Subsidizing power

This study explores whether the amount of fossil fuel subsidies paid by the government is subject to an election cycle. Theoretically, it is not a priori directly clear whether the provision of fossil fuel subsidies should go up or down when elections are upcoming. On the one hand, governments may reap electoral benefits from offering additional support in an election year since voters generally prefer candidates from whom they expect to receive greater material well-being by reducing the prices of basic goods. On the other hand, if the number of recipients is only small or when they are politically not well organized, reducing fossil fuel subsidies to finance a tax cut or an increase in other public spending areas that benefit and attract more voters might be a more successful re-election strategy. My main empirical findings clearly show a U-shaped election effect. It turns out that election cycles encourage fossil fuel support only in countries that have either a large or small fossil fuel demand. In these countries, governments are more inclined to provide additional fossil fuel support in an election year. In turn, I do not find any significant evidence for the notion that upcoming elections create a window of opportunity to reduce fossil fuel subsidies. Finally, the significant election effects are in particular visible during presidential elections.     

Referendum and the choice between monarchy and republic in Greece

Drawing on the 1974 Greek parliamentary elections and constitutional referendum which abolished the monarchy, the paper employs a spatial decision model to examine the strategic use of a parliamentary election and a non mandatory referendum by an agenda setter. The parliamentary election bundles two issues, the right to form a government and the right to choose the form of state. This implies that the election campaign efforts to attract votes are different from the campaign efforts to win an election for government and a separate referendum for the form of state. The choice of the agenda setter turns out to depend on his costs of campaign efforts in the different contests relative to those of the opposition, his benefits to be gained from winning the different contests, his comparative electoral appeal and the probability that the referendum secures his favourite outcome.     

A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy

This paper presents a dynamic model of elections, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate votes strategically by taking into account the likely governments that parties would form based on their representation and the policies they would choose as a function of the status quo. The status quo thus affects both the election outcomes and the bargaining power of the parties during government formation. A formateur party therefore has incentives to strategically position the current policy to gain an advantage in both the next election and the subsequent bargaining over government formation and policy choice. These incentives can give rise to centrifugal forces that result in policies that are outside the Pareto set of the parties.     

Divided government and dominance solvability

This paper considers strategic voters who face an institutional structure in which there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule and the legislature, elected by proportional rule. Policy outcomes are described through a compromise between these two branches. I solve the game by relying only on purely non-cooperative behavior of individual voters. I prove the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the legislative subgame, where the election of the president is known. This equilibrium can be obtained by the process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. I then solve the whole game by backward induction. The results suggest moderate behavior of voters, due to the desire to balance the plurality of a party in the presidential election by voting for the opposite party in the legislature. Similar results can be obtained in the case of reverse timing of the elections, as well as in the case where elections of the two branches of the government are simultaneous.     

Local elections and consumption insurance

During our sample period from 1987 to 2002, Chinese villages completed the transition from government‐appointed village leaders to elected ones. This article examines if and how much democratic elections of the village leaders affected consumption insurance by Chinese village residents. Exploring a panel dataset of 1,400 households from this period, we find that consumption insurance is around 20 percent more complete with elected village leaders. Furthermore, local elections improve consumption insurance only for the poor and middle‐income farmers, but not for the rich. The results are robust when we allow for pretrending, potential endogeneity of elections, and higher measurement errors for rich residents. We also find that the effects on consumption insurance are stronger when closer to the upcoming election year and when the village committees consist largely of non‐Communist Party members. These findings suggest that the election effects on consumption insurance partly come from increasing accountability to local constituents.     

Divided government versus incumbency externality effect—Quasi-experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions

This paper explores the causal relationship between vote outcomes in different elections. We ask: (1) Does the partisan identity of the mayor influence the voter's decision in subsequent town council elections? (2) Do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election? The analysis mainProd. Type: FLPly relies on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes based on municipal level data for Germany. We find that the party of the mayor can receive a significant bonus in the next town council election. Moreover, voters punish mayor candidates of parties that performed strongly in earlier council elections. Throughout the paper, we highlight how these findings can be related to an incumbency externality effect and to the theory of divided government.     

Election frequency,choice fatigue,and voter turnout

Influential scholars have argued that frequent elections lead to voter fatigue and can therefore be directly responsible for low turnout in countries characterized by frequent contests. However, other theories predict that frequent elections can even increase turnout. The existing empirical evidence is problematic as it simply correlates election frequency with turnout. By contrast, I exploit a natural experiment in the German state of Hesse, where voters from different municipalities faced the same electoral contest but experienced different election frequency, due to the staggered timing of some local elections. I find that when two elections are scheduled within a relatively short period of time, voter turnout at the later election is significantly reduced. This effect is stronger when the election is deemed less important in the eyes of the voters. Election frequency thus might also partly explain the wide turnout gap between first- and second-order elections, as suggested by Lijphart (1997).     

The effects of earmarks on the likelihood of reelection

Many models predict that incumbent legislators use government spending – “pork barrel” spending – to increase their vote shares in elections. To date, however, evidence for this hypothesis is scarce. Using recently available data on the sponsorship of earmarks in U.S. appropriations legislation, this paper tests the effects of earmarks on the likelihood of legislators' reelection. The results show that secured earmarks lead to higher vote shares. The analysis demonstrates that a $10 million increase in earmarks leads to as much as a one percentage point increase in vote share on election day. Furthermore, the paper tests for voter responses to earmarks when earmarks have few or many sponsors.     

Zur Wahlzyklik wirtschaftspolitischer Maßnahmen

Summary Election cycles of economic policy measures: An empirical test of the votemaximizing hypothesis.A special characteristic of the economic theory of democracy lies in the assumption of the behaviour of politicians: they are not as much striving for the advancement of public interest but display much rather a behaviour of utility maximization. It is their goal to win the next elections. Public preferences are taken into consideration only because voters seem to favour the political party whose election pledge most closely corresponds to their own ideas. Assuming further that voters are forgetful, we can derive the hypothesis that governments set popular (i.e. vote capturing) economic policy measures ahead of elections and unpopular ones right afterwards. In this paper we test this hypothesis using the increase of political prices and the development of certain categories of public expenditure as explanatory variables.Administered prices and public tariffs proved greatly dependent upon the timing of elections. For all of the tariffs under examination a statistically significant predominance of increases (unpopular) could be observed shortly after elections. The extent of the increase, however, does not appear to have any correlation with the election date.As to popular government expenditures, only subsidies have been paid clearly in line with election cycles in the period under consideration.As to further spending categories, our hypothesis appears to be directionally confirmed, yet the data available is infufficient for a statistically significant proof. Besides, especially in the case of Austria, other factors seem to be important in the determination of economic policy measures as well. Some reasons are given in this paper.     

Damaging democracy? Security provision and turnout in Afghan elections†

In emerging democracies, elections are encouraged as a route to democratization. However, not only does violence often threaten these elections, but citizens often view as corrupt the security forces deployed to combat violence. We examine the effects of such security provision. In Afghanistan's 2010 parliamentary election, polling centers with similar histories of pre‐election violence unintentionally received different deployments of the Afghan National Police, enabling identification of police's effects on turnout. Using data from the universe of polling sites and various household surveys, data usually unavailable in conflict settings, we estimate increases in police presence decreased voter turnout by an average of 30%. Our results adjudicate between competing theoretical mechanisms through which security forces could affect turnout, and show behavior is not driven by voter anticipation of election‐day violence. This highlights a pitfall for building government legitimacy via elections in weakly institutionalized and conflict‐affected states.     

Do business cycle peaks predict election calls in Canada?

This paper examines the empirical regularity that in Canada business cycle peaks and federal elections have tended to arise together over the long post-Confederation time period following 1867. We argue that rather than being simultaneous, the two events are related sequentially and that causality can be identified properly if the selection issue associated with observed events is addressed carefully. Our results suggest that business cycle peaks lead federal elections rather than the other way around. Such a finding reinforces the hypothesis of strategic election timing for such countries and is insightful in helping to explain why the presence of a political business cycle is harder to establish for parliamentary governments where the date of the next election is under the control of the incumbent governing party than in democratic systems where governing durations and election dates are fixed.     

Electoral uncertainty and financial volatility: Evidence from two‐round presidential races in emerging markets

We study how the predictability and the decisiveness of electoral outcomes affect financial volatility. We argue that traders’ optimal investment strategies depend on their ability to make accurate electoral forecasts and the prospective losses associated with placing a bet on the wrong candidate. Using a triple difference‐in‐difference approach and data from two‐round presidential elections in five Latin American countries between 1999 and 2018, we find that financial volatility is greatest in the days immediately following unpredictable, decisive, elections. Postelectoral volatility also occurs following predictable, indecisive elections. The effect of learning the identity of the winning candidate on financial volatility is null when the election is unpredictable and indecisive, as well as when the election is decisive, but the outcome is predictable. These findings offer insights into investors seeking to hedge price risk around elections. They also have important implications regarding the relationship between public opinion polls and postelectoral financial volatility.     

Fixed versus flexible election terms: explaining innovation in the timing of Canada’s election cycle

This paper argues that there is an efficiency gain underlying the recent adoption of legislation calling for a fixed 4-year governing term by the federal and most provincial governments in Canada. The efficiency gain arises from foreclosing an externality produced by the Canadian constitutional provision that sets a maximum length for a legislative term (5 years) while allowing the governing party (through the Governor General) to dissolve the House early. Because the opportunistic use of surprise can improve the governing party’s probability of winning, strategic choice can lead to elections being held at times that most disadvantage the incumbent’s rivals. Evidence from Canada is introduced suggesting that federal elections became less predictable through successive reductions in the campaign time given to competitors, thus raising the cost of this externality. The same reasoning suggests that the party most likely to propose this legislative innovation will be the party in opposition rather than in power and/or the new leader of an established party facing loss in the upcoming election. By fulfilling the fixed term even when it could benefit by calling the election early, the party establishes a precedent that raises the political cost to others of cancelling the fixed term legislation.     

Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models

Electoral equilibria depend upon candidates' motivations. Maximization of expected vote share may not lead to the same behavior as maximization of the probability of winning the election. Accordingly, it is desirable to understand when electoral equilibria are insensitive to the choice of candidate motivations. This paper examines sufficient conditions for local equilibrium equivalence between expected vote share maximization and maximization of probability of victory in the spatial model of elections with probabilistic voters.     

Moderation of an ideological party

It is a common fear in many countries that ideological parties will come to power through elections but will implement extreme policies. Many countries cope with this problem by overriding the election results when such parties are elected. We demonstrate that the alternative approach of containing these parties within the democratic system is more effective. We show that, as the probability of state's intervention in the next elections increases, an ideological party implements a more extreme policy in equilibrium. This hurts the median voter. Our main result shows that from the median voter's perspective, the optimal intervention scheme can be implemented by committing not to intervene and adjusting election times appropriately. That is, elections are a better incentive mechanism than the threat of a coup.     

Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office by lot

Contrary to modern democracies ancient Athens appointed large numbers of government officers by lot. After describing the Athenian arrangements, the paper reviews the literature on the choice between election and lot focusing on representativeness of the population, distributive justice, minimization of conflicts, quality of appointees and administrative economy. It then examines why in drawing up the constitution a self-interested citizen may give up voting for government officials and appoint them by lot. It is shown that appointment by lot is preferred when the effort required to choose candidates is less than the benefit expected from their actions as government officials. It is also found that, given the choice, office motivated candidates may unanimously agree to selection by lot but not to election.     

Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies

This paper explores the impact of elections on public investment. Working with a sample of 67 presidential and parliamentary democracies between 1975 and 2012, we find that the growth rate of nominal public investment is higher at the beginning of electoral cycles and decelerates thereafter. The peak in public investment growth occurs 28 months before elections, and each month closer to the next election the growth rate of public investment declines by 0.7 percentage points. Other political variables, such as cabinet ideology and government fragmentation have less influence on short-term public investment dynamics. Fiscal rules and stronger institutions seem to attenuate the impact of elections on investment, but available information is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. These results are robust to a number of controls, including for fixed elections.     

The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments

The paper develops a model explaining why IMF programs are less likely to be concluded before national election dates. Since conclusion of an IMF arrangement may signal the incumbent's incompetence, rational voters use this signal when deciding upon his re-election. In order to demonstrate competence, politicians may therefore decide not to conclude IMF programs prior to elections. The model also shows that re-election probabilities of politicians who nevertheless conclude arrangements at election times depend on the state of the economy. Using panel data for 96 countries between 1976 and 1997, the model is tested empirically. The results show that conclusion of an IMF arrangement within six months prior to an election increases re-election probabilities when GDP growth is low, but reduces the chance to win an election with high growth rates.     

SEQUENTIAL VOTING WHEN LONG ELECTIONS ARE COSTLY

This paper analyzes sequential voting in binary elections when voters are motivated by a desire both to elect their preferred candidate and to avoid a long and costly election. I find a unique equilibrium in which a voter's action depends both on the intensity of the voter's preferences as well as how well the candidates have done in earlier voting rounds. This equilibrium results in momentum in which voters are more likely to vote for the candidate currently in the lead. Furthermore, the probability a voter votes for a candidate is increasing in the size of the candidate's lead. As a consequence, a candidate is more likely to win the election if the candidate's stronger supporters vote earlier in the election.     

Independent electoral management bodies and international election observer missions: any impact on the observed level of democracy? A conceptual framework

What kind of institutions are needed to stabilize and foster democracy? Clearly elections are crucial and much of the institutional and legal surrounding of elections has been subject to research. Two institutional variables have been neglected though, specifically in empirical research: Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and International Observer Missions (EOMs). Can EMBs and EOMs foster free and fair elections? If yes, under what conditions? And what kind of competences are needed for them? We hypothesize that both can become crucial institutions for free and fair elections. Whereas independent central banks or audit courts control special issue areas in order to take certain decision out of the realm of politics, EMBs control the moment of the set-up of government—the election, when conflicts of interest of politicians are at its peak. Although other kinds of independent administrative agencies have been the subject of political science and economic research, EMBs and EOMs have also been neglected here. This article undertakes to outline a conceptual framework for testing various hypotheses on the institutional set-up of EMBs. Hypothesizing that de iure and de facto independence of EMBs foster fair elections, the detailed institutional set-up of EMBs as independent variable is outlined in order to test for the level of democracy as a dependent variable. Furthermore, the importance of EOMs as well as their interaction effect with EMBs is analyzed. Although by now EOMs are sent to almost any country with elections, their impact has not been analyzed in an encompassing way in spite of that the mission have intensified in their work, have become more costly and their verdicts are gaining ever more publicity.