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1.
Satoru Takahashi 《Games and Economic Behavior》2005,53(2):231-247
We consider infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. A game is a K-coordination game if each player can decrease other players' payoffs by at most K times his own cost of punishment. The number K represents the degree of commonality of payoffs among the players. The smaller K is, the more interest the players share. A K-coordination game tapers off if the greatest payoff variation conditional on the first t periods of an efficient history converges to 0 at a rate faster than K−t as t→∞. We show that every subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is efficient in any tapering-off game with perfect information. Applications include asynchronously repeated games, repeated games of extensive form games, asymptotically finite horizon games, and asymptotically pure coordination games. 相似文献
2.
In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from a belief distribution that is dispersed around a central strategy profile, the focus. At an RBE: (1) Each chooses a best response relative to her beliefs. (2) Each player's expected choice coincides with the focus of the other players' belief distributions. RBE provides a statistical framework for estimation which we apply to data from three experimental games. We also characterize the limit-RBE as players' beliefs converge to certainty. When atoms in the belief distributions vanish in the limit, not all limit-RBE (called robust equilibria) are trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria and not all perfect equilibria are robust. 相似文献
3.
We present here an evolutionary game model, and address the issue of equilibrium selection working with the scale function
of a diffusion process describing the dynamics of population processes with mutation modeled as white noise. This model is
the same as the one in Foster and Young (1990) but with a different interpretation at the boundaries and with different mutation
modelings. First, we justifiably assume that the boundaries of the solution of the stochastic differential equation are absorbing so that the first boundary of the interval [0,1] hit will determine the equilibrium selected. Then, working with the scale
function, we obtain for 2×2 symmetric games and different mutation parameters, some new and interesting equilibrium selection
results. The aim of this article is to describe another method of approach in evolutionary games with mutation which we believe
will prove to be very useful in studying more general normal form games and different mutation modelings. 相似文献
4.
We model economies of adverse selection as Arrow–Debreu economies. In the spirit of Prescott and Townsend (Econometrica 52(1),
21–45, 1984a), we identify the consumption set of the individuals with the set of lotteries over net transfers. Thus, prices
are linear in lotteries, but they may be non linear in commodity bundles. First, we study a weak equilibrium notion by viewing
the economy of adverse selection as a pure exchange economy. The weak equilibrium set is non empty, but some of the allocations
may be inefficient, and the equilibria indeterminate. Second, following Prescott and Townsend (Econometrica 52(1), 21–45,
1984a), we introduce an intermediary (firm) supplying feasible and incentive compatible measures. Equilibria are constrained
efficient, but the equilibrium set is empty for an open set of economies containing the Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance
economies.
The research of A. Rustichini was supported by the NSF grant NSF/SES-0136556. 相似文献
5.
《Games and Economic Behavior》2013,77(2):753-772
An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each playerʼs payoff is a function of only his own strategy and an aggregate of the strategy profile of all players. Such games possess properties that can often yield simple characterizations of equilibrium aggregates without requiring that one solves for the equilibrium strategy profile. When payoffs have a quasi-linear structure and a degree of symmetry, we construct a self-generating maximization program over the space of aggregates with the property that the solution set corresponds to the set of equilibrium aggregates of the original n-player game. We illustrate the value of this approach in common-agency games where the playersʼ strategy space is an infinite-dimensional space of nonlinear contracts. We derive equilibrium existence and characterization theorems for both the adverse selection and moral hazard versions of these games. 相似文献
6.
People do bargain over how to bargain. We examine the role of individuals’ ability to pursue certain bargaining protocols
in a multi-agent bilateral bargaining model. Bargaining protocols are not completely settled, but will emerge endogenously
in equilibrium. We show that players’ ability to partially influence bargaining protocols plays a crucial role in determining
equilibrium outcomes. When discounting is not too high, there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria, including inefficient
ones. As the number of players increases, both the set of discount factors that support multiple equilibrium outcomes and
the set of the first proposing player’s equilibrium payoffs expand. The maximum loss of efficiency increases with respect
to the discount factor.
We would like to thank Hongbin Cai, John Conlon, Andrew Daughety, Taiji Furusawa, Byoung Heon Jun, Akira Okada, Ping Wang,
and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 相似文献
7.
8.
We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each seller competes
for a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. We call this game a catalog game. Our main objective is to show that catalog games have Nash equilibria. The Nash existence problem for catalog games is particularly
contentious due to payoff discontinuities caused by tie-breaking. We make three contributions. First, we establish under very
mild conditions on primitives that no matter what the tie-breaking rule, catalog games are uniformly payoff secure, and therefore have mixed extensions which are payoff secure. Second, we show that if the tie-breaking rule awards the sale
to firms which value it most (i.e., breaks ties in favor of firms which stand to make the highest profit), then firm profits
are reciprocally upper semicontinuous (i.e., the mixed catalog game is reciprocally upper semincontinuous). This in turn implies
that the mixed catalog game satisfies Reny’s condition of better-reply security—a condition sufficient for existence (Reny
in Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999). Third, we show by example that if the tie-breaking rule does not award the sale to firms
which value it most (for example, if ties are broken randomly with equal probability), then the catalog game has no Nash equilibrium.
This paper was written while the second author was Visiting Professor, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Universite Paris
1, Pantheon-Sorbonne. The second author thanks CES and Paris 1, and in particular, Bernard Cornet and Cuong Le Van for their
support and hospitality. The second author also thanks the C&BA and EFLS at the University of Alabama for financial support.
Both authors are grateful to Monique Florenzano and to participants in the April 2006 Paris 1 NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference
for many helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Finally, both authors are especially grateful to an anonymous
referee whose thoughtful comments led to substantial improvements in the paper. Monteiro acknowleges the financial support
of Capes-Cofecub 468/04. 相似文献
9.
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models
that have been used in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. In our
experiment, each subject receives a noisy signal about the true payoffs. This game (inspired by the “global” games of Carlsson
and van Damme, Econometrica, 61, 989–1018, 1993) has a unique strategy profile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies (thus a unique Nash
equilibrium). The equilibrium outcome coincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome of the underlying
coordination game. In the baseline game, the behavior of the subjects converges to the theoretical prediction after enough
experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that this behavior can be explained by learning. To test this
hypothesis, we use a different game with incomplete information, related to a complete information game where learning and
prior experiments suggest a different behavior. Indeed, in the second treatment, the behavior did not converge to equilibrium
within 50 periods in some of the sessions. We also run both games under complete information. The results are sufficiently
similar between complete and incomplete information to suggest that risk-dominance is also an important part of the explanation.
相似文献
10.
Indrajit Ray 《Economic Theory》2001,17(1):223-231
Summary. This paper compares the sets of Nash, coalition- proof Nash and strong Nash equilibrium payoffs of normal form games which
are closely related. We propose sufficient conditions for equivalent or closely related games to have identical sets of equilibrium payoffs.
Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: November 23, 1999 相似文献
11.
Walter Elberfeld 《Journal of Economics》1997,65(3):279-290
For the class of 2×2 matrix games with two strict Nash equilibria the paper introduces an equilibrium refinement called incentive monotonicity. It selects the risk-dominant equilibrium if interests are conflicting, while it remains silent in games with common interests. These results suggest that the equilibrium-selection problem might be more difficult in games with common interests, which is certainly the case if risk dominance and payoff dominance go in opposite directions. 相似文献
12.
We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer's (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this paper is to extend this characterization to the n-player case. The proof of the characterization relies on an analogy with an auxiliary 2-player repeated game with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. We use Kohlberg's (Int. J. Game Theory (1975) 7) result to construct explicitly a canonical communication device for each communication equilibrium payoff. 相似文献
13.
Tadashi Sekiguchi 《Games and Economic Behavior》2002,40(2):382
We consider finitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, and provide several sufficient conditions for such a game to have an equilibrium whose outcome is different from repetition of Nash equilibria of the stage game. Surprisingly, the conditions are consistent with uniqueness of the stage game equilibrium. A class of repeated chicken is shown to satisfy the condition. 相似文献
14.
Lorenzo Rocco 《International Review of Economics》2007,54(2):225-247
This paper purpose is twofold. First, it offers a critical review of the proofs of existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria
in nonatomic games. In particular, it focuses on the alternative ways of formalizing the critical assumption of anonymity.
Second, the paper proves the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria by relaxing anonymity and allowing instead for “limited
anonymity” (i.e. players’ decisions depend on the average strategy of a finite number of players’ subsets and not on the average
strategy of the whole set of players). (JEL: C72, C79) 相似文献
15.
Sophie Bade 《Economic Theory》2005,26(2):309-332
Summary. This paper investigates Nash equilibrium under the possibility that preferences may be incomplete. I characterize the Nash-equilibrium-set of such a game as the union of the Nash-equilibrium-sets of certain derived games with complete preferences. These games with complete preferences can be derived from the original game by a simple linear procedure, provided that preferences admit a concave vector-representation. These theorems extend some results on finite games by Shapley and Aumann. The applicability of the theoretical results is illustrated with examples from oligopolistic theory, where firms are modelled to aim at maximizing both profits and sales (and thus have multiple objectives). Mixed strategy and trembling hand perfect equilibria are also discussed.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 24 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D11, C72, D43.I would like to thank Jean-Pierre Benôit, Juan Dubra, Alejandrio Jofre, Debraj Ray, Kim-Sau Chung and the seminar participants at NYU and at the Universidad de Chile for their comments. I am most grateful to Efe Ok, for his comments, criticism, suggestions and questions. 相似文献
16.
Summary. We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in recent evolutionary literature to a class of coordination games played
simultaneously by the entire population. In these games payoffs, and hence best replies, are determined by a summary statistic
of the population strategy profile. We demonstrate that with simultaneous play, the equilibrium selection depends crucially
on how best responses to the summary statistic remain piece-wise constant. In fact, all the strict Nash equilibria in the
underlying stage game can be made stochastically stable depending on how the best response mapping generates piece-wise constant
best responses.
Received: February 12, 2001; revised version: October 29, 2001 相似文献
17.
18.
A Nash equilibrium is an optimal strategy for each player under the assumption that others play according to their respective Nash strategies, but it provides no guarantees in the presence of irrational players or coalitions of colluding players. In fact, no such guarantees exist in general. However, in this paper we show that large games are innately fault tolerant. We quantify the ways in which two subclasses of large games – λ-continuous games and anonymous games – are resilient against Byzantine faults (i.e. irrational behavior), coalitions, and asynchronous play. We also show that general large games have some non-trivial resilience against faults. 相似文献
19.
Wen Mao 《Economic Theory》2001,17(3):701-720
This paper considers the seemingly inconsistent behavior of individuals who simultaneously vote for incumbents and for limitations
on their terms in office. We argue that such behavior may occur even if voters pursue their self-interests in both candidate
and term-limitation elections. First, we formulate elections for Congressional candidates as a two-person game, where each
candidate maximizes votes by proposing a distribution of benefits to voters. Then we discuss the term limitation at the state
level, where voters in each district compare, over time, the average benefits obtained from two alternative series of campaign
games: one with a longer tenure associated with no term limit and the other with a shorter tenure created by the introduction
of a term limit. In elections of candidates for Congress, the incumbent is successful because he can generate more aggregate
benefits for voters. We show, however, that at some critical point of the tenure, his behavior will be less beneficial to
his core constituents. In term-limitation elections, those voters tend to support a term limit. In some cases, they represent
a majority in the state, and term limits are enacted.
Received: February 23, 1999; revised version: January 24, 2000 相似文献
20.
Global warming (GW) is now recognized as a significant threat to sustainable development on an international scale. After providing some introductory background material, we introduce a benchmark dynamic game within which to study the GW problem. The model allows for population growth and is subsequently generalized to allow for changes in technology. In each case, a benchmark “Business as Usual” (BAU) equilibrium is analyzed and contrasted with the efficient solution. Furthermore, a complete characterization is provided in the benchmark model of the entire subgame perfect equilibrium value correspondence.JEL Classification Q54, D99, O12This paper builds on the Woytinsky Lecture delivered by Roy Radner at the University of Michigan, March 11, 1998. We would like to thank Graciela Chichilnisky, Arnulf Grubler, Geoffrey Heal, Leonid Hurwicz, Jill Jaeger, Peter de Janosi, Paul Kleindorfer, Giuseppe Lopomo, Thomas Schelling, Tapan Mitra, and Michael Toman for helpful discussions and references, and Andrew King, Charlotte V. Kuh, and Frank Sinden for comments on an earlier draft. In the case of the present enterprise, much of whose scope lies outside of our previous expertise, it is even more important than usual to emphasize that we are responsible for all errors. 相似文献