Does independent directors’’ monitoring affect reputation? Evidence from the stock and labor markets

Using novel data on independent directors’ opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying “no” to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said “no.” We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.     

Predicting the next step of a random walk: experimental evidence of regime-shifting beliefs

Barberis et al. (J. Financial Econ. 49 (1998) 307), construct a model in which investors use the prevalence of past trend reversals as an indicator of the likelihood of future reversals. While such “regime-shifting” beliefs are consistent with a variety of psychological theories, other contrary predictions are consistent with the same theories. We report two experiments with MBA-student participants that strongly support the existence of regime-shifting beliefs. We conclude that regime-shifting models can provide a useful framework for understanding market anomalies, including underreactions to earnings changes and overreactions to long-term earnings trends.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Cost of Adverse Selection

Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000, was designed to prohibit disclosure of material private information to selected market participants. The informational advantage such select participants gain is unclear. If multiple “insiders” receive identical information, private information is immediately incorporated in price and each insider has zero expected profit. If, on the other hand, Regulation FD has curtailed the flow of information from firms, private information becomes longer‐lived and more valuable. Hence, market makers will demand increased compensation by widening the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread. We identify the cost components of the bid‐ask spread for a sample of NASDAQ stocks surrounding the implementation of Regulation FD. Controlling for other factors affecting the spread, we find that adverse selection costs increase approximately 36% after Regulation FD. We interpret our finding as Regulation FD failing to achieve one of its desired objectives.     

Stock Returns and Open-Market Stock Repurchase Announcements

Recent studies document stock price underreactions and overreactions. This evidence is extended by studying open-market stock repurchase announcements. Repurchase announcements were chosen for the study because of the uncertainty regarding the appropriate interpretation of the repurchase announcement. Cross-section regression models are used to test the relation between the reaction to the repurchase announcement and returns in subsequent periods. The results indicate that the market overreacts to repurchase announcements that are deemed to be “good news” by the market. Neither reversal nor drift is observed following repurchase announcements considered to be “bad news” by the market. The results are robust and are not driven by a few influential observations, beta shifts, or bid-ask bounce.     

Tests of Analysts' Overreaction/Underreaction to Earnings Information as an Explanation for Anomalous Stock Price Behavior

This study examines whether security analysts underreact or overreact to prior earnings information, and whether any such behavior could explain previously documented anomalous stock price movements. We present evidence that analysts' forecasts underreact to recent earnings. This feature of the forecasts is consistent with certain properties of the naive seasonal random walk forecast that Bernard and Thomas (1990) hypothesize underlie the well-known anomalous post-earnings-announcement drift. However, the underreactions in analysts' forecasts are at most only about half as large as necessary to explain the magnitude of the drift. We also document that the “extreme” analysts' forecasts studied by DeBondt and Thaler (1990) cannot be viewed as overreactions to earnings, and are not clearly linked to the stock price overreactions discussed in DeBondt and Thaler ( 1985 , 1987 ) and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (Forthcoming). We conclude that security analysts' behavior is at best only a partial explanation for stock price underreaction to earnings, and may be unrelated to stock price overreactions.     

INSIDERS,OUTSIDERS, OR TREND CHASERS?: AN INVESTIGATION OF PRE-TAKEOVER TRANSACTIONS IN THE SHARES OF TARGET FIRMS

In this study we examine pre-takeover volume run-ups preceding tender offer announcements from 1982 to 1985 and consider three possible explanations for the run-ups: (1) they are due primarily to registered insiders, (2) they are due to market anticipation of the impending event by informed outsiders, and (3) they are due (at least in part) to “positive feedback” investors—i.e., those who observe early price and volume increases and buy to “chase the trend.” Our results suggest that pre-announcement volume run-ups are largely due to trading by registered insiders. We explain this phenomenon in the context of the relatively lax regulatory environment during the period studied.     

Different momentum effects across countries: An explanation based on investors' behavior

We establish a model in which speculators use feedback trading characteristics to infer the behavior of irrational investors and induce them to trade. We also discuss the stability and time series of asset prices. Our results show that: (1) speculators have speculation and arbitrage demands and make “noise” to induce irrational investors to trade, (2) the time series of asset prices show stable momentum and a reversal effect when fundamental traders dominate the market, and (3) momentums are unstable and perform poorly under extreme circumstances. Our article offers a unique approach to understanding the micro mechanism of different momentum effects in various markets and suggests a plausible theoretical framework to illustrate such differences.     

Risk A version and Information Structure: An Experimental Study of Price Variability in the Securities Markets

This study investigates the differences in the behaviors between the speculative investors and the conservative investors in two separate experimental markets. Although the market for speculators shows greater price volatility in both bid/ask spread within a trade as well as with intraperiod variances, it exhibits several desirable properties. Specifically, the price patterns tend to converge closer, and at a greater speed to either the prior information equilibrium price or the rational expectation equilibrium price. It also achieves better allocational efficiency. And, it is also less likely to be misled by potentially “false” price information.     

Stock Prices and the Secondary Dissemination of Information: The Wall Street Journal's "Insider Trading Spotlight"Column

In this paper we test whether a secondary dissemination of information affects stock prices. We examine stock price reactions to the publication of the “Insider Trading Spotlight”(ITS) column in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Since insider trades reported in the ITS column are initially disclosed to the public when insiders’ reports are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the information contained in the WSJ is a secondary dissemination. Around the WSJ publication day, we find significant abnormal stock performance accompanied by a significant increase in trading volume. Our evidence suggests that a secondary dissemination of information can affect stock prices if the initial public disclosure attracts only limited attention by the market. In addition, we document how insider trading information is conveyed to the market.     

The mandatory disclosure of trades and market liquidity

Financial market regulations require various 'insiders' to disclosetheir trades after the trades are made. We show that such mandatorydisclosure rules can increase insiders' expected trading profits.This is because disclosure leads to profitable trading opportunitiesfor insiders even if they possess no private information onthe asset's value. We also show that insiders will generallynot voluntarily disclose their trades, so for disclosure tobe forthcoming, it must be mandatory. Key to the analysis isthat the market cannot observe whether an insider is tradingon private information regarding asset value of is trading forpersonal portfolio reasons.     

Speculator activity and the cross-asset predictability of FX returns

This paper tests the gradual information diffusion hypothesis, which suggests that information spreads gradually across asset markets, to explain the role of speculator activity in the cross-asset return predictability of foreign exchange (FX) market strategies. We argue that the activity of speculators increase the rate of information diffusion across asset markets. Hence, we expect the predictive effect from the equity and commodity markets on FX market strategies to be weaker when speculators are active in the FX market. Our results show that, when speculator activity is high, the equity market's ability to predict the FX market dissipates, but not to the same extent as for the commodity market. Our findings suggest that speculators play a vital role in enhancing informational efficiency in the FX market.     

Glued to the TV: Distracted Noise Traders and Stock Market Liquidity

In this paper, we study the impact of noise traders’ limited attention on financial markets. Specifically, we exploit episodes of sensational news (exogenous to the market) that distract noise traders. We find that on “distraction days,” trading activity, liquidity, and volatility decrease, and prices reverse less among stocks owned predominantly by noise traders. These outcomes contrast sharply with those due to the inattention of informed speculators and market makers, and are consistent with noise traders mitigating adverse selection risk. We discuss the evolution of these outcomes over time and the role of technological changes.     

Fundamental Investors Reduce the Distraction on Management from Random Market “Noise”: Evidence from France

The authors find that financial markets have real effects on corporate decisions but that, unfortunately, some temporary market enthusiasm, unrelated to firm intrinsic value, may cause management to make value‐destroying decisions as the result of random and uninformed stock market volatility. In particular, they are prone to making bad decisions after stock market overreactions to “surprise” earnings announcements. This study shows a positive effect of greater long‐term ownership on French listed firms. Fundamental investor ownership reduces the degree of market mispricing which serves long‐run shareholder value maximization. A fundamental investor is one that, on average, hold his shares for at least two years, is in the top quartile of a firm ownership, and has an active allocation strategy. They are about 8% of all investors. Compared to non‐fundamental investors, fundamental investors hold their positions on average three times longer and have positions 1.5 times larger. Fundamental investors are more present in firms which have more liquid stocks, which pay dividends, and which are relatively poorer performers and have relatively lower market‐to‐book than their industry peers.     

Insider trading patterns

We revisit the information content of stock trading by corporate insiders with an expectation that opportunistic insiders will spread their trades over longer periods of time when they have a longer-lived informational advantage, and trade in a short window of time when their advantage is fleeting. Controlling for the duration of insiders' trading strategies, we find robust new evidence that both insiders' sales and purchases predict abnormal stock returns. In addition, we provide evidence that insiders attempt to preserve their informational advantages and increase their trading profits by disclosing their trades after the market has closed. When insiders report their trades after business hours, they are more likely to engage in longer series of trades, they trade more shares overall, and their trades are associated with larger abnormal returns. Finally, we show how accounting for these trading patterns sharpens screens for corporate insiders who trade on infor- mation.     

Information Content of Insider Trading Around Corporate Announcements: The Case of Capital Expenditures

There is gathering evidence of insider trading around corporate announcements of dividends, capital expenditures, equity issues and repurchases, and other capital structure changes. Although signaling models have been used to explain the price reaction of these announcements, a usual assumption made in these models is that insiders cannot trade to gain from such announcements. An innovative feature of this paper is to model trading by corporate insiders (subject to disclosure regulation) as one of the signals. Detailed testable predictions are described for the interaction of corporate announcements and concurrent insider trading. In particular, such interaction is shown to depend crucially on whether the firm is a growth firm, a mature firm, or a declining firm. Empirical proxies for firm technology are developed based on measures of growth and Tobin's q ratio. In the underlying “efficient” signaling equilibrium, investment announcements and net insider trading convey private information of insiders to the market at least cost. The paper also addresses issues of deriving intertemporal announcement effects from the equilibrium (cross-sectional) pricing functional. Other announcement effects relate the intensity of the market response to insider trading, variance of firm cash flows, risk aversion of the insiders, and characteristics of firm technology (growth, mature, or declining).     

Informed arbitrage with speculative noise trading

We consider speculative noise trading when some naïve speculators trade on noise as if it were information [Black, F., 1986. Noise. Journal of Finance 41, 529–543]. We examine the optimal trading strategy of an informed investor who faces such naïve speculators in the market. We find that the informed investor trades aggressively on her information and takes large, opposite positions against the naïve speculators. The trading volume is thereby drastically magnified. While such speculative noise trading enhances liquidity, it makes prices less efficient. The overall dynamic patterns that emerge from our model are most consistent with the evidence for interday variations in volume, volatility, and transaction costs.     

What drives the valuation premium in IPOs versus acquisitions? An empirical analysis

Using a hand-collected data set of private firm acquisitions and IPOs, this paper develops the first empirical analysis in the literature of the “IPO valuation premium puzzle,” which refers to a situation where many private firms choose to be acquired rather than to go public at higher valuations. We also test several new hypotheses regarding a private firm's choice between IPOs and acquisitions. Our analysis of private firm valuations in IPOs and acquisitions indicates that IPO valuation premia disappear for larger VC backed firms after controlling for various observable factors affecting a firm's propensity to choose IPOs over acquisitions. Further, after controlling for the long-run component of the expected payoff to firm insiders from an IPO exit, we find that the IPO valuation premium vanishes even for larger non-VC backed firms and shrinks substantially for smaller firms as well. Our Heckman-style treatment effects regression analysis demonstrates that the above results are robust to controlling for the selection of exit mechanism by firm insiders based on unobservables. Our findings on private firms' choice between IPOs and acquisitions can be summarized as follows. First, firms operating in industries characterized by the absence of a dominant market player (and therefore more viable against product market competition) are more likely to go public rather than to be acquired. Second, more capital intensive firms, those operating in industries characterized by greater private benefits of control, and those which are harder to value by IPO market investors are more likely to go public rather than to be acquired. Third, the likelihood of an IPO over an acquisition is greater for venture backed firms and those characterized by higher pre-exit sales growth.     

事前披露能够降低董监高减持的获利能力吗?——基于中国“减持新规”的实证检验

"事前披露"能否降低董监高交易的信息优势?中国证监会于2017年5月修订并实施的"减持新规"首次为上述命题的检验提供了独特的研究场景。通过"事件研究法",本文对"减持新规"颁布前后的董监高减持行为进行研究,考察事前披露减持计划是否会削弱董监高减持时的信息优势。实证结果表明,"减持新规"实施后董监高减持的短期超常回报显著低于"减持新规"实施前,这说明事前披露会抑制董监高交易的择时能力。进一步研究发现,当公司信息质量较差、所处地区的市场化程度较低、成长性较高、减持规模较大时,事前披露对董监高减持获利能力的削弱作用更强;"减持新规"实施对董监高减持超常回报的削弱主要体现在交易日与减持计划披露日间隔短的减持样本中。本文不仅在实证层面上验证了"事前披露"可以降低董监高交易的信息优势,丰富了内部人交易研究文献,也为我国"减持新规"的实施效果提供了证据和建议。     

Insiders' hedging in a jump diffusion model

In this paper, we formulate the optimal hedging problem when the underlying stock price has jumps, especially for insiders who have more information than the general public. The jumps in the underlying price process depend on another diffusion process, which models a sequence of firm-specific information. This diffusion process is observed only by insiders. Nevertheless, the market is incomplete to insiders as well as to the general public. We use the local risk minimization method to find an optimal hedging strategy for insiders. We also numerically compare the value of the insider's hedging portfolio with the value of an honest trader's hedging portfolio for a simulated sample path of a stock price.     

Stock Price Movements in Response to Stock Issues under Asymmetric Information

This paper characterizes the function relating the number of new shares issued by a firm to the resulting change in the firm's stock price, when insiders are asymmetrically informed. We show that, in equilibrium, the stock price will be a decreasing function of the issue size; moreover, the rate of decrease can be so rapid to cause “equity rationing.” We also show that there will be underinvestment relative to the symmetric information case.