180 days after the IPO. We also find evidence of negative abnormal stock returns at and around lock-in expiry of similar magnitude to those reported in US studies. However, these abnormal returns are typically not statistically significant. While the deterioration in stock returns immediately around the expiry date appears to be particularly much more pronounced for high-tech stocks than for others, the differences in performance are not statistically significant.     

Private Information and the Exercise of Executive Stock Options

This paper finds strong evidence that executives use private information when exercising their stock options. The most informed executives tend to exercise early, do not exercise on the vest date, do not exercise to capture dividends, exercise a high percentage of their options, and exercise when the option is the least in‐the‐money. We also find that exercises around resignation and retirement are followed by significant negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, the operating performance of firms following exercises motivated by private information is significantly worse than that of firms in which the exercises are not motivated by private information.     

The impact of hedging on the market value of equity

We examine the annual stock performance of firms that disclose the use of derivatives to hedge over the period 1995 to 1999. We find that only 21.6% of publicly traded U.S. corporations in our sample hedged with derivative instruments over this period and their use is concentrated in the larger companies. Similar to other studies we find that when derivatives are used, interest rate and currency securities are used much more frequently than commodity products. Our sample of 1308 companies that hedge outperforms other securities by 4.3% per year on average over our sample period. This result is robust to several alternative methods of estimating abnormal returns. When we segment performance by the type of hedge used, however, we find that the over-performance is due entirely to larger firms that hedge currency. We find no abnormal returns for firms hedging either interest rates or commodities. The abnormal returns in firms hedging currency is robust to alternative models that seek to control for exchange rate fluctuations and global equity returns; however, we find no significant abnormal returns to currency hedgers when using an augmented model that controls for the role of intangible assets.     

Who Blinks in Volatile Markets,Individuals or Institutions?

We investigate the relationship between the ownership structure and returns of firms on days when the absolute value of the market's return is two percent or more. We find that a firm's abnormal return on these days is related to the percentage of institutional ownership, that there is abnormally high turnover in the firm's shares on these days, and that this abnormal turnover is significantly related to the percentage of institutional ownership in the firm. Taken together, these results are consistent with positive feedback herding behavior on the part of some institutions, particularly mutual and pension funds.     

Dividends,Corporate Monitors and Agency Costs

We report new evidence on the hypothesis that dividends reduce agency costs. Consistent with dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency costs, we find that, on average, firms with a majority of strict outside directors on their boards experience significantly lower mean abnormal returns around the announcements of sizeable dividend increases. Our results are robust to multivariate controls for firm size, leverage, ownership, growth options, and change in dividend yield. However, we find no evidence that dividend increases reduce agency costs as measured by poison pills or outside blockholdings.     

The effect of merger anticipation on bidder and target firm announcement period returns

This paper examines investors' anticipation of bidder and target merger candidacy and if investor anticipations about candidacy affect the distribution of value between bidder and target firm shareholders. We find that bidder firms can be predicted more accurately than target firms. To investigate how merger announcement period returns are distributed among bidder and target shareholders, we control for different degrees of predictability in bidder and target selection and find that the difference between bidder and target firm three-day cumulative abnormal returns around a merger announcement decreases significantly. Thus, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the asymmetry in investor anticipations about merger candidacy causes disparity in bidder and target firm announcement period abnormal returns.     

Cross‐listings and dividend size and stability: evidence from China

We investigate the relationship between cross‐listings and dividend policy. We find that Chinese cross‐listed firms have lower and more stable dividends than their non‐cross‐listed peers, and that dividends become more stable the longer a company has been cross‐listed. We also find the strength of the cross‐listing/dividend policy relationship varies based on the market where the shares are cross‐listed. The strength of the relationship varies from B‐shares (least strong) to Hong Kong shares (stronger) to American Depository Receipts (strongest). Our results indicate cross‐listings may influence both dividend size and stability, and that this influence can vary by the type of cross‐listing.     

Payout policy in Brazil: Dividends versus interest on equity

We examine the impact of tax burden on cash distribution using a sample of Brazilian firms, which are allowed by law to distribute cash to shareholders in two forms: dividends and tax-advantaged interest on equity. The Brazilian institutional setting is superior to those used in prior studies that examine the choice between dividends and capital gains because, in some cases, dividends provide advantages that outweigh their negative tax consequences, leading firms to rationally choose payout policies that are not optimal when viewed only from the perspective of taxes. We find that taxes are a primary determinant of Brazilian firms’ payout policy decisions, as profitability and payout ratios (nonequity tax shields) are positively (negatively) related to the likelihood that a firm pays interest on equity. However, many firms continue to pay dividends despite the tax advantages of interest on equity payments. Abnormal returns around payout policy announcements suggest that these firms are, at least in part, catering to investor demand.     

A TEST OF THE EASTERBROOK HYPOTHESIS REGARDING DIVIDEND PAYMENTS AND AGENCY COSTS

Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividend payments may be an ambiguous signal unless the market can distinguish growing firms from disinvesting firms. Shares of growing firms that announce both financing and dividend increases are predicted to rise more in value than shares of firms announcing a dividend increase alone. We examine the relation between prior financing activity and the market response to initial dividends and find evidence consistent with the Easterbrook agency cost model.     

Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy

We examine the relation between institutional holdings and payout policy in U.S. public firms. We find that payout policy affects institutional holdings. Institutions avoid firms that do not pay dividends. However, among dividend‐paying firms they prefer firms that pay fewer dividends. Our evidence indicates that institutions prefer firms that repurchase shares, and regular repurchasers over nonregular repurchasers. Higher institutional holdings or a concentration of holdings do not cause firms to increase their dividends, their repurchases, or their total payout. Our results do not support models that predict that high dividends attract institutional clientele, or models that predict that institutions cause firms to increase payout.